Murray v. Louisiana

163 U.S. 101 (1896)

MURRAY
v.
LOUISIANA.

No. 718.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued and submitted April 16, 1896. Decided May 18, 1896. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA.

Mr. Thomas F. Maher for plaintiff in error.

Mr. M.J. Cunningham, Attorney General of the State of Louisiana, and Mr. Alexander Porter Morse for defendant in error submitted on their brief.

MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

Several of the assignments of error bring into question the correctness of the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana affirming the action of the trial court in proceeding with the trial in disregard of a petition by the accused to have the cause removed into the Circuit Court of the United States upon the allegation that the petitioner was a negro, and that persons of African descent were, by reason of their race and color, excluded by the jury commissioners from serving as grand and petit jurors.

To dispose of such assignments it is sufficient to cite Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, and Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, decided at the present term, in which, after careful consideration, it was held that Congress had not, by section 641 of the Revised Statutes, authorized a removal of the prosecution from the state court upon an allegation that jury commissioners or other subordinate officers had, without authority derived from the constitution and laws of the State, excluded colored citizens from juries because of their race; that said section did not embrace a case in which a right is denied by judicial action during a trial, or in the sentence, or in the mode of executing the sentence; that for such denials arising from judicial action after a trial commenced the remedy lay in the revisory power of the higher courts of the State, and ultimately in the power of review which this court may exercise over their judgments whenever rights, privileges or immunities claimed under the Constitution or laws of the United States are withheld or violated; and that the denial or inability to enforce, in the judicial tribunals of the States, rights secured by any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, to which section 641 refers, and on account of which a criminal prosecution may be removed from a state court, is primarily, if not exclusively, a denial of such rights, or an inability to enforce them, resulting from the constitution or laws of the State, rather than a denial first made manifest at and during the trial of the case.

The petition for removal complained of the acts of the jury commissioners in illegally confining their summons to white citizens only, and in excluding from jury service citizens of the race and color of the petitioner, but did not aver that the jury commissioners so acted under or by virtue of the laws or constitution of the State; nor was there shown, during the course of the trial, that there was any statutory or constitutional enactment of the State of Louisiana which discriminated against persons on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude, or which denied to them the equal protection of the laws.

Other assignments ask our attention to errors alleged to have been committed in the course of the trial. It is claimed that the rights of the accused were disregarded in the proceedings under his challenge to the grand jury. The principal matters complained of seem to be the action of the court in endorsing on the challenge to the grand jury the words "filed subject to argument on face of papers;" and on the motion for subpœna duces tecum, directed to the registrar of voters, the words "filed subject to orders," and on the motion for subpœna duces tecum addressed to the jury commissioners the words "filed subject to orders;" and it is claimed that such indorsements were irregular, deprived the accused of opportunity to sustain the allegations contained in his written challenge and deprived him of due process of law.

The indorsements or orders made upon the various papers appear to us to have only signified that the court withheld immediate action on the motions. They evidently were not treated by the court as concluding the accused, because the record shows that subsequently the hearing of the challenge was proceeded in, and that evidence was adduced by both the State and the accused.

An exception was taken to the refusal of the court to grant what was termed a subpœna duces tecum, directed to Francis E. Zacharie, registrar of voters. The reason given by the court was that the so called writ of subpœna duces tecum did not purport to be such, did not describe or refer to any paper or document which was in the possession of the registrar, and which the defendant required. The court was of opinion that either the defendant should have specified the books or documents required; or, if he wished information from the registrar, he should have subpoenaed him to attend and testify. We perceive no error in this action.

Exception was likewise taken to the refusal of the court to grant a writ of subpœna duces tecum on the jury commissioners, not commanding them to produce specified books or papers, but that they should furnish the names and residences of the 3500 citizens whom they had summoned to qualify as jurors. The court thought that the writ asked for was not a writ of subpœna duces tecum, and that the defendant, if he desired information from the commissioners, should have subpœnaed them to attend as witnesses. Besides, the defendant had the advantage of their testimony by consenting to the use of their evidence in the Heard case.

At all events, no injury was suffered by the defendant by the refusal of the court to grant him the writs prayed for, because the evidence he desired to get did not tend to show that the rights of the accused were denied by the constitution or laws of the State, and therefore did not authorize the removal of the prosecution from the state court.

A more serious question is presented by an exception to the action of the trial court in permitting to be read the evidence of one King Jones, which had been taken in the presence of the accused in open court at a preliminary hearing, and read to and signed by the witness. The reason given by the district attorney for the use of the deposition was that after due diligence he was unable to procure the attendance of the witness, who was not within the jurisdiction of the court.

The record, however, discloses that the bill of exceptions to the allowance of this evidence was not presented for signature to the judge until March 14, 1885, two weeks after the sentence was rendered, and after a new trial had been refused and an appeal allowed. No error was assigned, in the Supreme Court of Louisiana, to the admission of this evidence, nor is it made the subject of assignment in this court. Neither does the record disclose the nature or effect of the testimony so admitted. In the absence of a bill of exceptions, disclosing at least the substance of the evidence, and of an assignment of error, we are permitted to suppose that the evidence was trivial, and that it did no injury to the defendant. We certainly have nothing in this record which would authorize us to convict the Supreme Court of Louisiana of any error in that behalf.

There was a motion to quash the indictment on the ground that act No. 170 of 1894, under the provisions of which the grand jury was drawn, was unconstitutional in that it was alleged to be a local or special law, and not enacted according to a constitutional requirement of previous public notice. This motion was refused by the trial court, and its action was approved by the Supreme Court of the State. Error is assigned in this court, but no Federal question is thereby presented.

Nor can we perceive any merit in the assignment which avers that this act No. 170 is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, because such law is alleged to confer on the jury commissioners of the parish of New Orleans judicial powers in the selection of citizens for jury services. It is not pretended that the accused was subjected to any other or different treatment, in respect to that feature of the statute, than that which prevails in other cases, or on the trial of white citizens.

A careful inspection of this record has failed to disclose any particular in which the accused was deprived of any right or immunity secured to him under the laws or Constitution of the United States, and the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is accordingly

Affirmed.