United States v. Dunn

Justice White

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari to decide whether the area near a barn, located approximately 50 yards from a fence surrounding a ranch house, is, for Fourth Amendment purposes, within the curtilage of the house. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the barn lay within the house’s curtilage, and that the District Court should have suppressed certain evidence obtained as a result of law enforcement officials’ intrusion onto the area immediately surrounding the barn. 782 F. 2d 1226 (1986). We conclude that the barn and the area around it lay outside the curtilage of the house, and accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

Respondent Ronald Dale Dunn and a codefendant, Robert Lyle Carpenter, were convicted by a jury of conspiring to manufacture phenylacetone and amphetamine, and to possess amphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846. Respondent was also convicted of manufacturing these two controlled substances and possessing amphetamine with intent to distribute. The events giving rise to respondent’s apprehension and conviction began in 1980 when agents from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) discovered that Carpenter had purchased large quantities of chemicals and equipment used in the manufacture of amphetamine and phenylacetone. DEA agents obtained warrants from a Texas state judge authorizing installation of miniature electronic transmitter tracking devices, or “beepers,” in an electric hot plate stirrer, a drum of acetic anhy-dride, and a container holding phenylacetic acid, a precursor to phenylacetone. All of these items had been ordered by Carpenter. On September 3, 1980, Carpenter took possession of the electric hot plate stirrer, but the agents lost the signal from the “beeper” a few days later. The agents were able to track the “beeper” in the container of chemicals, however, from October 27, 1980, until November 5, 1980, on which date Carpenter’s pickup truck, which was carrying the container, arrived at respondent’s ranch. Aerial photographs of the ranch property showed Carpenter’s truck backed up to a barn behind the ranch house. The agents also began receiving transmission signals from the “beeper” in the hot plate stirrer that they had lost in early September and determined that the stirrer was on respondent’s ranch property.

Respondent’s ranch comprised approximately 198 acres and was completely encircled by a perimeter fence. The property also contained several interior fences, constructed mainly of posts and multiple strands of barbed wire. The ranch residence was situated 14 mile from a public road. A fence encircled the residence and a nearby small greenhouse. Two barns were located approximately 50 yards from this fence. The front of the larger of the two barns was enclosed by a wooden fence and had an open overhang. Locked, waist-high gates barred entry into the barn proper, and netting material stretched from the ceiling to the top of the wooden gates.

On the evening of November 5, 1980, law enforcement officials made a warrantless entry onto respondent’s ranch property. A DEA agent accompanied by an officer from the Houston Police Department crossed over the perimeter fence and one interior fence. Standing approximately midway between the residence and the barns, the DEA agent smelled what he believed to be phenylacetic acid, the odor coming from the direction of the barns. The officers approached the smaller of the barns — crossing over a barbed wire fence— and, looking into the bam, observed only empty boxes. The officers then proceeded to the larger barn, crossing another barbed wire fence as well as a wooden fence that enclosed the front portion of the barn. The officers walked under the barn’s overhang to the locked wooden gates and, shining a flashlight through the netting on top of the gates, peered into the barn. They observed what the DEA agent thought to be a phenylacetone laboratory. The officers did not enter the barn.¹ At this point the officers departed from respondent’s property, but entered it twice more on November 6 to confirm the presence of the phenylacetone laboratory.

On November 6, 1980, at 8:30 p.m., a Federal Magistrate issued a warrant authorizing a search of respondent’s ranch. DEA agents and state law enforcement officials executed the warrant on November 8, 1980.² The officers arrested respondent and seized chemicals and equipment, as well as bags of amphetamines they discovered in a closet in the ranch house.

The District Court denied respondent’s motion to suppress all evidence seized pursuant to the warrant and respondent and Carpenter were convicted. In a decision rendered in 1982, the Court of Appeals reversed respondent’s conviction. United States v. Dunn, 674 F. 2d 1093. The court concluded that the search warrant had been issued based on information obtained during the officers’ unlawful warrantless entry onto respondent’s ranch property and, therefore, all evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should have been suppressed. Underpinning this conclusion was the court’s reasoning that “the barn in question was within the curtilage of the residence and was within the protective ambit of the fourth amendment.” Id., at 1100. We granted the Government’s petition for certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for further consideration in fight of Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170 (1984). 467 U. S. 1201 (1984). On remand, the Court of Appeals reaffirmed its judgment that the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant should have been suppressed, but altered the legal basis supporting this conclusion: the large barn was not within the curtilage of the house, but by standing outside the barn and peering into the structure, the officers nonetheless violated respondent’s “reasonable expectation of privacy in his barn and its contents.” 766 F. 2d 880, 886 (1985). The Government again filed a petition for certiorari. On January 17, 1986, before this Court acted on the petition, the Court of Appeals recalled and vacated its judgment issued on remand, stating that it would enter a new judgment in due course. 781 F. 2d 52. On February 4, 1986, the Court of Appeals reinstated the original opinion rendered in 1982, asserting that “[u]pon studied reflection, we now conclude and hold that the barn was inside the protected curtilage.” 782 F. 2d, at 1227. The Government thereupon submitted a supplement to its petition for certiorari, revising the question presented to whether the barn lay within the curtilage of the house. We granted the petition, 477 U. S. 903, and now reverse.

