Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Jennifer Campney

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC Assignee of
Synchrony Bank/HH Gregg, Respondent,
v.
Jennifer Campney, Defendant,
and
Jennifer Campney, Third-party Plaintiff,
v.
Cooling & Winter, LLC, Third-party Defendant,
of whom Jennifer Campney is the Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2020-000935
Appeal From Dorchester County
Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge
Opinion No. 6019
Heard May 1, 2023 – Filed August 23, 2023
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND
REMANDED
John R. Cantrell, Jr., of Cantrell Legal, PC, of St.
Matthews, for Appellant.
Jesse Ronald Jones, Jr., of Smith Debman Narron Drake
Saintsing & Myers LLP, of Charleston; and Caren D.
Enloe, of Raleigh, North Carolina, both for Respondent.
Carolyn Grube Lybarker and Kelly Hunter Rainsford,
both of South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs,
of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae South Carolina
Department of Consumer Affairs.
LOCKEMY, A.J.: Jennifer Campney appeals an order from the trial court
granting judgment in favor of Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC (PRA) and
Cooling & Winter, LLC (Cooling & Winter). On appeal, Campney argues the trial
court erred by (1) ruling she was liable to PRA in the amount of $4,236.78, plus
costs, under an account stated cause of action; (2) ruling that PRA and was not
liable to her on her counterclaims; and (3) denying her motion pursuant to Rules 52
and 59(e), SCRCP. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In January 2017, PRA filed a complaint against Campney. PRA asserted it was an
assignee of "Synchrony Bank/HH Gregg," which extended credit to Campney, and
she failed to make the required payments on the credit account. It alleged
Campney owed $4,236.78 and she and PRA "either expressly or impliedly agreed
that the statement or statements were true and was due to be paid then or at some
other specified time." The complaint included an affidavit and itemization of
accounts stating Campney owed a principal amount of $4,236.78 and $80 in costs.
It also included a credit statement from Synchrony Bank, a charge-off 1 statement,
and evidence of assignment. Campney filed a pro se answer, denying the
allegations of the complaint and stating she never agreed she owed any amount to
PRA. In August 2017, the magistrate court granted PRA's motion for summary
judgment. Campney appealed to the circuit court, which reversed the magistrate
court's grant of summary judgment and remanded.
After remand, Campney filed her first amended answer and counterclaims. In
addition to admissions, denials, and various defenses, she alleged the consumer
credit card transaction at issue was a consumer loan and PRA failed to send her the
1
To "charge off" a loan means "[t]o treat (an account receivable) as a loss or
expense because payment is unlikely." Charge Off, Black's Law Dictionary (11th
ed. 2019).
required notice of right to cure. Campney raised four counterclaims against PRA
and Cooling & Winter. The case was transferred to the Dorchester County Court
of Common Pleas due to the amount in controversy and relief requested in the
counterclaim.
On October 23, 2019, a one-day bench trial was held. Larry Andrews, the
custodian of records for PRA, testified he had been employed with PRA for
seventeen years, having been the custodian of records for eight years, and had
previously worked for Synchrony Bank as a collector for four years. 2 He stated
that while at Synchrony Bank, he received interdepartmental training and his duties
included processing and updating information pertaining to accounts with
outstanding credit balances. According to Andrews, his duties as custodian of
records at PRA included reviewing complaints, affidavits, and documents in PRA's
system to verify information. When PRA inquired if Andrews was familiar with
the process PRA implemented to purchase charged-off consumer accounts,
Campney objected, stating Andrews lacked the personal knowledge of the sales
process. The trial court overruled the objection, allowed PRA to lay an additional
foundation, and noted Andrews had been trained in various departments. Andrews
testified he received annual training at PRA regarding acquisitions and the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). Campney again objected, arguing the
training Andrew received only provided information as to the functions of various
PRA departments and he had no personal knowledge in regards to her alleged
consumer account; the trial court overruled the objection.
