Tedder v. State

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Jacqueline Tedder, Petitioner,
v.
State of South Carolina, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2012-207814
Appeal From Oconee County
John C. Few, Circuit Court Judge
Alexander S. Macaulay, First PCR Judge
J. Cordell Maddox, Jr., Second PCR Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-185
Heard March 16, 2016 – Filed April 20, 2016
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender Robert M. Pachak, of Columbia, for
Petitioner.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant
Attorney General Patrick Lowell Schmeckpeper, both of
Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Jacqueline Tedder appeals the post-conviction relief (PCR)
court's findings that she was not entitled to a belated appeal of the denial of her
first application for PCR and her plea counsel was ineffective in failing to hold a
suppression hearing. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:
1. As to a belated appeal and PCR counsel's ineffectiveness: Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (stating to prove trial counsel was
ineffective, the defendant must show (1) trial counsel's performance was deficient
and (2) the deficiency prejudiced the defendant); Solomon v. State, 313 S.C. 526,
529, 443 S.E.2d 540, 542 (1994) (finding when matters of credibility are involved
deference is given to the PCR court's findings because appellate courts lack the
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses); Caprood v. State, 338 S.C. 103,
109-10, 525 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2000) (determining the existence in the record of any
evidence of probative value is sufficient to uphold the PCR court's ruling).
2. As to plea counsel's ineffectiveness: Kolle v. State, 386 S.C. 578, 588, 690
S.E.2d 73, 78 (2010) ("A defendant who enters a plea on the advice of counsel may
only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea by showing that
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the defendant would
not have pled guilty, but would have insisted on going to trial."); State v. Williams,
351 S.C. 591, 598, 571 S.E.2d 703, 707 (Ct. App. 2002) (stating when probable
cause exists to believe a traffic violation has occurred, the decision to stop the
automobile is reasonable per se); State v. Pichardo, 367 S.C. 84, 97-98, 623 S.E.2d
840, 847 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding the police may stop and briefly detain a vehicle
if they have a reasonable suspicion the occupants are involved in criminal activity);
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (holding an examination by a
trained narcotics dog is not a search and seizure but is considered a minor
intrusion); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (holding once a drug dog
alerts an officer of possible contraband, probable cause exists to search the car);
State v. Weaver, 374 S.C. 313, 320, 649 S.E.2d 479, 482 (2007) ("Pursuant to the
automobile exception, if there is probable cause to search a vehicle, a warrant is
not necessary so long as the search is based on facts that would justify the issuance
of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained.").
AFFIRMED.
HUFF, A.C.J., and KONDUROS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.