Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi

Justice Blackmun

delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, appellees successfully challenged the constitutionality of Titles I and III, and of § 210 of Title II, of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (PURPA or Act). We conclude that appellees’ challenge lacks merit and we reverse the judgment below.

I

On November 9, 1978, President Carter signed PURPA into law.¹ The Act was part of a package of legislation,² approved the same day, designed to combat the nationwide energy crisis.

At the time, it was said that the generation of electricity consumed more than 25% of all energy resources used in the United States. S. Rep. No. 95-442, p. 7 (1977). Approximately one-third of the electricity in this country was generated through use of oil and natural gas, and electricity generation was one of the fastest growing segments of the Nation’s economy. S. Rep. No. 95-361, p. 32 (1977). In part because of their reliance on oil and gas, electricity utilities were plagued with increasing costs and decreasing efficiency in the use of their generating capacities; each of these factors had an adverse effect on rates to consumers and on the economy as a whole. S. Rep. No. 95-442, at 9. Congress accordingly determined that conservation by electricity utilities of oil and natural gas was essential to the success of any effort to lessen the country’s dependence on foreign oil, to avoid a repetition of the shortage of natural gas that had been experienced in 1977, and to control consumer costs.

A

Titles I and III

PURPA’s Titles I and III, which relate to regulatory policies for electricity and gas utilities, respectively, are administered (with minor exceptions) by the Secretary of Energy. These provisions are designed to encourage the adoption of certain retail regulatory practices. The Titles share three goals: (1) to encourage “conservation of energy supplied by . . . utilities”; (2) to encourage “the optimization of the efficiency of use of facilities and resources” by utilities; and (3) to encourage “equitable rates to . . . consumers.” §§ 101 and 301, 92 Stat. 3120 and 3149, 16 U. S. C. § 2611 (1976 ed., Supp. IV), 15 U. S. C. § 3201 (1976 ed., Supp. IV).³ To achieve these goals, Titles I and III direct state Utility regulatory commissions and nonregulated utilities to “consider” the adoption and implementation of specific “rate design” and regulatory standards.

Section 111(d) of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 2621(d), requires each state regulatory authority and nonregulated utility to consider the use of six different approaches to structuring rates: (1) promulgation, for each class of electricity consumers, of rates that, “to the maximum extent practicable,” would “reflect the costs of . . . service to such class”; (2) elimination of declining block rates;⁴ (3) adoption of time-of-day rates;⁵ (4) promulgation of seasonal rates;⁶ (5) adoption of interruptible rates;⁷ and (6) use of load management techniques.⁸ The Act directed each state authority and non-regulated utility to consider these factors not later than two years after PURPA’s enactment, that is, by November 8, 1980, and provided that the authority or utility by November 8, 1981, was to have made a decision whether to adopt the standards. § 2622(b). The statute does not provide penalties for failure to meet these deadlines; the state authority or nonregulated utility is merely directed to consider the standards at the first rate proceeding initiated by the authority after November 9, 1980. § 2622(c).

Section 113 of PURPA, 16 U. S. C. §2623, requires each state regulatory authority and nonregulated utility to consider the adoption of a second set of standards relating to the terms and conditions of electricity service: (1) prohibition of master-metering in new buildings;⁹ (2) restrictions on the use of automatic adjustment clauses;¹⁰ (3) disclosure to consumers of information regarding rate schedules; (4) promulgation of procedural requirements relating to termination of service; and (5) prohibition of the recovery of advertising costs from consumers. Similarly, § 303, 15 U. S. C. §3203, requires consideration of the last two standards — procedures for termination of service and the nonrecovery of advertising costs — for natural gas utilities. A decision as to the standards contained in §§113 and 303 was to have been made by November 1980, although, again, no penalty was provided by the statute for failure to meet the deadline.

Finally, § 114 of the Act, 16 U. S. C. §2624, directs each state authority and nonregulated utility to consider promulgation of “lifeline rates” — that is, lower rates for service that meets the essential needs of residential consumers — if such rates have not been adopted by November 1980.

Titles I and III also prescribe certain procedures to be followed by the state regulatory authority and the nonregulated utility when considering the proposed standards. Each standard is to be examined at a public hearing after notice, and a written statement of reasons must be made available to the public if the standards are not adopted. 16 U. S. C. §§ 2621(b) and (c)(2), and §§ 2623(a) and (c); 15 U. S. C. §§ 3203(a) and (c). “Any person” may bring an action in state court to enforce the obligation to hold a hearing and make determinations on the PURPA standards. 16 U. S. C. § 2633(c)(1); 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(1).

The Secretary of Energy, any affected utility, and any consumer served by an affected utility is given the right to intervene and participate in any rate-related proceeding considering the Title I standards. 16 U. S. C. § 2631(a). Under Title III, the Secretary alone has the right to intervene. 15 U. S. C. § 3205. Any person (including the Secretary) who intervenes or otherwise participates in the proceeding may obtain review in state court of any administrative determination concerning the Title I standards, 16 U. S. C. § 2633 (c)(1), and the Secretary has the right to participate as an amicus in any Title III judicial review proceeding initiated by another. 15 U. S. C. § 3207(b)(2). The right to intervene is enforceable against the state regulatory authority by an action in federal court. 16 U. S. C. § 2633(b); 15 U. S. C. § 3207(a)(2).

