Knight v. SCDLLR

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
N. Bobby Knight and Construction Group, LLC,
Appellants,
v.
South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and
Regulation, South Carolina Contractor's Board,
Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2017-001311
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Ralph King Anderson, III, Administrative Law Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2020-UP-299
Heard September 23, 2020 – Filed November 4, 2020
AFFIRMED
William Koatesworth Swope, of The Swope Law Firm,
PA, of Charleston, for Appellants.
Timothy Kyle Tennis, of The South Carolina Department
of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, of Columbia, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: N. Bobby Knight and Construction Group, LLC (collectively,
Appellants) appeal the Administrative Law Court's (ALC's) order dismissing their
appeal from the decision of the South Carolina Contractor's Licensing Board (the
Board). Appellants argue the ALC erred by dismissing their appeal because (1) the
South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (the Department)
failed to provide them with proper notice of a formal summons and complaint
pursuant to Rules 4(d), 4(g), and 5(d), SCRCP, and (2) the ALC and the Board
lacked jurisdiction. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:
1. We affirm the ALC's dismissal of Construction Group LLC's appeal as the law
of the case. See Dreher v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 412 S.C. 244,
249, 772 S.E.2d 505, 508 (2015) ("An unappealed ruling is the law of the case and
requires affirmance." (quoting Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. v. City of Union, 403 S.C.
560, 573, 743 S.E.2d 778, 785 (2013))); SCALC Rule 8A ("Any party which is not
a natural person must be represented by an attorney.").
2. We find the ALC did not err by dismissing Knight's appeal. We conclude the
Administrative Procedures Act (the APA), rather than the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure, governed the proceedings before the Board. We find the
Department complied with the requirements of due process and the APA by
mailing notice to the address Knight had on file with the Department, and we
affirm the ALC's dismissal of Knight's appeal. See Rule 1, SCRCP ("These rules
govern the procedure in all South Carolina courts in all suits of a civil nature . . . ."
(emphasis added)); Rule 81, SCRCP ("These rules, or any of them, shall apply to
every trial court of civil jurisdiction within this state . . . ." (emphasis added)); S.C.
Code Ann. § 1-23-320(A) (2005 & Supp. 2019) ("In a contested case, all parties
must be afforded an opportunity for hearing after notice of not less than thirty
days . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(3) (2005) ("'Contested case' means a
proceeding including . . . licensing, in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges
of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity
for hearing . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-310(2) (2005) ("'Agency' means each
state board, . . . department, or officer, other than the legislature, the courts, or the
[ALC], authorized by law to determine contested cases . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 1-23-370(C) (2005) ("No revocation[ or] suspension . . . of any license is lawful
unless, prior to the institution of agency proceedings, the agency gave notice by
mail to the licensee of facts or conduct which warrant the intended action, and the
licensee was given an opportunity to show compliance with all lawful requirements
for the retention of the license." (emphasis added)); Kurschner v. City of Camden
Planning Comm'n, 376 S.C. 165, 171, 656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008) ("The
fundamental requirements of due process include notice, an opportunity to be
heard in a meaningful way, and judicial review."); Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank
& Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (stating due process requires "notice
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections"); id. at 315 ("The means employed must be such as one desirous of
actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it.").
3. As to both Appellants, we find the ALC and the Board had subject matter
jurisdiction over the proceedings. The Board is an administrative agency, which
the General Assembly empowered to conduct hearings on alleged violations and to
discipline persons licensed by the Board. This case was a contested case involving
licensing and the discipline of Appellants for their alleged violations of certain
statutory provisions governing their occupation. Therefore, the Board had subject
matter jurisdiction over this case, and the ALC obtained subject matter jurisdiction
when Appellants appealed the Board's decision to the ALC. See S.C. Code Ann.
§ 40-1-40(B) (2011) (providing for the creation of the Contractors' Licensing
Board); S.C. Code Ann. § 40-1-70(6), (8) (2011) ("The powers and duties of
regulatory boards include . . . conducting hearings on alleged violations of this
article and regulations promulgated under this article; . . . [and] disciplining
persons licensed under this article in a manner provided for in this
article . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 40-1-115 (2011) ("A board has jurisdiction over
the actions committed or omitted by current and former licensees during the entire
period of licensure. The board has jurisdiction to act on any matter which arises
during the practice authorization period."); S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-600(D) (Supp.
2019) (providing the ALC "shall preside over appeals from final decisions of
contested cases pursuant to the [APA]").
4. As to Appellants' argument the Board lacked personal jurisdiction: Brown v.
S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 519, 560 S.E.2d 410, 417
(2002) ("[I]ssues not raised to and ruled on by the AL[C] are not preserved for
appellate consideration.").
AFFIRMED.
LOCKEMY, C.J., and KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.