Bank of New York Mellon Trust v. Riley

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Bank of New York Mellon Trust Co. N.A., not in its
individual capacity but Solely as Trustee on behalf of the
FDIC 2013-N1 Asset Trust, Respondent,
v.
Cornell Riley, Appellant.
Appellate Case No. 2015-001543
Appeal From Dorchester County
Diane Schafer Goodstein, Circuit Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-316
Submitted June 1, 2017 – Filed July 26, 2017
AFFIRMED
Cornell Riley, of Ladson, pro se.
Magalie Arcure Creech, of Finkel Law Firm LLC, of
Charleston, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Cornell Riley appeals the circuit court's order granting summary
judgment, arguing the circuit court erred in granting the Bank of New York Mellon
Trust's (Bank's) motion for summary judgment and in reversing its decision to
grant Riley a jury trial because Bank failed to give him notice of default and
acceleration. The note and mortgage provided that notice was deemed given when
mailed by first class mail. Accordingly, we affirm1 pursuant to Rule 220(b),
SCACR, and the following authorities: Turner v. Milliman, 392 S.C. 116, 121-22,
708 S.E.2d 766, 769 (2011) ("When reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
appellate courts apply the same standard applied by the trial court pursuant to Rule
56(c), SCRCP."); id. at 122, 708 S.E.2d at 769 (providing summary judgment is
warranted "when the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and discovery show there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the movant must prevail as a matter of law");
Carolina All. for Fair Emp't v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, Licensing, & Regulation, 337
S.C. 476, 485, 523 S.E.2d 795, 799 (Ct. App. 1999) ("The party seeking summary
judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact."); id. at 485, 523 S.E.2d at 799-800 ("Once the party moving for
summary judgment meets this initial burden, the non-moving party cannot simply
rest on the mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings. Rather, the
non-moving party must come forward with specific facts showing there is a
genuine issue for trial." (citation omitted)); Turner, 392 S.C. at 122, 708 S.E.2d at
769 ("[T]he evidence and all reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party." (quoting Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488,
493-94, 597 S.E.2d 857, 860 (2002))); BPS, Inc. v. Worthy, 362 S.C. 319, 326, 608
S.E.2d 155, 159 (Ct. App. 2005) ("[W]hen plain, palpable, and indisputable facts
exist on which reasonable minds cannot differ, summary judgment should be
granted.").
AFFIRMED.
LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.