Titles I and III also set forth certain reporting requirements. Within one year of PURPA’s enactment, and annually thereafter for 10 years, each state regulatory authority and nonregulated utility is to report to the Secretary “respecting its consideration of the standards established.” 16 U. S. C. § 2626(a); 15 U. S. C. § 3209(a). The Secretary, in turn, is to submit a summary and analysis of these reports to Congress. 16 U. S. C. § 2626(b); 15 U. S. C. § 3209(b). Electricity utilities also are required to collect information concerning their service costs. 16 U. S. C. § 2643. This information is to be filed periodically with appellant Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and with appropriate state regulatory agencies, and is to be made available to the public. Title III requires the Secretary, in consultation with FERC, state regulatory authorities, gas utilities, and gas consumers, to submit a report to Congress on gas utility rate design. 15 U. S. C. § 3206.

Despite the extent and detail of the federal proposals, however, no state authority or nonregulated utility is required to adopt or implement the specified rate design or regulatory standards. Thus, 16 U. S. C. §§ 2621(a) and 2623(a) and 15 U. S. C. § 3203(a) all provide: “Nothing in this subsection prohibits any State regulatory authority or nonregulated . . . utility from making any determination that it is not appropriate to implement [or adopt] any such standard, pursuant to its authority under otherwise applicable State law.” Similarly, 16 U. S. C. § 2627(b) and 15 U. S. C. § 3208 make it clear that any state regulatory authority or nonregulated utility may adopt regulations or rates that are “different from any standard established by this [subchapter or] chapter.”

B

Section 210

Section 210 of PURPA’s Title II, 92 Stat. 3144, 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3, seeks to encourage the development of cogen-eration and small power production facilities.¹¹ Congress believed that increased use of these sources of energy would reduce the demand for traditional fossil fuels. But it also felt that two problems impeded the development of nontraditional generating facilities: (1) traditional electricity utilities were reluctant to purchase power from, and to sell power to, the nohtraditional facilities,¹² and (2) the regulation of these alternative energy sources by state and federal utility authorities imposed financial burdens upon the nontraditional facilities and thus discouraged their development.¹³

In order to overcome the first of these perceived problems, § 210(a) directs FERC, in consultation with state regulatory authorities, to promulgate “such rules as it determines necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power production,” including rules requiring utilities to offer to sell electricity to, and purchase electricity from, qualifying co-generation and small power production facilities. Section 210(f), 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3(f), requires each state regulatory authority and nonregulated utility to implement FERC’s rules. And § 210(h), 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3(h), authorizes FERC to enforce this requirement in federal court against any state authority or nonregulated utility; if FERC fails to act after request, any qualifying utility may bring suit.

To solve the second problem perceived by Congress, § 210(e), 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3(e), directs FERC to prescribe rules exempting the favored cogeneration and small power facilities from certain state and federal laws governing electricity utilities.

Pursuant to this statutory authorization, FERC has adopted regulations relating to purchases and sales of electricity to and from cogeneration and small power facilities. See 18 CFR pt. 292 (1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 12214-12237 (1980). These afford state regulatory authorities and nonregulated utilities latitude in determining the manner in which the regulations are to be implemented. Thus, a state commission may comply with the statutory requirements by issuing regulations, by resolving disputes on a case-by-case basis, or by taking any other action reasonably designed to give effect to FERC’s rules.¹⁴

HH HH

In April 1979, the State of Mississippi and the Mississippi Public Service Commission, appellees here, filed this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against FERC and the Secretary of Energy, seeking a declaratory judgment that PURPA’s Titles I and III and §210 are unconstitutional. App. 3.¹⁵ Appellees maintained that PURPA was beyond the scope of congressional power under the Commerce Clause and that it constituted an invasion of state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment.¹⁶

Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court, in an unreported opinion, held that in enacting PURPA Congress had exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause. App. to Juris. Statement la. The court observed that the Mississippi Public Service Commission by state statute possessed the “power and authority to regulate and control intrastate activities and policies of all utilities operating within the sovereign state of Mississippi.” Id., at 2a. Relying on Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936), the court stated: “There is literally nothing in the Commerce Clause of the Constitution which authorizes or justifies the federal government in taking over the regulation and control of public utilities. These public utilities were actually unknown at the writing of the Constitution.” App. to Juris. Statement 4a. Indeed, in the court’s view, the legislation “does not even attempt to regulate commerce among the several states but it is a clear usurpation of power and authority which the United States simply does not have under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.” Id., at 7a.

Relying on National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), the court also concluded that PURPA trenches on state sovereignty.¹⁷ It therefore pronounced the statutory provisions void because “they constitute a direct intrusion on integral and traditional functions of the State of Mississippi.” App. to Juris. Statement 8a-9a. For reasons it did not explain, the court also relied on the guarantee of a republican form of government, U. S. Const., Art. IV, § 4, and on the Supremacy Clause, Art. VI, cl. 2. App. to Juris. Statement 2a, n. 1, and 9a.

FERC and the Secretary of Energy appealed directly to this Court pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 1252. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 274, n. 15(1981). We noted probable jurisdiction. 452 U. S. 936 (1981).

Ill

The Commerce Clause

We readily conclude that the District Court’s analysis and the appellees’ arguments are without merit so far as they concern the Commerce Clause. To say that nothing in the Commerce Clause justifies federal regulation of even the intrastate operations of public utilities misapprehends the proper role of the courts in assessing the validity of federal legislation promulgated under one of Congress’ plenary powers. The applicable standard was reiterated just last Term in Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U. S. 314 (1981):

“It is established beyond peradventure that ‘legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality . . . Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U. S. 1, 15 (1976). . . . A court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and the asserted ends.” Id., at 323-324.¹⁸

Despite these expansive observations by this Court, appel-lees assert that PURPA is facially unconstitutional because it does not regulate “commerce”; instead, it is said, the Act directs the nonconsenting State to regulate in accordance with federal procedures. This, appellees continue, is beyond Congress’ power: “In exercising the authority conferred by this clause of the Constitution, Congress is powerless to regulate anything which is not commerce, as it is powerless to do anything about commerce which is not regulation.” Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S., at 297. The “governance of commerce” by the State is to be distinguished from commerce itself, for regulation of the former is said to be outside the plenary power of Congress.¹⁹

It is further argued that the proper test is not whether the regulated activity merely “affects” interstate commerce but, instead, whether it has “a substantial effect” on such commerce, citing Justice Rehnquist’s opinion concurring in the judgment in the Hodel cases, 452 U. S., at 311-312. PURPA, appellees maintain, does not meet this standard.

