Judges： Taney, M'Lean, Story, Thompson
Filed Date： 2/14/1837
Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 10/19/2024
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The questions involved in this case are of the gravest character, and the Court have given to them the most anxious and deliberate consideration.' The value of the right claimed by the plaintiffs is large in amount; and many persons may no doubt be seriously affected in their pecuniary interests by any decision which the Court may pronounce; and the questions which have been raised as to the power of the several states, in relation to the corporations they have chartered, are pregnant with important consequences; not only to the individuals who are concerned in the corporate franchises, but to the communities in which they exist. The Court are fully sensible that it is their duty, in exercising the high powers conferred on them by the constitution of the United States, to déal with these great ánd extensive interests with the utmost caution; guarding, as far as they have the power to do so, the rights of property,-and at the same time carefully abstaining from any encroachment on the rights' reserved to the states.
It appears, from the record, that in the year 1650, the legislature of Massachusetts, granted to the president of Harvard college “the liberty and power,” to dispose of the ferry from Charlestown to Boston, by lease or otherwise, in the behalf and for the behoof of the college: and that, under that grant, the college continued to hold and keep the ferry by its lessees or agents, and to receive the profits of it until 1785. In the last mentioned year, a petition was presented to the legislature, by Thornas Russell and others, stating the inconvenience of the transportation by ferries, over Charles river, and the puolic advantages that would result from a bridge; and praying to be incorporated for the purpose of erecting a bridge in the place where the ferry between Boston and Charlestown was then kept. Pursuant to this petition, the legislature, on the 9th of March, 1785, passed an act incorporating a company, by the name of “ The Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge,” for the purposes mentioned in the petition. Under this charter the company.-were empowered to erect a bridge, in “ the place where the ferry was then kept;” certain tolls were granted, and the charter was limited to
The bridge was accordingly built, and was opened for . passengers on the 17th of June, 1786. In 1792, the charter was extended to seventy years, from the opening of the bridge; and at the expiration of that time it was to belong to the commonwealth. The corporation have regularly' paid to the college the annual sum of two hundred pounds, and have performed all of the duties imposed on them by the terms of their charter.
In 1828, the legislature of Massachusetts incorporated a company by the name of “ The Proprietors of the Warren Bridge,” for the purpose of erecting another bridge over Charles river. This bridge is only sixteen rods, at its commencement, on the Charlestown side, from the commencement of the bridge of the plaintiffs; and they are about fifty rods apart at their termination on the Boston side. The travellers who pass over either bridge, proceed from Charlestown square, which receives the travel of many great public roads leading from the country; and the passengers and travellers who go to and from Boston, used to pass over the Charles River Bridge, from and through this square, before the erection of the Warren Bridge.
The Warren Bridge, by the terms of its charter, was to be surrendered to the state, as soon as the expenses of the proprietors in building and supporting it should be reimbursed; but this period was not, in any event, to exceed six years from the time the company commenced receiving toll.
When the original bill in this case was filed, the Warren Bridge had not been built; and the bill was filed after the passage of the law, in order to obtain an injunction to prevent its erection, and for general relief. The bill, among other things, charged as a ground for relief, that the act for the erection of the Warren Bridge impaired the obligation of the contract between the commonwealth and the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge; and was therefore repugnant to the constitution of the United States. Afterwards, a supplemental bill was filed, stating that the bridge had then been so far
In the argument here, it was admitted, that since the filing of the supplemental bill, a sufficient amount of toll had been received by the proprietors of the Warren Bridge to reimburse all their expenses, and that the bridge is now the property of the state, and has been made a free bridge; and that the value of the franchise granted to the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge,' has by this means been entirely destroyed.
If the complainants deemed these ‘facts material, they ought to have been brought before be state court, by a supplemental bill; and this Court, in pronouncing its judgment, cannot regularly notice them. But in the view which the Court take of this subject, these additional circumstances would not in any degree influence their decision. And as they are conceded to be true, and the case has been argued on that ground, and the controversy has been for a long time depending, and all parties desire a final end of it;' and as it is. of importance to them, that the principles on which this Court decide should not be misunderstood; the case will be treated in the 'opinion now delivered, as if these admitted facts were regularly before us.
. A good deal of evidence has been offered to show the nature and extent of the ferry right granted to the'college;-.and also to show the rights cl airbed by the proprietors of therbridge at. difierent times,
The .plaintiffs in error insist, mainly, upon two grounds: 1st. That by virtue of the grant of 1650, Harvard college was entitled, in perpetuity, to the right of beeping a ferry between Charlestown and Boston; that this right was exclusive; and that the legislature had not the power to establish another ferry' on the same line of travel, becaiise .it would infringe the rights of the college; and that these rights, upon the erection of the bridge in the place of the ferry, under the: charter of 1785, were transferred to, and became vested in “ the proprietors of the Charles River. Bridge;” and that under, and by virtue of this .transfer of the ferry right, the rights of the bridge company were as exclusive in that line of' travel, as the rights of the ferry, 2d. That independently of the ferry right, the act? of the legislature of Massachusetts of 1785, and 1792, by their true construction, necessarily implied that the legislature would not authorize another bridge, and especially a free one, by the' Side of this, and placed in the same line of travel, whereby the franchise granted to the “ proprietors of the Charles River Bridge” should be rendered of no value; and the plaintiffs in error contend, that the grant of the ferry, to the college, and of the charter to the proprietors of the bridge, are both contracts on the part of the state; and that the law authorizing the erection of the Warren Bridge in 1828, impairs the obligation of one or both of these contracts.
It is very clear, that in the form in which this case comes before us; being a writ of error to a state-court; the plaintiffs in claiming under either of these rights, must place themselves on the ground of contract, and cannot support themselves upon the principle, that the law divests vested rights. It is well settled by the decisions of this Court, that a state law may be retrospective in its character, and may divest vested rights; and yet not violate the constitution of the United States, unless it also impairs the obligation of a contract. In 2 Peters, 413; Satterlee v. Mathewson; this Court, in speaking of the state law. then before them, and interpreting the article in the constitution of the United States which forbids the states to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts, uses the following language. “It (thd state law) is said to be retrospective; be it so. But retrospective laws which do not impair the obligation of contracts,
After these solemn decisions of this Court, it is apparent that the plaintiffs in error cannot sustain themselves here, either upon the ferry right, or the charter to the bridge; upon the ground that vested rights of property have been divested by the legislature.' -And whether they claim under the ferry right, or the charter ttf the bridge, they must show that the title which they claim, was acquired by contract, and that the terms of that contract,' have been violated by the charter to the Warren Bridge. In other words, they must show that the state had entered into a contract with 'them, or those under whom they claim, not to establish a free bridge at the 'place where the Warren Bridge is erected. Such, and such only, áre the principles upon which the plaintiffs in error' can claim, relief in this case.