Andrews testified his job duties required him to become familiar with certain
accounts and he was familiar with Campney's account. He stated plaintiff's exhibit
one was a bill of sale between PRA and Synchrony Bank and plaintiff's exhibit two
was a load data of account in the pool PRA purchased from Synchrony Bank.
Andrews testified that Synchrony Bank produced the bill of sale and provided it to
PRA and the load data of account was information regarding Campney's specific
charged-off account. When asked if the bill of sale and the load data of account
were documents kept in the regular course of business and prepared near the time
of the recorded event, by someone with knowledge or information transmitted,
Andrews answered affirmatively. The court admitted the bill of sale and the load
data of account into evidence over Campney's relevance, hearsay, authentication,
incompleteness, and summary requirement objections. Andrews testified plaintiff's
exhibit three was credit statements produced by Synchrony Bank, in the regular
course of business, and sent to Campney. The trial court admitted the credit card
2
Andrews testified that prior to 2014, Synchrony Bank was known as GE Capital.
statements over Campney's objections. In regards to the credit statements,
Andrews stated they were addressed to "Jennifer M. Campney" and mailed to the
address listed, in Summerville, and detailed purchases and payments made and
amounts due. According to Andrews, the amount due, based on the billing
statement dated April 23, 2015, was $4,236.78.
On cross-examination, Andrews stated the delinquent account with Synchrony
Bank was opened sometime in 2012. He acknowledged that at the time the
account was opened and subsequently charged off, he was not employed with
Synchrony Bank and he would not have had knowledge of Synchrony Bank
policies and procedures regarding Campney's account prior to PRA's purchase of
accounts. Andrews further admitted that he had no experience in creating (1) bills
of sale at PRA or Synchrony Bank; (2) credit statements during his time at
Synchrony Bank; or (3) load data of account. When asked if he was familiar as to
how Synchrony Bank would have stored the bill of sale or the load data of account
in its system, Andrews stated he was not familiar. Andrews testified Synchrony
Bank created the codes on the load data of account before PRA acquired the
account and he was unable to testify to what the codes represented. According to
Andrews, his knowledge regarding the load data of account came from the
document being in PRA's system. When asked if he was aware of any additional
credit statements after the statement dated April 25, 2015, Andrews testified he
could not recall because he did not have the account files "in front of [him]."
Additionally, when Campney inquired as to whether he had personal knowledge or
was aware if Synchrony Bank mailed the April 25, 2015 credit statement to her,
Andrews initially responded that federal regulations required credit statement be
mailed to accountholders but subsequently acknowledged he did not have personal
knowledge and was not aware if the statement was mailed.
At the close of PRA's evidence, Campney made a motion for an involuntary
nonsuit pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.
First, she asserted the evidence provided by PRA did not establish Synchrony Bank
properly assigned any debt to PRA because the bill of sale was void of any
information regarding her account. Second, she argued that under PRA's account
stated theory, it was required to present the delinquent account to her, and Andrews
could not testify if it was mailed. Third, Campney contended PRA failed to
produce any agreement to which she agreed to repay $4,236.78. Fourth, in regards
to whether any voluntary payments on the account amounted to acknowledging the
amount owed, Campney argued PRA failed to establish she was the individual who
made payments on the account prior to the account being charged off.
PRA argued Andrews testified federal regulations required Synchrony Bank to
mail account statements to accountholders and he further stated it was Synchrony
Bank's standard practice to mail account statements. It contended these provided
enough support to show Synchrony Bank mailed the statements to Campney and
further noted Campney did not dispute the amounts due when Synchrony Bank had
mailed the statements. Next, PRA asserted there was an agreement between
Synchrony Bank and Campney and PRA was Synchrony Bank's assignee. The
trial court denied Campney's motion for an involuntary nonsuit because it found
the evidence supported each element required for an account stated cause of action.