The difficulty with these arguments is that they disregard entirely the specific congressional finding, in § 2 of the Act, 16 U. S. C. § 2601, that the regulated activities have an immediate effect on interstate commerce. Congress there determined that “the protection of the public health, safety, and welfare, the preservation of national security, and the proper exercise of congressional authority under the Constitution to regulate interstate commerce require,” among other things, a program for increased conservation of electric energy, increased efficiency in the use of facilities and resources by electricity utilities, and equitable retail rates for electricity consumers, as well as a program to improve the wholesale distribution of electric energy, and a program for the conservation of natural gas while ensuring that rates to gas consumers are equitable. 16 U. S. C. § 2601. The findings, thus, are clear and specific.

The Court heretofore has indicated that federal regulation of intrastate power transmission may be proper because of the interstate nature of the generation and supply of electric power. FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U. S. 453 (1972). Our inquiry, then, is whether the congressional findings have a rational basis. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Inc., 452 U. S., at 277; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U. S., at 323-324.

The legislative history provides a simple answer: there is ample support for Congress’ conclusions. The hearings were extensive. Committees in both Houses of Congress noted the magnitude of the Nation’s energy problems and the need to alleviate those problems by promoting energy conservation and more efficient use of energy resources. See S. Rep. No. 95-442, at 7-10; H. R. Rep. No. 95-543, vol. I, pp. 5-10 (1977); H. R. Rep. No. 95-496, pt. 4, pp. 3-7, 125-130 (1977).²⁰ Congress was aware that domestic oil production had lagged behind demand and that the Nation had become increasingly dependent on foreign oil. Id., at 3. The House Committee observed: “Reliance upon imported oil to meet the bulk of U. S. oil demands could seriously jeopardize the stability of the Nation’s economy and could undermine the independence of the United States.” Ibid. See H. R. Rep. No. 95-543, vol. I, at 5-6. Indeed, the Nation had recently experienced severe shortages in its supplies of natural gas. Id., at 7. The House and Senate Committees both noted that the electricity industry consumed more than 25% of the total energy resources used in this country while supplying only 12% of the user demand for energy. S. Rep. No. 95-442, at 7-8; H. R. Rep. No. 95-496, pt. 4, at 125. In recent years, the electricity utility industry had been beset by numerous problems, id., at 129, which resulted in higher bills for the consuming public, a result exacerbated by the rate structures employed by most utilities. S. Rep. No. 95-442, at 26. Congress naturally concluded that the energy problem was nationwide in scope,²¹ and that these developments demonstrated the need to establish federal standards regarding retail sales of electricity, as well as federal attempts to encourage conservation and more efficient use of scarce energy resources. See id., at 24-32; H. R. Rep. No. 95-496, pt. 4, at 131-133, 136-138, 170-171.

Congress also determined that the development of co-generation and small power production facilities would conserve energy. The evidence before Congress showed the potential contribution of these sources of energy: it was estimated that if proper incentives were provided, industrial cogeneration alone could account for 7%-10% of the Nation’s electrical generating capacity by 1987. S. Rep. No. 95-442, at 21, 23.

We agree with appellants that it is difficult to conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than electric energy, a product used in virtually every home and every commercial or manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on its own resources in this respect. See FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., supra. Indeed, the utilities involved in this very case, Mississippi Power & Light Company and Mississippi Power Company, sell their retail customers power that is generated in part beyond Mississippi’s borders, and offer reciprocal services to utilities in other States. App. 93-94. The intrastate activities of these utilities, although regulated by the Mississippi Public Service Commission, bring them within the reach of Congress’ power over interstate commerce. See FPC v. Florida Power & Light Co., 404 U. S., at 458; New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U. S. 331 (1982).²²

Even if appellees were correct in suggesting that PURPA will not significantly improve the Nation’s energy situation, the congressional findings compel the conclusion that “‘the means chosen by [Congress are] reasonably adapted to the end permitted by the Constitution.’” Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Inc., 452 U. S., at 276, quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U. S. 241, 262 (1964). It is not for us to say whether the means chosen by Congress represent the wisest choice. It is sufficient that Congress was not irrational in concluding that limited federal regulation of retail sales of electricity and natural gas, and of relationships between cogenerators and electric utilities, was essential to protect interstate commerce. That is enough to place the challenged portions of PURPA within Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.²³ Because PURPA’s provisions concern private nonregulated utilities as well as state commissions, the statute necessarily is valid at least insofar as it regulates private parties. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Inc., 452 U. S., at 286.

<1

The Tenth Amendment

Unlike the Commerce Clause question, the Tenth Amendment issue presented here is somewhat novel. This case obviously is related to National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976), insofar as both concern principles of state sovereignty. But there is a significant difference as well. National League of Cities, like Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975), presented a problem the Court often confronts: the extent to which state sovereignty shields the States from generally applicable federal regulations. In PURPA, in contrast, the Federal Government attempts to use state regulatory machinery to advance federal goals. To an extent, this presents an issue of first impression.

