Estate of Weekley v. Weekley

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Estate of Willie G. Weekley, Deceased, By Its Personal
Representative, Betty W. Denney, Respondent,
v.
L.C. Weekley, Laura Weekley Segel, Individually and as
Personal Representative of the Estate of William James
Weekley, Deceased, Peter Saad as Personal
Representative of Mary Elizabeth Weekley Saad,
Deceased and as Trustee of the Mary Elizabeth Saad
Trust,
Of Whom Laura Weekley Segel, Individually And As
Personal Representative Of The Estate Of William James
Weekley, Deceased, is the Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2015-001721
Appeal From Hampton County
Perry M. Buckner, III, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-208
Heard February 14, 2017 – Filed May 17, 2017
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Amanda A. Bailey, of McNair Law Firm, P.A., of Myrtle
Beach; and Kelly McPherson Jolley and Ariail Burnside
Kirk, both of Jolley Law Group, LLC, of Hilton Head
Island, for Appellant.
George Hamlin O'Kelley, III, of Buist Byars & Taylor,
LLC, of Mount Pleasant, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Laura Weekley Segel, individually and as personal
representative of the Estate of William James Weekley (collectively Appellants),
appeal the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Estate of Willie G. Weekley
(the Estate). Appellants contend the circuit court erred when if affirmed the
probate court's ruling that certain property transfers did not comply with the terms
of Willie G. Weekley's will. We reverse and remand.
1. The probate court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction over the matters
presented in this complex case. This case involves distribution of the still-open
Estate's assets and compliance with the terms set forth in Willie G. Weekley's will.
Therefore, it is the type of case over which our legislature has granted broad
subject matter jurisdiction to the probate court. See Judy v. Judy, 393 S.C. 160,
169, 712 S.E.2d 408, 412 (2011) ("[T]he extent of the probate court's jurisdiction is
defined by our legislature."); S.C. Code Ann. § 62-1-302(a) (Supp. 2016) ("[T]he
probate court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all subject matter related to:
(1) estates of decedents, including the contest of wills, construction of wills, . . .
and determination of heirs and successors of decedents and estates of protected
persons . . . ."). Appellants' remaining jurisdictional arguments regarding removal
do not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. See Allison v. W.L. Gore & Assocs.,
394 S.C. 185, 188, 714 S.E.2d 547, 549 (2011) ("A court's subject matter
jurisdiction is determined by whether it has the authority to hear the type of case in
question."). Because Appellants raises these jurisdictional issues for the first time
on appeal, they are not properly preserved for this court's consideration. See Pye v.
Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 564, 633 S.E.2d 505, 510 (2006) ("It is well settled
that an issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, but must have been
raised to and ruled upon by the [circuit] court to be preserved."). Accordingly, the
portion of the probate court's order finding proper the deed conveying the forty
acres around Willie G. Weekley's home, is the law of the case. See Atl. Coast
Builders & Contractors, LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285
(2012) ("[A]n unappealed ruling, right or wrong, is the law of the case.").
2. The circuit court erred in granting summary judgment when genuine issues of
material fact existed regarding Appellants' affirmative defenses of laches and
estoppel. Segel presented evidence indicating the Estate and its personal
representative had actual and constructive knowledge of the disputed transactions
some years prior to filing the present lawsuit, and Segel demonstrated Appellants
would be prejudiced by the return of the disputed property interests to the Estate.
See In re Estate of Weeks, 329 S.C. 251, 260, 495 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ct. App. 1997)
("[T]he circuit court should apply the same standard of review when it considers an
appeal from the probate court as an appellate court would apply on appeal.");
Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002) ("When reviewing
the grant of summary judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard
applied by the trial court pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP."); id. ("Summary
judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact such that
the moving party must prevail as a matter of law."); Robinson v. Estate of Harris,
388 S.C. 616, 627, 698 S.E.2d 214, 220 (2010) ("Under the doctrine of laches, if a
party, knowing his rights, does not seasonably assert them, but by unreasonable
delay causes his adversary to incur expenses or enter into obligations or otherwise
detrimentally change his position, then equity will ordinarily refuse to enforce
those rights." (quoting Chambers of S.C., Inc. v. Cty. Council for Lee Cty., 315
S.C. 418, 421, 434 S.E.2d 279, 280 (1993))); Regions Bank v. Schmauch, 354 S.C.
648, 674-75, 582 S.E.2d 432, 446 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Elements of equitable estoppel
as to the party estopped are: (1) conduct by the party estopped which amounts to a
false representation or concealment of material facts; (2) the intention that such
conduct shall be acted upon by the other party; and (3) knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the true facts. Essential elements of estoppel as related to the party
claiming the estoppel are: (1) lack of knowledge and of means of knowledge of
truth as to facts in question; (2) reliance upon conduct of the party estopped; and
(3) prejudicial change in position." (quoting Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346
S.E. 580, 589, 553 S.E.2d 110, 114 (2001))).
3. Because we reverse the grant of summary judgment based on Appellants' laches
and estoppel arguments, we decline to address the remaining arguments as to why
the grant of summary judgment was error. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of
Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (noting an
appellate court need not address remaining issues on appeal when the disposition
of a prior issue is dispositive).
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
SHORT, WILLIAMS, and KONDUROS, JJ., concur.