The nature and extent of the- ferry right granted to Harvard. college, in 1650, must depend upon the laws of Massachusetts; and the character and extent of this right has been elaborately discussed- at .the bar. But in the view which the Court take of the case before, them, it is not necessary to 'express any opinion on these questions. For assuming that the grant to Harvard college, and the charter to the Bridge company, were both contracts, and that the ferry right was as extensive and exclusive as the plaintiffs contend for; still they
It has been strongly pressed upon- the Court, by the plaintiffs in error, that these rights are still existing, and are now held by the proprietors of the bridge. If this franchise still exists, there must be somebody possessed of authority to use it, and to keep the ferry. Who could now lawfully set up a ferry where the old one was kept? The bridge was built in the same place, and its abutments occupied the landings of the ferry.. The transportation of passengers in boats, from landing to landing, was no longer possible; and the ferry was as effectually destroyed, as if a convulsion of nature had made .there a-passage of dry land. The ferry then,, of necessity, ceased to exist, as soon as the bridge was erected; and when the ferry itself was destroyed, how can rights which were incident to it, be supposed to survive? The exclusive privileges, if they had such, must follow the fafe of the ferry, and can have no legal existence without it-*-and if the ferry right had been assigned by the college, in due and legal form, to the proprietors of the bridge, they themselves extinguished that right, when they erected the bridge in its place. It is not supposed, by any one, that the Bridge company have a right to keep a ferry. No such right is claimed for them, nor can be claimed for them, under their charter to erect a bridge — and it is difficult to imagine how ferry rights can be held by a corporation, or an individual, who have no right to keep a ferry. It is clear, that the incident must follow the fate of the principal, and the privilege connected with property, cannot survive the destruction of the-property; and if the ferry right in Harvard college was exclusive, and had been assigned to the proprietors of the bridge, the privilege of exclusion could ’not remain in the hands of their assignees, if those assignees destroyed the ferry.
But upon what ground can the plaintiffs in error contend that the ferry rights of the college have been transferred to the proprietors of the bridge? ' If they have been thus transferred, it must be by some mode-of transfer known to the law; and the evidence relied on to prove if, can be pointed out in the record. How was it transferred?' It is. not suggested that there ever was, in point of fact, a deed of eon
It is however said, that the payment of the two hundred pounds a year to the college, as provided for in the law, gives to the proprietors of the bridge an equitable claim to be treated as the assignees of their interest; and by substitution, upon chancery principles, to-be-clothed with all their rights.
The answer to this argument is obvious. This annual sum was intended to be paid out of the proceeds of the tolls, which the company were authorized to collect. The amount of the tolls,- it must be presumed, was graduated with a view to this incumbrance, as well as- to every other expenditure to which the company might be subjécted, under the provisions of - their charter. The tolls were to-be collected from the public, and it was intended that the expense of the annuity to Harvard college should be borne by the public; and it is manifest that it was so borne, from the amount which it is admitted they received, until the Warren Bridge was erected. Their agreement,’.therefore, to pay-that sum, can give them no equitable right to be regarded as the assignees of the college, and certainly can furnish no foundation for presuming a conveyance; and as the proprietors of the bridge are-neither the legal nor equitable assignees-of the college, it is ¿oí easy to perceive how the ferry franchise cart be invoked in aid of their claims, if it were even still a subsisting privilege; and had. not been resumed by the state, for the purpose of building-a bridge.in its place., .
Neither can the extertt of the pre-existing ferry right, whatever it may have been, have any influence upon the construction of. the written charter for„the bridge. -It .does not', by any means, follow, that, because the legislative-power in Massachusetts, in 1650, may have granted to a justly favoured seminary of learning, the exclusive right of' ferry between Boston and Charlestown, they would, in 1785, give the same extensive privilege to another corporation, who were about to erect a bridge in the same place. The fact that such a tight
This brings us to the act of the legislature of Massachusetts, of 1785, by which the plaintiffs were incorporated by the name of “ The Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge;” and it is here, and in the law of 1792, prolonging their charter, that we must look for the extent and nature of the franchise conferred, upon the plaintiffs.
Much has been said in the argument of the principles of construction by which this law is to be expounded, and what undertakings, on the part of the- state, may be implied. The Court think there can be no serious difficulty on that head. It is the grant of certain franchises by the public to a private corporation, and in .a matter where the public interest is concerned. The rule of construction in such cases is well settled,.both in England, and by the decisions of our own tribunals. In 2 Barn. & Adol. 798; in the case of the Proprietors of the Stourbridge. Canal against Wheely and others, the court’say, “ the canal having been made under an act of parliament, the rights of the plaintiffs are derived entirely from that act; This, like many other cases, is’a bargain between a company of adventurers and the public, the terms of which are expressed in the statute; and the rule of construction in all such cases,-is now fully established to be this; that any ambiguity in the terms of the contract, must operate against the adventurers, and in favour of the- public, and" the plaintiffs can claim nothing that,is not clearly, given them by the-act.”- And the doctrine thus laid down is abundantly sustained by the authorities referred to in this decision. The case itself wás as strong, a one, as could well be imagined, for giving to the
Borrowing, as we have done, our system, of jurisprudence from the English law;' and-having adopted, in every other case, civil and criminal,-its rulés for the construction of statutes; is there any thing in our local situation, or in the nature of our political institutions, which should lead us to depart, from -the principle where corporations are concerned? Are we to apply, to acts of incorporation, a rule of construction differing from that of the English law, and, by implication, make the terms of a charter in one of the states, morunfavourable to the. public, than upon an act of parliament, framed in the same words, would be sanctioned in an English court? Can any good reason-be'assigned -for excepting this particular class of cases from the operation of the general principle; and for introducing a new and adverse rule of construction in favour of corporations, while we adopt and adhere to the rules of construction known to the English common law, in every other case, without exception? We think cot;- and it would present -a singular spectacle, if, while the courts in England are réstraining, within the strictest limits, the spirit of monopoly, and exclusive privileges in nature of monopolies, and confining corporations to the privileges plainly given to them in their charter; the courts of this country should be found enlarging
But we are not now left to.determine, for the first time, the rules by which public grants are to be construed in this country. The subject has already been considered in this Court; and the rule of construction, above stated, fully established. In the case of the United States v. Arredondo, 8 Pet. 738, the leading cases upon this subject are collected together by the learned judge who delivered the opinion of the Court; and the principié recognised, that in grants bythe public, nothing passes by implication.
The rule is still more clearly and plainly stated in the case of Jackson v. Lamphire, in 3 Pet. 289. That was a grant of land by the state; and in speaking of this doctririe of implied covenants in grants by the state, the Court use the following language, which is strikingly applicable to the case at bar: — “ The only contract made by the state, is the grant to John Cornelius, his heirs and assigns, of the land in question. The patent contains no covenant to do, or not to do any further act in relation to the land; and we do not feel ourselves at liberty, in this case, to create one by implication. The state has not, by this act, impaired the force of the grant; it does not profess or attempt to take the land from the assigns of Cornelius, and giye it to one not claiming under Rim; neither does the award produce that effect; the grant remains in full force; the property conveyed is held by his grantee, and the state asserts no claim to it.?’
The sáme rule of construction is also stated in the case of Beatty v. The Lessee of Knowles, 4 Pet. 168; decided in this Court in 1830. In delivering their opinion in that case, the Court, say: — “ That a corporation is strictly limited to the exercise of those powers which are specifically conferred on it, will not be denied. The exercise of the corporate franchise being restrictive of individual-rights, cannot be extended beyond the letter and spirit of the act of incorporation.”
