Palmetto State Enterprises v. Greene

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Palmetto State Enterprises, LLC, Respondent,
v.
Clegg Lamar Greene a/k/a Lamar Greene, Juleene
Greene, a/k/a Julie Greene, J & P Enterprises of the
Carolinas, Inc., and Gaston Engineering, Inc.,
Defendants,
Of Which J & P Enterprises of the Carolinas, Inc., is the
Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2013-002154
Appeal From Pickens County
Charles B. Simmons, Jr., Special Referee
Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-254
Submitted March 1, 2015 – Filed May 13, 2015
AFFIRMED
Scott Franklin Talley, of Talley Law Firm, P.A., of
Spartanburg, for Appellant.
David Richard Price, Jr., of David R. Price, Jr., P.A., of
Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: J & P Enterprises of the Carolinas, Inc. (J&P) appeals the special
referee's order finding J&P liable to Palmetto State Enterprises, LLC (PSE) for
conversion in the amount of $154,772.65. On appeal, J&P argues the referee erred
in finding in favor of PSE because the evidence demonstrated (1) Lamar Greene
had the authority and the right to convey his salary from a PSE account into a J&P
account and (2) Greene had the authority to make loans to J&P from a PSE
account. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities:
As to Issue 1: Ritter & Assocs., Inc. v. Buchanan Volkswagen, Inc., 405 S.C. 643,
649, 748 S.E.2d 801, 804 (Ct. App. 2013) ("[W]hen reviewing an action at law, on
appeal of a case tried without a jury, the appellate court's jurisdiction is limited to
correction of errors at law, and the appellate court will not disturb the [special
referee]'s findings of fact as long as they are reasonably supported by the
evidence." (alteration by court) (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)); Moore v. Benson, 390 S.C. 153, 162, 700 S.E.2d 273, 278 (Ct.
App. 2010) ("An action for conversion is an action at law.").
As to Issue 2: S.C. Code Ann. § 33-44-301(b)(1) (2006) (providing "[e]ach
manager is an agent of the company for the purpose of its business, and an act of a
manager, including the signing of an instrument in the company's name, for
apparently carrying on in the ordinary course the company's business or business
of the kind carried on by the company binds the company" (emphasis added));
Town of Kingstree v. Chapman, 405 S.C. 282, 314, 747 S.E.2d 494, 510 (Ct. App.
2013) (stating "the concept of apparent authority depends upon manifestations by
the principal to a third party and the reasonable belief by the third party that the
agent is authorized to bind the principal" (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
AFFIRMED.1
FEW C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.