Bullard v. Bank

85 U.S. 589 (1873) 18 Wall. 589

BULLARD
v.
BANK.

Supreme Court of United States.

Mr. C.B. Goodrich, contra.

Mr. Justice STRONG delivered the opinion of the court.

The extent of the powers of National banking associations is to be measured by the act of Congress under which such associations are organized. The fifth section of that act enacts that the articles of association "shall specify in general terms the object for which the association is formed, and may contain any other provisions, not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, which the association may see fit to adopt for the regulation of the business of the association and the conduct of its affairs." And the eighth section of the same act empowers the board of directors "to define and regulate by by-laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, the manner in which its stock shall be transferred." There are other powers conferred by the act, but unless these confer authority to make and enforce a by-law giving a lien on the stock of debtors to a banking association, very plainly it has not been given.

What, then, were the intentions of Congress respecting the powers and rights of banking associations? The act of 1864 was enacted as a substitute for a prior act, enacted February 25th, 1863, and in many particulars the provisions of the two acts are the same. But the earlier statute, in its thirty-sixth section, declared that no shareholder in any association under the act should have power to transfer or sell any share held in his own right so long as he should be liable, either as principal debtor, surety, or otherwise, to the association for any debt which had become due and remained unpaid.

This section was left out of the substituted act of 1864, and it was expressly repealed. Its repeal was a manifestation of a purpose to withhold from banking associations a lien upon the stock of their debtors. Such was the opinion of this court in Bank v. Lanier.^[*] In that case it appeared that a bank had been organized under the act of 1863, and that it had adopted a by-law, which had not been repealed, that the stock of the bank should be assignable only on its books, subject to the provisions and restrictions of the act of Congress, among which provisions and restrictions was the one contained in the thirty-sixth section, that no shareholder should have power to sell or transfer any share so long as he should be liable to the bank for any debt due and unpaid. And when the bank was sued for refusing to permit a transfer of stock, it set up, in defence, that the stockholder was indebted to it, and that under the by-law he had no right to make the transfer. But this court said, "Congress evidently intended, by leaving out of the act of 1864 the thirty-sixth section of the act of 1863, to relieve the holders of bank shares from the restrictions imposed by that section. The policy on the subject was changed, and the directors of banking associations were, in effect, notified that thereafter they must deal with their shareholders as they dealt with other people. As the restrictions fell so did that part of the by-law relating to the subject fall with them." But this could have been only because the restriction was regarded as inconsistent with the policy and spirit of the act of 1864. It cannot truly be said that the by-law was founded upon the thirty-sixth section, though it doubtless referred to that section. It was not in that the power to make by-laws was given. The eleventh section was the one which authorized associations to make by-laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of the act, for the management of their property, the regulation of their affairs, and for the transfer of their stock; and that was substantially re-enacted in the act of 1864. Moreover, the sixty-second section of the latter act, while repealing the act of 1863, enacted that the repeal should not affect any appointments made, acts done, or proceedings had, or the organization, acts, or proceedings of any association organized, or in the process of organization under the act aforesaid, and gave to such associations all the rights and privileges granted by the act, and subjected them to all the duties, liabilities, and restrictions imposed by it. It is, therefore, manifest that it was not the repeal of the thirty-sixth section which caused the by-law to fall. It fell because it was considered a regulation inconsistent with the new Currency Act, the policy of which was to permit no liens in favor of a bank upon the stock of its debtors. It is impossible, therefore, to see why the decision in the case of The Bank v. Lanier does not require that the certified question should be answered in the negative.

An attempt was made in the argument to distinguish that case from the present by the fact that the articles of association of the Eagle Bank contain the provision to which we have referred, namely, that the directors should have the power to make by-laws which may prohibit the transfer of stock owned by any stockholder, who may be a debtor to the association, without the consent of the board, a provision which, it is said, the associates were justified in making by the fifth section of the act of 1864. The argument is that, though the act of Congress does not itself create a lien on a debtor's stock (as did the act of 1863), it does by the words of its fifth section authorize the creation of such a lien by the articles of association, and by by-laws made under them. This leads to the inquiry whether the fifth section does authorize any provision in the articles of association that by-laws may be made prohibiting the transfer of stock of debtors to a bank, for if it does not the foundation of the argument is gone. Certainly there is no express grant of authority to make such a prohibition contained in that section. There is no specification of such a power. And if such a grant could be implied from the words used by Congress, the implication would be in direct opposition to the policy indicated by the repeal of the thirty-sixth section of the act of 1863, and the failure to re-enact it, as well as by the provisions of the thirty-fifth section, which prohibit loans and discounts by any bank on the security of the shares of its own capital stock, and prohibit also every bank from purchasing or holding any such shares, unless such security or purchase shall be necessary to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted in good faith. Surely an implication is inadmissible which contradicts either the letter or the spirit of the act. Surely when the statute has prohibited all express agreements for a lien in favor of a bank upon the stock of its debtors, there can be no implication of a right to create such a lien from anything contained in the fifth section. But were there no such policy manifest in the act, the words of the fifth section would not bear the meaning attributed to them. The articles of association required by that section to be entered into must specify in general terms the object for which the association is formed, and may contain any other provisions, not inconsistent with the provisions of the act, which the association may see fit to adopt for the regulation of its business and the conduct of its affairs. To us it seems that a by-law giving to the bank a lien upon its stock, as against indebted stockholders, ought not to be considered as a regulation of the business of the bank or a regulation for the conduct of its affairs. That Congress did not understand the section as extending to the subject of stock transfers is very evident in view of the fact that in another part of the statute express provision was made for such transfers. The eighth section empowers the board of directors of every banking association to define and regulate by by-laws, not inconsistent with the provisions of the act, the manner in which its stock shall be transferred. This would be superfluous if the power had been previously given in the fifth section. That Congress considered it necessary to make such an enactment is convincing evidence that they thought it had not elsewhere been made. Whatever power, therefore, the directors of a bank possess to regulate transfers of its stock, they derive, not from the fifth section of the act, and not from the articles of association, but from the eighth and twelfth sections by express and direct grant. It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the present case is not governed by the decision made in Bank v. Lanier, because the articles of association for the Eagle Bank authorized the directors to make a by-law restricting the transfer of stock. In that case there was a by-law prohibiting the transfer, as in this. Independent of the thirty-sixth section of the act of 1863, there was as much authority to make and enforce such a by-law as is given by the act of 1864. The eleventh and twelfth sections of the act of 1863 enacted that associations formed under it might make by-laws, not inconsistent with the laws of the United States or the provisions of the act, for the transfer of their stock, and that the stock should be transferable on the books of the association "in such manner as might be prescribed in the by-laws or articles of association." These powers given to the associates under that act are quite as large as those given by the act of 1864. Yet this court held that after the passage of the latter act a by-law giving a lien upon a debtor's stock was inconsistent with its provisions and invalid. Of course, if the act destroyed an existing by-law, it must prevent the adoption of a new one to the same effect.

We hold, therefore, on the authority of Bank v. Lanier, that the first question certified must be answered in the negative, and consequently the same answer must be given to the other two questions.

ANSWERED IN THE NEGATIVE.

Mr. Justice CLIFFORD, dissenting:

I dissent from the judgment and opinion of the court in this case for the reasons assigned in the opinion delivered by me in the case of Knight et al. v. Bank, decided in the Circuit Court, Rhode Island District, June Term, 1871, which I still believe to be correct, and consequently refer to that case as a full expression of the reasons of my dissent in the present case.

NOTES

[*] 11 Wallace. 369.