Helper v. Helper

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Diahnnie Helper, Respondent,
v.
Vernon Helper, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2015-000715
Appeal From Richland County
Peter L. Fuge, Family Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2016-UP-463
Submitted September 1, 2016 – Filed November 9, 2016
AFFIRMED
Bradley Myers Kirkland, of Bradley M. Kirkland, LLC,
of Columbia; and Stephanie Nichole Weissenstein, of
McDonnell & Associates, P.A., of Lexington, for
Appellant.
Diahnnie Helper, of Columbia, pro se.
PER CURIAM: Vernon Helper appeals an order awarding Diahnnie Helper
alimony. We affirm.
1. We find the family court did not err in finding Diahnnie was not collaterally
estopped from pursuing her alimony claim. See McNaughton-McKay Elec. Co. of
N.C. v. Andrich, 324 S.C. 275, 279, 482 S.E.2d 564, 566 (Ct. App. 1997)
("Collateral estoppel will bar the relitigation of an issue which was actually
litigated and necessary to the outcome of a prior lawsuit."). Although the
bankruptcy order was a final order that was binding on Diahnnie, we find the issue
of the reserved alimony was not "essential to the prior [bankruptcy] judgment"
because when Diahnnie filed the bankruptcy petition, she had not been able to
locate Vernon in more than two years. See id. at 280, 482 S.E.2d at 567 ("The
general rule is that a confirmed plan of reorganization [in bankruptcy] is binding
on the debtor and other proponents of the plan." (quoting Paul v. Monts, 906 F.2d
1468, 1471 (10th Cir. 1990))); id. at 279, 482 S.E.2d at 566-67 ("[I]n the context of
bankruptcy matters, the elements required for collateral estoppel to apply are: (1)
the same issue; (2) was actually litigated; (3) determined by a valid and final
judgment; and (4) such determination was essential to the prior judgment.").
2. We find the family court did not re-open the issue of equitable distribution.
Although Diahnnie requested a division of Vernon's stock incentive plan and an
apportionment of debt in her complaint for alimony, the family court stated at the
beginning of the hearing that it could not consider those issues and could only go
forward on the issue of alimony. In its order, the family court found Diahnnie's
request for a division of Vernon's stock incentive plan and an apportionment of
marital debt was barred by res judicata, and "[t]he sole issue before this [c]ourt
[was] the issue of alimony as reserved in the prior" divorce order. Thus, we find
the family court did not re-open the issue of equitable distribution.
3. We find the family court did not err in finding Diahnnie's claim was not barred
by laches. See Strickland v. Strickland, 375 S.C. 76, 83, 650 S.E.2d 465, 469
(2007) ("Laches is an equitable doctrine defined as 'neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, under circumstances affording opportunity for
diligence, to do what in law should have been done.'" (quoting Hallums v.
Hallums, 296 S.C. 195, 198, 371 S.E.2d 525, 527 (1988))); id. ("In order to
establish laches as a defense, a defendant must show that the complaining party
unreasonably delayed its assertion of a right, resulting in prejudice to the
defendant."). Although Diahnnie brought the present action eleven years after the
divorce order, there is no evidence Diahnnie delayed in bringing the action and
serving Vernon once she learned his whereabouts. Thus, Vernon failed to establish
the defense of laches.
4. We find the family court adequately considered the statutory factors for
awarding alimony and properly awarded Diahnnie $75,000 in lump-sum alimony.
See Crossland v. Crossland, 408 S.C. 443, 451, 759 S.E.2d 419, 423 (2014)
("Alimony is a substitute for the support normally incidental to the marital
relationship."); id. ("Generally, alimony should place the supported spouse, as
nearly as is practical, in the same position he or she enjoyed during the marriage."
(quoting Allen v. Allen, 347 S.C. 177, 184, 554 S.E.2d 421, 424 (Ct. App. 2001)));
S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-130(C) (2014) (setting forth factors a family court should
consider when determining whether to award alimony); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-3-
130(B)(2) (2014) (providing the family court may award "[l]ump-sum alimony in a
finite total sum to be paid in one installment, or periodically over a period of time,
terminating only upon the death of the supported spouse, but not terminable or
modifiable based upon remarriage or changed circumstances in the future. The
purpose of this form of support may include, but not be limited to, circumstances
where the court finds alimony appropriate but determines that such an award be of
a finite and nonmodifiable nature"); Hendricks v. Hendricks, 285 S.C. 591, 594,
330 S.E.2d 553, 554 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating lump-sum alimony should only be
awarded "where special circumstances require it or make it advisable" (quoting
Millis v. Millis, 282 S.C. 610, 320 S.E.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1984))); id. (finding
lump-sum alimony was appropriate when the husband had not supported his family
for nineteen years and the wife needed funds for surgery and extensive home
repairs); Jones v. Jones, 270 S.C. 280, 283-84, 241 S.E.2d 904, 905 (1978)
(finding lump-sum alimony was appropriate when the husband's "past conduct and
statements demonstrate[d] both his inability and his unwillingness to provide
support for his family in regular installments"); Murdock v. Murdock, 243 S.C.
218, 225, 133 S.E.2d 323, 326 (1963) (finding lump-sum alimony was appropriate
when the "husband ha[d] moved to a distant state and remarried," and "[t]here
[was] little reason to think that he would have voluntarily sent periodic
payments . . . had they been ordered").
AFFIRMED.1
LOCKEMY, C.J., and SHORT and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.