On direct examination, Campney testified (1) she experienced emotional distress as
a result of the lawsuit, (2) she had to take time off from work and had to travel for
this case, and (3) she hired counsel. On cross-examination, Campney testified she
believed she received the credit statements at the address listed on the statements.
On redirect, she stated she could not recall if she received the statements that were
admitted into evidence.
After the close of evidence, PRA moved for a directed verdict. First, PRA argued
it met its burden because (1) Andrews testified that pursuant to Synchrony Bank's
procedure, credit statements were mailed to Campney and she could not state she
did not receive the statements and (2) Andrews testified the amount owed on the
account was $4,236.78. Second, PRA maintained it had no obligation to notify
Campney regarding the right to cure because that obligation was only required of
the original creditor, Synchrony Bank. Third, in regards to Campney's
counterclaims that the differing amounts on the affidavit and itemization of
accounts versus the evidence PRA presented amounted to misleading and false
statements, PRA contended there were adjustments on the account before this
lawsuit was filed, resulting in differing amounts. PRA also asserted that any issues
arising from letters sent to Campney, requiring differing amounts of debt, were
outside of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code's (the SCCPC's) 3 three-
year and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act's (the FDCPA's) 4 one-year
respective statutes of limitations.
In response, Campney argued letters PRA sent to her claimed she owed $4,274.78
as of October 7, 2015, but the complaint alleged she owed $4,236.78. She
asserted, given the differing amounts, the letters were false and misleading under
the SCCPC and the FDCPA. Further, Campney asserted PRA admitted in the
3
S.C. Code Ann. §§ 37-1-101 to 37-30-175 (2015 & Supp. 2022).
4
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).
requests for admissions that the credit transactions at issue were consumer credit
transactions within section 37-1-201 of the SCCPC. She contended, given PRA's
admission, it was required to send a notice of right to cure before accelerating the
debt.
PRA noted that Campney's counterclaims related to false and misleading amounts,
referenced differing amounts on the affidavit and itemization and the
counterclaims did not reference any letters PRA sent her. Therefore, it asserted the
argument she presented was not properly before the court. Additionally, PRA
contended the amounts in the letters and the amount in the complaint were
different because each was under a different theory of recovery; however, PRA
only sought to recover under an account stated claim, not a breach of contract
claim.
After considering the evidence presented, the circuit court found in favor of PRA
and ordered Campney to pay $4,236.78 plus costs to PRA. It found Andrews
testified to the admission of the bill of sale, the load data of account, and credit
statements from Synchrony Bank and found he was familiar with Synchrony
Bank's billing practices and procedures. The court determined Campney's account
was charged off with an outstanding balance of $4,274.48 and PRA brought the
current suit, under an account stated theory of recovery, for $4,236.78. Further, it
stated Andrews testified Campney never disputed the credit statements with
Synchrony Bank.
The trial court concluded PRA established the elements of its account stated
theory, in that it showed a delinquent account and Campney's implied agreement to
the account by making payments and subsequent failure to dispute any charges.
As to Campney's counterclaims, first, the court found Cooling & Winter properly
signed the affidavit and verified itemization of account. Second, as to PRA's
failure to send Campney a right to cure notice, the court determined (1) the
FDCPA's one-year statute of limitations barred her related counterclaim; (2) her
counterclaim under the SCCPC failed on the merits because this was not a
"consumer credit transaction" as defined in the SCCPC and therefore the SCCPC
was inapplicable; and (3) the right to cure notice provisions of the code did not
apply to PRA as an assignee of Synchrony Bank or to Cooling & Winter. Third,
the court found Campney's counterclaim that PRA and Cooling & Winter violated
the SCCPC and the FDCPA by misrepresenting the amount owed failed because
both amounts were correct under different theories of liability and PRA only
pursued the amount under the account stated theory. Finally, the court also
determined Campney's counterclaims related to the South Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act (SCUTPA) and negligence per se failed. The court ordered
Campney to pay PRA $4,236.78 plus court costs.
