DocketNumber： 76-709
Judges： BlackmuN, BreNNAN, Marshall, Powell, Rehnquist, White
Filed Date： 6/29/1978
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 11/15/2024
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case concerns the personal immunity of federal officials in the Executive Branch from claims for damages arising from their violations of citizens’ constitutional rights. Respondent
I
Respondent controls Arthur N. Economou and Co., Inc., which was at one time registered with the Department of Agriculture as a commodity futures commission merchant. Most of respondent’s factual allegations in this lawsuit focus on an earlier administrative proceeding in which the Department of Agriculture sought to revoke or suspend the company’s registration. On February 19, 1970, following an audit, the Department of Agriculture issued an administrative complaint alleging that respondent, while a registered merchant, had willfully failed to maintain the minimum financial requirements prescribed by the Department. After another audit, an amended complaint was issued on June 22, 1970. A hearing was held before the Chief Hearing Examiner of the Department, who filed a recommendation sustaining the administrative complaint. The Judicial Officer of the Department, to whom the Secretary had delegated his decisional authority in enforcement proceedings, affirmed the Chief Hearing Examiner’s decision. On respondent’s petition for review, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the order of the Judicial Officer. It reasoned that “the essential finding of willfulness . . . was made in a proceeding instituted without the eustomary warning letter, which the Judicial Officer conceded might well have resulted in prompt correction of the claimed insufficiencies.” Economou v. U. S. Department of Agriculture, 494 F. 2d 519 (1974).
While the administrative complaint was pending before the Judicial Officer, respondent filed this lawsuit in Federal District Court. Respondent sought initially to enjoin the progress of the administrative proceeding, but he was unsuccessful in that regard. On March 31, 1975, respondent filed a second
The complaint stated that prior to the issuance of the administrative complaints respondent had been “sharply critical of the staff and operations of Defendants and carried on a vociferous campaign for the reform of Defendant Commodity Exchange Authority to obtain more effective regulation of commodity trading.” App. 157-158. The complaint also stated that, some time prior to the issuance of the February 19 complaint, respondent and his company had ceased to engage in activities regulated by the defendants. The complaint charged that each of the administrative complaints had' been issued without the notice or warning required by law; that the defendants had furnished the complaints “to interested persons and others without furnishing respondent's answers as well”; and that following the issuance of the amended complaint, the defendants had issued a “deceptive” press release that “falsely indicated to the public that [respondent’s] financial resources had deteriorated, when Defendants knew that their statement was untrue and so acknowledge [d] previously that said assertion was untrue.” Ibid.
The complaint then presented 10 “causes of action,” some
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that “as to the individual defendants it is barred by the doctrine of official immunity . . . .” Id., at 163. The defendants relied on an affidavit submitted earlier in the litigation by the attorney who had prosecuted the original administrative complaint against respondent. He stated that the Secretary of Agriculture had had no involvement with the case and that each of the other named defendants had acted “within the course of his official duties.” Id., at 142-149.
The District Court, apparently relying on the plurality opinion in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), held that the individual defendants would be entitled to immunity if they could show that “their alleged unconstitutional acts were
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the District Court’s judgment of dismissal with respect to the individual defendants. Economou v. U. S. Department of Agriculture, 535 F. 2d 688 (1976). The Court of Appeals reasoned that Barr v. Matteo, supra, did not “represen [t] the last word in this evolving area,” 535 F. 2d, at 691, because principles governing the immunity of officials of the Executive Branch had been elucidated in later decisions dealing with constitutional claims against state officials. E. g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232 (1974); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975). These opinions were understood to establish that officials of the Executive Branch exercising discretionary functions did not need the protection of an absolute immunity from suit, but only a qualified immunity based on good faith and reasonable grounds. The Court of Appeals rejected a proposed distinction between suits against state officials sued pursuant to 42 U. S. C. § 1983 and suits against federal officials under the Constitution, noting that “[o]ther circuits have also concluded that the Supreme Court’s development of official immunity doctrine in § 1983 suits against state officials applies with equal force to federal officers sued on a cause of action derived directly from the Constitution, since both types of suits serve the same function of protecting citizens against violations of their constitutional rights by government officials.” 535 F. 2d, at 695 n. 7. The Court of Appeals recog
II
The single submission by the United States on behalf of petitioners is that all of the federal officials sued in this case are absolutely immune from any liability for damages even if in the course of enforcing the relevant statutes they infringed respondent’s constitutional rights and even if the violation was knowing and deliberate. Although the position is earnestly and ably presented by the United States, we are quite sure that it is unsound and consequently reject it.
