Patterson v. SCPPPS

THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE
CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING
EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
James Wesley Patterson, Appellant,
v.
South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and
Pardon Services, Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2017-000486
Appeal From The Administrative Law Court
Deborah Brooks Durden, Administrative Law Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2018-UP-223
Submitted May 1, 2018 – Filed June 6, 2018
AFFIRMED
James Wesley Patterson, pro se.
Tommy Evans, Jr., of the South Carolina Department of
Probation, Parole and Pardon Services, of Columbia, for
Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following
authorities: Barton v. S.C. Dep't of Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 404 S.C. 395,
414, 745 S.E.2d 110, 120 (2013) ("Statutory interpretation is a question of law
subject to de novo review."); S.C. Code Ann. § 24-13-100 (2007) ("For purposes
of definition under South Carolina law, a 'no parole offense' means a class A, B, or
C felony . . . ."); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-1-90(A) (2015 & Supp. 2017) (classifying
manufacturing methamphetamine, third offense, as a class A felony); S.C. Code
Ann. § 24-13-150(A) (2007 & Supp. 2017) (providing that "an inmate convicted of
a 'no parole offense' . . . is not eligible for early release, discharge, or community
supervision . . . until [he] has served at least eighty-five percent" of his sentence);
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-53-375(B)(3) (2018) ("Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, a person convicted and sentenced pursuant to this subsection for a third or
subsequent offense in which all prior offenses were for possession of a controlled
substance . . . is eligible for parole . . . ." (emphasis added)); Bolin v. S.C. Dep't of
Corrs., 415 S.C. 276, 282, 781 S.E.2d 914, 917 (Ct. App. 2016) ("The legislature's
use of the phrase, 'Notwithstanding any other provision of law,' in the amendments
to section[] 44-53-375 . . . expresses its intent to repeal section 24-13-100 to the
extent it conflicts with amended section[] 44-53-375 . . . ."); Miller v. Doe, 312
S.C. 444, 447, 441 S.E.2d 319, 321 (1994) ("If a statute's language is plain and
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for
employing rules of statutory interpretation and the court has no right to look for or
impose another meaning.").
AFFIRMED.1
HUFF, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.
1
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.