McFadden v. City of Lake City

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Jeffery L. McFadden, Employee, Appellant,
v.
City of Lake City, Employer, and South Carolina
Municipal Insurance Trust, Carrier, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2012-212278
Appeal From The Workers' Compensation Commission
Unpublished Opinion No. 2013-UP-337
Heard April 11, 2013 – Filed August 7, 2013
DISMISSED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART
Steven J. Wukela, of Wukela Law Firm, of Florence, for
Appellant.
Grady Larry Beard and Ben Gibbs Leaphart, Jr., both of
Sowell Gray Stepp & Laffitte, LLC, of Columbia, for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: In this workers' compensation appeal, Jeffery L. McFadden
appeals the Workers' Compensation Commission Appellate Panel's ("Appellate
Panel") order declining to impose sanctions against the City of Lake City and the
South Carolina Municipal Insurance Trust (collectively, the "City") for the denial
of medical care, pending investigation of a subsequent motor vehicle accident. In
addition, McFadden appeals the Appellate Panel's assessment of costs against his
attorney for a frivolous appeal. We dismiss in part and reverse in part.
1. As to McFadden's issues regarding the Appellate Panel's order affirming the
single commissioner's order declining to impose sanctions against the City, we find
this order does not constitute a "final decision" as required by the Administrative
Procedures Act ("APA") and, thus, is not immediately appealable. The APA
governs review of decisions of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation
Commission by the Court of Appeals. See S.C. Code Ann. §1-23-380 (Supp.
2012); Hargrove v. Titan Textile Co., 360 S.C. 276, 288, 599 S.E.2d 604, 610 (Ct.
App. 2004). The APA allows "[a] party who has exhausted all administrative
remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision in a
contested case" to appeal the agency's decision to the Court of Appeals. S.C. Code
Ann. § 1-23-380 (emphasis added). For an order to be final, it must "dispose[] of
the whole subject matter of the action or terminate[] the particular proceeding or
action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce . . . what has already been
determined." Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth. v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl.
Control, 387 S.C. 265, 267, 692 S.E.2d 894, 895 (2010). In the instant action, the
Appellate Panel's order does not dispose of the whole subject matter of the action
or terminate the action. Instead, the order merely affirms the single
commissioner's denial of McFadden's motion for sanctions and requires the parties
continue with discovery. Accordingly, McFadden's appeal relating to the denial of
sanctions against the City is dismissed.
2. As to McFadden's remaining issues regarding the assessment of hearing
costs against his attorney for a frivolous appeal, we reverse. The Appellate Panel's
order requires that McFadden's "attorney, not [McFadden], . . . pay the [cost of the
hearing]." The order relies on section 42-17-80 of the South Carolina Code (Supp.
2012) to assess this sanction. However, section 42-17-80 states: "If the
Commission . . . shall determine that such proceedings have been brought,
prosecuted or defended without reasonable grounds, it may assess the whole cost
of the proceedings upon the party who has brought or defended them." S.C. Code
Ann. § 42-17-80 (Supp. 2012) (emphasis added). Thus, the Appellate Panel lacks
statutory authority to impose this sanction upon McFadden's counsel. See Bazzle
v. Huff, 319 S.C. 443, 445, 462 S.E.2d 273, 274 (1995) ("An administrative agency
has only such powers as have been conferred by law and must act within the
authority granted for that purpose."). Accordingly, we reverse the assessment of
hearing costs upon McFadden's attorney.
Based on the foregoing, McFadden's appeal is
DISMISSED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART.
HUFF, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.