Slayman v. SCDOE

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Dr. Agnes M. Slayman, Appellant,
v.
South Carolina Department of Education, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2020-000950
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
S. Phillip Lenski, Administrative Law Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2023-UP-275
Heard June 7, 2023 – Filed July 26, 2023
AFFIRMED
J. Lewis Cromer and Shannon Marie Polvi, both of
Cromer Babb Porter & Hicks, LLC, of Columbia, for
Appellant.
Vann Henry Gunter, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this appeal from the administrative law court (the ALC), Dr.
Agnes Slayman argues the ALC erred in affirming the South Carolina Department
of Education's (the Department) issuance of a public reprimand against her.
Specifically, Dr. Slayman asserts the ALC erred in finding: (1) the Department did
not err in failing to dismiss the Chester County School District's complaint alleging
Dr. Slayman committed professional misconduct by creating a hostile work
environment (the complaint); (2) the Department did not violate Dr. Slayman's due
process rights in processing the complaint; (3) the State Board of Education's (the
State Board) hearing did not violate Dr. Slayman's due process rights; (4) the State
Board did not err in failing to follow the hearing officer's recommendation; and (5)
the State Board did not err in reporting the public reprimand against Dr. Slayman
to the National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and
Certification (NASDTEC). We affirm.
1. We hold the Department did not err in failing to dismiss the complaint. See
Original Blue Ribbon Taxi Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 380 S.C. 600,
604, 670 S.E.2d 674, 676 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The decision of the Administrative
Law Court should not be overturned unless it is unsupported by substantial
evidence or controlled by some error of law."). From a plain reading of
Department Regulation 43-58.1, nothing in the language mandated the Department
to dismiss Dr. Callicutt's complaint. See Murphy v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env't
Control, 396 S.C. 633, 639, 723 S.E.2d 191, 195 (2012) ("Regulations are
interpreted using the same rules of construction as statutes."); Converse Power
Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env't Control, 350 S.C. 39, 47, 564 S.E.2d 341,
346 (Ct. App. 2002) ("When interpreting a regulation, we look for the plain and
ordinary meaning of the words of the regulation, without resort to subtle or forced
construction to limit or expand the regulation's operation."). Despite Dr. Slayman's
assertions, nothing in the regulation stipulates that the individual making the filing
must have personal knowledge of the allegations. Furthermore, the allegations
made against Dr. Slayman undoubtedly fall within the scope of misconduct
contemplated by the regulation. Moreover, we find the language mandated Dr.
Callicutt to file the complaint and Dr. Slayman's argument as to the overall
outcome does not pass muster. Although the Department ultimately did not revoke
or suspend Dr. Slayman's educator's certificate, it was not unreasonable for Dr.
Callicutt to believe that was a possibility based on the allegations.
2. We hold the Department did not violate Dr. Slayman's due process rights in
processing the complaint. See Original Blue Ribbon Taxi Corp, 380 S.C. at 604,
670 S.E.2d at 676 ("The decision of the Administrative Law Court should not be
overturned unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled by some
error of law."). Dr. Slayman asserts the Department violated her due process rights
in handling the complaint because it violated Department Regulation 43-58.1.
Specifically, Dr. Slayman contends the Department failed to timely notify her of
and investigate the complaint because she did not receive notice of the complaint
until March 2018. In its order, the ALC noted that the length of time between the
filing of the complaint and the initial hearing was substantial; however, it found
nothing in Regulation 43-58.1 proscribed a specific time period for investigating a
complaint and Dr. Slayman presented no other sources of authority to support her
claims. The ALC further found Dr. Slayman failed to show she suffered any
prejudice from the Department's delay. We agree with the ALC's interpretation of
regulation 43-58.1 and also find Dr. Slayman's assertions to be unsupported and
conclusory.
Dr. Slayman additionally argues the Department violated her due process rights
during the State Board hearing because it improperly limited the testimony of her
witnesses. In its order, the ALC found this argument unpreserved for appellate
review because Dr. Slayman failed to argue with specificity instances in which the
Department improperly limited the testimony of her witnesses. In reviewing Dr.
Slayman's appellate brief to the ALC, we agree her contentions are conclusory and
unsupported. See Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557
S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[S]hort, conclusory statements made without
supporting authority are deemed abandoned on appeal and therefore not presented
for review.").
3. Dr. Slayman argues the hearing process before the State Board violated her due
process rights. Specifically, Dr. Slayman contends the State Board erred in failing
to allow the hearing officer to physically "present" her report to the State Board in
violation of State Board Rule BCAF IV(K) and both parties were arbitrarily
limited to three minutes for arguments. Consequently, Dr. Slayman asserts there is
no evidence that the State Board was provided the bare minimum required to act
against Dr. Slayman's certification. We find Dr. Slayman failed to safeguard her
procedural due process arguments for review. Although Dr. Slayman was not
required to file a motion for rehearing prior to filing an appeal with the ALC, at no
point during the hearing with the State Board did she raise any objections to either
the three-minute limitation or the hearing officer's failure to "present" her
recommendation to the State Board. As such, Dr. Slayman failed to give the State
Board an opportunity to rule upon these objections. See Wilder Corp. v. Wilke,
330 S.C. 71, 77, 497 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1998) ("Post-trial motions are not necessary
to preserve issues that have been ruled upon at trial; they are used to preserve those
that have been raised to the trial court but not yet ruled upon by it.").
4. We hold the ALC did not err in finding substantial evidence supported the State
Board's decision to issue a public reprimand against Dr. Slayman. See Original
Blue Ribbon Taxi Corp, 380 S.C. at 604, 670 S.E.2d at 676 ("The decision of the
Administrative Law Court should not be overturned unless it is unsupported by
substantial evidence or controlled by some error of law."); id. at 605, 670 S.E.2d at
676 ("Substantial evidence, when considering the record as a whole, would allow
reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the Administrative Law Court
and is more than a mere scintilla of evidence."); id. at 605, 670 S.E.2d at 677 ("The
mere possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does
not prevent a finding from being supported by substantial evidence." (quoting
Olson v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Env't Control, 379 S.C. 57, 63, 663 S.E.2d 497,
501 (Ct. App. 2008))). In making its determination, the State Board reviewed the
hearing officer's report and recommendation, the transcript of the hearing, the
Department's exceptions, and the hearing officer's response to those exceptions.
The record contains ample evidence supporting differing conclusions as to whether
Dr. Slayman's conduct was unprofessional; thus, reasonable minds could reach the
same conclusion as the ALC. As such, we find the record substantiates the State
Board's decision.
5. Dr. Slayman argues the State Board violated Policy BCAF(IV)(M) in notifying
the NASDTEC Clearinghouse of her public reprimand. From a plain reading of
the regulation, we find nothing in the language prohibited a notification to
NASDTEC and Dr. Slayman offers no other authority contesting this decision. See
Murphy, 396 S.C. at 639, 723 S.E.2d at 195 ("Regulations are interpreted using the
same rules of construction as statutes."); Converse Power Corp., 350 S.C. at 47,
564 S.E.2d at 346 ("When interpreting a regulation, we look for the plain and
ordinary meaning of the words of the regulation, without resort to subtle or forced
construction to limit or expand the regulation's operation."). Thus, this argument
lacks merit. See Original Blue Ribbon Taxi Corp, 380 S.C. at 604, 670 S.E.2d at
676 ("The decision of the Administrative Law Court should not be overturned
unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or controlled by some error of
law.").
AFFIRMED.
WILLIAMS, C.J., and GEATHERS and VERDIN, JJ., concur.