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), the victim of an arrest and search claimed to be violative of the Fourth Amendment brought suit for damages against the responsible federal agents. Repeating the declaration in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 163 (1803), that “‘[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,’ ” 403 U. S., at 397, and stating that “ [historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty,” id., at 395, we rejected the claim
Bivens established that compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest could be vindicated by a suit for damages invoking the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts,
In our view, the Courts of Appeals have reached sound results. We cannot agree with the United States that our prior cases are to the contrary and support the rule it now urges us to embrace. Indeed, as we see it, the Government’s
The Government places principal reliance on Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959). In that case, the acting director of an agency had been sued for malicious defamation by two employees whose suspension for misconduct he had announced in a press release. The defendant claimed an absolute or qualified privilege, but the trial court rejected both and the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff.
In the 1958 Term,
Barr did not, therefore, purport to,depart from the general rule, which long prevailed, that a federal official may not with impunity ignore the limitations which the controlling law has placed on his powers. The immunity of federal executive officials began as a means of protecting them in the execution of their federal statutory duties from criminal or civil actions based on state law. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 865-866 (1824).
Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204 (1877), was a similar case. The relevant statute directed seizures of alcoholic beverages in Indian country, but the seizure at issue, which was made upon the orders of a superior, was not made in Indian country. The “objection fatal to all this class of defenses is that in that locality [the seizing officers] were utterly without any authority in the premises” and hence were answerable in damages. Id., at 209.
As these cases demonstrate, a federal official was protected for action tortious under state law only if his acts were authorized by controlling federal law. “To make out his defence he must show that his authority was sufficient in law to protect him.” Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R. Co., 109 U. S. 446, 452 (1883); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 19 (1896). Since an unconstitutional act, even if authorized by statute, was viewed as not authorized in contemplation of
In both Barreme and Bates, the officers did not merely mistakenly conclude that the circumstances warranted a particular seizure, but failed to observe the limitations on their authority by making seizures not within the category or type of seizures they were authorized to make. Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87 (1845), addressed a different situation. The case involved a suit against the Postmaster General for erroneously suspending payments to a creditor of the Post Office. Examining and, if necessary, suspending paymentsTo creditors were among the Postmaster’s normal duties, and it appeared that he had simply made a mistake in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon him. He was held not liable in damages since “a public officer, acting to the best of his judgment and from a sense of duty, in a matter of account with an individual [is not] liable in an action for an error of. judgment.” Id., at 97-98. Having “the right to examine into this account” and the right to suspend it in the proper circumstances, id., at 98, the officer was not liable in damages if he fell into error, provided, however, that he acted “from a sense of public duty and without malice.” Id., at 99.
Four years later, in a case involving military discipline, the Court issued a similar ruling, exculpating the defendant
In Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), on which the Government relies, the principal issue was whether the malicious motive of an officer would render him liable in damages for injury inflicted by his official act that otherwise was within the scope of his authority. The Postmaster General was sued for circulating among the postmasters a notice that assertedly injured the reputation of the plaintiff and interfered with his contractual relationships. The Court first inquired as to the Postmaster General’s authority to issue the notice. In doing so, it “recognize[d] a distinction between action taken by the head of a Department in reference to matters which are manifestly or palpably beyond his authority, and action having more or less connection with the general matters committed by law to his control or supervision.” Id., at 498. Concluding that the circular issued by the Postmaster General “was not unauthorized by law, nor beyond the scope of his official duties,” the Court then addressed the major question in the case — whether the action could be “maintained because of the allegation that what the officer did was done maliciously?” Id., at 493. Its holding was that the head of a department could not be “held liable to a civil suit for damages on account of official communications made by him pursuant to an act of Congress, and in respect of matters within his authority,” however improper his motives might have been. Id., at 498. Because the Postmaster General in issuing the circular in question “did not exceed his authority, nor pass the line of his duty,” id., at 499, it was irrelevant that he might have acted maliciously.
Insofar as cases in this Court dealing with the immunity or privilege of federal officers are concerned,
The liability of officials who have exceeded constitutional limits was not confronted in either Barr or Spalding. Neither of those cases supports the Government’s position. Beyond that, however, neither case purported to abolish the liability of federal officers for actions manifestly beyond their line of duty; and if they are accountable when they stray beyond the plain limits of their statutory authority, it would be incongruous to hold that they may nevertheless willfully or knowingly violate constitutional rights without fear of liability.
Although it is true that the Court has not dealt with this
Ill
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967), decided that § 1983 was not intended to abrogate the immunity of state judges which existed under the common law and which the Court had held applicable to federal judges in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). Pierson also presented the issue “whether immunity was available to that segment of the executive branch of a state government that is . . . most frequently exposed to situations which can give rise to claims under § 1983 — the local police officer.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at 244-245. Relying on the common law, we held that police officers were entitled to a defense of “good faith and probable cause,” even though an arrest might subsequently be proved to be unconstitutional. We observed, however, that “[t]he common law has never granted police officers an absolute and unqualified immunity, and the officers in this case do not claim that they ■ are entitled to one.” 386 U. S., at 555.
In Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, the issue was whether “higher officers of the executive branch” of state governments were immune from liability under § 1983 for violations of constitutionally protected rights. 416 U. S., at 246. There, the Governor of a State, the senior and subordinate officers of the state National Guard, and a state university president had been sued on the allegation that they had suppressed a civil dis
“(1) the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position, to exercise discretion; (2) the danger that the threat of such liability would deter his willingness to execute his office with the decisiveness and the judgment required by the public good.” 416 U. S., at 240.
The opinion also recognized that executive branch officers must often act swiftly and on the basis of factual information supplied by others, constraints which become even more acute in the “atmosphere of confusion, ambiguity, and swiftly moving events” created by a civil disturbance. Id., at 246-247. Although quoting at length from Barr v. Matteo,
“[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It is the*498 existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for acts performed in the course of official conduct.” 416 U. S., at 247-248.
Subsequent decisions have applied the Scheuer standard in other contexts. In Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 308 (1975), school administrators were held entitled to claim a similar qualified immunity. A school board member would lose his immunity from a § 1983 suit only if “he knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student.” 420 U. S., at 322. In O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U. S. 563 (1975), we applied the same standard to the superintendent of a state hospital. In Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U. S. 555 (1978), we held that prison administrators would be adequately protected by the qualified immunity outlined in Scheuer and Wood. We emphasized, however, that, at least in the absence of some showing of malice, an official would not be held liable in damages under § 1983 unless the constitutional right he was alleged to have violated was “clearly established” at the time of the violation.
None of these decisions with respect to state officials furnishes any support for the submission of the United States that federal officials are absolutely immune from liability for their constitutional transgressions. On the contrary, with impressive unanimity, the Federal Courts of Appeals have concluded that federal officials should receive no greater degree of protection from constitutional claims than their counterparts in state government.
“it would be ‘incongruous and confusing, to say the least’ to develop different standards of immunity for state officials sued under § 1983 and federal officers sued on similar grounds under causes of action founded directly on the Constitution.” Economou v. U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, 535 F. 2d, at 695 n. 7, quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 456 F. 2d 1339, 1346-1347 (CA2 1972) (on remand).26
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has reasoned:
“[Defendants] offer no significant reason for distinguishing, as far as the immunity doctrine is concerned, between litigation under § 1983 against state officers and actions against federal officers alleging violation of constitutional rights under the general federal question statute. In contrast, the practical advantage of having just one fed*500 eral immunity doctrine for suits arising under federal law is self-evident. Further, the rights at stake in a suit brought directly under the Bill of Rights are no less worthy of full protection than the constitutional and statutory rights protected by § 1983.” Mark v. Groff, 521 F. 2d 1376, 1380 (1975).
Other courts have reached similar conclusions. E. g., Apton v. Wilson, 165 U. S. App. D. C. 22, 506 F. 2d 83 (1974) ; Brubaker v. King, 505 F. 2d 534 (CA7 1974); see Weir v. Muller, 527 F. 2d 872 (CA5 1976); Paton v. La Prade, 524 F. 2d 862 (CA3 1975); Jones v. United States, 536 F. 2d 269 (CA8 1976); G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 560 F. 2d 1011 (CA10 1977).
We agree with the perception of these courts that, in the absence of congressional direction to the contrary, there is no basis for according to federal officials a higher degree of immunity from liability when sued for a constitutional infringement as authorized by Bivens than is accorded state officials when sued for the identical violation under § 1983. The constitutional injuries made actionable by § 1983 are of no greater magnitude than those for which federal officials may be responsible. The pressures and uncertainties facing decisionmakers in state government are little if at all different from those affecting federal officials.
The Government argues that the cases involving state officials are distinguishable because they reflect the need to preserve the effectiveness of the right of action authorized by § 1983. But as we discuss more fully below, the cause of action recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S. 388 (1971), would similarly be “drained of meaning” if federal officials were entitled to absolute immunity for their constitutional transgressions. Cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at 248.
Moreover, the Government’s analysis would place undue emphasis on the congressional origins of the cause of action in determining the level of immunity. It has been observed more than once .that the law of privilege as -a defense to damages actions against officers of Government has “in large
The presence or absence of congressional authorization for suits against federal officials is, of course, relevant to the question whether to infer a right of action for damages for a particular violation of the Constitution. In Bivens, the Court noted the “absence of affirmative action by Congress” and therefore looked for “special factors counselling hesitation.” 403 U. S., at 396. Absent congressional authorization, a court may also be impelled to think-more carefully about whether the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff is normally compensable in damages, id., at 397, and whether the courts are qualified to handle the types of questions raised by the plaintiff's claim, see id., at 409 (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment).