Campney filed a motion to alter or amend pursuant to Rules 52 and 59(e) of the
South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure; the court summarily denied Campney's
motion. This appeal followed. 5
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Did the trial court err when ruling Campney was liable to PRA in the amount of
$4,236.78, plus costs, under an account stated cause of action?
a. Is the account stated cause of action applicable to the collection of a
consumer credit card debt?
b. Even if the account stated cause of action applies to this case, did PRA
prove all the elements of the cause of action?
2. Did the trial court err when ruling that PRA was not liable to Campney on her
counterclaims?
a. Did the trial court err when ruling the SCCPC did not apply to consumer
credit card accounts?
b. Did the trial court err when ruling Campney's claim that PRA
misrepresented the amount owed on the account?
3. Did the trial court err in denying Campney's Rule 52 and 59(e), SCRCP,
motion?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether our courts recognize a certain cause of action is a question of law.
Moriarty v. Garden Sanctuary Church of God, 341 S.C. 320, 327, 534 S.E.2d 672,
675 (2000). When appeals present a novel question of law, appellate courts decide
the case de novo. Burke v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 429 S.C. 319, 321, 838 S.E.2d
534, 535 (Ct. App. 2020). Appellate courts are "free to decide [novel] question of
law with no particular deference to the lower court." I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt.
Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 411, 526 S.E.2d 716, 718-19 (2000). Further, "[q]uestions
of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which [this court is] free to decide
without any deference to the court below." CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cnty.
Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 (2011).
5
Cooling & Winter is not a party to this appeal.
LAW/ANALYSIS
1. Campney's Liability to PRA
a. Account Stated Cause of Action
Campney argues the trial court erred in recognizing an account stated cause of
action in a consumer debt collection matter. We disagree.
"[The account stated doctrine] was the rule that accounts stated existed only
between merchants. Gradually, the doctrine was extended in many jurisdictions to
all classes of business men." Huggins v. Com. & Sav. Bank, 141 S.C. 480, 494,
140 S.E. 177, 181 (1927). "This broadening of the doctrine seems to have been
recognized in the federal courts and in the courts of the greater number of states in
the Union." Id. "[An account stated cause of action] was at first confined to
accounts between merchants. The trend of modern decisions is to open the doors
to persons other than merchants." 6 Gwathmey v. Burgiss, 104 S.C. 280, 282, 88
S.E. 816, 817 (1916).
We hold an account stated cause of action is a recognized cause of action in South
Carolina against a consumer in a credit card transaction. As our supreme court
found in Gwathmey, though the account stated cause of action was limited to
actions between merchants, the trend of applying the account stated cause of action
"is to open the doors to persons other than merchants." Id. at 282, 88 S.E. at 817.
6
Other jurisdictions recognize an account stated cause as a proper cause of action
to recover an outstanding debt on a consumer credit card account and this
jurisprudence is persuasive. See Leslie Cook v. Midland Funding, LLC, 208 So. 3d
1153 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016); Bushnell v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 255 So.
3d 473 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018); CACH, LLC v. Moore, 133 N.E.3d 661 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2019); Colorado Nat'l. Bank of Denver v. Story, 862 P.2d 1120 (Mont. 1993);
Citibank (S. Dakota) N.A. v. Poynton, 723 N.Y.S.2d 327 (App. Term 2000);
Aymett v. Citibank S.D. N.A., 397 S.W.3d 876 (Tex. App. 2013). Specifically, the
Supreme Court of Oregon recognized that the account stated doctrine, though
having "its historical origins in accountings between merchants," "'extended to
embrace every kind of transaction in which the relation of debtor or creditor is
involved.'" Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Sanders, 462 P.3d 263, 275 (Or.
2020) (en banc) (quoting Crawford v. Hutchinson, 65 P. 84 (Or. 1901)).
