SCDSS v. Kristen Anderson

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
South Carolina Department of Social Services,
Respondent,
v.
Kristen Anderson, Reginald J. Bruce, and Jonnie
Anderson, Defendants,
Of whom Kristen Anderson is the Appellant.
In the interest of a minor under the age of eighteen.
Appellate Case No. 2022-000772
Appeal From Florence County
FitzLee H. McEachin, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-403
Submitted December 8, 2023 – Filed December 11, 2023
AFFIRMED
John Brandt Rucker and Allyson Sue Rucker, both of
The Rucker Law Firm, LLC, of Greenville, for
Appellant.
Daniel Tindall Jordan, of McGowan, Rogers, Stewart &
Hiller, PA, of Florence, as the Guardian ad Litem for
Appellant.
Scarlet Bell Moore, of Greenville; and Taylor Jule
Yarnal, of South Carolina Department of Social Services,
of Florence, both for Respondent.
Stuart Wesley Snow, Jr., of Snow & Bailey Law Firm,
P.A., of Florence, for the minor child's Guardian ad
Litem.
PER CURIAM: Kristen Anderson (Mother) appeals a family court order
removing her minor daughter (Child) from her custody; granting custody to Child's
maternal grandmother (Grandmother); authorizing the Department of Social
Services (DSS) to forego reasonable efforts at reunification; and closing the case.
On appeal, Mother argues the family court erred in removing Child from her
custody, granting custody of Child to Grandmother, authorizing DSS to forego
reasonable efforts at reunification, and closing the case without ordering a future
permanency planning hearing. We affirm.
On appeal from the family court, this court reviews factual and legal issues de
novo. Simmons v. Simmons, 392 S.C. 412, 414, 709 S.E.2d 666, 667 (2011).
Although this court reviews the family court's findings de novo, we are not
required to ignore the fact that the family court, which saw and heard the
witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign
comparative weight to their testimony. Lewis v. Lewis, 392 S.C. 381, 385, 709
S.E.2d 650, 651-52 (2011).
We hold a preponderance of the evidence showed Mother physically neglected
Child and Child could not be returned to Mother's care without placing her at an
unreasonable risk of harm. See S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-1660(E) (2010) ("The
[family] court shall not order that a child be removed from the custody of the
parent . . . unless the court finds that the allegations of the petition are supported by
a preponderance of evidence including a finding that . . . return of the child to the
home would place the child at unreasonable risk of harm affecting the child's life,
physical health or safety, or mental well-being and the child cannot reasonably be
protected from this harm without being removed."); S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(22)
(Supp. 2023) ("'Preponderance of evidence' means evidence which, when fairly
considered, is more convincing as to its truth than the evidence in opposition.");
S.C. Code Ann. § 63-7-20(6)(a)(i) (Supp. 2023) ("'Child abuse or neglect' or 'harm'
occurs when" a parent "inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical or
mental injury or engages in acts or omissions which present a substantial risk of
physical or mental injury to the child . . . ."). A DSS case manager testified this
case began after DSS received a report that Mother attempted to choke Child. She
stated DSS had concerns about Mother's mental health, found Mother physically
neglected Child, gave Mother a treatment plan, and referred Mother for treatment
services. Her testimony showed Mother attempted to receive mental health
treatment several times after DSS became involved in the case; however, according
to the DSS case manager, Mother stopped attending services at Pee Dee Mental
Health in January 2022. Further, Child's guardian ad litem stated Child was
"extremely uncomfortable" around Mother and reports indicated Child had refused
to visit Mother or sit in the same room with her. Therefore, we hold a
preponderance of the evidence showed Child was neglected and returning her to
Mother's care would have placed her at an unreasonable risk of further harm.
We also hold a preponderance of the evidence showed the family court properly
allowed DSS to forego reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and Child. See S.C.
Code Ann. § 63-7-1640(C)(1)(b) (Supp. 2023) ("The family court may authorize
[DSS] to terminate or forego reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify a family . . .
when the family court determines . . . the parent has subjected the child or another
child while residing in the parent's domicile to . . . severe or repeated
neglect . . . ."). The DSS case manager's testimony that DSS indicated a case
against Mother after investigating whether Mother choked Child pursuant to the
initial report shows Child was severely neglected. Moreover, Mother's failure to
follow DSS's recommendations, considered alongside the DSS case manager's
testimony regarding Mother's mental health issues, constitutes a preponderance of
the evidence that Mother neglected Child, and the family court properly authorized
DSS to forego reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and Child.
We further hold the issue of whether the family court erred in closing the case
without providing for a subsequent permanency planning hearing is not preserved
for review because the record does not indicate Mother challenged the family
court's case closure ruling in a post-trial motion after the family court issued its
written order. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke, 330 S.C. 71, 76, 497 S.E.2d 731, 733
(1998) ("It is axiomatic that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal,
but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the [family court] to be preserved
for appellate review.").
AFFIRMED. 1
THOMAS, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.