State v. Smith

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Sam Harold Smith, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2012-211846
Appeal From Spartanburg County
John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2014-UP-047
Submitted November 1, 2013 – Filed February 5, 2014
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Susan Barber Hackett, of Columbia,
for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: State v. Breeze, 379 S.C. 538, 543, 665 S.E.2d 247, 250 (Ct. App.
2008) ("Our role when reviewing a trial court's ruling concerning the admissibility
of a statement upon proof of its voluntariness is not to reevaluate the facts based on
our view of the preponderance of the evidence."); id. ("[O]n appeal the trial court's
findings as to the voluntariness of a statement will not be reversed unless they are
so erroneous as to show an abuse of discretion."); id. at 544, 665 S.E.2d at 250
("The test of voluntariness is whether a suspect's will was overborne by the
circumstances surrounding the given statement."); id. ("In making this
determination, the trial court must examine the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the statement."); State v. Miller, 375 S.C. 370, 385, 652 S.E.2d 444,
452 (Ct. App. 2007) (stating that in analyzing the totality of the circumstances,
courts consider such factors as "the crucial element of police coercion, the length
of the interrogation, its location, its continuity, the defendant's maturity, education,
physical condition, and mental health" (citations omitted)); id. at 386, 652 S.E.2d
at 452 ("Appellate entities in South Carolina have recognized that appropriate
factors to consider in the totality-of-circumstances analysis include: background,
experience, and conduct of the accused; age; length of custody; police
misrepresentations; isolation of a minor from his or her parent; threats of violence;
and promises of leniency."); id. ("Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate
to finding a statement is not voluntary."); State v. Rochester, 301 S.C. 196, 200,
391 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1990) (stating a "confession may not be extracted by any sort
of threats or violence, [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises, however
slight, [or] by the exertion of improper influence" (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Miller, 375 S.C. at 387-88, 652 S.E.2d at 453 (upholding the trial
court's determination of voluntariness because the trial court had the opportunity to
listen to the testimony, assess the demeanor and credibility of witnesses, and weigh
evidence accordingly when defendant's attorney testified defendant was coerced
into making a statement by a promise of a lenient sentence but four witnesses for
the State denied any promise of leniency).
AFFIRMED.1
FEW, C.J., and PIEPER and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.