II

The curtilage concept originated at common law to extend to the area immediately surrounding a dwelling house the same protection under the law of burglary as was afforded the house itself. The concept plays a part, however, in interpreting the reach of the Fourth Amendment. Hester v. United States, 265 U. S. 57, 59 (1924), held that the Fourth Amendment’s protection accorded “persons, houses, papers, and effects” did not extend to the open fields, the Court observing that the distinction between a person’s house and open fields “is as old as the common law. 4 Bl. Comm. 223, 225, 226.”³

We reaffirmed the holding of Hester in Oliver v. United States, supra. There, we recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects the curtilage of a house and that the extent of the curtilage is determined by factors that bear upon whether an individual reasonably may expect that the area in question should be treated as the home itself. 466 U. S., at 180. We identified the central component of this inquiry as whether the area harbors the “intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.’” Ibid, (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 630 (1886)).

Drawing upon the Court’s own cases and the cumulative experience of the lower courts that have grappled with the task of defining the extent of a home’s curtilage, we believe that curtilage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207, 221 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Care v. United States, 231 F. 2d 22, 25 (CA10), cert. denied, 351 U. S. 932 (1956); United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F. 2d 992, 993-994 (CA4 1981)).⁴ We do not suggest that combining these factors produces a finely tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, yields a “correct” answer to all extent-of-curtilage questions. Rather, these factors are useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they bear upon the centrally relevant consideration — whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the home itself that it should be placed under the home’s “umbrella” of Fourth Amendment protection. Applying these factors to respondent’s barn and to the area immediately surrounding it, we have little difficulty in concluding that this area lay outside the curtilage of the ranch house.

First. The record discloses that the barn was located 50 yards from the fence surrounding the house and 60 yards from the house itself. 766 F. 2d, at 882-883; 782 F. 2d, at 1228. Standing in isolation, this substantial distance supports no inference that the barn should be treated as an adjunct of the house.

Second. It is also significant that respondent’s barn did not lie within the area surrounding the house that was enclosed by a fence. We noted in Oliver, supra, that “for most homes, the boundaries of the curtilage will be clearly marked; and the conception defining the curtilage — as the area around the home to which the activity of home life extends —is a familiar one easily understood from our daily experience.” 466 U. S., at 182, n. 12. Viewing the physical layout of respondent’s ranch in its entirety, see 782 F. 2d, at 1228, it is plain that the fence surrounding the residence serves to demark a specific area of land immediately adjacent to the house that is readily identifiable as part and parcel of the house. Conversely, the barn — the front portion itself enclosed by a fence — and the area immediately surrounding it, stands out as a distinct portion of respondent’s ranch, quite separate from the residence.

Third. It is especially significant that the law enforcement officials possessed objective data indicating that the barn was not being used for intimate activities of the home. The aerial photographs showed that the truck Carpenter had been driving that contained the container of phenylacetic acid was backed up to the barn, “apparently,” in the words of the Court of Appeals, “for the unloading of its contents.” 674 F. 2d, at 1096. When on respondent’s property, the officers’ suspicion was further directed toward the barn because of “a very strong odor” of phenylacetic acid. App. 15. As the DEA agent approached the barn, he “could hear a motor running, like a pump motor of some sort . . . .” Id., at 17. Furthermore, the officers detected an “extremely strong” odor of phenylacetic acid coming from a small crack in the wall of the barn. Ibid. Finally, as the officers were standing in front of the barn, immediately prior to looking into its interior through the netting material, “the smell was very, very strong . . . [and the officers] could hear the motor running very loudly.” Id., at 18. When considered together, the above facts indicated to the officers that the use to which the barn was being put could not fairly be characterized as so associated with the activities and privacies of domestic life that the officers should have deemed the barn as part of respondent’s home.

Fourth. Respondent did little to protect the barn area from observation by those standing in the open fields. Nothing in the record suggests that the various interior fences on respondent’s property had any function other than that of the typical ranch fence; the fences were designed and constructed to corral livestock, not to prevent persons from observing what lay inside the enclosed areas.

l — l HH 1 — I

Respondent submits an alternative basis for affirming the judgment below, one that was presented to but ultimately not relied upon by the Court of Appeals. Respondent asserts that he possessed an expectation of privacy, independent from his home’s curtilage, in the barn and its contents, because the barn is an essential part of his business. Brief for Respondent 9. Respondent overlooks the significance of Oliver v. United States, 466 U. S. 170 (1984).