But once this analysis is completed, there is no reason to return again to the absence of congressional authorization in resolving the question of immunity. Having determined that the plaintiff is entitled to a remedy in damages for a constitutional violation, the court then must address how best to reconcile the plaintiff’s right to compensation with the need to protect the decisionmaking processes of an executive department. Since our decision in Scheuer was intended to guide the federal courts in resolving this tension in the myriad factual situations in which it might arise, we see no reason why it should not supply the governing principles for resolving this dilemma in the case of federal officials. The Court’s opinion in Scheuer relied on precedents dealing with federal as well as state officials, analyzed the issue of executive im
Accordingly, without congressional directions to the contrary, we deem it untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials. The § 1983 action was provided to vindicate federal constitutional rights. That Congress decided, after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, to enact legislation specifically requiring state officials to respond in federal court for their failures to observe the constitutional limitations on their powers is hardly a reason for excusing their federal counterparts for the identical constitutional transgressions. To create a system in which the Bill of Rights monitors more closely the conduct of state officials than it does that of federal officials is to stand the constitutional design on its head.
IV
As we have said, the decision in Bivens established that a citizen suffering a compensable injury to a constitutionally protected interest could invoke the general federal-question jurisdiction of the district courts to obtain an award of monetary damages against the responsible federal official. As Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in the judgment, pointed out, the action for damages recognized in Bivens could be a vital means of providing redress for persons whose constitutional rights have been violated. The barrier of sovereign immunity is frequently impenetrable.
Our opinion in Bivens put aside the immunity question; but we could not have contemplated that immunity would be absolute.
The extension of absolute immunity from damages liability to all federal executive officials would seriously erode the protection provided by basic constitutional guarantees. The broad authority possessed by these officials enables them to direct their subordinates to undertake a wide range of projects — including some which may infringe such important personal interests as liberty, property, and free speech. It makes
Our system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption that all individuals, whatever their position in government, are subject to federal law:
“No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.” United States v. Lee, 106 U. S., at 220.
See also Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at 239-240. In light of this principle, federal officials who seek absolute exemption from personal liability for unconstitutional conduct must bear the burden of showing that public policy requires an exemption of that scope.
This is not to say that considerations of public policy fail to support a limited immunity for federal executive officials. We consider here, as we did in Scheuer, the need to protect officials who are required to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority. Yet Scheuer and other cases have recognized that it is not unfair to hold liable the official who knows or should know he is acting outside the law, and that insisting on an awareness of clearly established constitutional limits will not
The Scheuer principle of only qualified immunity for constitutional violations is consistent with Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S. 564 (1959), Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), and Kendall v. Stokes, 3 How. 87 (1847). Federal officials will not be liable for mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law. But we see no substantial basis for holding, as the United States would have us do, that executive officers generally may with impunity discharge their duties in a way that is known to them to violate the United States Constitution or in a manner that they should know transgresses a clearly established constitutional rule. The principle should prove as workable in suits against federal officials as it has in the context of suits against state officials. Insubstantial lawsuits can be quickly terminated by federal courts alert to the possibilities of artful pleading. Unless the complaint states a compensable claim for relief under the Federal Constitution, it should not survive
y
Although a qualified immunity from damages liability should be the general rule for executive officials charged with constitutional violations, our decisions recognize that there are some officials whose special functions require a full exemption from liability. E. g., Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S. 409 (1976). In each case, we have undertaken “a considered inquiry into the immunity historically accorded the relevant official at common law and the interests behind, it.” Id., at 421.
In Bradley v. Fisher, the Court analyzed the need for absolute immunity to protect judges from lawsuits claiming that their decisions had been tainted by improper motives. The Court began by noting that the principle of immunity for acts done by judges “in the exercise of their judicial functions” had been “the settled doctrine of the English courts for many centuries, and has never been denied, that we are aware of, in the courts of this country.” 13 Wall., at 347. The Court explained that the value of this rule was proved by experience.
The principle of Bradley was extended to federal prosecutors through the summary affirmance in Yaselli v. Goff, 275 U. S. 503 (1927), aff’g 12 F. 2d 396 (CA2 1926). The Court of Appeals in that case discussed in detail the common-law precedents extending absolute immunity to parties participating in the judicial process: judges, grand jurors, petit jurors, advocates, and witnesses. Grand jurors had received absolute immunity “ ‘lest they should be biased with the fear of being
We recently reaffirmed the holding of Yaselli v. Goff in Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, a suit against a state prosecutor under § 1983. The Court’s examination of the leading precedents led to the conclusion that “[t]he common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their duties.” 424 U. S., at 422-423. The prosecutor’s role in the criminal justice system was likely to provoke “with some frequency” retaliatory suits by angry defendants. Id., at 425. A qualified immunity might have an adverse effect on the functioning of the criminal justice system, not only by discouraging the initiation of prosecutions, see id., at 426 n. 24, but also by affecting the prosecutor’s conduct of the trial.
