DocketNumber： 2004-UP-425
Filed Date： 6/30/2004
Status： Non-Precedential
Modified Date： 10/11/2024
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 239(d)(2), SCACR.
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Court of Appeals
The State, Respondent,
v.
Alan J. Dalrymple, Appellant.
Appeal From Florence County
James E. Brogdon, Jr., Circuit Court
Judge
Unpublished Opinion No. 2004-UP-425
Submitted June 8, 2004 Filed June
30, 2004
AFFIRMED
Henry Morris Anderson, Jr., of Florence, for Appellant.
Attorney General Henry Dargan McMaster, Chief Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Charles H. Richardson, Assistant Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Edgar Lewis Clements, III, of Florence, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: Alan J. Dalrymple was convicted
of assault and battery with intent to kill (ABIK) and possession of a knife
during the commission of a violent crime. He appeals, arguing the trial court
erred in refusing to charge defense of others to the jury and failing to direct
a verdict on the ABIK charge. We affirm
[1] pursuant to Rule 220(b)(2), SCACR and the following authorities. As
to Issue I: State v. Crosby, 355 S.C. 47, 51, 584 S.E.2d 110, 112 (2003)
(The law to be charged must be determined from the evidence presented at trial.);
State v. Starnes, 340 S.C. 312, 322-23, 531 S.E.2d 907, 913 (2000) (Under
the theory of defense of others, one is not guilty of taking the life of an
assailant who assaults a friend, relative, or bystander if that friend, relative,
or bystander would likewise have the right to take the life of the assailant
in self-defense.); State v. Day, 341 S.C. 410, 416, 535 S.E.2d 431,
434 (2000) (holding self-defense is established where the evidence shows the defendant (1) the defendant was without
fault in bringing on the difficulty, (2) the defendant was in imminent danger of losing
his life or sustaining serious bodily injury or reasonably believed he was in
such danger, that (3) if based on a belief of imminent danger, an ordinary reasonable
person in his the defendants position would strike the fatal
blow, and (43)
the defendant had
no means of avoiding the danger). As to Issue II: State v. Lindsey,
355 S.C. 15, 20, 583 S.E.2d 740, 742 (2003) (holding on appeal from the denial
of a directed verdict the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the State); State v. McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 642, 576 S.E.2d 168,
172 (2003) (If there
is any direct evidence or substantial circumstantial evidence reasonably tending
to prove the guilt of the accused, we must find the case was properly submitted
to the jury.), cert.
denied, 124 S. Ct. 101 (2003); Hill v. State, 350 S.C. 465,
472, 567 S.E.2d 847, 851 (2002) (ABIK is an unlawful act of a violent nature
to the person of another with malice aforethought, either express or implied.);
State v. Wilds, 355 S.C. 2697, 276, 584 S.E.2d 138, 141-42 (Ct. App. 2003)
(defining malice as the wrongful intent to injure another indicating a depraved
spirit intent on doing wrong); State v. Ballington, 346 S.C. 262,
272, 551 S.E.2d 280, 285 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding malice may be implied by use
of a deadly weapon).
AFFIRMED.
HEARN, C.J., STILWELL, J., and CURETON, A.J., concur.
[1] We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.