Additionally, absent clear language to the contrary and any policy reason to limit
the cause of action, we hold the account stated cause of action applies in consumer
credit card transactions. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err in
recognizing that an account stated cause of action is a valid cause of action in a
consumer debt collection matter. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
b. Elements of an Account Stated Cause of Action
Campney argues the trial court erred by finding PRA established the elements of
an account stated cause of action. She avers PRA failed to properly present the
existence of the delinquent account and failed to show an agreement between her
and PRA. We disagree.
"The essential elements of an account stated are (1) that the account is actually
stated; and (2) that the parties either expressly or impliedly agreed that it is a true
statement and is due to be paid then or at some other specified time." S. Welding
Works, Inc. v. K & S Constr. Co., 286 S.C. 158, 164, 332 S.E.2d 102, 106 (Ct.
App. 1985). "Evidence of the retention by a depositor of statements or passbook of
his bank, after a reasonable time for examination, without notice to the bank of
objection thereto, may be given to show an implied admission of an acquiescence
in the correctness of the account." Huggins, 141 S.C. at 497, 140 S.E. at 182.
We hold the trial court did not err in determining PRA proved the elements of an
account stated cause of action. See S. Welding Works, 286 S.C. at 164, 332 S.E.2d
at 106 ("The essential elements of an account stated are (1) that the account is
actually stated; and (2) that the parties either expressly or impliedly agreed that it is
a true statement and is due to be paid then or at some other specified time.").
First, the account was presented to Campney because (1) Andrews testified that
according to Synchrony Bank's standard procedures, it would have mailed out
credit statements to the address on the statement; (2) Campney testified she
believed she had received the billing statements from Synchrony Bank; and (3) she
admitted she had made prior payments on the account. She also confirmed her
address was the same address that was printed on the credit statements admitted
into evidence. See Gwathmey, 104 S.C. at 282, 88 S.E. at 817 ("Where a creditor
sends to his debtor a statement of the account between them and the debtor assents
to the balance stated, then the account between them ceases to be an open account
and becomes an account stated."). Additionally, Campney did not provide any
evidence she objected to the account balance before charge off and sale to PRA.
Second, an agreement existed between PRA and Campney. Though no express
agreement was introduced between PRA and Campney, or Synchrony Bank and
Campney, an implied agreement existed as to Synchrony Bank and Campney.
Campney testified she believed she received the credit statements from Synchrony
Bank and previously made payments on the account prior to charge off. Therefore,
an implied agreement existed between her and Synchrony Bank. See id. at 282, 88
S.E. at 817 ("Assent might be expressed or implied from the circumstances. The
circumstances were such as a promise to pay the stated balance; long retention of
the account without question of the balance and the like."). As assignee of
Synchrony Bank, PRA stood "in the shoes" Synchrony Bank for this purpose and
received the benefit of this implied agreement. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Draper,
405 S.C. 214, 220, 746 S.E.2d 478, 481 (Ct. App. 2013) ("An assignee stands in
the shoes of its assignor."). Accordingly, we hold PRA established all the elements
of the account stated cause of action and affirm this issue.
2. PRA and Cooling & Winter's Liability on Campney's Counterclaims
a. Applicability of SCCPC
Campney argues the trial court erred by ruling PRA was not liable on her
counterclaims related to the SCCPC, the FDCPA, and the SCUTPA and for
negligence per se. First, she asserts the trial court erred by determining the
respective statute of limitations barred her counterclaims pursuant to the SCCPC
and the FDCPA. She asserts that even if these counterclaims are time barred, any
recovery she was entitled to can be used to set off any debt obligations. Second,
Campney contends the SCCPC and its right to cure notice requirement is
applicable in situations regarding consumer credit card accounts. Finally, she
avers the trial court erred in finding PRA did not mispresent the amount owed on
the account. We disagree with two of Campney's contentions: (1) that her FDCPA
counterclaim can be used to set off any obligation towards the PRA debt and (2)
that the trial court erred in finding PRA did not mispresent the amount owed.