PURPA, for all its complexity, contains essentially three requirements: (1) § 210 has the States enforce standards promulgated by FERC; (2) Titles I and III direct the States to consider specified ratemaking standards; and (3) those Titles impose certain procedures on state commissions. We consider these three requirements in turn:

A. Section 210. On its face, this appears to be the most intrusive of PURPA’s provisions. The question of its constitutionality, however, is the easiest to resolve. Insofar as § 210 authorizes FERC to exempt qualified power facilities from “State laws and regulations,” it does nothing more than pre-empt conflicting state enactments in the traditional way. Clearly, Congress can pre-empt the States completely in the regulation of retail sales by electricity and gas utilities and in the regulation of transactions between such utilities and cogenerators. Cf. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U. S. 761, 769 (1945). The propriety of this type of regulation — so long as it is a valid exercise of the commerce power — was made clear in National League of Cities, and was reaffirmed in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn.: the Federal Government may displace state regulation even though this serves to “curtail or prohibit the States’ prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States may consider important.” 452 U. S., at 290.

Section 210’s requirement that “each State regulatory authority shall, after notice and opportunity for public hearing, implement such rule (or revised rule) for each electric utility for which it has ratemaking authority,” 16 U. S. C. § 824a-3(f)(1) (emphasis added), is more troublesome. The statute’s substantive provisions require electricity utilities to purchase electricity from, and to sell it to, qualifying co-generator and small power production facilities. § 824a-3(a). Yet FERC has declared that state commissions may implement this by, among other things, “an undertaking to resolve disputes between qualifying facilities and electric utilities arising under [PURPA].” 18 CFR § 292.401(a) (1980). In essence, then, the statute and the implementing regulations simply require the Mississippi authorities to adjudicate disputes arising under the statute. Dispute resolution of this kind is the very type of activity customarily engaged in by the Mississippi Public Service Commission. See, e. g., Miss. Code Ann. §§ 77-1-31, 77-3-5, 77-3-13(3), 77-3-21, 77-3-405 (1973).

Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S. 386 (1947), is instructive and controlling on this point. There, the Emergency Price Control Act, 56 Stat. 34, as amended, created a treble-damages remedy, and gave jurisdiction over claims under the Act to state as well as federal courts. The courts of Rhode Island refused to entertain such claims, although they heard analogous state causes of action. This Court upheld the federal program. It observed that state courts have a unique role in enforcing the body of federal law, and that the Rhode Island courts had “jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under established local law to adjudicate this action.” 330 U. S., at 394. Thus the state courts were directed to heed the constitutional command that “the policy of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every state,” id., at 393, “‘and should be respected accordingly in the courts of the State.’” Id., at 392, quoting Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 223 U. S. 1, 57 (1912).

So it is here. The Mississippi Commission has jurisdiction to entertain claims analogous to those granted by PURPA, and it can satisfy § 210’s requirements simply by opening its doors to claimants. That the Commission has administrative as well as judicial duties is of no significance.²⁴ Any other conclusion would allow the States to disregard both the preeminent position held by federal law throughout the Nation, cf. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 340-341 (1816), and the congressional determination that the federal rights granted by PURPA can appropriately be enforced through state adjudicatory machinery. Such an approach, Testa emphasized, “flies in the face of the fact that the States of the Union constitute a nation,” and “disregards the purpose and effect of Article VI of the Constitution.” 330 U. S., at 389.

B. Mandatory Consideration of Standards. We acknowledge that “the authority to make . . . fundamental. . . decisions” is perhaps the quintessential attribute of sovereignty. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S., at 851. Indeed, having the power to make decisions and to set policy is what gives the State its sovereign nature. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U. S. 350, 360 (1977) (State Supreme Court speaks as sovereign because it is the “ultimate body wielding the State’s power over the practice of law”). It would follow that the ability of a state legislative (or, as here, administrative) body — which makes decisions and sets policy for the State as a whole — to consider and promulgate regulations of its choosing must be central to a State’s role in the federal system. Indeed, the 19th-century view, expressed in a well-known slavery case, was that Congress “has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it.” Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66, 107 (1861).

Recent cases, however, demonstrate that this rigid and isolated statement from Kentucky v. Dennison—which suggests that the States and the Federal Government in all circumstances must be viewed as coequal sovereigns — is not representative of the law today.²⁵ While this Court never has sanctioned explicitly a federal command to the States to promulgate and enforce laws and regulations, cf. EPA v. Brown, 431 U. S. 99 (1977), there are instances where the Court has upheld federal statutory structures that in effect directed state decisionmakers to take or to refrain from taking certain actions. In Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975), for example, state executives were held restricted, with respect to state employees, to the wage and salary limitations established by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U. S. 658 (1979), acknowledged a federal court’s power to enforce a treaty by compelling a state agency to “prepare” certain rules “even if state law withholds from [it] the power to do so.” Id., at 695.²⁶ And certainly Testa v. Katt, supra, by declaring that “the policy of the federal Act is the prevailing policy in every state,” 330 U. S., at 393, reveals that the Federal Government has some power to enlist a branch of state government — there the judiciary — to further federal ends.²⁷ In doing so, Testa clearly cut back on both the quoted language and the analysis of the Dennison case of the preceding century.²⁸

Whatever all this may forebode for the future, or for the scope of federal authority in the event of a crisis of national proportions, it plainly is not necessary for the Court in this case to make a definitive choice between competing views of federal power to compel state regulatory activity. Titles I and III of PURPA require only consideration of federal standards. And if a State has no utilities commission, or simply stops regulating in the field, it need not even entertain the federal proposals. As we have noted, the commerce power permits Congress to pre-empt the States entirely in the regulation of private utilities. In a sense, then, this case is only one step beyond Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., supra. There, the Federal Government could have pre-empted all surface mining regulations; instead, it allowed the States to enter the field if they promulgated regulations consistent with federal standards. In the Court’s view, this raised no Tenth Amendment problem: “We fail to see why the Surface Mining Act should become constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to allow the States a regulatory role.” 452 U. S., at 290. “[T]here can be no suggestion that the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a regulatory program.” Id., at 288.

