DocketNumber： 2012-UP-098
Filed Date： 2/22/2012
Status： Non-Precedential
Modified Date： 10/22/2024
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Andre Maurice Massey, Appellant.
Appeal From Sumter County
George C. James, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2012-UP-098
Submitted February 1, 2012 Filed
February 22, 2012
AFFIRMED
Appellate Defender LaNelle Cantey DuRant, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan Wilson, Chief Deputy Attorney John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Assistant Attorney General Mark R. Farthing, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Ernest A. Finney, III, of Sumter, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Andre Maurice Massey appeals his convictions for armed robbery and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) denying Massey's suppression motion and motion for a mistrial based on evidence obtained in violation of section 24-21-290 of the South Carolina Code (2007), and (2) sentencing Massey to life without parole when the notice was deficient because it did not include the words "without parole." We affirm[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), SCACR, and the following authorities:
1. As to whether the trial court erred in denying Massey's motion to suppress and motion for a mistrial: S.C. Code Ann. § 24-21-290 (2007) ("All information and data obtained in the discharge of his official duty by a probation agent is privileged information, is not receivable as evidence in a court, and may not be disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone other than the judge or others entitled under this chapter to receive reports unless ordered by the court or the director."); State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006) ("The trial [court]'s factual findings on whether evidence should be suppressed due to a Fourth Amendment violation are reviewed for clear error."); State v. Stanley, 365 S.C. 24, 33, 615 S.E.2d 455, 460 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The decision to grant or deny a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial [court]."); Hutto v. State, 387 S.C. 244, 250, 692 S.E.2d 196, 199 (2010) (holding that even if a disclosure is made in violation of section 24-21-290, the exclusionary rule would not apply to a statutory right).
2. As to whether the trial court erred in sentencing Massey to life without parole when the notice was deficient because it did not include the words "without parole": S.C. Code Ann. § 17-25-45(H) (Supp. 2011) ("Where the solicitor is required to seek or determines to seek sentencing of a defendant under this section, written notice must be given by the solicitor to the defendant and defendant's counsel not less than ten days before trial."); James v. State, 372 S.C. 287, 294, 641 S.E.2d 899, 903 (2007) ("[S]o long as the defendant and his counsel, at least ten days prior to trial, possess actual notice of the State's intention to seek a sentence under South Carolina's recidivist statute, the statute has been satisfied."); State v. Burdette, 335 S.C. 34, 39-40, 515 S.E.2d 525, 528 (1999) ("Once the indictment informs a defendant of the charges against him, section 17-25-45(H) only requires the solicitor to inform the defendant that the recidivist sentencing statue will be applied upon conviction." (emphasis added)).
AFFIRMED.
WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.