“Attaining the system’s goal of accurately determining guilt or innocence requires that both the prosecution and the defense have wide discretion in the conduct of the trial and the presentation of evidence. ... If prosecutors were hampered in exercising their judgment as to the use of . . . witnesses by concern about resulting personal liability, the triers of fact in criminal cases often would be denied relevant evidence.” Id., at 426.
Despite these precedents, the Court of Appeals concluded that all of the defendants in this case — including the Chief Hearing Examiner, Judicial Officer, and prosecuting attorney — were entitled to only a qualified immunity. The Court of Appeals reasoned that officials within the Executive Branch generally have more circumscribed discretion and pointed out that, unlike a judge, officials of the Executive Branch would face no conflict of interest if their legal representation was provided by the Executive .Branch. The Court of Appeals recognized that “some of the Agriculture Department officials may be analogized to criminal prosecutors, in that they initiated the proceedings against [respondent], and presented evidence therein,” 535 F. 2d, at 696 n. 8, but found that attorneys in administrative proceedings did not face the same “serious constraints of time and even information” which this Court has found to be present frequently in criminal cases. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 425.
We think that the Court of Appeals placed undue emphasis on the fact that the officials sued here are — from an administrative perspective — employees of the Executive Branch. Judges have absolute immunity not because of their particular location within the Government but because of the special nature of their responsibilities. This point is underlined by the fact that prosecutors — themselves members of the Exec
The cluster of immunities protecting the various participants in judge-supervised trials stems from the characteristics of the judicial process rather than its location. As the Bradley Court suggested, 13 Wall., at 348-349, controversies sufficiently intense to erupt in litigation are not easily capped by a judicial decree. The loser in one forum will frequently seek another, charging the participants in the first with unconstitutional animus. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S., at 554. Absolute immunity is thus necessary to assure that judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions without harassment or intimidation.
At the same time, the safeguards built into the judicial process tend to reduce the need for private damages actions as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct. The insulation of the judge from political influence, the importance of precedent in resolving controversies, the adversary nature of the process, and the correctability of error on appeal are just a few of the many checks on malicious action by judges.
We think that adjudication within a federal administrative
There can be little doubt that the role of the modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge within this framework is “functionally comparable” to that of a judge. His powers are often, if not generally, comparable to those of a trial judge: He may issue subpoenas, rule on proffers of evidence, regulate the course of the hearing, and make or recommend decisions. See § 556 (c). More importantly, the process of agency adjudication is currently structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the parties or other officials within the agency. Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act, there was considerable concern that persons hearing administrative cases at the trial level could not exercise independent judgment because
In light of these safeguards, we think that the risk of an unconstitutional act by one presiding at an agency hearing is clearly outweighed by the importance, of preserving the independent judgment of these men and women. We therefore hold that persons subject to these restraints and ¡performing adjudicatory functions within a federal agency are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their judicial acts. Those who complain of error in such proceedings must seek agency or judicial review.
The discretion which executive officials exercise with respect to the initiation of administrative proceedings might be distorted if their immunity from damages arising from that decision was less than complete. Cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U. S., at 426 n. 24. While there is not likely to be anyone willing and legally able to seek damages from the officials if they do not authorize the administrative proceeding, cf. id., at 438 (White, J., concurring in judgment), there is a serious danger that the decision to authorize proceedings will provoke a retaliatory response. An individual targeted by an administrative proceeding will react angrily and may seek vengeance in the courts. A corporation will muster all of its financial and legal resources in an effort to prevent administrative sanctions. “When millions may turn on regulatory decisions, there is a strong incentive to counter-attack.”
The defendant in an enforcement proceeding has ample opportunity to challenge the legality of the proceeding. An
We believe that agency officials must make the decision to move forward with an administrative proceeding free from intimidation or harassment. Because the legal remedies already available to the defendant in such a proceeding provide sufficient checks on agency zeal, we hold that those officials who are responsible for the decision to initiate or continue a proceeding subject to agency adjudication are entitled to absolute immunity from damages liability for their parts in that decision.
We turn finally to the role of an agency attorney in conducting a trial and presenting evidence on the record to the trier of fact. We can see no substantial difference between the function of the agency attorney in presenting evidence in an agency hearing and the function of the prosecutor who brings evidence before a court.
VI
There remains the task of applying the foregoing principles to the claims against the particular petitioner-defendants involved in this case. Rather than attempt this here in the first instance, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to that court with instructions to remand the case to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
The individual Arthur N. Economou, his corporation Arthur N. Economou and Co., and another corporation which he heads, the American Board of Trade, Inc., were all plaintiffs in this action and are all respondents in this Court. For convenience, however, we refer to Arthur N. Economou and his interests in the singular, as “respondent.”
These individuals included the Administrator of the Commodity Exchange Authority, the Director of its Compliance Division, the Deputy Director of its Registration and Audit Division, and the Regional Administrator for the New York Region.
