Alexander v. South Carolina Department of Transportation

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Aubry G. Alexander, Sr., Respondent,
v.
South Carolina Department of Transportation, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2012-209192
Appeal From Orangeburg County
Edgar W. Dickson, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-266
Heard June 5, 2013 – Filed June 19, 2013
AFFIRMED
Elmer Kulmala, of Harvey & Kulmala, of Barnwell, for
Appellant.
Paul E. Tinkler, of Law Office of Paul E. Tinkler, of
Charleston, and Bradley Hutto, of Williams & Williams,
of Orangeburg, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this tort action, the South Carolina Department of
Transportation (SCDOT) appeals the trial court's denial of its motion for a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing the Respondent, Aubrey
Alexander, failed to produce evidence indicating SCDOT's acts or omissions
proximately caused his injury. SCDOT further argues it was entitled to a JNOV
because Alexander failed to present evidence of a standard of care. We affirm
pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying SCDOT's motion for JNOV
because Alexander failed to produce evidence indicating SCDOT's actions or
omissions proximately caused1 the injury: Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock
Ctr., Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 147, 638 S.E.2d 650, 662 (2006) ("Causation in fact is
proved by establishing the injury would not have occurred 'but for' the defendant's
negligence."); Keeter v. Alpine Towers Int'l, Inc., 399 S.C. 179, 188, 730 S.E.2d
890, 895 (Ct. App. 2012) (noting a trial court's denial of a JNOV will only be
reversed when there is no evidence to support the denial or when the denial is
governed by an error of law).
2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying SCDOT's motion for JNOV
because Alexander failed to present evidence of a standard of care: Madison ex
rel. Bryant, 371 S.C. at 140, 638 S.E.2d at 659 ("The standard of care in a given
case may be established and defined by the common law, statutes, administrative
regulations, industry standards, or a defendant's own policies and guidelines."
(emphasis added)).
AFFIRMED.
SHORT, THOMAS, and PIEPER, JJ., concur.
1
During oral argument, SCDOT conceded it was only challenging the trial court's
proximate cause ruling with respect to causation in fact.