State v. Parkhurst

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Tiphani Marie Parkhurst, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2013-000909
Appeal From Spartanburg County
R. Lawton McIntosh, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2015-UP-446
Heard December 9, 2014 – Filed September 9, 2015
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Lara Mary Caudy, of Columbia, for
Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Deputy Attorney General David A. Spencer, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Appellant Tiphani Parkhurst appeals her conviction for
trafficking in methamphetamine, arguing the circuit court erred in (1) denying her
pretrial motion to dismiss because, under the plain meaning of South Carolina
Code section 44-53-375(C) (Supp. 2014), the State could not establish she
attempted to manufacture methamphetamine when no methamphetamine was
found in the home; and (2) denying her motion for directed verdict because no
direct or substantial circumstantial evidence demonstrated she knowingly engaged
in manufacturing or trafficking methamphetamine. We affirm.
1. We find the circuit court properly denied Parkhurst's motion to dismiss the
indictment based on a plain reading of the statute. See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-
375(C) ("A person who . . . knowingly attempts to become in actual or constructive
possession of ten grams or more of methamphetamine . . . is guilty of a felony
which is known as trafficking in methamphetamine"); S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-
110(28) (Supp. 2014) ("'Methamphetamine' includes any salt, isomer, or salt of an
isomer, or any mixture or compound containing amphetamine or
methamphetamine."); State v. Elwell, 403 S.C. 606, 612, 743 S.E.2d 802, 806
(2013) ("What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best
evidence of the legislative intent or will." (citation omitted)); Bryant v. State, 384
S.C. 525, 529, 683 S.E.2d 280, 282 (2009) ("The primary rule of statutory
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature." (citation
omitted)); State v. Amerson, 311 S.C. 316, 320, 428 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1993)
("Appellate courts are bound by fact findings in response to motions preliminary to
trial when the findings are supported by the evidence and not clearly wrong or
controlled by an error of law." (citation omitted)); State v. Cain, Op. No. 5324
(S.C. Ct. App. filed Sept. 2, 2015) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 34 at 39–46)
(affirming the conviction of Parkhurst's codefendant because the circuit court
properly admitted evidence regarding the theoretical yield of methamphetamine the
defendant could have produced "based on empty blister packs of
pseudoephedrine," as well as other components of a methamphetamine lab found
in and around the home, to establish the statutory weight for trafficking in
methamphetamine (citations omitted)).
2. We find the circuit court properly denied Parkhurst's motion for directed verdict
because the evidence created a quintessential jury question of whether she was
involved in manufacturing or trafficking methamphetamine. See State v. Brandt,
393 S.C. 526, 542, 713 S.E.2d 591, 599 (2011) ("When reviewing a denial of a
directed verdict, an appellate court views the evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the State." (citation omitted)); id. (stating
if any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tends
to prove the guilt of the accused, this court must find the case was properly
submitted to the jury (citation omitted)); State v. Hudson, 277 S.C. 200, 202, 284
S.E.2d 773, 775 (1981) ("Constructive possession can be established by
circumstantial as well as direct evidence, and possession may be shared." (citations
omitted)); id. at 203, 284 S.E.2d at 775 (providing in cases in which "contraband
materials are found on premises under the control of the accused, this fact in and of
itself gives rise to an inference of knowledge and possession [that] may be
sufficient to carry the case to the jury" (citation omitted)); State v. Jackson, 395
S.C. 250, 255, 717 S.E.2d 609, 612 (Ct. App. 2011) ("In drug cases, the element of
knowledge is seldom established through direct evidence, but may be proven
circumstantially. Knowledge can be proven by the evidence of acts, declarations,
or conduct of the accused from which the inference may be drawn that the accused
knew of the existence of the prohibited substances." (citations omitted)); State v.
Zeigler, 364 S.C. 94, 101, 610 S.E.2d 859, 863 (Ct. App. 2005) ("When ruling on a
motion for a directed verdict, the [circuit] court is concerned with the existence or
nonexistence of evidence, not its weight." (citations omitted)).
AFFIRMED.
WILLIAMS, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.