David Caesar v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
David Caesar, Appellant,
v.
The State of South Carolina, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2019-001476
Appeal From Sumter County
R. Ferrell Cothran, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2022-UP-131
Submitted January 1, 2022 – Filed March 23, 2022
AFFIRMED
Tommy Arthur Thomas, of Irmo, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior
Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch,
Jr., Assistant Attorney General Leon David Leggett, III,
and Assistant Attorney General Harley Littleton
Kirkland, all of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: David Caesar appeals the circuit court's order dismissing his
action for a declaratory judgment. On appeal, Caesar argues the circuit court erred
in dismissing his action because (1) the Post-Conviction Relief (PCR) Act did not
preclude him from bringing his petition for a declaratory judgment and (2) his prior
conviction, for which he received a sentence under the Youthful Offender Act,
should not have been used to enhance his sentence under the recidivist statute.
Because the PCR Act provides the exclusive remedy for Caesar's claim, the circuit
court did not err in dismissing Caesar's action for a declaratory judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(A)(1) (2014) ("Any person who has been
convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims . . . [t]hat the conviction or
the sentence was in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution or laws of this State . . . may institute . . . a proceeding under [the
PCR Act] to secure relief."); S.C. Code Ann. § 17-27-20(B) (2014) ("Except as
otherwise provided in [the PCR Act], it comprehends and takes the place of all
other common law, statutory or other remedies heretofore available for challenging
the validity of the conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of
them."); Carpenter v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 431 S.C. 512, 523-24, 848 S.E.2d 346,
351-52 (Ct. App. 2020) (finding Carpenter's claims that he raised under the
Declaratory Judgment Act were procedurally barred by the PCR Act because his
claims "fit squarely into a category available for redress under the PCR Act").1
AFFIRMED.2
WILLIAMS, C.J., MCDONALD, J., and LOCKEMY, A.J., concur.
1
Because the resolution of this issue is dispositive, we need not consider Caesar's
remaining argument. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335
S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (stating an appellate court need not
address remaining issues when its resolution of a prior issue is dispositive).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.