McQuiddy v. Ware

87 U.S. 14 (____) 20 Wall. 14

McQUIDDY
v.
WARE.

Supreme Court of United States.

Mr. W.H. Letcher, for the appellant.

Mr. G.P. Strong, contra.

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.

In the view we take of this case we are not required to wade through the various statutes of Missouri, and the decisions of the courts of the State, in order to determine whether or not the proceedings in question are valid. The complainant is not, in our opinion, in a position to invoke the aid of a court of equity to decide that question. The bill presents the case of a man who chose to neglect his private interest for the purpose of devoting his time to the destruction of the government, complaining that his creditors enforced the collection of their debts on a wrong theory of his status, in consequence of entering the service of the enemy. There is no pretence that the debts were not meritorious, or that the judgments were entered for a larger amount than he owed. The real ground of complaint is that he was not an absent or absconding debtor, or a person whose residence was unknown, and was not, therefore, sub ject to the proceedings which were instituted against him. Whether this be so or not it is easy enough to see in the anomalous condition of affairs existing at the time in Missouri, that creditors might honestly suppose that an individual leaving his State to destroy the government under which his rights of property were acquired, did not intend to return to it, and proceed to collect their debts under that supposition. The inquiry is whether a party acting in this way has stated such a case as entitles him to equitable relief, because his creditors, who ought to have been provided for before he left, mistook the condition he occupied, and treated him as a person who had permanently abandoned his home.

There is no averment that he did not have actual notice of the proceedings against him in time to protect his rights. And it is fair to infer, in the absence of such an averment, that it could not be truthfully made. It is difficult to suppose, when he moved his family to Tennessee, that he did not communicate with friends in Missouri who were acquainted with the true state of his affairs.

Besides, if the proceedings against him were irregular, why did he not seek his remedy under the statutes of Missouri, which concede to the party against whom judgment has been rendered on constructive notice only, the right to come in at any time within three years and file his petition for review. If this had been done, and the State court had permitted the cases to be reopened for the reasons set forth in the bill, his remedy would have been complete, as the bill charges the purchasers at the sale with notice of all irregularities. It cannot be said that there was no opportunity of doing this, for the earliest judgment was in May, 1862, and both the others in November, 1863, and the war was substantially over in May, 1865. There is no averment of the want of this opportunity, nor is the absence of it aided by the general allegation, without specification of time or circumstance, that he could not with safety return to Nodaway County on account of existing prejudices. This might be true, and yet the opening of the judgments obtained by an attorney, as his personal presence was not required for that purpose. It were easy enough before the three years expired to communicate with St. Louis by letter, or even to go there, and it is very certain that he could not have been under any apprehension while there of being disturbed in the assertion of his legal rights.

But if the proceedings, instead of being irregular and voidable, are null and void, as they are characterized in the bill, the remedy at law is complete, for there is in such a condition of things nothing in the way of the successful maintenance of an action of ejectment, which will result not only in the restoration of the lands, but also their rents and profits.

Apart from all this, the maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity in the transaction in respect to which relief is sought, has not been observed by this complainant. While admitting his indebtedness, and that it has existed for ten years or more, he does not make a tender in court of what is justly due, although he is asking the court to set aside the proceedings by which this indebtedness was satisfied, on the ground of their absolute nullity. The willingness to pay what is found to be due on the adjustment of the accounts for rents and profits is not the sort of offer required of a person in the situation of this complainant.

Moreover, there has been an utter lack of personal diligence, which is required in such a case as this in order to bring into activity the powers of a court of equity. Equity always refuses to interfere where there has been gross laches in the prosecution of rights. There is no artificial rule on such a subject, but each case as it arises must be determined by its own particular circumstances. These proceedings were begun early in the war, and yet no move is made to disturb them until July, 1871, more than six years after hostilities ceased. Why this delay? The complainant says he was in ignorance of them until recently, and that as soon as he ascertained them he took steps to assert his rights. Such a general allegation will not suffice to provoke the interposition of a court of equity. It will not do to remain wilfully ignorant of a thing readily ascertainable. There has been free and uninterrupted communication between Tennessee and Missouri since the war closed, and the courts everywhere accessible for the prosecution of any cause of action. Besides, in the very nature of things, the complainant must have known soon after it occurred that an improved farm, once occupied by him, was in the possession of adverse claimants. This was notice sufficient to put him on inquiry, and this inquiry would have resulted in ascertaining all the facts stated in the bill. There is no reason given for the delay, nor any facts and circumstances on which any satisfactory excuse can be predicated.

Here, then, is the case of a party engaging in the rebellion without provision for his debts, to which there was no defence, asking a court of equity, after the lapse of many years without sufficient excuse for the delay, to interfere in his behalf because his creditors adopted the wrong methods for the enforcement of their claims against him. And this, too, without any specific charge of fraud, except in the matter of the affidavits on which the proceedings were founded.

Such a charge, under the circumstances, is too weak and unsatisfactory to relieve the complainant from the consequences of his own folly.

In any aspect of the case we think the demurrer was properly sustained, and the decree of the Circuit Court dismissing the bill is therefore

AFFIRMED.