Alexander v. SCDC

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
John Alexander, Appellant,
v.
South Carolina Department of Corrections, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2015-001761
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
S. Phillip Lenski, Administrative Law Court Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2017-UP-269
Submitted May 1, 2017 – Filed July 5, 2017
AFFIRMED
John Alexander, pro se.
Christina Catoe Bigelow, of the South Carolina
Department of Corrections, of Columbia, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B)(e) (Supp. 2016) ("The court of appeals
may . . . reverse or modify the decision [of the ALC] if the substantive rights of the
petitioner have been prejudiced because the finding, conclusion, or decision
is . . . clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence
on the whole record . . . ."); Friends of Earth v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of S.C., 387
S.C. 360, 366, 692 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2010) ("Substantial evidence is not a mere
scintilla; rather, it is evidence which, considering the record as a whole, would
allow reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the [ALC]."); S.C. Code
Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2016) (explaining an appellate court "may not substitute
its judgment for the judgment of the [ALC] as to the weight of the evidence on
questions of fact"); Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 382, 527 S.E.2d 742, 757
(2000) ("Courts traditionally have adopted a 'hands off' doctrine regarding judicial
involvement in prison disciplinary procedures and other internal prison matters,
although they must intercede when infringements complained of by an inmate
reach constitutional dimensions."); id. at 369-70, 527 S.E.2d at 750 ("The statutory
right to sentence-related credits is a protected 'liberty' interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment, entitling an inmate to minimal due process to ensure the state-created
right was not arbitrarily abrogated." (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
557-58 (1974))); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 567 ("If confrontation and cross-examination
of those furnishing evidence against [an] inmate were to be allowed as a matter of
course, as in criminal trials, there would be considerable potential for havoc inside
the prison walls."); Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 371, 527 S.E.2d at 751 ("The Supreme
Court . . . held [an] inmate does not have a constitutional right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses who testify against him, although prison officials have the
discretion to grant that right in appropriate cases."); Skipper v. S.C. Dep't of Corr.,
370 S.C. 267, 279, 633 S.E.2d 910, 916 (Ct. App. 2006) ("Due process in prison
drug testing does not require that a prisoner be afforded duplicative testing, nor
does it require utilizing a testing method chosen by the prisoner.").
AFFIRMED.1
LOCKEMY, C.J., and HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.