But the case most analogous to this, and in which the -question .came more directly before the Court, is the case of the. Providence Bank v. Billings & Pittmann, 4 Pet. 514; and which was decided, in 1830. In that case, it appeared that the legislature of Rhode Island had chartered the bank, in the usual form of such acts of incorporation. The. charter contained no stipulation on the part of the state, that it would not. impose a tax on the bank, nor any reservation of the right to do so. It was silent on this point. Afterwards; a law
It may, perhaps, be said, that in the case of the Providence Bank, this Court were speaking of the taxing power; which is of vital importance to the very existence of every government. But the object and end of all government is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is established; ard it can never be assumed, that the government intended to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it was created. And in a country like ours, free, active, and enterprising, continually advancing in numbers and wealth; new channels of communication are daily found necessary, both for travel and trade; and are essential to the comfort, convenience, and prosperity of the people, A state ought never to be presumed to surrender this power; because, like the taxing power, the whole community have an interest in pre
Adopting the rule of construction above stated as the settled one, we proceed to apply it to the charter of 1785, to the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge. This act of incorporation is in the usual form, and the privileges such as are commonly given to corporation^ of that kind. It confers on them the ordinary faculties of a corporation, for the purpose of building the bridge; and establishes certain rates of toll, which the company are authorized to take. This is the whole grant. There is no exclusive privilege given to them over the waters of Charles river, above or below their bridge. No right to erect another bridge themselves, nor to prevent other persons from erecting one. No engagement from the state, that another shall not be erécted; and no undertaking not to sanctioii competition, nor to make improvements that may diminish the amount of its income. Upon all these subjects the charter is silent; and no
The relative position of the Warren Bridge has already been described. It does, not interrupt the passage over the Charles.River Bridge, nor make- the way to it or from it less convenient. None of the faculties or franchises granted to that corporation, have been revoked by the legislature; and it's right to take the tolls granted by the charter remains unaltered. In short, all the franchises and rights of property enumerated in the charter, and there mentioned to have been granted to it, remain unimpaired. But its income is destroyed by the Warren Bridge; which, being free, draws off the passengers and property which would have gone over it, and renders their franchise of no value: This is the gist of the complaint. For it. is not pretended, that the erection of the Warren Bridge would have done them any injury, or in any degree affected their right of property;, if it had not diminished the amount of their tolls. In order then to entitle themselves to relief, it'is necessary to show, that the legislature contracted not to do the act of which they complain; and that they impaired, or in' other words, violated that contract by the erection of the Warren Bridge.
The inquiry then is, does the charter contain such a contract on the part of the state? Is there any such stipulation to be found in that-instrument? It must be admitted on all hands, that there is none— no words that even relate to another bridge, or to the diminution of their tolls, or to the line of travel. - If a contract on that subject can be gathered from the charter, it must be by implication; and cannot be found in the words used. Can such an agreement be implied ? The rule of construction before stated is an answer to the question. In charters of- this description, no rights are taken from the public, or given to the corporation, beyond those which the words of the charter, by their natural and proper construction, purport to convey. There are no words which import such a contract as the plaintiffs in error contend for, and none can be implied; and the same answer must be given to them that was given by this Court to the Providence Bank. The whole community are interested in this inquiry, and they have a right to require that the power of promoting their
But the case before the Court is even still stronger against any such implied contract, as the plaintiffs in error contend for. The Charles River Bridge was, completed in 1786. The time limited for the duration of the corporation by their original charter, expired in 1826. When, therefore, the law passed authorizing the erection of the Warren Bridge, the proprietors of Charles River Bridge held their corporate existence under the law of 1792, which extended their charter for thirty years; and the rights, privileges, and franchises of the company, must depend upon the construction of the last 'mentioned law, taken in connection wdth the act of 1785.
The act of 1792. which extends the charter of this bridge, incorporates another company to build a bridge over Charles river; furnishing another communication with Boston, and distant only between one and two miles from the old bridge.
The first six sections of this- act incorporate the proprietors of the West Boston Bridge, and define the privileges, and describe the duties of that corporation. In the seventh section there is the following recital: “And whereas the eredtion of Charles River Bridge was a work of hazard-and public utility, and another bridge in the place of West Boston bridge may diminish the emoluments of Charles River Bridge; therefore, for the encouragement of enterprise,” they proceed to extend the charter of the Charles River Bridge, and to continue it for the term of seventy years from-"the day the bridge was completed; subject to the conditions prescribed in the original act, and to be entitled to the same tolls. It appears, then, that by the same act that extended this charter, the legislature established another bridge, which they knew would lessen its profits; and this, too, before the expiration of the first charter, and only seven years after it was granted; thereby showing, that the state did not suppose that, by the terms it had used in the' first law, it had deprived itself of the power of making such public improvements as might impair the profit's of the Charles River Bridge; and from the language used in the clauses of the law by which the charter is extended, it would seem, that the legislature were especially carefuk to exclude any inference that the extension was made upon the ground of com
On the contrary, words are cautiously employed to exclude that conclusion; and the-extension is declared to be granted as a reward for the hazard they had run, and “ for the encouragement of enterprise.’^ The extension was given because the company had undertaken and executed a work of doubtful success; and the improvements which the legislature then contemplated, might diminish the emoluments they had expected to receive from it. It results from this statement, that the legislature in the very law extending the charter, asserts its rights to authorize improvements over Charles river which would take off a portion of the travel from this bridge and diminish its profits; and the Bridge Company accept the renewal thus given, and thus carefully connected with this assertion of. the right on the part of the state. Can they, when holding their corporate existence under this law, and deriving their franchises altogether from it; add to tire privileges expressed in their charter an implied agreement, which is in direct conflict with a portion of the law from which they derive their corporate existence? Can the legislature be presumed to have taken upon themselves an implied obligation, contrary to its own acts and declarations contained in the' same law? It would be difficult to find a case justifying such an implication, even between individuals; still less will it be found where sovereign rights are concerned, and where the interests of a whole community would be deeply affected by such an implication. It would, indeed, be a strong exertion of judicial power, acting upon' its own views of what justice required, and the parties ought to have done; to raise, by a sort of judicial coercion, an implied contract, and infer it from the nature of the very instrument in which the legislature appear to have taken pains to use words which .disavow and repudiate any intention, on the part of the state, to make such a contract.
Indeed, the practice and usage of almost every state in the Union, old enough to have commenced the work of internal improvement, is opposed to the doctrine contended for on the part of the plaintiffs in error. Turnpike roads have been made in succession, on the same line of travel; the later ones interfering materially with the profits of the first. These corporations have, in some instances, been utterly ruined by the introduction of newer and better modes of transportation, and travelling. In some cases, rail roads have rendered the turnpike roads on the same line of travel so entirely useless, that the
And what would be the fruits of this doctrine of implied contracts on the part of the states, and of property in a line of travel by a corporation;, if it should now be sanctioned by this Court?' To what results would it lead us? If it is to be found in the charter to this bridge, the same process of reasoning must discover it, in the various acts which have been passed, within the last forty years, for turnpike companies." And what is to be the extent of the privileges of exclusion on the different sides of the road? The counsel who have so ably argued this case, have not attempted to .define it by any certain boundaries. How far- must the new improvement be distant from the old one? How near may you approach without .invading its rights in the privileged line? If this Court should establish the principles now contended for, what is to become of the numerous rail roads established on the same line of travel with turnpike companies; and which have rendered the franchises of the turnpike corporations of no value? Net it once be understood that such charters carry with them these implied contracts, and give this unknown and undefined property in ¿fine of travelling; and you will soon find the old turnpike corporations awakening from their sleep, and calling
Many other questions, of the deepest importance, have been raised and elaborately discussed in the argument. It is not necessary, for the decision of this case, to express our opinion upon them; and the Court deem it proper to avoid volunteering an opinion on any question, involving the construction of the constitution, where, the case itself does not bring the question directly before them, and make it their duty to decide upon it.
Some questions, also, of a purely technical character, have been made and argued, as to the form of proceeding and the right-to relief. But enough appears on the record to bring out the great question in contest; and it is the interest of all parties concerned, that the real controversy should be settled without further delay: and as the opinion of the Court is pronounced on the main question in dispute here, and disposes of the whole case, it is altogether unnecessary to enter upon the examination of the forms of proceeding, in which the párties have brought it before the Court.
The judgment of the supreme judicial court of the commonwealth of Massachusetts, dismissing the plaintiffs’ bill, must, therefore,, be affirmed, with costs.
