State v. Hyatt

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Aaron D. Hyatt, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2014-000082
Appeal From Lancaster County
Brian M. Gibbons, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-343
Submitted April 1, 2015 – Filed July 15, 2015
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Kathrine Haggard Hudgins, of
Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Christina Catoe Bigelow, of Columbia;
and Solicitor Douglas A. Barfield Jr., of Kershaw, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Aaron D. Hyatt appeals his conviction for assault and battery of
a high and aggravated nature, arguing (1) the trial court erred in refusing to
recharge the jury on the law of self-defense and (2) the trial court erred in denying
his motion for a directed verdict. We affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR,
and the following authorities:
1. As to whether the trial court erred by not recharging the law of self-defense:
State v. Lemire, 406 S.C. 558, 565, 753 S.E.2d 247, 251 (Ct. App. 2013) ("An
appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision regarding jury instructions
unless the trial court abused its discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when the
trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual
conclusions, is without evidentiary support." (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); State v. Anderson, 322 S.C. 89, 94, 470 S.E.2d 103, 106 (1996) ("It is
well established in South Carolina that [w]hen a jury requests an additional charge,
it is sufficient for the court to charge only those matters necessary to answer the
jury's request." (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Hyatt's motion for a directed
verdict: State v. Adams, 332 S.C. 139, 144, 504 S.E.2d 124, 126 (Ct. App. 1998)
(holding the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion
for a directed verdict was unpreserved because the defendant did not renew his
motion at the close of his case); State v. Bailey, 368 S.C. 39, 43 n.4, 626 S.E.2d
898, 900 n.4 (Ct. App. 2006) ("If a defendant presents evidence after the denial of
his directed verdict motion at the close of the State's case, he must make another
directed verdict motion at the close of all evidence in order to appeal the
sufficiency of the evidence."); State v. Hepburn, 406 S.C. 416, 432, 753 S.E.2d
402, 410 (2013) (adopting the waiver rule regarding the review of motions for a
directed verdict); id. at 430 n.15, 753 S.E.2d at 409 n.15 ("If a defendant fails to
renew his motion for judgment of acquittal at the end of all the evidence, the
waiver doctrine operates to foreclose the issue of sufficiency of the evidence on
appeal absent a manifest miscarriage of justice." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
FEW, C.J., and HUFF and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.