Similarly here, Congress could have pre-empted the field, at least insofar as private rather than state activity is concerned; PURPA should not be invalid simply because, out of deference to state authority, Congress adopted a less intrusive scheme and allowed the States to continue regulating in the area on the condition that they consider the suggested federal standards.²⁹ While the condition here is affirmative in nature — that is, it directs the States to entertain proposals — nothing in this Court’s cases suggests that the nature of the condition makes it a constitutionally improper one. There is nothing in PURPA “directly compelling” the States to enact a legislative program. In short, because the two challenged Titles simply condition continued state involvement in a pre-emptible area on the consideration of federal proposals, they do not threaten the States’ “separate and independent existence,” Lane County v. Oregon, 7 Wall. 71, 76 (1869); Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U. S. 559, 580 (1911), and do not impair the ability of the States “to function effectively in a federal system.” Fry v. United States, 421 U. S., at 547, n. 7; National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S., at 852. To the contrary, they offer the States a vehicle for remaining active in an area of overriding concern.

We recognize, of course, that the choice put to the States— that of either abandoning regulation of the field altogether or considering the federal standards — may be a difficult one. And that is particularly true when Congress, as is the case here, has failed to provide an alternative regulatory mechanism to police the area in the event of state default. Yet in other contexts the Court has recognized that valid federal enactments may have an effect on state policy — and may, indeed, be designed to induce state action in areas that otherwise would be beyond Congress’ regulatory authority. Thus in Oklahoma v. CSC, 330 U. S. 127 (1947), the Court upheld Congress’ power to attach conditions to grants-in-aid received by the States, although the condition under attack involved an activity that “the United States is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate.” Id., at 143. The Tenth Amendment, the Court declared, “has been consistently construed ‘as not depriving the national government of authority to resort to all means for the exercise of a granted power which are appropriate and plainly adapted to the permitted end,”’ ibid., quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941)—the end there being the disbursement of federal funds. Thus it cannot be constitutionally determinative that the federal regulation is likely to move the States to act in a given way, or even to “coerc[e] the States” into assuming a regulatory role by affecting their “freedom to make decisions in areas of ‘integral governmental functions.’” Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Inc., 452 U. S., at 289.

Equally as important, it has always been the law that state legislative and judicial decisionmakers must give preclusive effect to federal enactments concerning nongovernmental activity, no matter what the strength of the competing local interests. See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 1 Wheat., at 340-341. This requirement follows from the nature of gov-emmental regulation of private activity. “[Individual businesses necessarily [are] subject to the dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the State in which they reside,” National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S., at 845; when regulations promulgated by the sovereigns conflict, federal law necessarily controls. This is true though Congress exercises its authority “in a manner that displaces the States’ exercise of their police powers,” Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Inc., 452 U. S., at 291, or in such a way as to “curtail or prohibit the States’ prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States may consider important,” id., at 290 — or, to put it still more plainly, in a manner that is “extraordinarily intrusive.” Id., at 305 (Powell, J., concurring). Thus it may be unlikely that the States will or easily can abandon regulation of public utilities to avoid PURPA’s requirements. But this does not change the constitutional analysis: as in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., “[t]he most that can be said is that the . . . Act establishes a program of cooperative federalism that allows the States, within limits established by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular needs.” Id., at 289.³⁰

To be sure, PURPA gives virtually any affected person the right to compel consideration of the statutory standards through judicial action. We fail to see, however, that this places any particularly onerous burden on the State. Mississippi by statute already grants “[a]ny interested, person . . . the right to petition the [Public Service] [Commission for issuance, amendment or repeal of a rule or regulation,” Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-45 (1973) (emphasis added), and provides that “any party aggrieved by any final finding, order or judgment of the commission shall have the right, regardless of the amount involved, of appeal in chancery court.” Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-67(1) (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added). Indeed, “[a]ny person whose rights may be directly affected by said appeal may appear and become a party . . . .” Ibid. And “[ajppeals in accordance with law may be had to the supreme court of the State of Mississippi from any final judgment of the chancery court.” Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-71 (1973).

It is hardly clear on the statute’s face, then, that PURPA’s standing and appeal provisions grant any rights beyond those presently accorded by Mississippi law, and appellees point to no specific provision of the Act expanding on the State’s existing, liberal approach to public participation in ratemak-ing.³¹ In this light, we again find the principle of Testa v. Katt, supra, controlling: the State is asked only to make its administrative tribunals available for the vindication of federal as well as state-created rights. PURPA, of course, establishes as federal policy the requirement that state commissions consider various ratemaking standards, and it gives individuals a right to enforce that policy; once it is established that the requirement is constitutionally supportable, “the obligation of states to enforce these federal laws is not lessened by reason of the form in which they are cast or the remedy which they provide.” Testa v. Katt, 330 U. S., at 391. See Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 57 (1912).