This suit in chancery was commenced in the supreme court of Massachusetts, where the bill'was dismissed by a decree,- pro forma, the members of that court being equally divided in opinion; and a writ of error was taken to this Court, on the ground, .that the right asserted by the complainants, and which has been violated under the charter of the respondents, is protected by a special provision in the federal constitution.
The complainants’ right is founded on an act of the legislature .of Massachusetts, passed March 9th, 17S5; which incorporáted certain individuals, and authorized them to erect a bridge over Charles river, a navigable stream between Boston and Charlestown, and an amendatorjr act, passed in 1791, extending the charter thirty years.
As explanatory of this right, if not the ground on which it in part jests, a reference is made to an ancient ferry, over the same river, which was held by Harvard college; and the right of which was transferred, it is contended, in equity, if not in law, to the Bridge Company.
The wrong complained of, consists in the construction of a new bridge, over the same river; under a recent act of- the legislature, within a few rods of the old one, and which takes away the entire profits of the old bridge.
The act to' establish the Charles River Bridge required it to be constructed within a limited time, of certain dimensions, to be-kept in repair, and to afford certain specified accommodations, to the public. The company were authorized to charge certain rates of .toll; and they were required to pay, annually, two hundred pounds to Harvard college. The first charter was granted for forty years.
The' facts proved in the case show that a bridge of the description required by the act of 1785, was constructed within the time limited; that the annual pevment, has been made to the college; and that, in every other respect, the corporation has faithfully performed thé conditions and duties enjoined on it.
It is contended that the charter granted to the respondents, violates the obligation of that which had been previously granted to the complainants; and that, consequently, it is in conflict with that provision of the constitution which declares, that no “ state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of Contracts.”
In the investigation of this case, the first inquiry which seems na
As early as the year 1631', a ferry was established across Charles river by the colonial government of Massachusetts Bay. In 1640, the general court say, “ that .the ferry is granted to the college.” From this time the profits of the ferry were received by the. college, and it was required by various statutes, under certain penalties, to keep certain boats, &c., for the accommodation of the public. This duty was performed by the college; and it continued to occupy the ferry until the Charles River Bridge was constructed.
From the above act of the general court, and others which have been shown, and the uhmolestéd use of the ferry for more than one hundred and forty years, by the college, it w;ould seem, that its right to this use had received all the sanctions necessary to constitute a valid title. If the right was not foundéd strictly on precription, it rested on a basis’ equally unquestionable.
At the time this ferry was established, it was the only public-communication between Boston and Charlestown. These places, and especially the latter, were then small; and no greater accommodation was required than was afforded by the ferry. Its franchise was not limited, it is contended, to the ferry ways; but extended to the whole line of travel between the two tSwns.
lit cannot be very. material to inquire whether this ferry was originally public or private property; or whether the landing places were vested in the college, or their use only, and -the profits of the ferry. The beneficial interest in the ferry was held by the college, and-it received the tolls.
-The regulation of the ferry, it being a matter of public concern, belonged to the government. It prescribed the number of boats to be kept, ánd the attendance necessary to be given; and on a failure to comply with these requisitions, the college would have been subjected to the forfeiture of the franchise, and the other penalties provided by statute.
Was this right of ferry, with all its immunities, transferred to the Charles River Bridge Company?
It is not.contended that there is any express assignment of this right by deed or otherwise; but the complainants claim that the evidence of the transfer is found in the’facts of the case. Before the charter was granted, the college was. consulted on the subject; so soon'as the bridge was constructed, the use of the ferry ceased;
That there was a substitution of the bridge for the ferry, with the consent of the college, is evident; but there seems to have, been no assignment of the rights of the ferry. The original bridge charter was granted for forty years; at the expiration of which period, the property of the bridge was to revert to the commonwealth, “saving to' the college a reasonable and ’ annual compensation for the annual income of the: ferry, which they might have received, had not said bridge been erected.”
Had. the bridge been destroyed by fire or otherwise, there was no investiture of right to the ferry in the complainants,' that would have enabled them to keep up the ferry, and realize the profits of it.
On the destruction of the bridge, the college, it is presumed, might have resumed all the rights and responsibilities attached to the ferry. At least, it.is very clear, that these rights and responsibilities would not have devolved on the complainants. They stipulated to afford a different accommodation to the public. If thén these rights could not have been claimed and exercised by the complainants, under such circumstance's; how can they bq considered as enlarging, or in any. way materially affecting the franchise under the charter of 1785? ,.
That the franchise of a ferry at common law, and in the state of Massachusetts, extends beyond the landing places, is very clear from authority. 10 Petersdorf, 53; 13 Vin. 513; Willes’ Rep. 512, note; 12 East, 330; 6 Barn. & Cres. 703; Year Book, Hen. 6, 22; Rolles’ Ab. 140; Fitz. 428. n; Com. Digest, Market, C. 2; Piscary, B. Action on the Case, A; 3 Blk. 219; Nott & M'Cord, 387; 2 Saund. 172; 6 Mod. 229; 2 Vent. 344; 3 Levinz. 220; Com. Dig. Patent, F. 4, 5, 6, 7; 2 Saund. 72, n. 4; 2 Inst. 406 ; Chit. Pre. 12 chap. 3; 10 chap. 2; 3 Salk. 198; Willes, 512; 4 Term, 666; Saund. 114; Croke, E. 710.
The annuity given to the college was a compensation for the profits of the ferry; and Shows a willingness by the college to suspend its rights to the ferry, during the time specified in the act. And if indeed jit might be construed into an abandonment of the ferry, still it. was an abandonment to the publie, on the terms specified, for a better accommodation.
If there was no assignment of the ferry franchise to the complainants, its extent cannot be a matter of importance in this investigation: nor is it necessary to inquire into the effect of an assignment, under the circumstances of the case, if iffiad been made.
There is no provision in the act of incorporation vésting the company with the privileges of the ferry. A reference is made to it merely with the view of fixing the site of the bridge. The right and obligations of the complainants must be ascertained by the construction of the act of 1785.
This act. must be considered in the light of a contract, and tifie law of contracts applies to it; In one sense it is a law, having passed through all the forms of legislation, and received the necessary sanctions; but it is essentially á contract', as to the obligations, imposed bjr it, and the privileges it confers.
Much discussion has been had at the bar, as to the rule of construing a charter or grant, and many authorities have been referred to on this point. In ordinary cases, a grant is construed favourable to the grantee, ánd against the grantor. But it is. contended, that in governmental grants, nothing is taken by implication.
The broad rule, thus laid down, cannot be sustained by authority. If an office fie granted by name, all the immunities of that office are taken, by implication. Whatever is essential to the enjoyment of the thing granted, must be taken by implication. And this rule holds good, whether the grant emanate from the royal prerogative of the king in England, or under an act of legislation in this country.
The general, rule is, that í£ a grant of the king, at the suit of the grantee, is tó be construed' most beneficiálly for the king, and most strictly against the grantee;” but grants obtained as a matter of special favour of the king, or on a consideration, are more liberally construed: Grants of limited political powers are construed strictly. Com. Dig. tit. Grant, E. 5; 2 Dane’s Ab. 683; 1 Nott & M'Cord, Stark v. M'Gowan; Pop. 79; Moore, 474; 8 Coke, 92; 6 Barn. & Cres, 703; 5 Ib. 875; 3 M. & S. 247; Hargrave, 18 to 23; Angel on Tide Water, 106, 7; 4 Burr. 2161; 4 Durn. & East. 439; 2 Bos.
Where the legislature, with a view of advancing the public interest by the construction of. a bridge, a turnpike road, or any other work ..of public futility, grants a charter, no reason is perceived why such a charter should not be construed by the same rule that governs contracts between 'individuals.
