John Deere Financial v. Bruce

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
John Deere Financial, f.s.b., f/k/a FPC Financial, f.s.b.,
Plaintiff,
v.
Jerry A. Bruce, Defendant,
and
Jerry A. Bruce, Third-Party Plaintiff,
Of Whom Jerry A. Bruce is the Respondent,
v.
Flint Equipment Co., Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2013-002435
Appeal From Greenville County
Edward W. Miller, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-183
Heard September 10, 2015 – Filed April 20, 2016
REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED
Casper Fredric Marcinak, III, and Kristen Lacombe
Nowacki, both of Smith Moore Leatherwood, LLP, of
Greenville, for Appellant.
Oscar W. Bannister, of Bannister, Wyatt & Stalvey, LLC,
of Greenville, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Flint Equipment Company (Flint) appeals the orders of the trial
court denying its motion to set aside a default and awarding damages to third-party
plaintiff Jerry A. Bruce. We reverse, vacate the damages award, and remand.
We agree with Flint's argument the trial court erred by reviewing its motion to set
aside the entry of default under the more stringent standard of Rule 60(b), SCRCP,
the relief from default judgment rule. See Rule 55(a), SCRCP ("When a party
against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or
otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter his default upon the calendar (file
book)."); Rule 55(b)(2), SCRCP (providing after a party applies for a default
judgment in a case not involving liquidated damages, "[i]f, in order to enable the
court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account
or to determine the amount of damages . . . the court may conduct such hearing or
order such references as it deems necessary and proper"); Ricks v. Weinrauch, 293
S.C. 372, 374, 360 S.E.2d 535, 536 (Ct. App. 1987) (stating the language of Rule
55(b), SCRCP, "indicates a court is unable to enter judgment until damages are
determined," and "[t]he entry of default is an official recognition of the failure to
appear or otherwise respond, but is not a judgment by default"); Sundown
Operating Co., Inc. v. Intedge Indus., Inc., 383 S.C. 601, 607, 681 S.E.2d 885, 888
(2009) ("[T]he standard for granting relief under Rule 60(b) is more rigorous than
under Rule 55(c), [SCRCP,] and . . . an entry of default may be set aside for
reasons that would be insufficient to relieve a party from a default judgment."); id.(recognizing the standard for granting relief from an entry of default under Rule
55(c) is mere "good cause," and "[t]his standard requires a party seeking relief
from an entry of default under Rule 55(c) to provide an explanation for the default
and give reasons why vacation of the default entry would serve the interests of
justice"); id. at 608, 681 S.E.2d at 888 ("Rule 60(b) requires a more particularized
showing of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, surprise, newly discovered
evidence, fraud, misrepresentation, or 'other misconduct of an adverse party.'"); id.
at 608, 681 S.E.2d at 888-89 ("The different standards under the two rules
underscore the clear intent to make it more difficult for a party to avoid a default
once the court has entered a judgment, which carries greater finality, and often
occurs later than, a clerk's entry of default.").
As Bruce was only seeking an entry of default—and more importantly—the trial
court did not award damages but set a damages hearing for the future, we find the
May 30 order was for an entry of default and not a default judgment. See Acrey v.
Acrey, 292 S.C. 387, 389, 356 S.E.2d 437, 438 (Ct. App. 1987) ("An order should
be construed within the context of the proceeding in which it is rendered.");
Petition of White, 299 S.C. 406, 412, 385 S.E.2d 211, 215 (Ct. App. 1989) ("As a
general rule, judgments are to be construed like other written instruments. The
determinative factor is the intent of the parties or the court, as gathered, not from
an isolated part of the contract or judgment but from all its parts. Hence, in
construing a contract or a judgment, it should be examined and considered in its
entirety; if the language employed is plain and unambiguous, there is no room for
construction or interpretation and the effect thereof must be declared in the light of
the literal meaning of the language used.").
Accordingly, the trial court erred in applying the more stringent standard of Rule
60(b) in considering Flint's motion for relief.1 We therefore reverse the trial court's
order denying relief, vacate the order awarding damages, and remand.
REVERSED, VACATED, AND REMANDED.
HUFF, A.C.J., and WILLIAMS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
1
We find no merit to Bruce's argument that Flint's position requiring an award of
damages in a default judgment creates a disparity in how relief from default is
obtained between claims for liquidated damages and claims for unliquidated
damages. The difference in default judgments for liquidated and unliquidated
damages is the need for a hearing to determine unliquidated damages, while no
such hearing may be needed for liquidated damages. An award of damages is still
necessary for a judgment in either situation.