City of Rock Hill v. Allen

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
City of Rock Hill, Appellant,
v.
James Delaney Allen, III, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2014-002286
Appeal From York County
John C. Hayes, III, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-422
Submitted September 1, 2016 – Filed October 5, 2016
REVERSED
City Solicitors Paula Knox Brown and Christopher
Edward Barton, both of Rock Hill, for Appellant.
James Delaney Allen, III, of Rock Hill, pro se.
PER CURIAM: The City of Rock Hill (the City) appeals the circuit court's
reversal of James Allen's conviction for driving under the influence (DUI), first
offense, arguing the circuit court erroneously determined Allen's arrest was illegal
because the arresting officer (1) did not personally observe any of the acts
establishing probable cause to stop Allen, and (2) charged Allen using a uniform
traffic ticket instead of an arrest warrant. We reverse pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR.1
As to Issue 1, Allen's arrest was legal because a municipal police officer has the
authority to arrest a person without a warrant for any suspected freshly committed
crime, regardless of whether the crime was committed in the officer's presence.
See S.C. Code Ann. § 5-7-110 (2004) ("Police officers shall be vested with all the
powers and duties conferred by law upon constables . . . ."); Richardson v. Town of
Mount Pleasant, 350 S.C. 291, 297, 566 S.E.2d 523, 527 (2002) (recognizing the
legislature has expressly delegated "the powers of state constables . . . to municipal
police officers"); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-7-50 (2007) ("A special state constable
possesses all of the rights and powers prescribed by law for . . . deputy sheriffs
. . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 23-13-60 (2007) ("The deputy sheriffs may for any
suspected freshly committed crime, whether upon view or upon prompt
information or complaint, arrest without warrant . . . ."). Additionally, Allen's
offense was, in legal effect, committed in the arresting officer's presence because it
was committed within the view of other officers and Allen admitted to consuming
alcohol prior to driving on the night of his arrest. See Prosser v. Parsons, 245 S.C.
493, 500-01, 141 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1965) (holding "an act taking place within the
view of one officer [i]s in legal effect within the view of . . . other cooperating
officers and, if the combination of acts committed within the view of the
cooperating officers furnished probable cause for believing that the offense . . . was
being committed in their presence, then the arrest was lawful"); State v. Sawyer,
283 S.C. 127, 129, 322 S.E.2d 449, 449 (1984) ("[A] driver's admission should be
treated as part of the officer's sensory awareness of the commission of the offense
which satisfies the presence requirement . . . .").
As to Issue 2, the arresting officer properly charged Allen with DUI using a
uniform traffic ticket. See S.C. Code Ann. § 56-7-10(A) (Supp. 2015) ("There will
be a uniform traffic ticket used by all law enforcement officers in arrests for traffic
offenses . . . ."); City of Camden v. Brassell, 326 S.C. 556, 566, 486 S.E.2d 492,
497 (Ct. App. 1997) ("[D]riving under the influence, first offense, under
[section] 56-5-2930 [of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2015)] is a 'traffic
violation' . . . ."); City of Goose Creek v. Brady, 288 S.C. 20, 21, 339 S.E.2d 509,
510 (1986) ("Since this [DUI] action was commenced by the issuance of a
[uniform traffic ticket], an arrest warrant was not required . . . .").
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
REVERSED.
WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and GEATHERS, JJ., concur.