However, we agree that consumer credit card accounts are subject to the SCCPC
and PRA was required to send her a right to cure notice before requiring
repayment.
The South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs (the Department) argues in
support of Campney. First, it asserts consumer credit card debt is subject to the
SCCPC. Second, the Department avers PRA was required to provide Campney a
right to cure notice before suing for the debt.
The SCCPC defines "creditor" as "the person who grants credit in a credit
transaction or, except as otherwise provided, an assignee of a creditor's right to
payment, but use of the term does not in itself impose on an assignee any
obligation of his assignor." § 37-1-301(13). A "consumer credit transaction" is
defined as a "consumer credit sale," "consumer loan," "consumer lease," or
"consumer rental-purchase agreement." S.C. Code Ann. § 37-1-301(11) (2015). A
"consumer loan" is defined as
[A] loan made by a person regularly engaged in the
business of making loans in which:
(a) the debtor is a person other than an
organization;
(b) the debt is incurred primarily for a
personal, family, or household purpose;
(c) either the debt is payable in installments
or a loan finance charge is made; and
(d) either the principal does not exceed
twenty-five thousand dollars or the debt is
secured by an interest in land.
S.C. Code Ann. § 37-3-104 (2015).
A "lender credit card" is defined as:
[A]n open-end credit arrangement or loan agreement,
other than a seller credit card, pursuant to which a lender
gives a debtor the privilege of using a credit card, letter
of credit, or other credit confirmation or identification in
transactions out of which debt arises:
(a) by the lender's honoring a draft or similar
order for payment of money drawn or
accepted by the debtor;
(b) by the lender's payment or agreement to
pay the debtor's obligations; or
(c) by the lender's purchase from the obligee
of the debtor's obligations.
S.C. Code Ann. § 37-1-301(16) (2015).
Pursuant to the SCCPC, in "a consumer credit transaction payable in two or more
installments," a creditor must first provide the consumer a right to cure notice
before accelerating the debt after the consumer's default. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 37-5-110(1) (2015). Section 37-5-110(2) of the South Carolina Code (2015)
states that a right to cure notice must
be in writing and conspicuously state: the name, address
and telephone number of the creditor to whom payment
is to be made, a brief identification of the credit
transaction, the consumer's right to cure the default, and
the amount of payment and date by which payment must
be made to cure the default.
We hold the trial court erred by determining the SCCPC did not apply to the credit
transactions in this case. We find PRA was required to send Campney a right to
cure notice before accelerating the amount due and filing a lawsuit.
We hold consumer credit cards are "lender credit cards" and "consumer loans"
pursuant to the SCCPC. See S.C. Code Ann. § 37-1-301 (2015) (defining "lender
credit card" under the SCCPC); § 37-3-104 (defining "consumer loans" under the
SCCPC). Here, Campney is a "person other than an organization"; no party
disputed that the debt was incurred "primarily for a personal, family, or household
purpose"; the credit statements state the "loan finance charge" annual percentage
rate was 29.99%; and the total principal amount owed on Campney's account did
not exceed the maximum dollar amount for a consumer loan. 7 See § 37-3-104.
Because we hold the credit transactions are consumer loans and therefore,
7
As the Department notes in its amicus brief, while section 37-3-104(d) states
the principal amount in a consumer loan "does not exceed twenty-five thousand
dollars," this amount is adjusted based upon changes in the Consumer Price Index.
See S.C. Code Ann. § 37-1-109 (2015). The Department provides the relevant
maximum amount was $105,000. See South Carolina Department of Consumer
Affairs, Dollar Amount Adjustment, https://consumer.sc.gov/business-
resourceslaws/dollar-amount-adjustment (last accessed June 2, 2023).
consumer credit transactions under the SCCPC, we find the trial court erred in
determining PRA was not required to send a right to cure notice before suing for
the debt.