Also named as defendants were, the United States, the Department of Agriculture and the Commodity Exchange Authority.
More detailed allegations concerning many of the incidents charged in the complaint were contained in an affidavit filed by respondent in connection with his earlier efforts to obtain injunctive relief.
In the second “cause of action,” respondent stated that the defendants had issued administrative orders “illegal and punitive in nature” against him when he was no longer subject to their authority. The fourth “cause of action” alleged, inter alia, that respondent’s rights to due process of law and to privacy as guaranteed by the Federal Constitution had been infringed by the furnishing of the administrative complaints to interested persons without respondent’s answers. The fifth “cause of action” similarly alleged as a violation of due process that defendants had issued a press release containing facts the defendants knew or should have known were false. Respondent’s remaining “causes of action” allege common-law torts: abuse of legal process, malicious prosecution, invasion of privacy, negligence, and trespass.
The District Court held that the complaint was barred as to the Government agency defendants by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Although we had noted in Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678 (1946), that “where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief,” id., at 684, the specific question faced in Bivens had been reserved.
The Court’s opinion in Bivens concerned only a Fourth Amendment claim and therefore did not discuss what other personal interests were similarly protected by provisions of the Constitution. We do not consider that issue here. Cf. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306, 325 (1973).
Black v. United States, 534 F. 2d 524 (CA2 1976); States Marine Lines v. Shultz, 498 F. 2d 1146 (CA4 1974); Mark v. Groff, 521 F. 2d 1376 (CA9 1975); G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 560 F. 2d 1011 (CA10 1977); Apton v. Wilson, 165 U. S. App. D. C. 22, 506 F. 2d 83 (1974); see Paton v. La Prade, 524 F. 2d 862 (CA3 1975); Weir v. Muller, 527 F. 2d 872 (CA5 1976); Brubaker v. King, 505 F. 2d 534 (CA7 1974); Jones v. United States, 536 F. 2d 269 (CA8 1976).
The case had been before the Court once before, during the 1957 Term. After the trial, the defendant had appealed only the denial of an absolute privilege. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment against him on the ground that the press release exceeded his authority. Barr v. Matteo, 100 U. S. App. D. C. 319, 244 F. 2d 767 (1957). This Court vacated that judgment, 355 U. S. 171 (1957), directing the Court of Appeals to consider the qualified-privilege question. This the Court of Appeals did, 103 U. S. App. D. C. 176, 256 F. 2d 890 (1958), holding as this Court described it, that “the press release was protected by a qualified privilege, but that there was evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that petitioner had acted maliciously, or had spoken with lack of reasonable grounds for believing that his statement was true, and that either conclusion would defeat the qualified privilege.” 360 U. S., at 569. Because the case was remanded for a new trial, the defendant sought certiorari a second time.
Mr. Justice Harlan’s opinion in Barr was joined by three other Justices. The majority was formed through the concurrence in the judgment of Mr. Justice Black, who emphasized in a separate opinion the strong public interest in encouraging federal employees to ventilate their ideas about how the Government should be run. Id., at 576.
The Court wrote a similar opinion and entered a similar judgment in a companion case, Howard v. Lyons, 360 U. S. 593 (1959). There a complaint for defamation under state law alleged the publication of a deliberate and knowing falsehood by a federal officer. Judgment was entered for the officer before trial on the ground that the release was within the limits of his authority. The judgment was reversed in part by the Court of Appeals on the ground 'that in some respects the defendant was entitled to only a qualified privilege. This Court reversed, ruling that Barr controlled.
See n. 10, supra. The question presented in the Government’s petition for certiorari was broadly framed:
“Whether the absolute immunity from defamation suits, accorded officials of the Government with respect to acts done within the scope of their official authority, extends to statements to the press by high policy-making officers, below cabinet or comparable rank, concerning matters committed by law to their control or supervision.” Pet. for Cert. in Barr v. Matteo, O. T. 1958, No. 350, p. 2.
This question might be viewed as subsuming the question whether the official’s immunity extended to situations in which the official had no reasonable grounds for believing that a statement, was true.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall explained:
“An officer, for example, is ordered to arrest an individual. It is not necessary, nor is it usual, to say that he shall not be punished for obeying this order. His security is implied in the order itself. It is no unusual thing for an act of congress to imply, without expressing, this very exemption from State control .... The collectors of the revenue, the carriers of the mail, the mint establishment, and all those institutions which are public in their nature, are examples - in point. It has never been doubted that all who are employed in them are protected while in the line of duty; and yet this protection is not expressed in any act of congress. It is incidental to, and is implied in, the several acts by which these institutions are created, and is secured to the individuals employed in them by the judicial power alone . . . .”