• The public, through their agent, enter into the contract with the company; and a valuable consideration is received in the construction of the contemplated improvement.. This consideration is paid by the company, and sound policy requires, that its rights should be ascertained and protected, by-the same rules as. aré applied to private contracts.
In the argument, great reliance was placed on the case of the Stourbridge Canal v. Wheeley and others; 2 Barn. & Ald. 792.
Tne question in this case was, whether the plaintiffs had a right to charge toll in certain cases; and lord Tenterden said, “the canal having been made under the provisions of. an act of parliament, the rights of the plaintiff are derived entirely from that act. This, like many other tases, is a bargain betweén a company of adventurers, and the public, the terms of which are expressed in the statute; and the rule of construction in all such cases, is now fully established to be- this — that any ambiguity in the terms of the contract must operate against the adventurers, and in favour of the public; and the plaintiffs can claim nothing, which is not clearly given to them by the act.”
This is relied on to show, that nothing is taken, under such a grant, by implication or inference. His lordship says, the right must be clearly giyen — he does not say expressly given, which would preclude-all inference. In another part of the same opinion, his lordship says, “ Now it is quite certain that the company have no right; expressly given, to receive any compensation, excépt the tonnage paid for goods carried through some of the locks on the canal, or the collateral cuts; and it is therefore -incumbent upon them to show that they have a right, clearly given by inference, ivoixi some of the
. The doctrine laid down in this case, is simply this;’ that the right to charge the toll, must be given expressly, or it must be clearly made out by inference. • Does not this case establish the doctriné of implication, as applied to the construction of grants? Is not the right to pass by-laws incident to a corporation? A right cannot be claimed by a corporation, under ambiguous terms. It must clearly appear to have been granted, either in express terms, of by inference, as stated by lord Tenterden.
A corporate power to impose a tax on the land of the company, as considered in the case of Beatty v. The Lessee of KnoWlfes, 4 Peters, 168, must, in its nature, be strictly construed; and so in all cases where corporate powers, in the nature of legislation, are exercised. In that case, the directors were authorized to impose a tax under certain circumstances; and the .Court held that they had no power to impose the tax under,other eircúmstances.
Charles river being a navigable stream, any obstructions to its navigation, by,the erection of a bridge, or any other work, would have been punishable, Unless authorized by law.
By the act of 1785, the complainants were authorized to build the bridge, elect their officers, &c. and charge certain rates of .toll. The power to tax 'passengers, was the consideration on which the expense of building the bridge, lighting it, &c. .and keeping it in repair, was incurred. The grant then of tolls, was the essential part of the franchise.
That course of reasoning which Would show the consideration to consist in any thing short of this power to tax, and the profit arising therefrom, is too refined for practical purposes. The builders of the bridge had no doubt á desire to increase the public aceommodatiqp: but they looked chiefly to a profitable investment of their, funds; and that part of the charter which secured this object, formed the consideration on which the work was performed.
But it is said, there was no exclusive right given; and that consequently the legislature might well cause another bridge to be built, whenever, in their opinion, the public convenience required it.
On the other hand, it is insisted that the franchise of the bridge was as extensive as that of the ferry; and that the grant of this franchise having been made by the legislature, it had no power to grant a part of it to the new bridge.
The right granted to the Charles River Bridge Company, is, in its naturej to a certain extent, exclusive; but to measure this extent, .presents the chief difficulty. If the boundaries of this right could be clearly established, it would scarcely be contended by any one, that the legislature could, without compensation, grant to another company the whole or any part of it.
. As well might it undertake to grant a tract of land, although an operative grant had been previously made for the same land. In such a case the second grant would be void, on the ground that the legislature had' parted with the entire interest in the premises. As agent of the public it had passed the title to. the first grantee; and having done so, it could convey no right’by its second grant.
The principle is the same in regard to the question under consideration. If the franchise granted to the complainants extended beyond the new bridge; it was as much above the power of the legislature to make the second grant, as'it would be to grant a part of a tract of land for which a patent had been previously and regularly issued..
The franchise, though incorporeal in legal contemplation, has body and extension; and having been granted, is not less scrupulously guarded by the.principles.-of law than an interest in the soil. It is a substantive right in law, and can no more be resumed by the legislature, when once granted, than any other right.-
But would it not be unsafe, it. is suggested, for the judicial authority to interpóse and limit- this exercise of legislative discretion?
The charter of the Warren Bridge, it is said, was- not hastily granted; that all the circumstances of the case, year after year, were, duly examined by the legislature; and at last the act of incorporation was passed, because, in the judgment of the'legislature, the public
It' is undoubtedly the province of the legislature to provide for. the public exigencies, and the utmost respect is always due to their acts; and the validity of those acts can only be questioned judicially, where they infringe upon private rights. At- the time the Charles River Bridge was built, the population of Boston and Charlestown was small in comparison with their present numbers; and it is' probable that the increase has greatly exceeded any calculation made at the time. The bridge was sufficient to accommodate the public; and it was, perhaps, believed that it would be sufficient, during the time limited in the charter. If, however, the increased population and intercourse between these towns and the surrounding country, required greater accommodation, than was afforded by the bridge, there can be no doubt that the legislature could make provision fot it.
On the part of the complainants’ counsel it is contended, if increased' facilities of intercourse between these places were required by the public, the legislature was bound in good faith to give the option to the Charles River Bridge Company, either to enlarge their bridge, or construct a new one, as might be required. And this-argument rests upon the ground that the complainants’ franchise included the whole line of travel between the two places.
Under this view of their rights, the company proposed to the legislature, before the new charter was granted to the respondents, to do any thing which should be deemed requisite for the public accommodation.
In support of the complainants’ right, in this respect, a case is referred to in 7 Barn. and Cres. 40; where it is laid down, that the lord of an ancient market may, by law, have a right to prevent other persons from selling goods in their private houses, situated within the limits of his franchise: and also to 5 Barn. and Cressw. 363. These cases show, that the grant to the lord of the market is exclusive; yet, if the place designated for the market is made too small by the act of the owner, any person -may sell in the vicinity of the market, without" incurring any responsibility to the lord of the market.
Suppose the legislature had passed a law requiring the complain
When the Charles River Bridge was built, it was considered a work of great magnitude. It was, perhaps, the first experiment made to throw a bridge of such length over an arm of the sea; and in the construction- of i.t great risk and expense were incurred. The unrestricted profits contemplated, were necessary to induce or justify the undertaking. Suppose within two or three years after the Charles River Bridge had been erected, the legislature had authorized another bridge to be built alongside of it, which could only accommodate the same line of travel. Whether the profits of such a bridge were realised by a company or by the state, would not the act of thé legislature have been deemed so gross a violation of the rights of the complainants, as to be condemned by the.common sense and common justice of mankind?
The plea, that the timbers or stone of the new bridge did not interfere with the old one, could not, in such a case, have availed. The value of the bridge is not estimated by the quantity of timber and stone it may contain, but by the travel over it And if one-half or two-thirds of this travel, all of which might conveniently have passed-over. the old bridge, be drawn to the new one', the injury is milch greater than would have been the destruction of the old bridge. A reconstruction of the bridge, if destroyed, would secure to the company the ordinary profits; but the division or destruction of the profits, by the new bridge, runs to the end of the charter of the old one. And shall it be said, that the greater injury, the diversion of the profits, may be inflicted on the company with impunity; while for the less injury, the destruction of the bridge, the law would give an adequate remedy?
