Miller v. SCPEBA

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
Edward W. Miller, Appellant,
v.
South Carolina Public Employee Benefit Authority,
South Carolina Retirement Systems, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2015-002228
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Deborah Brooks Durden, Administrative Law Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-074
Heard October 4, 2017 – Filed February 7, 2018
AFFIRMED
Howard W. Paschal, Jr., of Price, Paschal & Ashmore,
PA, of Greenville; Edward W. Miller, of Grenville, both
for Appellant.
Justin Richard Werner, of the South Carolina Public
Employee Benefit Authority, of Columbia, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Edward W. Miller (Appellant), appeals the administrative law
court's (ALC's) order granting summary judgment in favor of the South Carolina
Public Employee Benefit Authority and South Carolina Retirement Systems
(collectively, Respondents), arguing the ALC erred in failing to find Respondents
(1) owe Appellant the fiduciary duty to fully and fairly disclose material facts, (2)
violated Appellant's right to equal protection by classifying him differently than
another similarly situated beneficiary, and (3) are estopped from asserting a
timeliness bar to Appellant's claim. Appellant further contends the ALC denied
him due process by conducting a hearing without full and fair notice and by failing
to preserve a proper record. We affirm pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the
following authorities:
1. Although we agree that the ALC erred in failing to find Respondents owe
Appellant the fiduciary duty to fully and fairly disclose material facts, we
nevertheless affirm in result as there has been no fiduciary violation. See CFRE,
LLC v. Greenville Cty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 (2011)
("Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which we are free to
decide without any deference to the court below."); State v. Elwell, 403 S.C. 606,
612, 743 S.E.2d 802, 806 (2013) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature."); S.C. Code Ann. § 9-16-
10(4) (Supp. 2017) (defining "fiduciary" as a person who "exercises any authority
to invest or manage assets of a system"); S.C. Code Ann. § 9-16-10(10)(a) (Supp.
2017) (defining "trustee" as "the Board of Directors of the South Carolina Public
Employee Benefit Authority"); S.C. Code Ann. § 9-16-40 (Supp. 2017) (providing
the duties "[a] trustee, commission member, or other fiduciary shall discharge . . .
with respect to a retirement system" including but not limited to "care, skill, and
caution," "impartially," and "good faith"); Strother v. Lexington Cty. Recreation
Comm'n, 332 S.C. 54, 62, 504 S.E.2d 117, 122 (1998) ("When faced with an
undefined statutory term, the court must interpret the term in accord with its usual
and customary meaning."); Trustee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(defining the term "trustee" as "[s]omeone who stands in a fiduciary or confidential
relation to another; esp[ecially], one who, having legal title to property, holds it in
trust for the benefit of another and owes a fiduciary duty to that beneficiary");
Anthony v. Padmar, Inc., 320 S.C. 436, 449, 465 S.E.2d 745, 752 (Ct. App. 1995)
("Parties in a fiduciary relationship must fully disclose to each other all known
information that is significant and material, and when this duty to disclose is
triggered, silence may constitute fraud.").
2. Because Appellant indicated he was employed "part-time" on his service
verification form and his employer also designated him as a part-time employee,
Appellant cannot establish an equal protection violation. See TNS Mills, Inc. v.
S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 331 S.C. 611, 626, 503 S.E.2d 471, 479 (1998) ("In order to
establish an equal protection violation, a party must show that similarly situated
persons received disparate treatment.").
3. The ALC properly declined to rule that Respondents are estopped from
asserting a timeliness bar to Appellant's challenge of the System's December 2002
determination. See S.C. Code Ann. § 9-21-50(A) (Supp. 2017) ("A member or the
member's designated beneficiary shall file a claim concerning an administrative
decision by the retirement systems arising pursuant to or by virtue of this title that
adversely affects the personal interest of the member or the member's designated
beneficiary by the filing of a written claim with the director within one year of the
decision by the retirement systems."); S.C. Code Ann. § 9-21-20(5) (Supp. 2017)
(explaining a member has exhausted his administrative remedies if that member
has "(a) filed a timely claim pursuant to Section 9-21-50 containing the
information required pursuant to that section; (b) participated in the agency claims
procedure established by the board; and (c) obtained a final retirement system
decision").
4. Because the record reflects the parties submitted undisputed and stipulated facts
and joint exhibits, agreed the case would be decided as a matter of law based upon
these submissions, and agreed no evidentiary hearing was necessary, the ALC
neither erred in viewing these submissions as cross-motions for summary judgment
nor in granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents. See SCALC Rule 68
(stating the rules of civil procedure may be applied in proceedings before the ALC
to resolve questions not addressed by the ALC rules); Rule 56(c), SCRCP ("The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."); Pee Dee Stores, Inc. v. Doyle, 381 S.C.
234, 240, 672 S.E.2d 799, 802 (Ct. App. 2009) ("Summary judgment should be
granted when plain, palpable, and indisputable facts exist on which reasonable
minds cannot differ.").
5. Although the ALC's order denying Appellant's motion to alter or amend refers
to a teleconference with the parties as a "telephonic hearing" and recites comments
allegedly made by Appellant as a partial basis for its ruling, we note the ALC held
the teleconference to confirm the parties' agreement to have the case adjudicated as
a matter of law based on the stipulated facts and joint exhibits; it neither accepted
evidence nor heard arguments from the parties during the call.
AFFIRMED.
WILLIAMS, THOMAS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.