In short, Titles I and III do not involve the compelled exercise of Mississippi’s sovereign powers. And, equally important, they do not set a mandatory agenda to be considered in all events by state legislative or administrative decision-makers. As we read them, Titles I and III simply establish requirements for continued state activity in an otherwise pre-emptible field.³² Whatever the constitutional problems associated with more intrusive federal programs, the “mandatory consideration” provisions of Titles I and III must be validated under the principle of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn.³³

C. The Procedural Requirements. Titles I and III also require state commissions to follow certain notice and comment procedures when acting on the proposed federal standards. In a way, these appear more intrusive than the “consideration” provisions; while the latter are essentially hortatory, the procedural provisions obviously are prescriptive. Appellants and amici Maryland et al. argue that the procedural requirements simply establish minimum due process standards, something Mississippi appears already to provide,³⁴ and therefore may be upheld as an exercise of Congress’ Fourteenth Amendment powers. We need not go that far, however, for we uphold the procedural requirements under the same analysis employed above in connection with the “consideration” provisions. If Congress can require a state administrative body to consider proposed regulations as a condition to its continued involvement in a pre-emptible field — and we hold today that it can — there is nothing unconstitutional about Congress’ requiring certain procedural min-ima as that body goes about undertaking its tasks. The procedural requirements obviously do not compel the exercise of the State’s sovereign powers, and do not purport to set standards to be followed in all areas of the state commission’s endeavors.

The judgment of the District Court is reversed.

It is so ordered.

1 The Senate vote was taken on October 9, 1978. The Mississippi Senators voted against the bill. See 124 Cong. Rec. 34780. The House vote was taken on October 14, 1978. The five-member Mississippi delegation voted three “ayes” and two “nays.” See id., at 38503.

2 In addition to PURPA, the package included the Energy Tax Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-618, 92 Stat. 3174; the National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206; the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289; and the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-621, 92 Stat. 3351.

3 For simplicity of citation, and to avoid repetition, unless otherwise noted herein, any reference to 15 or 16 U. S. C. relates to Supplement IV of the 1976 edition of the Code.

4 “Declining block rates” are a traditional and still common approach used by utilities in their charges for electricity. The highest unit rate is charged for basic electrical consumption, with a declining per-unit price for each block of additional consumption. See S. Rep. No. 95-442, pp. 26-27 (1977).

5 “Time-of-day rates” are designed to reduce “peak load,” the term used to describe the greatest demand for a utility’s electricity. Demand varies by hour and season, usually reaching a daily maximum in the afternoon and a seasonal maximum in midsummer or midwinter. A utility must have enough generating capacity to meet that demand; steps that reduce peak demand also reduce the required amount of generating capacity and the use of “peaking” generating equipment, which frequently is gas- or oil-fueled. Under time-of-day rates, utilities charge more for electricity consumed during peak load hours. See id., at 29.

6 “Seasonal rates” operate to reduce peak load by imposing higher rates during the seasons when demand is greatest.

7 “Interruptible rates” tend to reduce peak load by charging less for service which the utility can interrupt, or stop, during peak demand periods.

8 “Load management techniques” are methods used to reduce the demand for electricity at peak times. For example, a utility might employ remote-control devices that temporarily turn off applicances during periods when the demand is particularly great.

9 “Master-metering” is the use of one meter for several living units. Studies have shown that tenants of master-metered buildings use 35% more electricity, on the average, than tenants of buildings where each apartment has its own meter. See id., at 31.

10 An “automatic adjustment clause” provides that as a utility’s fuel costs rise it may increase its rates without public hearing or review by the state regulatory authority. A clause of this kind provides the utility with no incentive to reduce its costs or to shift away from oil- or gas-fueled generating facilities, and therefore tends to discourage the efficient use of energy resources.

11 A “cogeneration facility” is one that produces both electric energy and steam or some other form of useful energy, such as heat. 16 U. S. C. § 796(18)(A). A “small power production facility” is one that has a production capacity of no more than 80 megawatts and uses biomass, waste, or renewable resources (such as wind, water, or solar energy) to produce electric power. § 796(17)(A).

12 See 123 Cong. Rec. 25848 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Percy); id,., at 32403 (remarks of Sen. Durkin); id., at 32437 (remarks of Sen. Haskell); id., at 32419 (remarks of Sen. Hart); National Energy Act: Hearings on H. R. 6831 et al. before the Subcommittee on Energy and Power of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 552-553 (1977).

13 See H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1750, p. 98 (1978); H. R. Rep. No. 95-496, pt. 4, p. 157 (1977); 123 Cong. Rec. 32399 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Cranston); id., at 32660 (remarks of Sen. Percy).

14 Congress recognized that a State’s compliance with the requirements of PURPA would involve the expenditure of funds. Accordingly, it authorized the Secretary of Energy to make grants to state regulatory authorities to assist them in carrying out the provisions of Titles I and III, including the reporting requirements, and the provisions of § 210. See 42 U. S. C. § 6807 (1976 ed., Supp. IV).

For each of the fiscal years 1979 and 1980, Congress authorized for appropriation up to $40 million to help state regulatory authorities defray the costs of complying with PURPA. Pub. L. 95-617, § 142(1), 92 Stat. 3134, 42 U. S. C. § 6808(1) (1976 ed., Supp. IV).

15 Mississippi Power & Light Company was permitted to intervene in the action as a plaintiff and is also an appellee here.

16 “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U. S. Const., Amdt. 10.

17 “The sovereign state of Mississippi is not a robot, or lackey which may be shuttled back and forth to suit the whim and caprice of the federal government.” App. to Juris. Statement 2a.

18 In the companion case decided the same day, this Court observed:

“Judicial review in this area is influenced above all by the fact that the Commerce Clause is a grant of plenary authority to Congress. . . . This power is ‘complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the constitution.’ Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). Moreover, this Court has made clear that the commerce power extends not only to ‘the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce’ and to ‘protection of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce ... or persons or things in commerce,’ but also to ‘activities affecting commerce.’ Perez v. United States, 402 U. S. 146, 150 (1971). As we explained in Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542, 547 (1975), ‘[ejven activity that is purely intrastate in character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States or with foreign nations.’” Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264, 276-277 (1981).

