Jeffery White v. St. Matthews Healthcare

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Jeffery White, individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Lizzie White,
Respondent,
v.
St. Matthews Healthcare, LLC, d/b/a Calhoun
Convalescent Center, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2021-000700
Appeal From Calhoun County
Maite Murphy, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-393
Submitted December 5, 2023 – Filed December 13, 2023
AFFIRMED
Stephen Lynwood Brown, Russell Grainger Hines,
Donald Jay Davis, Jr., and Ted Ashton Phillips, III, all of
Clement Rivers, LLP, of Charleston, for Appellant.
Jessica Lerer Fickling and Matthew B. Robins, both of
Strom Law Firm, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: St. Matthews Healthcare, LLC, d/b/a Calhoun Convalescent
Center (the Facility) appeals the circuit court's order denying its motion to compel
to arbitration the claims of Jeffery White, individually and as Personal
Representative of the Estate of Lizzie White. On appeal, the Facility argues the
circuit court erred by denying its motion to compel arbitration because (1) the
signatory on the Arbitration Agreement had a valid healthcare power of attorney
(HCPOA) and (2) the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement
merged. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR.
We hold the circuit court did not err by denying the Facility's motion to compel
arbitration. See Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 596, 553 S.E.2d
110, 118 (2001) ("The question of the arbitrability of a claim is an issue for judicial
determination, unless the parties provide otherwise."); New Hope Missionary
Baptist Church v. Paragon Builders, 379 S.C. 620, 625, 667 S.E.2d 1, 3 (Ct. App.
2008) ("Appeal from the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is subject to de
novo review."); Stokes v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 351 S.C. 606, 609-10, 571 S.E.2d
711, 713 (Ct. App. 2002) ("However, the circuit court's factual findings will not be
overruled if there is any evidence reasonably supporting them.").
Initially, we hold the HCPOA did not give Darlene Nunnally authority to execute
the arbitration agreement on Lizzie White's (Lizzie's) behalf. See Arredondo v.
SNH SE Ashley River Tenant, LLC, 433 S.C. 69, 80-84, 856 S.E.2d 550, 556-58
(2021) (reviewing an identical authorization provision of a HCPOA document and
finding the authorization did not grant the patient's daughter authority to grant the
waivers recited in an arbitration agreement because the authorization was limited
to action "necessary" concerning the patient's healthcare and the patient's daughter
was not required to sign the agreement), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 584 (2021); id. at
84-85, 856 S.E.2d at 558-59 (holding the HCPOA did not grant the patient's
daughter the authority to execute the arbitration agreement because the "pursuing
any legal action" language in the healthcare power of attorney document was in the
context of forcing compliance with the patient's wishes and daughter did not
execute the arbitration agreement in connection with an existing claim against the
facility). Here, as in Arredondo, the Facility acknowledges "the Arbitration
Agreement was not a precondition to admission." Thus, Nunnally's signature on
the Arbitration Agreement was not necessary to Lizzie receiving care at the
Facility. Here, also as in Arredondo, Nunnally did not execute the Arbitration
Agreement in connection with an existing claim against the Facility, because the
document was executed on the day of Lizzie's admission and prior to the
development of her injuries. Thus, Nunnally did not execute the Arbitration
Agreement in the pursuit of legal action in the context of forcing compliance with
Lizzie's wishes. Accordingly, we conclude the HCPOA did not give Nunnally
authority to grant the waivers recited in the Arbitration Agreement.
Next, we hold the Admission Agreement and the Arbitration Agreement did not
merge. See Est. of Solesbee by Bayne v. Fundamental Clinical & Operational
Servs., LLC, 438 S.C. 638, 648-49, 885 S.E.2d 144, 149 (Ct. App. 2023), cert.
pending (finding the admission agreement and arbitration agreement did not merge
after considering (1) the admission agreement provided it was governed by South
Carolina law and the arbitration agreement provided it was governed by federal
law, (2) the arbitration agreement recognized the two documents were separate by
stating the arbitration agreement "shall survive any termination or breach of this
Agreement or the Admission Agreement," (3) the documents were separately
paginated and had their own signature pages, and (4) signing the arbitration
agreement was not a precondition to admission); Coleman v. Mariner Health Care,
Inc., 407 S.C. 346, 355, 755 S.E.2d 450, 455 (2014) (concluding that by their own
terms, language in the admission agreement that "recognize[d] the 'separatedness'
of [the arbitration agreement] and the admission agreement" and a clause allowing
the arbitration agreement to "be disclaimed within thirty days of signing while the
admission agreement could not" indicated the parties' intention "that the common
law doctrine of merger not apply"); Hodge v. UniHealth Post-Acute Care of
Bamberg, LLC, 422 S.C. 544, 562-63, 813 S.E.2d 292, 302 (Ct. App. 2018)
(determining an admissions agreement and arbitration agreement did not merge
because the fact "the [a]dmissions [a]greement indicated it was governed by South
Carolina law, whereas the [a]rbitration [a]greement stated it was governed by
federal law[,]" "each document was separately paginated and had its own signature
page[,]" and "the [a]rbitration [a]greement stated signing it was not a precondition
to admission" evidenced the parties' intention that the documents be construed as
separate instruments). Here, as in Solesbee and Hodge, (1) the two agreements
were governed by different bodies of law because the Admission Agreement was
governed by state law and the Arbitration Agreement was governed by federal law;
(2) each document was separately labeled, numbered, and contained its own
signature page; (3) the arbitration agreement recognized the two documents were
separate, stating the arbitration agreement "shall survive any termination or breach
of this Agreement or the Admission Agreement"; and (4) the Facility
acknowledged that signing the Arbitration Agreement was not a prerequisite to
admission to the Facility. Thus, the Admission Agreement and Arbitration
Agreement did not merge. Because we find the documents did not merge, a
controlling consideration of whether the Arbitration Agreement bound Lizzie, we
decline to reach the Facility's remaining argument. See Futch v. McAllister Towing
of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (ruling an
appellate court need not address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior
issue is dispositive); Est. of Solesbee, 438 S.C. at 649, 885 S.E.2d at 149
(determining that because the admission agreement and arbitration agreement did
not merge, the equitable estoppel argument was properly denied); Coleman, 407
S.C. at 356, 755 S.E.2d at 455 ("Since there was no merger here, appellants'
equitable estoppel argument was properly denied by the circuit court."); Hodge,
422 S.C. at 563, 813 S.E.2d at 302 (concluding "equitable estoppel would only
apply if documents were merged").
AFFIRMED. 1
HEWITT and VERDIN, JJ., and BROMELL HOLMES, A.J., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.