Indeed, there appears to have been some doubt as to whether even an Act of Congress would immunize federal officials from suits seeking damages for constitutional violations. See Milligan v. Hovey, 17 F. Cas. 380 (No. 9,605) (CC Ind. 1871); Griffin v. Wilcox, 21 Ind. 370, 372-373 (1863). See generally Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. Cob. L. Rev. 1, 50-51 (1972).
While the Virginia Coupon Cases, like United States v. Lee, involved a suit for the return of specific property, the principles espoused therein are equally applicable to a suit for damages and were later so applied. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co. v. O’Connor, 223 U. S. 280, 287 (1912).
An individual might be viewed as acting maliciously where “the circumstances show that he is not disagreeably impressed by the fact that
In addressing the liability of the Postmaster General, the Court referred to Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872), which the Court described as holding that “judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction [are] not liable to civil suits for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” 161 U. S., at 493. The Court was of the view that “the same general considerations of public policy and convenience which demand for judges of courts of superior jurisdiction immunity from civil suits for damages arising from acts done by them in the course of the performance of their judicial functions, apply to a large extent to official communications made by heads of Executive Departments when engaged in the discharge of duties imposed upon them by law.” Id., at 498. The Court plainly applied Bradley v. Fisher principles in holding that proof of malice would not subject an executive officer to liability for performing an act which he was authorized to perform by federal law. These principles, however, were not said to be completely applicable; and, as indicated in the text, the Court revealed no intention to overrule Kendall v. Stokes or Wilkes or to immunize an officer from liability for a willful misapplication of his authority. Also, on the face of the Spalding opinion, it would appear that an executive officer would be vulnerable if he took action “manifestly or palpably” beyond his authority or ignored a clear limitation on his enforcement powers.
Mr. Justice BrenNAN, dissenting in Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S., at 587 n. 3, emphasized this point:
“The suit in Spalding seems to have been as much, if not more, a suit for malicious interference with advantageous relationships as a libel suit. The Court reviewed the facts and found no false statement. See 161 U. S., at 487-493. The case may stand for no more than the proposition that where a Cabinet officer publishes a statement, not factually inaccurate, relating to a matter within his Department’s competence, he can
The Barr plurality did not disagree with this characterization of the lawsuit in Spalding. See also Gray, Private Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 303, 336 (1959).
Indeed, Bárreme and Bates were cited with approval in a decision that was under submission with Spalding and was handed down a scant month before the judgment in Spalding was announced. Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 18 (1896).
During the period prior to Barr, the lower federal courts broadly extended Spalding in according absolute immunity to federal officials sued for common-law torts. E. g., Jones v. Kennedy, 73 App. D. C. 292, 121 F. 2d 40, cert. denied, 314 U. S. 665 (1941); Papagianakis v. The Samos, 186 F. 2d 257 (CA4 1950), cert. denied, 341 U. S. 921 (1951). See cases collected in Gray, supra n. 19, at 337-338.
We view this case, in its present posture, as concerned only with constitutional issues. The District Court memorandum focused exclusively on respondent’s constitutional claims. It appears from the language and reasoning of its opinion that the Court of Appeals was also essentially concerned with respondent’s, constitutional claims. See, e. g., 535 F. 2d, at 695 n. 7. The Second Circuit has subsequently read Economou as limited to that context. See Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin Nat. Bank, 559 F. 2d 863, 870, and n. 2 (1977), cert. denied sub nom. Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Federal Reserve Bank of N. Y., 434 U. S. 1012 (1978). The argument before us as well has focused on respondent’s constitutional claims, and our holding is so limited.
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973), did involve a constitutional claim for invasion of privacy — but in the special context of the Speech or Debate Clause. The Court held that the executive officials would be immune from suit only to the extent that the legislators at whose behest they printed and distributed the documents could claim the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause.
416 U. S., at 247, quoting Barr v. Matteo, 360 U. S., at 573-574. The Court spoke of Barr v. Matteo as arising “[i]n a context other than a § 1983 suit.” 416 U. S., at 247. Elsewhere in the opinion, however, the Court discussed Barr as arising “in the somewhat parallel context of the privilege of public officers from defamation actions.” 416 U. S., at 242. The Court also relied on Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U. S. 483 (1896), without mentioning that that decision concerned federal officials. 416 U. S., at 242 n. 7, 246 n. 8.
As early as 1971, Judge, now Attorney General, Bell, concurring specially in a judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
Courts and judges have noted the “incongruity” that would arise if officials of the District of Columbia, who are not subject to § 1983, were given absolute immunity while their counterparts in state government received qualified immunity. Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 456 F. 2d, at 1347; Carter v. Carlson, 144 U. S. App. D. C. 388, 401, 447 F. 2d 358, 371 (1971) (Nichols, J., concurring), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S. 418 (1973).
The First and Sixth Circuits have recently accorded immunity to federal officials sued for common-law torts, without discussion of their views with respect to constitutional claims. Berberian v. Gibney, 514 F. 2d 790 (CA1 1975); Mandel v. Nouse, 509 F. 2d 1031 (CA6 1975).