19 For this proposition, appellees rely on Brown v. EPA, 521 F. 2d 827, 839 (CA9 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U. S. 99 (1977), and District of Columbia v. Train, 172 U. S. App. D. C. 311, 332, 521 F. 2d 971, 992 (1975), vacated and remanded sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U. S. 99 (1977).

20 See also 124 Cong. Rec. 34558 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Jackson); id., at 34560 (remarks of Sen. Bumpers); id., at 34776 (remarks of Sen. Robert C. Byrd); id., at 38350 (remarks of Rep. Ashley); id,., at 38370-38371 (remarks of Rep. Dingell); 123 Cong. Rec. 25894 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Ashley); id., at 25916-25917 (remarks of Rep. Ottinger); id., at 27063-27064 (remarks of Rep. Wolff).

21 See, e. g., id., at 32437-32438 (remarks of Sen. Brooke); id., at 32444 (remarks of Sen. Percy).

22 PURPA could be upheld even if some of its provisions were not directly related to the purpose of fostering interstate commerce: “A complex regulatory program . . . can survive a Commerce Clause challenge without a showing that every single facet of the program is independently and directly related to a valid congressional goal. It is enough that the challenged provisions are an integral part of the regulatory program and that the regulatory scheme when considered as a whole satisfies this test.” Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U. S. 314, 329, n. 17 (1981).

23 This is not to say the Congress can regulate in an area that is only tangentially related to interstate commerce. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U. S. 183, 196-197, n. 27 (1968). That obviously is not the case here.

24 In another context, the Court has noted that “the role of the modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge ... is ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a judge." Butz v. Economou, 438 U. S. 478, 513 (1978).

25 Justice O’Connor reviews the constitutional history at some length, ultimately deriving the proposition that the Framers intended to deny the Federal Government the authority to exercise “military or legislative power over state governments,” instead “allowing] Congress to pass laws directly affecting individuals.” Post, at 795. If Justice O’Connor means this rhetorical assertion to be taken literally, it is demonstrably incorrect. See, e. g., Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982); Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975); Parden v. Terminal R. Co., 377 U. S. 184 (1964); California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957); Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92 (1946); United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175 (1936).

26 The Court did express doubt as to whether a state agency “may be ordered actually to promulgate regulations having effect as a matter of state law.” 443 U. S., at 695. As we have noted, however, PURPA does not require promulgation of particular regulations.

27 Justice O’Connor’s partial dissent finds each of these cases inappo-site. Yet the purported distinctions are little more than exercises in the art of ipse dixit. Thus she suggests that Testa v. Katt provides no support for the imposition of federal responsibilities on state legislatures, because “the requirement that [state courts] evenhandedly adjudicate state and federal claims falling within their jurisdiction does not infringe any sovereign authority to set an agenda.” Post, at 784-785. Yet the courts have always been recognized as a coequal part of the State’s sovereign decision-making apparatus, see Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 438 U. S. 350, 360 (1977), and it seems evident that requiring state tribunals to entertain federal claims interferes, at least to a degree, with the State’s sovereign prerogatives, see n. 25, supra, as well as with the amount of time that state courts may devote to adjudicating state claims. Conversely, it is difficult to perceive any fundamental distinction between the state legislature’s power to establish limits on the jurisdiction of state courts, and its prerogative to set ratemaking criteria for use by quasi-legislative utilities commissions. Justice O’Connor fails to explain, however, why this does not implicate her concern that “[w]hile engaged in . . . congressionally mandated tasks, state utility commissions are less able to pursue local proposals . . . .” Post, at 787.

The partial dissent finds Fry v. United States inapposite because the wage freeze there at issue “ ‘displaced no state choices as to how governmental operations should be structured .... Instead, it merely required that the wage scales and employment relationships which the States themselves had chosen be maintained . . . .’” Post, at 784, n. 13, quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833, 853 (1976). It seems absurd to suggest, however, that a federal veto of the States’ chosen method of structuring their employment relationships is less intrusive in any realistic sense than are PURPA’s mandatory consideration provisions. Finally, Justice O’Connor would distinguish Fishing Vessel Assn. as involving only “[t]he power of a court to enjoin adjudicated violations of federal law.” Post, at 784, n. 13. In doing so, however, the Court unambiguously held that federal law could impose an affirmative obligation upon state officials to prepare administrative regulations — a holding of obvious relevance to this case.

28 In Dennison, the Court concluded that the state courts entertained federal actions solely as a discretionary “matter of comity, which the several sovereignties extended to one another for their mutual benefit. It was not regarded by either party as an obligation imposed by the Constitution.” 24 How., at 109. That analysis cannot survive Testa, which squarely held “that state courts do not bear the same relation to the United States that they do to foreign countries.” 330 U. S., at 389. And Testa, of course, placed the obligation of state officials to enforce federal law squarely in the Supremacy Clause.

Our recent cases also demonstrate that the Federal Government, at least in certain circumstances, can structure the State’s exercise of its sovereign powers. In National League of Cities v. Usery, supra, for example, the Court made clear that the State’s regulation of its relationship with its employees is an “undoubted attribute of state sovereignty.” 426 U. S., at 845. Yet, by holding “unimpaired” California v. Taylor, 353 U. S. 553 (1957), which upheld a federal labor regulation as applied to state railroad employees, 426 U. S., at 854, n. 18, National League of Cities acknowledged that not all aspects of a State’s sovereign authority are immune from federal control. This analysis was restated in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reel. Assn., supra, which indicated that federal regulations are subject to Tenth Amendment attack only if they “regulat[e] the ‘States as States,’ ” “address matters that are indisputably ‘attributes of state sovereignty,’ ” and impair the States’ “ability ‘to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions.’” 452 U. S., at 287-288, quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S., at 854, 845, 852. And even when these requirements are met, “[tjhere are situations in which the nature of the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state submission.” Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Inc., 452 U. S., at 288, n. 29.