I am not here about to apply the principles which have been long established in England, for the protection of ancient ferries, markets,
In this country there are few rights founded on prescription. The settlement of our country is comparatively recent; and its rapid growth in population and advance in improvements have prevented, in a great degree, interests from being acquired by immemorial usage. Such evidence of right is found in countries where society has become more fixed, and improvements are in a great degree stationary. But without the aid of the principles of the common law, we should be at a loss how to constru the charter of the complainants, and ascertain their rights.
Although the complainants cannot fix their franchise by showing the extent of the ferry rights; yet, under the principles of the common law, which have been too long settled in Massachusetts, in my opinion, to be now shaken; they may claim their franchise beyond the timbers of their bridge. If .they may go beyond these, it is contended that no exact limit can be prescribed. -^And because it my be difficult, and perhaps impracticable, to designate with precision the exact limit; does it follow that the complainants’ franchise is as narrow as their bridge.
Is it more difficult to define, with reasonable certainty, the extent of this right, than it is, in many other cases, to determine the character of an offence against the laws, from established facts. What shall constitute a public or private nuisance? What measure of individual wrong shall be sufficient to convict a person of the latter?. And what amount of inconvenience to the public shall constitute the former?
Would it be more difficult to define the complainants’ franchise, than to answer these questions? And yet public ana private nuisances are of daily cognizance in courts of justice. How have ferry rights, depending upon the same principles, been protected for centuries in England?
The principles of the common law are not applied with that mathematical precision, of which the principles of the civil law are susceptible. But if the complainants’ franchise cannot be measured by feet and inches, it does not follow that they have no rights.
In determining upon facts which establish rights or wrongs, pub-
The bridge of the complainants was substituted tor the ferry; and it was designed to accommodate the course of travel between Boston and Charlestown. This was the view of the legislature in granting the charter,, and of the complainants in accepting it. And if it be admitted that the great increase of population has required the erection of other bridges than that which is complained of in this suit, over this arm of the sea, that can afford no protection to the defendants. If the interests of the complainants have been remotely injured by the construction of other bridges, does that give a license, to the defendants to inflict on. them a more direct and greater injury? By an extension of the complainants’ charter, thirty years, an indemnity .was given and accepted by them "for the construction of the West Boston bridge.
The franchise of the complainants must extend a reasonable distance above and below the. timbers of their bridge. This distance must not be so great.as to subject the public to serious inconvenience, nor so limited as to authorize a ruinous competition. It may not be necessary to say, that for a remote injury the law would afford a remedy; but where the injury is ruinous, no doubt can exist on the subject. The new bridge, while tolls were charged, lessened the profits of the .old one about .one-half, or two-thirds; and now that it is a free bridge by law, the tolls received by the complainants are merely nominal. On what principle of law can such an act.be sustained? Are rights acquired under a solemn contract with the legislature, held' by a more uncertain tenure than other rights? Is the legislative power so omnipotent in such cases, as to resume what it has granted without compensation? It will scarcely be contended, that if the legislature may do this, indirectly, it may not do it directly. If it may do it through the instrumentality of the Warren Bridge Company, it may dispense with that'instrumentality.
But it is said that any check to the exercise of this discretion by the legislature, will operate against the advance of improvements.. Will not a different effect be produced? If fevery bridge or turnpike company were liable to have their property wrested from them, under an act of the legislature,,without compensation; could much value be attached to such property? Would prudent men expend their funds in making such improvements?
But it has been urged that the property, of the complainants has not been taken, as the- tolls in anticipation cannot be denominated property. The entire value of the bridge consists in the right of exacting toll. Is not this right property, and cannot its value be measured? Do not past receipts and increased intercourse, afford a rule by which future receipts may be estimated? And if the whole of these tolls are taken under an act of the legislature, is not the property of the complainants taken?
The charter of the complainants has been compared to .a bank charter, which implies no obligation on the legislature not to establish another bank in the same place. This is often done; and--it is contended, that fbr the consequential injury done the old bank by lessening its profits, no one supposes that an action would lie,' nor that the second charter is unconstitutional. ' This case bears little or no analogy to the one under consideration. A bank may wind up its business, or refuse its discounts, at the pleasure of its stockholders and directors. They are under no obligation to carry on the operations of the institution,’or afford any amount' of accommodation to the public. Not so with the'complainants. Under heavy penalties they are obliged to keep their bridge in repair, have it lighted, the gates kept open, and to pay two hundred pounds annually to the college. This the complainants are bound to do, although the tolls received should scarcely pay for the oil consumed in the lamps of the bridge.
The sovereign power of the state has taken the tolls of the complainants, but it has left them in possession of their bridge. Its stones and timbers are untouched, and the roads that lead to it, remain unobstructed.
One of the - counsel in the defence; with emphasis,, declared, that the legislature can no more repeal a charter, than it can lead a citizen to the block. The legislature" cannot bring a citizen to the block; may it open his arteries? It cannot cut off his head; may it bleed him to death? Suppose the legislature had authorized the construction of an impassable wall, which encircled the ends of the bridge, so as to prevent passengers from crossing on it. The wall may be
The legislature had the same right to destroy the plaintiffs’ bridge by authorizing the construction of the wall, as they had by authorizing the construction of. a free bridge. In deciding this question we are not to consider what may be the law on this subject in Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia or Ohio; but what it is in Massachusetts. And ip that state, the doctrine has been sanctioned that associations of men to accomplish enterprises of importance to the public, and who have vested their funds on the public faith, are entitled to protection. That their rights do not become the sport of popular excitement, no more than the rights of other citizens.' The case under consideration forms, it is believed, a solitary exception to this rule; whether we look to the action of the legislature, .or the opinions of the distinguished jurists of the state, on the bench, and at the bar.
The expense of keeping up the bridge, and paying-the annuity to. the college, is all that is left by the state to the .complainants. Had this been, proposed, or any thing which might lead to such a result - soon after the construction of the complainants’ bridge, it is not probable, that it would have. been sanctioned; and ygt it might as well have been done ¡hen as now. A free bridge then^ couldJbave.been no more injurious to the plaintiffs than it is now. No reflection is intended on the commonwealth of Massachusetts, which is so renowned in our'history for its intelligence, virtue and patriotism. She will not withhold justice, when the rights of the complainants shall be established.
Much reliance is placed on the argument, in the case reported in 4 Peters, 560, in which it was decided, that a law of the state of Rhode Island, imposir g a tax upon banks, is constitutional. As these banks were chartered by the state, it was contended that there was no implied obligation on the legislature not to tax them. That if
The complainants’ charter has been called a monopoly; but in no just sense can it be so considered, A monopoly is that which has been granted without consideration; as a monopoly of trade; or of the manufacture of any particular article, to the exclusion of all competition. It is withdrawing that which is a common right, from the community, and vesting it in one or more individuals to the exclusion of all others. Such monopolies are justly odious, as they operate not only injuriously to trade, but against the general prosperity of society. But the accommodation afforded- to the public by the Charles River Bridge, and the annuity paid to the college, constitute a valuable consideration for the privilege granted by the charter. • The odious features of a monopoly do not, therefore, attach to the charter of-the plaintiffs.
The 10th article of the declaration of rights in the constitution of Massachusetts, provides; “ Whenever the public exigencies require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.” And in the 12th article it is declared, that, “ no subject shall be deprived of his property-, immunities, privileges or estate, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land.” Here is a power recognised in the sovereignty, and is incident to it, to apply private property to public uses by making for it a just compensation: This power overreaches every other, and- must be exercised 'at the discretion of the government; and a bridge, a turnpike road, a tract of land, or any other property, may be taken in whole, or in part, for public purposes, on the condition of making compensation.