In Apton v. Wilson, 165 U. S. App. D. C. 22, 32, 506 F. 2d 83, 93 (1974), Judge Leventhal compared the Governor of a State with the highest officers of a federal executive department:
“The difference in office is relevant, for immunity depends in part upon ‘scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office, Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, 416 U. S., at 247 .... But the difference is not conclusive in this case. Like the highest executive officer of a state, the head of a Federal executive department has broad discretionary authority. Each is called
Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat. 13, provided in pertinent part:
“[A]ny person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law . . .
The purpose of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act was not to abolish the immunities available at common law, see Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547, 554 (1967), but to insure that federal courts would have jurisdiction of constitutional claims against state officials. We explained in District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U. S., at 427-428:
“At the time this Act was adopted, . . . there existed no general federal-question jurisdiction in the lower federal courts. Rather, Congress relied on the state courts to vindicate essential rights arising under the Constitution and federal laws.’ Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 245 (1967). With the growing awareness that this reliance had been misplaced, however, Congress recognized the need for original federal court jurisdiction as a means to provide at least indirect federal control over the unconstitutional actions of state officials.” (Footnotes omitted.)
The situation with respect to federal officials was entirely different: They were already subject to judicial control through the state courts, which were not particularly sympathetic to federal officials, or through the removal jurisdiction of the federal courts. See generally Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U. S. 402 (1969); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257 (1880). Moreover, in 1875 Congress vested the circuit courts with general federal-question jurisdiction, which encompassed many suits against federal officials. 18 Stat. 470. Thus, the absence of a statute similar to § 1983 pertaining to federal officials cannot be the basis for an inference about the level of immunity appropriate to federal officials.
At the time of the Bivens decision, the Federal Tort Claims Act prohibited recovery against the Government for
“Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
The statute was subsequently amended in light of Bivens to lift the bar against some of these claims when arising from the act of federal law enforcement officers. See 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (h) (1976 ed.).
Mr. Justice Harlan, the author of the plurality opinion in Barr, noted that although “interests in efficient law enforcement . . . argue for a protective zone with respect to many types of Fourth Amendment violations ... at the very least ... a remedy would be available for the most flagrant and patently unjustified sorts of police conduct.” Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U. S., at 411 (concurring in judgment).
Pursuant to 28 U. S. C. § 2680 (1976 ed.), the Government is immune from
“(a) Any claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.”
See generally Dalehite v. United States, 346 U. S. 15 (1953).
The Government argued in Bivens that the plaintiff should be relegated to his traditional remedy at state law. “In this scheme the Fourth Amendment would serve merely to limit the extent to which the agents could defend the state law tort suit by asserting that their actions were a valid exercise of federal power: if the agents were shown to have violated the Fourth Amendment, such a defense would be lost to them and they would stand before the state law merely as private individuals.” 403 U. S., at 390-391. Although, as this passage makes clear, traditional doctrine did not accord immunity to officials who transgressed constitutional limits, we believe that federal officials sued by such traditional means should similarly be entitled to a Scheuer immunity.
The defendant official may also be able to assert on summary judgment some other common-law or constitutional privilege. For example, in this case the defendant officials may be able to argue that their issuance of the press release was privileged as an accurate report on a matter of public record in an administrative proceeding. See Handler & Klein, The Defense of Privilege in Defamation Suits Against Government Executive Officials, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 44, 61-62, 75-76 (1960). Of course, we do not decide this issue at this time.
In Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967), we recognized that state judges sued on constitutional claims pursuant to § 1983 could claim a similar absolute immunity. The Court reasoned:
“It is a judge’s duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most intense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litigation charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to intimidation.” Id., at 554.
The Imbler Court specifically reserved the question “whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor’s responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate.” 424 U. S., at 430-431.
See generally Handler & Klein, supra n. 35, at 54-55.
Expeditions Unlimited Aquatic Enterprises, Inc. v. Smithsonian Institution, 184 U. S. App. D. C. 397, 401, 566 F. 2d 289, 293 (1977), cert. pending, No. 76-418.
That prosecutors act under “serious constraints of time and even information” was not central to our decision in Imbler, for the same might be said of a wide variety of state and federal officials who enjoy only qualified immunity. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S., at 246-247. Nor do we think that administrative enforcement proceedings may be distinguished from criminal prosecutions on the ground that the former often turn on documentary proof. The key point is that administrative personnel, like prosecutors, “often must decide, especially in cases of wide public interest, whether to proceed to trial where there is a sharp conflict in the evidence.” Imbler, 424 U. S., at 426 n. 24. The complexity and quantity of documentary proof that may be adduced in a full-scale enforcement proceeding may make this decision even more difficult than the decision to prosecute á suspect.