Carter v. Myers

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Raymond Carter, Appellant,
v.
Donnie Myers, Solicitor, Lexington County; Tracey
Carroll, Assistant Solicitor, Lexington County; Brian
Buck, Irmo Police Department; Scott Franklin, Irmo
Police Department; Timothy E. Stephenson, South
Carolina Law Enforcement Division; George White;
Tammy Carter (AKA: Tammy Scrogham); Barbara
Keadle (AKA: Diane Hinkle), Lexington County DSS;
Francis Ross, Lexington County DSS; and Paulette Jolly,
Guardian ad Litem, in their official and individual
capacities, Defendants,
Of whom Donnie Myers, Solicitor, Lexington County;
Tracey Carroll, Assistant Solicitor, Lexington County;
Brian Buck, Irmo Police Department; Scott Franklin,
Irmo Police Department; Timothy E. Stephenson, South
Carolina Law Enforcement Division; and The Estate of
George White are the Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2013-000449
Appeal From Lexington County
Frank R. Addy, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-158
Submitted December 1, 2015 – Filed April 6, 2016
AFFIRMED
Raymond Carter, of Columbia, pro se.
Andrew F. Lindemann and William H. Davidson, II, both
of Davidson & Lindemann, PA, of Columbia, for
Respondent Donnie Myers.
David Leon Morrison and Kassi B. Sandifer, both of
Morrison Law Firm, LLC, of Columbia, for Respondents
Brian Buck and Scott Franklin.
PER CURIAM: Raymond Carter appeals a circuit court's order dismissing
Carter's claims against Respondents. Carter argues the circuit court erred by (1)
determining the South Carolina Tort Claims Act's (the Act's) statute of limitations
barred his claims, (2) failing to toll the statute of limitations, and (3) finding
Solicitor Donnie Myers and Assistant Solicitor Tracey Carroll were entitled to
prosecutorial immunity. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:
1. We find the Act's statute of limitations barred Carter's claims. See Doe v.
Marion, 373 S.C. 390, 395, 645 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2007) ("In reviewing the
dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP, the appellate court
applies the same standard of review as the [circuit] court."); id. at 395, 645 S.E.2d
at 247-48 ("The question is whether, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
with every doubt resolved in his behalf, the complaint states any valid claim for
relief." (quoting Gentry v. Yonce, 337 S.C. 1, 5, 522 S.E.2d 137, 139 (1999))); S.C.
Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a) (2005) ("[The Act] constitutes the exclusive remedy for
any tort committed by an employee of a governmental entity."); S.C. Code Ann.
§ 15-78-30(c) (Supp. 2015) ("'[E]mployee' means any officer, employee, agent, or
court appointed representative of the State or its political subdivisions . . . ."); S.C.
Code Ann. § 15-78-110 (2005) ("[A]ny action brought pursuant to [the Act] is
forever barred unless an action is commenced within two years after the date the
loss was or should have been discovered . . . .").1
2. We find Carter's second issue is abandoned. See Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 691 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[S]hort,
conclusory statements made without supporting authority are deemed abandoned
on appeal and therefore not presented for review.").
3. We need not address Carter's prosecutorial immunity argument. See Futch v.
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598
(1999) (finding it unnecessary to address remaining issues on appeal when the
disposition of a preceding issue is dispositive).
AFFIRMED.2
HUFF, A.C.J., and WILLIAMS, and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
1
We also note the circuit court properly dismissed Carter's criminal conspiracy
claim against the Estate of George White. See S.C. Code Ann. § 17-1-10 (2014)
(providing that the State prosecutes criminal actions); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-410(2015) (codifying the crime of criminal conspiracy); Marion, 373 S.C. at 395, 645
S.E.2d at 247-48 ("The question is whether . . . the complaint states any valid claim
for relief." (quoting Gentry, 337 S.C. at 5, 522 S.E.2d at 139)).
2
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.