In the case of Chadwick v. The Proprietors of the Haverhill Bridge, reported in Dane’s Abridgment, it appears that a bridge was built under a charter within forty rods of the plaintiff’s ferry, and over the same water. By an act of the legislature, commissioners were authorized to ascertain the damages sustained by the plain
In the extension of the national road through the state of Ohio, a free bridge was thrown across a stream by the side of a toll bridge, which had some ten or fifteen years of its charter to run. The new bridge did not in the least obstruct the passage over the old one; and it was contended, that- as no exclusive right wa; given under the first grant, the owner of the toll bridge was entitled to no compensation. It was said on.that occasion, as it has been urged on this, that the right was given' subject to the discretion of the legislature, as to a subsequent grant; and that the new bridge could not be objected to by the first grantee, whether.it was built under'the authority of the state, or federal government.
This course of reasoning influenced a decision against the claimant in the first instance; but a reconsideration of his case, and a more thorough investigation of it, induced the proper authority to reverse the decision, and award an indemnity for the injury done. The value of the charter was estimated, and a just compensation was made. This, it is true, was not a judicial .decision, but it was a decision of the high functionaries of the government, and is entitled to respect It was dictated by that sense of justice which should be felt on the bench, and by every tribunal having the power to act upon private rights.
It is contended by the respondents’ counsel, that there was not only no exclusive right granted in the complainants’ charter, beyond the timbers of the bridge; but the broad ground is assumed, that the legislature had no power to make such a grant;, that they cannot grant any part of the eminent domain, which shall bind a subsequent legislature. And a number of authorities were cited to sustain their position; 1 Vattell, ch. 9, sec. 101; 4 Litt. R. 327; Domat. Book 1, tit. 6, sec. 1; 17 Vin. 88; Chitt. on Prer. 81; 10 Price, 350; Puff.
If this doctrine be sustainable, as applied to this case, it is not perceived why an exception should be made in favour of the plaintiffs, within the timbers of their bridge. It is admitted, that their grant is good to this extent; and if the legislature may grant a part of the eminent domain to this extent, why may it not go beyond it? If it may grant any part of the.eminent domain, must not the extent of the grant be fixed at its discretion? In what other mode can it be determined, than by a judicial construction of the grant?
Acts of incorporation, when granted on a valuable consideration, assume the nature of contracts; and vested rights under them are no. more subject to the legislative power than any other vested rights. In granting the charter to the Charles River Bridge Company, the legislature did not divest itself of the power to grant similar charters. But the thing granted passed to the grantee; and can no more be resumed by the legislature, than it can resume the right to a tract of land which has been granted. When land is granted, the state can exercise nc acts of ownership over it* unless it be taken for public use; and the same rule applies to a grant for a bridge, a turnpike road, or any other public improvement. It wouM assume a bold position to say, that a subsequent legislature may resume the ownership of a tract of land, which had been granted at a preceding session; and yet the principle is the same in regard to vested rights, under an act of incorporation. By granting a franchise, the state does not divest itself of any portion of its sovereignty; but to advance the public interests, one or more individuals are vested with a capacity to exercise the powers necessary to attain the desired object. In the case under consideration, the necessary powers to construct and keep up the Charles River Bridge were given to Thomas Russell and his associates. This did not withdraw the bridge from the action of the State sovereignty, any more than it is withdrawn from land which it has granted. In both cases the extent of the grant may become a question for judicial investigation and decision; but the rights granted are protected by the law.
It is insisted that, as the complainants accepted the extension of their charter in 1792, under an express assertion of right by the legislature to make-new grants at its discretion, they cannot now object to the respondents’ charter. In the acceptance of the extended charter, the complainants are bound only by the provisions of that
It has been decided by the supreme court of New York, that unless the act making the appropriation of private property for public use, contain a provision of indemnity, it is void. Where property is taken under great emergencies, by an officer of the government, he could hardly be considered, I should suppose; a trespasser; though he does not pay for the property at the time it is taken.
There can be no doubt, that a compensation should be provided for in the same act which authorizes the appropriation of the pro“perty, or in a cotemporaneous act. If, however, this be omitted, and the property be taken, the law unquestionably gives a remedy adequate to the damages sustained. No government which- rests upon the basis of fixed laws, whatever form it may have assumed, or wherever the sovereignty may reside, has asserted the right, or exercised the power of appropriating private property to public purposes, without making compensation.
In the 4th section of the act to establish the Warren Bridge, there is a provision that the corporation shall make compensation for any real estate that may be taken for the use of ,the bridge. The property of the complainants, which was appropriated under the new charter, cannot strictly be denominated real estate; and consequently this special provision does not reach their case. In this respect the law must stand as though no such provision had been made.
But was the complainants! property appropriated under the charter granted to the respondents, for public purposes? If the new bridge were deemed -necessary, by the legislature, to promote the general convenience, and the defendants were consequently authorizéd to construct it, and a part of the plaintiffs’ franchise were granted to the defendants; it was an appropriation of private property for aublic.use. It was as much an appropriation of private property for public use, as would have been an appropriation of the ground of an Individual, for a turnpike, or a rail road, authorized by la
By the charter of the Warren Bridge, so soon as-the company anould be reimbursed the money expended in the construction of tile bridge, the expenses incurred in keeping it up, and five per cent.
In granting the charter of the Warren Bridge, the legislature seem to recognise the,, fact that they were about to appropriate the property of the complainants for public uses, as they provide, that the new company shall pay annually to the college, in behalf of the old one, a hundred pounds. By this provision, it appears that the legislature has undertaken to do what a jury of the country only could constitutionally do;..assess the amount of compensation to which the complainants are entitled.
Here; then, is a law which not only takes away the property of the complainants, but provides, to some extent, for their indemnity. Whether the complainants have availed themselves of this provision or not, does not appear, nor is it very material. The láw, in this respect, does not bind them; and they are entitled to an adequate compensation for the property taken. These considerations, belong to the case, as it. arises under the laws and const'tution of Massachusetts.
The important inquiry yet remains, whether this Court can take jurisdiction in the form in which the case is presented. . The jurisdiction of this Court is resisted on two grounds. In the first place, it’ is contended that the Warren Bridge has become the property of the state, and that the defendants have no longer any control over the subject; and also, that the supreme court of Massachusetts have no jurisdiction over trusts.
The chancery jurisdiction of the supreme court of Massachusetts, is admitted to be limited; but they are specially authorized in cases of nuisances, to issue injunctions.; and where this ground of jurisdiction is sustained, all the' incidents must follow it. If the law incorporating the Warren Bridge Company was unconstitutional, on the ground that it appropriated to public use the property of the complainants, without making compensation; can there be any doubt, that the supreme court of Massachusetts had jurisdiction of the case? And having jurisdiction, is it not clear that the whole matter in controversy may be settled by a decree, that the defendants shfjll
It is also insisted, that the state is the substantial party to this suit, and as the Court has no jurisdiction against a sovereign state, that they can sustain no jurisdiction against those who act as agents under the authority of a state. That if such a jurisdiction were asserted by this Court, they would do indirectly, what the law prohibits them from doing directly.
In the case of Osborn et al. v. Bank United States, 9 Wheat. 733, this Court says, “ The circuit courts of the United States haye jurisdiction of a bill in equity, filed by the Bank of the United States for the purpose of protecting the bank in the exercise of its franchises, which are threatened with invasion and destruction undfer an unconstitutional state law; and as the state itself cannot be made a defendant, it may be maintained against the officers and agents of the state who are appointed to execute such law.”