29 It seems evident that Congress intended to defer to state prerogatives — and expertise — in declining to pre-empt the utilities field entirely. See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 95-442, pp. 9, 13-14 (1977); 124 Cong. Rec. 34558 (1978) (remarks of Sen. Jackson); id., at 34560 (remarks of Sen. Bumpers); id., at 34763 (remarks of Sen. Metzenbaum); id., at 34768 (remarks of Sen. Durkin); 123 Cong. Rec. 32430 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Johnston); id., at 32395 (remarks of Sen. Bartlett).

Justice O’Connor’s partial dissent’s response to this is peculiar. On the one hand, she suggests that the States might prefer that Congress simply pre-empt the field, since that “would leave them free to exercise their power in other areas.” Post, at 787. Yet Justice O’Connor elsewhere acknowledges the importance of utilities regulation to the States, post, at 781, and emphasizes that local experimentation and self-determination are essential aspects of the federal system. Post, at 787-791. PURPA, of course, permits the States to play a continued role in the utilities field, and gives full force to the States’ ultimate policy choices. Certainly, it is a curious type of federalism that encourages Congress to pre-empt a field entirely, when its preference is to let the States retain the primary regulatory role.

30 Justice O’Connor’s partial dissent suggests that our analysis is an “absurdity,” post, at 781, and variously accuses us of “conscript[ing] state utility commissions into the national bureaucratic army,” of transforming state legislative bodies into “field offices of the national bureaucracy,” of approving the “dismemberment of state government,” of making state agencies “bureaucratic puppets of the Federal Government,” and — most colorfully — of permitting “Congress to kidnap state utility commissions.” Post, at 775, 777, 782, 783, 790. While these rhetorical devices make for absorbing reading, they unfortunately are substituted for useful constitutional analysis. For while Justice O’Connor articulates a view of state sovereignty that is almost mystical, she entirely fails to address our central point.

The partial dissent does not quarrel with the propositions that Congress may pre-empt the States in the regulation of private conduct, that Congress may condition the validity of State enactments in a pre-emptible area on their conformity with federal law, and that Congress may attempt to “coerce” the States into enacting nationally desirable legislation. Given this, the partial dissent fails to identify precisely what is “absurd” about a scheme that gives the States a choice between regulating in conformity with federal requirements, or abandoning regulation in a given field. Though the partial dissent finds Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn. inapposite, in our view the parallel is striking: there, the States were directed to legislate consistently with congressional enactments, or not at all; here, the States are asked to regulate in conformity with federal requirements, or not at all. While it is true that PURPA conditions continued state regulatory activity on the performance of certain affirmative tasks, the partial dissent nowhere explains why — so long as the field is pre-emptible — the nature of the condition is relevant. And while PURPA’s requirements in practice may be more intrusive and more difficult for the States to avoid than was the legislation at issue in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Justice O’Connor herself acknowledges that an “evaluation of intrusiveness ... is simply irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry.” Post, at 785-786. Similarly, the difference between PURPA and the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 identified by the partial dissent cannot be that only the former affects a “traditional function of state government,” post, at 781, for regulation of land use is perhaps the quintessential state activity. In short, while the area of state action potentially foreclosed by PURPA may be broader than was the case in Hodel, the partial dissent has pointed to no constitutionally significant theoretical distinction between the two statutory schemes.

31 We believe that this seemingly precise parallel between state and federal procedures suffices to overcome Justice Powell’s objections to PURPA, at least where, as here, the statute is subjected to a facial attack. See also n. 34, infra.

32 Justice O’Connor’s partial dissent accuses us of undervaluing National League of Cities, and maintains that our analysis permits Congress to “dictate the agendas and meeting places of state legislatures.” Post, at 782. These apocalyptic observations, while striking, are overstated and patently inaccurate. We hold only that Congress may impose conditions on the State’s regulation of private conduct in a pre-emptible area. This does not foreclose a Tenth Amendment challenge to federal interference with the State’s ability “to structure employer-employee relationships,” 426 U. S., at 851, while providing “those governmental services which [its] citizens require,” id., at 847, as was the case in National League of Cities. It does not suggest that the Federal Government may impose conditions on state activities in fields that are not pre-emptible, or that are solely of intrastate concern. And it does not purport to authorize the imposition of general affirmative obligations on the States.

33 As we note above, PURPA imposes certain reporting requirements on state commissions. But because these attach only if the State chooses to continue its regulatory efforts in the field, we find them supportable for the reasons addressed in connection with the other provisions of Titles I and III. Appellees nevertheless suggest that PURPA’s requirements must fall because compliance will impose financial burdens on the States. We are unconvinced: in a Tenth Amendment challenge to congressional activity, “the determinative factor . . . [is] the nature of the federal action, not the ultimate economic impact on the States.” Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Assn., Inc., 452 U. S., at 292, n. 33. In any event, Congress has taken steps to reduce or eliminate the economic burden of compliance. See n. 14, supra.

34 Mississippi law provides for reasonable notice in the fixing of rates and conditions of service of utilities. Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-33(2) (1973). It also requires the Public Service Commission to keep a “full and complete record” of all proceedings, § 77-3-63, and to “make and file its findings and order, and its opinion, if any,” § 77-3-59. Indeed, the state statute requires that “[a]ll findings of the commission and the determination of every matter by it shall be in writing and placed upon its minutes.” § 77-1-41. These “shall be deemed a public record, and shall at all seasonable times be subject to the inspection of the public.” Ibid. Thus, the requirements that appellees characterize as an extraordinary burden on the State appear to accord few, if any, procedural rights not already established by Mississippi law.