We find PRA's argument that the requirement to issue a notice of right to cure
before suing Campney disappeared when PRA bought the debt from Synchrony
Bank is without merit. We determine PRA's argument that it is not a creditor as
defined in section 37-1-301(13) is an improper reading of the statute. See
§ 37-1-301(13) (defining creditor as "the person who grants credit in a credit
transaction or, except as otherwise provided, an assignee of a creditor's right to
payment, but use of the term does not in itself impose on an assignee any
obligation of his assignor"); Duke Energy Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 415 S.C.
351, 355, 782 S.E.2d 590, 592 (2016) ("[R]egardless of how plain the ordinary
meaning of the words in a statute, courts will reject that meaning when to accept it
would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not have been intended by the
General Assembly."); id. ("If possible, the [c]ourt will construe a statute so as to
escape the absurdity and carry the intention into effect."). Particularly, no creditor,
initial or assignee, would be held liable for violation of the SCCPC's right to cure
notice requirement whenever a charged off debt was assigned because an initial
creditor would argue it would have no obligation once all their claims to a debtor's
account were assigned and an assignee would raise the argument PRA raises.
Additionally, such a scenario would frustrate the General Assembly's intent and
purpose in enacting the SCCPC. See § 37-1-102(1) to (2) (setting forth the policies
of the SCCPC); § 37-1-102(1) (stating the SCCPC must be "liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies"). Therefore, we conclude
the trial court erred in finding PRA was not required to send a right to cure notice
prior to accelerating the debt and reverse the trial court's determination for PRA on
Campney's counterclaim regarding the SCCPC's right to cure notice. 8
Though the statute of limitations for Campney's SCCPC counterclaim is two years,
the SCCPC allows for an aggrieved individual's debt obligations to be set off by
any "refunds or penalties" she may be entitled, regardless of "time limitations."
See S.C. Code Ann. § 37-5-202(1) (2015) ("With respect to violations arising from
sales or loans made pursuant to a revolving charge or a revolving loan account no
action pursuant to this subsection may be brought more than two years after the
violation occurred."); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 37-5-205 (2015) ("Refunds or
penalties to which the debtor is entitled pursuant to this part may be set off against
8
Additionally, we note PRA admitted in its response to Campney's first requests
that the transaction at issue was a "consumer credit transaction."
the debtor's obligation, and may be raised as a defense to a suit on the obligation
without regard to the time limitations prescribed by this subdivision."). Therefore,
pursuant to her SCCPC counterclaim, Campney may be entitled to a set off of
amounts she owed PRA and we remand this counterclaim to the trial court.
However, we find the trial court properly found for PRA on Campney's FDCPA
claims because they were time-barred and not subject to any set off provision. See
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (2021) (requiring that any action seeking to enforce a claim
pursuant to the FDCPA must be brought "within one year from the date on which
the violation occurs"). Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's determination in
favor of PRA on the dismissal of Campney's counterclaim related to the SCCPC's
right to cure notification and remand to allow the trial court to determine the
amount of set-off and attorney's fees, if any, Campney is entitled. We affirm the
trial court's determination in favor of PRA on the dismissal of her counterclaims
related to the FDCPA, the SCUTPA, and negligence per se.
b. Amount Owed
We hold the trial court did not err in finding PRA did not misrepresent the amount
owed. As to this issue, we find Campney's claims are without merit. We conclude
the trial court properly determined that both amounts were correct on different
theories of recovery and PRA only sought to recover under the account stated
theory. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in finding PRA did not misrepresent
the amount owed, and we affirm this issue.
3. Rule 52 and 59(e), SCRCP Motion
Given our disposition of the prior issues, we do not address this issue. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598
(1999) (observing an appellate court need not address remaining issues when the
determination of a prior issue is dispositive).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's order is
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., concur.