NAFH Bank v. Tower Home

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
NAFH National Bank, Respondent,
v.
Tower Homes, Inc.; Nathan Seppala a/k/a Nathan P.
Seppala; Matthew G. Seppala a/k/a Matthew Seppala;
Total Comfort Installations, LLC a/k/a Total Comfort
Installations; Blue Tarp Financial, Inc. d/b/a ProTrade
Credit; CEMEX Construction Materials, L.P. a/k/a
CEMEX Construction Materials LP; Stock Building
Supply, LLC f/k/a Stock Building Supply, Inc.; Central
Mutual Insurance; Imperial Systems, Inc. a/k/a Imperial
Systems Inc. a/k/a Imperial Systems Inc; The Peoples
National Bank; The Greenville News; Air Systems, Inc.;
HD Supply Plumbing/HVAC, Ltd.; Greer Flooring
Center, Inc.; MTP Nursery, LLC d/b/a MTP Nursery and
Landscaping; 84 Lumber Company, L.P.; Marsh
Furniture Company; Sears Commercial d/b/a Sears
Holdings, Inc.; Thomas Concrete of South Carolina, Inc.
d/b/a Thomas Concrete of South Carolina Inc; Bradco
Supply Corporation; and Israel Romero, Defendants,
Of whom Israel Romero is the Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2011-201547
Appeal From Greenville County
Charles B. Simmons, Jr., Master-in-Equity
Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-559
Submitted October 1, 2012 – Filed October 24, 2012
AFFIRMED
Israel Romero, of Taylors, pro se.
Kristin Burnett Barber and Shane William Rogers, both
of Johnson, Smith, Hibbard & Wildman, LLP, of
Spartanburg, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Israel Romero, proceeding pro se, appeals the master-in-equity's
order granting NAFH National Bank's (the Bank's) motion to dismiss Romero's
counterclaim for failure to state a cause of action.1 We affirm2 pursuant to Rule
220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: Rice-Marko v. Wachovia Corp.,
398 S.C. 301, 307, 728 S.E.2d 61, 64 (Ct. App. 2012) ("In reviewing the dismissal
of an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, the appellate court applies the
same standard of review as the trial court." (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc., 348 S.C. 420, 424,
559 S.E.2d 362, 364 (Ct. App. 2001) ("A motion to dismiss a counterclaim must be
based solely on the allegations set forth in the counterclaim."); id. ("The question is
whether in the light most favorable to the complainant, and with every doubt
resolved on his behalf, the counterclaim states any valid claim for relief.").
AFFIRMED.
SHORT, GEATHERS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
1
Romero also argues the master-in-equity erred in granting the Bank's motion to
strike Romero's affidavit of default; however, because Romero did not file a Notice
of Appeal from the order granting the motion to strike, we need not address this
issue. See Rule 203, SCACR (requiring a party to serve and file a notice of appeal
indicating the date of the order from which the appeal is taken).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.