Akbar v. SCDC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Basil W. Akbar, Appellant,
v.
South Carolina Department of Corrections, Bill Byers,
Martha Roof, Debrah Long, Lisia Johnson, Ann and John
Doe, Respondents.
Appellate Case No. 2013-002306
Appeal From Richland County
G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-348
Submitted February 1, 2016 – Filed July 6, 2016
AFFIRMED
Basil W. Akbar, pro se.
Daniel R. Settana, Jr. and Brandon Paul Jones, both of
McKay Cauthen Settana & Stubley, PA, of Columbia, for
Respondents.
PER CURIAM: Basil Akbar, an inmate serving a life sentence, appeals the
circuit court's order granting Respondents' motion to dismiss and motion for
summary judgment. On appeal, Akbar argues the circuit court erred in (1) denying
his motion to compel discovery and his request for damages, and granting
Respondents' motion for summary judgment and motion to dismiss; (2) not finding
Respondents unlawfully deprived him of personal property; (3) not finding
Respondents' refusal to process grievances constituted default and reprisal; (4) not
finding Respondents' conduct of closing his account and fraudulently appropriating
his work-release escrow savings account violated his constitutional rights; and (5)
not finding Respondents' conduct hindered Akbar's "ability to grieve Civil Rights
and Civil liberty claims." We affirm.
Summary judgment was proper because Akbar's claims were barred by the two-
year statute of limitations in the Torts Claims Act. See Young v. S.C. Dep't of
Corr., 333 S.C. 714, 717, 511 S.E.2d 413, 415 (Ct. App. 1999) ("Summary
judgment is appropriate when it is clear there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); id. at 717-18,
511 S.E.2d at 415 ("In determining whether any triable issue of fact exists, as will
preclude summary judgment, the evidence and all inferences which can be
reasonably drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party."); S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-110 (2005) (setting forth a two-year
statute of limitations for claims arising under the Tort Claims Act).1 Regarding
any alleged misappropriation of the 1981 account, Akbar waited until January
2013 to file his complaint. Viewed in the light most favorable to Akbar, the record
shows he was aware the 1981 account did not exist more than two years prior to
filing the complaint. Akbar admitted in his complaint that he first became aware
on February 9, 2009, that the Department of Corrections (the Department) did not
have any records of the 1981 account. Additionally, the record contains a
document from the Department dated April 28, 2010, informing Akbar it did not
1
We find the circuit court properly applied the two-year statute of limitations
because Akbar did not submit evidence showing he filed a verified claim. See
Flateau v. Harrelson, 355 S.C. 197, 207, 584 S.E.2d 413, 418 (Ct. App. 2003)
(stating the claimant must file a verified claim pursuant to section 15-78-80 of the
South Carolina Code (2005 & Supp. 2015) for the three-year statute of limitations
to apply); Pollard v. Cty. of Florence, 314 S.C. 397, 400, 444 S.E.2d 534, 535 (Ct.
App. 1994) ("[T]he 'verified claim' procedure must be strictly complied with in
order to trigger the three-year limitations period."); Flateau, 355 S.C. at 208, 584
S.E.2d at 418 (finding the two-year statute of limitations applied when the record
did not contain evidence showing the claimant filed a verified claim).
have any record of that account. Notwithstanding that, Akbar waited until January
16, 2013, to file his complaint. Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to Akbar,
the circuit court properly determined Akbar's claims related to the alleged
misappropriation of his 1981 account were barred by the two-year statute of
limitations.
Additionally, any claims arising from Respondents' alleged failure to timely
respond to Akbar's requests or provide him information about the account were
barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Akbar filed Step 1 grievance forms
on August 18, 2009; March 19, 2010; May 4, 2010; and June 16, 2010; alleging the
Department's employees were not timely responding to his requests and asserting
the Department and its employees were committing a tort by refusing to provide
information about the account. Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to Akbar,
Akbar was aware of the facts giving rise to his allegations on August 18, 2009;
March 19, 2010; May 4, 2010; and June 16, 2010; yet he waited until January 16,
2013, to file his complaint. Accordingly, any claims related to Respondents'
alleged failure to timely respond to Akbar's requests or provide him information
about the account were barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
Because the circuit court properly granted summary judgment on the basis that
Akbar's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, it did not err in denying
his motion to compel discovery on the ground the motion was moot. See Young,
333 S.C. at 718, 511 S.E.2d at 415 ("[W]hen plain, palpable, and indisputable facts
exist on which reasonable minds cannot differ, summary judgment should be
granted.").2
AFFIRMED.3
HUFF, KONDUROS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.
2
Because our finding that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment
based on the two-year statute of limitations is dispositive, we do not consider
Akbar's remaining arguments. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown,
Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing an appellate court
need not address remaining issues when determination of a prior issue is
dispositive).
3
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.