We may accept, for the sake of argument, respondent’s submission that his barn enjoyed Fourth Amendment protection and could not be entered and its contents seized without a warrant. But it does not follow on the record before us that the officers’ conduct and the ensuing search and seizure violated the Constitution. Oliver reaffirmed the precept, established in Hester, that an open field is neither a “house” nor an “effect,” and, therefore, “the government’s intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those ‘unreasonable searches’ proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment.” 466 U. S., at 177. The Court expressly rejected the argument that the erection of fences on an open field — at least of the variety involved in those cases and in the present case — creates a constitutionally protected privacy interest. Id., at 182-183. “[T]he term ‘open fields’ may include any unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage. An open field need be neither ‘open’ nor a ‘field’ as those terms are used in common speech.” Id., at 180, n. 11. It follows that no constitutional violation occurred here when the officers crossed over respondent’s ranch-style perimeter fence, and over several similarly constructed interior fences, prior to stopping at the locked front gate of the barn. As previously mentioned, the officers never entered the barn, nor did they enter any other structure on respondent’s premises. Once at their vantage point, they merely stood, outside the curti-lage of the house and in the open fields upon which the barn was constructed, and peered into the barn’s open front. And, standing as they were in the open fields, the Constitution did not forbid them to observe the phenylacetone laboratory located in respondent’s barn. This conclusion flows naturally from our previous decisions.

Under Oliver and Hester, there is no constitutional difference between police observations conducted while in a public place and while standing in the open fields. Similarly, the fact that the objects observed by the officers lay within an area that we have assumed, but not decided, was protected by the Fourth Amendment does not affect our conclusion. Last Term, in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U. S. 207 (1986), we held that warrantless naked-eye aerial observation of a home’s curtilage did not violate the Fourth Amendment. We based our holding on the premise that the Fourth Amendment “has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when passing by a home on public thoroughfares.” Id., at 213. Importantly, we deemed it irrelevant that the police observation at issue was directed specifically at the identification of marijuana plants growing on an area protected by the Fourth Amendment. Ibid. Finally, the plurality opinion in Texas v. Brown, 460 U. S. 730, 739-740 (1983), notes that it is “beyond dispute” that the action of a police officer in shining his flashlight to illuminate the interior of a car, without probable cause to search the car, “trenched upon no right secured . . . by the Fourth Amendment.” The holding in United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559, 563 (1927) is of similar import. Here, the officers’ use of the beam of a flashlight, directed through the essentially open front of respondent’s barn, did not transform their observations into an unreasonable search within the meaning of Fourth Amendment.

The officers lawfully viewed the interior of respondent’s barn, and their observations were properly considered by the Magistrate in issuing a search warrant for respondent’s premises. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.

1 In denying respondent’s motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the search warrant, the District Court Judge stated that the law enforcement officials, during their incursions onto respondent’s property, “did not invade the premises, that is, the houses or the barns . . . .” Tr. 216. The Court of Appeals did not disturb this finding. At the suppression hearing, the DEA agent described the officers’ approach to the large barn on November 5:

“A. We came back around, we crossed a small wooden type fence here, which put us right underneath a type of a tin overhang and in front of us was a wooden locked gate ....

“Q. How high was that gate?

“A. It probably came up to my waist, estimated.

“Q. Was that gate open or shut?

“A. It was shut and it was locked.

“Q. Was there anything above that gate?

“A. Yes, there was.

“Q. What was that?

“A. A fish netting, kind of a netting, that was hanging from the ceiling down to the gate.

“Q. Did you cross over that gate and go into the barn?

“A. No.

“Q. Did you stand outside the gate?

“A. We stood right at the gate.”

App. 17-18.

2 Prior to the actual search of the barn and ranch house, the agents entered the property for further observations.

3 In the section of Blaekstone’s Commentaries which the Court cited, Blackstone described the elements of common-law burglary, and elaborated on the element that a breaking occur in a mansion or dwelling house. In defining the terms “mansion or dwelling-house,” Blackstone wrote that “no distant barn, warehouse, or the like are under the same privileges, nor looked upon as a man’s castle of defence . . . .” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *225. Blackstone observed, however, that “if the barn, stable, or warehouse, be parcel of the mansion-house, and within the same common fence, though not under the same roof or contiguous, a burglary may be committed therein; for the capital house protects and privileges all its branches and appurtenances, if within the curtilage or homestall.” Ibid.

4 We decline the Government’s invitation to adopt a “bright-line rule” that “the curtilage should extend no farther than the nearest fence surrounding a fenced house.” Brief for United States 14. Fencing configurations are important factors in defining the curtilage, see infra, at 302, but, as we emphasize above, the primary focus is whether the area in question harbors those intimate activities associated with domestic life and the privacies of the home. Application of the Government’s “first fence rule” might well lead to diminished Fourth Amendment protection in those cases where a structure lying outside a home’s enclosing fence was used for such domestic activities. And, in those cases where a house is situated on a large parcel of property and has no nearby enclosing fence, the Government’s rule would serve no utility; a court would still be required to assess the various factors outlined above to define the extent of the curtilage.