Frank v. SCDSS

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Michael Frank, individually, and as the parent and
guardian of a minor, Appellant,
v.
South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2017-002024
Appeal From York County
S. Jackson Kimball, III, Special Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-008
Submitted November 1, 2019 – Filed January 15, 2020
AFFIRMED
J. Cameron Halford, of Halford, Niemiec & Freeman,
LLP, of Fort Mill, for Appellant.
Walter Keith Martens, of Hamilton Martens, LLC, of
Rock Hill, and Michael Elliot Hirsch, of Clawson &
Staubes, LLC, of Charlotte, North Carolina, both for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Michael Frank appeals the circuit court's order dismissing his
complaint against the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS). Frank
argues the circuit court erred by finding his complaint time-barred, finding he
failed to allege facts to support any cause of action against DSS under any theory
of liability pertaining to gross negligence, and failing to view the facts in the light
most favorable to him, as required under the standard of review. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. We find the circuit court did not err in dismissing the complaint based on the
statute of limitations. See Rydde v. Morris, 381 S.C. 643, 646, 675 S.E.2d 431,
433 (2009) ("On appeal from the dismissal of a case pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6)
SCRCP, an appellate court applies the same standard of review as the [circuit]
court."); id. ("That standard requires the [c]ourt to construe the complaint in a light
most favorable to the nonmovant and determine if the 'facts alleged and the
inferences reasonably deducible from the pleadings would entitle the [appellant] to
relief on any theory of the case.'"). Here, the circuit court properly dismissed the
complaint based on the statute of limitations because the injuries alleged in the
complaint stemmed from a hearing held on December 10, 2013, and the complaint
was not filed until March 23, 2017. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110 (2005)
("[A]ny action brought pursuant to this chapter is forever barred unless an action is
commenced within two years after the date the loss was or should have been
discovered . . . ."); Gillman v. City of Beaufort, 368 S.C. 24, 27, 627 S.E.2d, 746,
748 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Under the discovery rule, the statutory limitations period
begins to run from the date when the injury resulting from the wrongful conduct
either is discovered or may be discovered by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.").
2. Because Frank's claims are barred by the statute of limitations, we decline to
address his remaining issues. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.,
335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) ("[An] appellate court need not
address remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is dispositive.").
AFFIRMED.1
HUFF, WILLIAMS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.