Estate of Patricia B. Holliday v. Ross S. Holliday

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The Estate of Patricia B. Holliday, Appellant,
v.
Ross S. Holliday, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2019-002002
Appeal From Charleston County
Deadra L. Jefferson, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-220
Heard November 15, 2022 – Filed June 7, 2023
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
Jesse Sanchez, of The Law Office of Jesse Sanchez, of
Charleston, for Appellant.
Forrest Truett Nettles, II, of Rosen Hagood, LLC, of
Charleston, Alice F. Paylor, of Saxton & Stump, LLC, of
Charleston, and Bijan Khaladj-Ghom, of Saxton &
Stump, LLC, of Charleston, all for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: The Estate of Patricia B. Holliday (the Estate) appeals the circuit
court's orders granting summary judgment to Ross Holliday on the Estate's claim
for payment of a promissory note (the Note) Ross executed and made payable to
his parents, Warren and Patricia, who later divorced. The Estate argues the circuit
court erred in finding: (1) Patricia released any right to the Note in her marital
settlement agreement (the Agreement) with Warren; (2) the Agreement discharged
Ross's obligation to pay the Note; and (3) the purported discovery of the original
Note was not newly discovered evidence under Rule 60(b)(2), SCRCP. As
additional sustaining grounds, Ross asserts summary judgment was proper because
the Estate's claim for breach of contract is barred by the statute of limitations and
the doctrine of laches. While we agree summary judgment is appropriate, our
reasoning differs from that of the circuit court.
In 2004, Warren and Patricia agreed to loan their son, Ross, two million dollars so
Ross could buy into a construction business in Utah. In connection with this loan,
Ross executed a promissory note, which stated, in pertinent part:
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, Ross. S. Holliday, the
undersigned borrower, promises to pay to Warren P.
Holliday and Patricia B. Holliday, as joint tenants or the
survivor of them, or order, the sum of Two Million
Dollars ($2,000,000) together with interest on the unpaid
balance at the rate equal to the prime rate of National
Bank of South Carolina plus one-half percent (1/2%),
payable upon demand.
In his deposition, Ross testified he made several payments on the loan:
approximately $800,000 from 2005 to 2007 and $371,613 in 2010 following the
sale of property transferred to him. Ross admitted he did not have any record of
these payments, explaining his bank only kept such records for seven years.
Warren died in September 2016. On July 12, 2017, Patricia made her first
demand, through counsel, that Ross repay the remaining "amounts owed on" the
Note. On February 20, 2018, Patricia filed a breach of contract action in circuit
court seeking to collect on the Note.
On June 11, 2019, Ross moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that
Patricia had expressly released any claim to the Note in the Agreement and that the
statute of limitations barred her claim.
Following a September 27, 2019 hearing, the circuit court granted summary
judgment to Ross. The circuit court found Patricia released all claims she had to
the Note in the December 2013 marital settlement agreement and declined to rule
on the merits of Ross's statute of limitations argument.
We disagree with the circuit court's interpretation of the Agreement, but find the
statute of limitations bars the Estate's claim. See Rule 220(c), SCACR ("The
appellate court may affirm any ruling, order, decision or judgment upon any
ground(s) appearing in the Record on Appeal."); I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt.
Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 420, 526 S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000) ("The appellate court
may review respondent's additional reasons and, if convinced it is proper and fair
to do so, rely on them or any other reason appearing in the record to affirm the
lower court's judgment.").
Section 36-3-118(b) 1 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2022) states:
Except as provided in Subsection (d) or (e), if demand for
payment is made to the maker of a note payable on
demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to
pay the note must be commenced within six years after
the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the
maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither
principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a
continuous period of 10 years.
Patricia filed the action to collect the debt on February 20, 2018. Ross claimed
Warren made a demand in 2005 or 2006, and Ross subsequently made payments
on the Note. Patricia admitted she knew Warren asked Ross for payment on a
couple of occasions, including while Ross was working with Holmes Homes, and
she assumed Ross made payments after Warren's demand. In his deposition, Ross
testified he left Holmes Homes in 2010. Thus, even if Warren's demand occurred
as late as 2010—the latest Ross worked with Holmes Homes—Patricia's 2018
1
Although the parties argued—and the circuit court considered—the statute of
limitations now found at § 36-3-118(b), the note at issue here predates the effective
date of this version of statute. See 2008 S.C. Act No. 204 § 4.A ("This act does not
apply to a transaction or event, or obligation or duty arising out of or associated
with a transaction or event, before the effective date of this act."). However, even
if § 15-3-530(1)'s three-year statute of limitations for contracts, obligations, and
other liabilities is considered, the result remains the same: the Estate's claim as to
the Note is time-barred.
filing came too late. As both Patricia and Ross testified in their depositions that
Warren indeed demanded payment at some point between 2005 and 2010, the six-
year statute of limitations was triggered—at the latest—by the 2010 demand. 2 For
this reason, we affirm the grant of summary judgment. See McMaster v. Dewitt,
411 S.C. 138, 143, 767 S.E.2d 451, 453 (Ct. App. 2014) ("Summary judgment is
appropriate when a plaintiff does not commence an action within the applicable
statute of limitations.").
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 3
GEATHERS and MCDONALD, JJ., and HILL, A.J., concur.
2
The ten-year statute of limitations of § 36-3-118(b) would apply only if "no
demand for payment is made to the maker." As the circuit court noted in its order,
"Patricia argued that no payments were made to her and that she had no knowledge
that any payments had ever been made by Ross to Warren. Thus [Ross] argues,
Patricia went thirteen (13) years without requesting payments on the Note or even
inquiring as to whether the Note had been, or was being, paid."
2
We find no support in the record for the circuit court's holding that Patricia
released her claim to the Note in the marital settlement agreement. The Estate
correctly argues the Agreement "did not address the Note explicitly or implicitly."
Nevertheless, our finding as to the expiration of the statute of limitations is
dispositive, and we decline to address the Estate's remaining issues raised in this
appeal. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613,
518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (recognizing an appellate court need not address
remaining issues when disposition of prior issue is dispositive).