Vermilye & Co. v. Adams Express Co.

88 U.S. 138 (____) 21 Wall. 138

VERMILYE & CO.
v.
ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY.

Supreme Court of United States.

Mr. J.E. Burrill, for the appellant, contended, among other things &mdash.

Messrs. Clarence A. Seward and T.P. Chapman, contra.

Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court.

1. The first thing which presents itself on the facts of this case is to determine the character of the notes as it affects the law of their transferability at the time they were purchased by the appellants; for notwithstanding some testimony about the erasure of an indorsement on some of the notes, we are of opinion that it was so skilfully done as not to attract attention with the usual care in examining such notes given by bankers.

They had the ordinary form of negotiable instruments, payable at a definite time, and that time had passed and they were unpaid. This was obvious on the face of the paper. The fact that the holder had an option to convert them into other bonds does not change their character.

That this option was to be exercised by the holder, and not by the United States, is all that saves them from losing their character as negotiable paper, for if they had been absolutely payable in other bonds, or in bonds or money at the option of the maker, they would not, according to all the authorities, be promissory notes, and they can lay claim to no other form of negotiable instrument. As it is they were negotiable promissory notes nine months overdue when purchased by the appellants. They were not legal tenders, made to circulate as money, which must, from the nature of the functions they are to perform, remain free from the liability attaching to ordinary promises to pay after maturity. Nor were they bonds of the class which, having long time to run, payable to holder, have become by the necessities of modern usage negotiable paper, with all the protection that belongs to that class of obligations. These were simply notes, negotiable it is true, having when issued three years to run, which three years had long expired, and the notes were due and unpaid.

We cannot agree with counsel for the appellants that the simple fact that they were the obligations of the government takes them out of the rule which subjects the purchaser of overdue paper to an inquiry into the circumstances under which it was made, as regards the rights of antecedent holders. The government pays its obligations according to their terms with far more punctuality than the average class of business men. The very fact that when one of its notes is due the money can certainly be had for it, if payable in money, should be a warning to the purchaser of such an obligation after its maturity to look to the source from which it comes, and to be cautious in paying his money for it. In the case of Texas v. White,^[*] the bonds of the government issued to the State of Texas were dated July 1st, 1851, and were redeemable after the 31st day of December, 1864. This court held that after that date they were to be considered as overdue paper, in regard to their negotiability, observing that in strictness, it is true, they were not payable on the day when they became redeemable, but the known usage of the United States to pay all bonds as soon as the right of payment accrues, except when a distinction between redeemability and payability is made by law and shown on the face of the bonds, requires the application of the rule respecting overdue obligations to bonds of the United States which have become redeemable, and in respect to which no such distinction is made.

Mr. Justice Grier was the only member of the court who dissented from the proposition, and he based it on the ground that the government had exercised its option of continuing to pay interest instead of redeeming the bonds.

We have not quoted the language from the opinion in that case with any view of affirming it. It may admit of grave doubt whether such bonds, redeemable but not payable at a certain day, except at the option of the government, do become overdue in the sense of being dishonored if not paid or redeemed on that day.

But the notes in the case before us have no such feature. They are absolutely payable at a certain time, and we think the case is authority for holding that such an obligation overdue ceases to be negotiable in the sense which frees the transaction from all inquiry into the rights of antecedent holders. This ground is sufficient, of itself, to justify the decree in favor of the express company.

2. When these notes were offered to the appellants for sale they carried upon their face the fact that the period for their payment or conversion into bonds had come nine months before; that for that time they had ceased to bear interest; and this would very naturally suggest the inquiry which the law of negotiable paper implies, as to the reason why they had not been paid or converted into bonds.

Bankers, brokers, and others cannot, as was attempted in this case, establish by proof a usage or custom in dealing in such paper, which, in their own interest, contravenes the established commercial law. If they have been in the habit of disregarding that law, this does not relieve them from the consequences nor establish a different law. Nor sitting here as chancellors can we say that the testimony offered of the impossibility of men in that business bearing in mind the notices of loss or theft of bonds or notes well described, with which they have been served, satisfies us of the soundness of the proposition. By the well-settled law of the case they may purchase such paper before due without cumbering their minds or their offices with the memoranda of such notices. But we apprehend that the amount of overdue paper presented for negotiation is not so large as that bankers receiving notice of loss cannot make or keep a book or other form of reference which will enable them with a very little trouble to ascertain when overdue paper is presented whether they have been served with notice of a claim adverse to the party presenting it.

The fact that the notes were at once recognized at the treasury by reason of the notices served there, proves that no unreasonable amount of care and prudence was necessary to enable bankers and brokers to do the same.

There are other rights in cases of overdue paper besides the right to purchase it, which require that care should be exercised, especially by parties who have fair notice of these rights.

Bankers and brokers cannot, more than others, when warned of possible or probable danger in their business, shut their eyes and plead a want of knowledge which is wilful. In this matter also the appellants were in fault.

We attach no importance to the denial of the title of the express company. Either as bailees or as equitable owners of the notes for which they had paid the parties who intrusted them to their custody, they are entitled to recover them, and the decree of the Circuit Court to that effect is

AFFIRMED.

NOTES

[*] 7 Wallace, 700.