Dana Dixon v. SCDMH (2)

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Dana Dixon, Employee, Appellant,
v.
SC Department of Mental Health, Employer, and State
Accident Fund, Carrier, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2021-000696
Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission
Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-075
Submitted February 14, 2023 – Filed March 1, 2023
AFFIRMED
Dana L. Dixon, of St. Matthews, pro se.
M. Stephen Stubley, of Speed, Seta, Martin, Trivett &
Stubley, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Dana Dixon appeals the order of the Appellate Panel of the
South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (the Appellate Panel)
affirming the single commissioner's denial of Dixon's claims for additional medical
treatment for an alleged injury to her back. Dixon raises numerous issues on
appeal. We affirm.
We hold substantial evidence supports the Appellate Panel's decision that Dixon
failed to provide expert medical evidence showing to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty that the treatment she sought was related to her December 22,
2016 work accident as required to justify treatment beyond ten weeks from the date
of her injury. See Jordan v. Kelly Co., 381 S.C. 483, 486, 674 S.E.2d 166, 168
(2009) (stating the appellate court "must affirm the findings of fact made by the
[Appellate Panel] if they are supported by substantial evidence"); Hargrove v.
Titan Textile Co., 360 S.C. 276, 289, 599 S.E.2d 604, 611 (Ct. App. 2004)
("Substantial evidence is not a mere scintilla of evidence, nor the evidence viewed
blindly from one side of the case, but is evidence which, considering the record as
a whole, would allow reasonable minds to reach the conclusion the administrative
agency reached in order to justify its action."); S.C. Code Ann. § 42-15-60(A)
(2015) ("The employer shall provide medical, surgical, hospital, and other
treatment . . . for a period not exceeding ten weeks from the date of an injury, to
effect a cure or give relief and for an additional time as in the judgment of the
commission will tend to lessen the period of disability as evidenced by expert
medical evidence stated to a reasonable degree of medical certainty."); Hartzell v.
Palmetto Collision, LLC, 419 S.C. 87, 96, 796 S.E.2d 145, 150 (Ct. App. 2016)
("To hold an employer liable for medical expenses beyond [the ten-week from the
date of injury] time period, the Appellate Panel must decide that, based upon a
heightened standard of medical evidence, additional treatment would tend to lessen
the claimant's period of disability."). Accordingly, we affirm the Appellate Panel's
denial of Dixon's claim for additional treatment of her back.1
AFFIRMED. 2
KONDUROS and VINSON, JJ., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.
1
We need not address Dixon's remaining issues because our determination of the
above issue is dispositive. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.,
335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need
not review remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of
the appeal).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.