As it regards the question of jurisdiction, this case, in principle, is similar to the one under consideration. Osborn acted as the agent, or officer of the state of Ohio, in collecting from the bank, under an act of the state, a tax or penalty unconstitutionally imposed: and if in such a case jurisdiction could be sustained against the agent of the state, why can it not be sustained against a corporation acting as agent under an unconstitutional act of Massachusetts, in collecting tolls which belong to the plaintiffs?
In the second place, it is contended, that this Court cannot take jurisdiction of this ease under that provision of the federal constitution, which prohibits any state from impairing the obligation of contracts, as the charter of the complainants has not been impaired. It may be necessary to ascertain, definitely, the meaning of this provision of the constitution; and the judicial decisions which have been made under it.
What was the evil against which' the constitution intended to provide, by declaring, that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts ? What is a contract, and what is the obligation of a contract?
A contract is defined to be an agreement between two or more persons to do or not to do a particular thing. The obligation of a contract is found in the terms of the agreement,'sanctioned by moral and legal principles.
The evil which this inhibition on the states was- intendea to pre
An executed contract is the evidence of a thing done; and it would seem, does not necessarily impose any duty or'obligation on either party to do any act or thing. If a state convey land which it had previously granted, the second grant is void; not, it would seem to me,.because the second grant impairs the obligation of the first, for in fact it does not impair it: but because, having no interest in the thing granted, the state could convey none. The second grant would be void in this country, on the same ground that it would be void in England, if made by the king. This is a principle of the common law; and is as immutable as the basis of justice. It derives no strength from the above provision, of the constitution; nor does it seem to me to come within the scope of that provision.
When.we speak of the obligation of a contract, the mind seems necessarily to refer to an executory contract; to a contract, untferwhich something remains to be done, and there is an obligation oi^&pe or both of the parties to do it: No law of a state shall impair this obligation, by altering it in any material part. This prohibition does not apply to the' remedy, but to the terms used by the parties to the agreement, and which fix their respective rights and obligations. The obligation, and the mode of enforcing the obligation, are distinct things. The former consists in the acts of the parties, and is ascertained by the binding words of the contract. The other emanates from the law-makmg power, which may be exercised at the discretion of the legislature, within the prescribed limits of the constitu
On the part of the complainants, it is contended that on the question of jurisdiction, as in reference to any other matter in controversy, the Court must look at the pleadings, and decide the point raised in the form presented. The bill charges that the act to establish the Warren Bridge, purports to grant a right repugnant to the vested rights of the complainants, and that it impairs the obligation of the contract between them and the commonwealth; and, being contrary to the constitution of the United States, is void. In their answer, the respondents deny that the act creating the corporation of the Warren Bridge, impairs the obligation of any contract sét forth in the bill of the complainants.
The Court must .look at the case made in the bill) in determining any questions which may arise; whether they relate to the merits or the jurisdiction of the.Court. But in either case, they are not bound by any technical allegations or- responses, which may be found in the bill and answer. They must ascertain the nature of the relief sought, and the ground of jurisdiction, from the -tenor of the bill.
In this case, the question of jurisdiction under the constitution is broadly presented; and may be examined free from technical embarrassment.
Chief Justice Parker, in the state court, says, in reference to the charter of the complainants, “The contract-of the government is, that this right shall not' be disturbed or impaired, unless public necessity demand; and if it shall so demand, the grantees shall be indemnified.” Such a contract, he observes, “ is founded upon' the principles of our constitution, as well as natural justice; and it cannot be impaired without a'violation of the constitution of the United States: and I think, also, it is against the .principles of our state constitution.”
In the conclusion of his opinion, Mr. Justice Putnam says, in speaking of the defendants’ charter, “ It impairs the obligation of the grants before made to the plaintiffs. It takes away their property for public uses without -compensation, against their consent, and without a provision for a trial by jury. It is therefore void.”
Mr. Justice Wilde, and Mr. Justice Morton, did not consider the
In their decree, the court say, “That no property belonging to the complainants was taken and appropriated to public use, within the terms and meaning of the 10th article of the declaration of rights prefixed to the constitution of this commonwealth.”
This decree can, in no point of view, be considered as fixing the construction of the constitution of Massachusetts, as it applies to . this case. .The decree was entered, pro forma, and is opposed to the opinion of two members of the court.
But if that court had deliberately and unanimously decided that the plaintiffs’ property had not been appropriated to public use, under the constitution of Massachusetts; still, where the sanie point becomes important on a question of jurisdiction before this Court, •they must decide for themselves. The jurisdiction of this Court could, in no respect, be considered as a consequence of the decision of the above question by the state court, in whatever way the decree might have been entered. But no embarrassment can arise on this head, as the above decree was made, as a mattfer of form, to bring the case before this Court.
To sustain the jurisdiction of this Court, the counsel for complainants place great reliance upon the fact, that the right, charged to be violated, is held directly from the state; and they insist, that there is' an implied obligation on the state, that it will do nothing to impair the -grant. And that, in this respect, the complainants’ right rests upon very different grounds from other rights in the Community, not held by grant directly from the state.
On the face of the complainants’ grant there is no stipulation that the legislature will do nothing that shall injure the rights of the grantees; but it is said that this is implied; and on what, ground does the implication arise? Does it arise from the fact, that the complainants are the immediate grantees of the state?
The principle is admitted, that the grantor can do nothing that shall destroy his deed; and this rule applies as well to the state as to an individual. And the same principle operates with equal force on all grants, whether made by the state or individuals.
Does an implied obligation arise on a grant made by the state, that the legislature shall do nothing to invalidate the grant, which does not arise on every other grant or deed in the commonwealth?
The legislature is bound by the constitution of the state, and it
The new charter does not purport to repeal the old one, nor to alter it in any material or immaterial part. It does not, then, operate upon the complainants’ grant, but upon the thing granted. It has, in effect, taken the tolls of the complainants and given them to the public. In other words, under the new charter, all that is valuable under the charter of the complainants has been appropriated to public usé.
It is urged, that the legislature did not intend to appropriate the property of the complainants; that there is nothing in the act of the legislature, which shows an intention by the exercise of the eminent domain, to take private property for public use; but that, on the contrary, it appears the Warren Bridge'charter was granted in the exercise of a legislative discretion, asserted and sustained by a majority of the legislature.
In this charter provision is made to indemnify .the owners of real estate, if it should be taken for the use of the bridge; and the new company is required to pay, in behalf of the Charles River Bridge Company, one-half of the annuity to the college.
This would seem to show an intention to appropriate private property, if necessary, for the establishment of the Warren Bridge; and also an intention to indemnify the complainants, to some extent, for the injury done them. There could have been no other motive tnan this, in providing' that the ~ new company should pay the hundred pounds.
But the Court can only judge of the intention, pf the legislature
If this be the character of the act; if, under its provisions the property of the complainants has been appropriated to public purposes; it may be important to inquire whether it can be considered as impairing the obligation of the contract, within the meaning of the federal constitution.
That a state may appropriate private property to public use, is universally admitted. This power is incident to sovereignty, and there are' no restrictions on its exercise, except such as may be imposed by the sovereignty itself. It may tax at its discretion, and adapt its policy to the wants of its citizens; and use their means for the promotion of its objects Under its own laws.
If an appropriation-of private property to public use impair the obligation of a contract' within the meaning of the constitution, then every exercise of this power by a state is unconstitutional. From this conclusion there is no escape; and whether compensation be • made or not, cannot vary the result
The provision is not, that no state shall pass a law impairing the obligation of contracts, unless compensation be made; But the power is.absolutely inhibited to a state. If the act of the state come within the' meaning of the provision, the act is void. No condition which may be annexed to it, no compensation that can' be made, can give it validity. It is in conflict with the supreme law of the land, and is therefore a nullity.
Can a state postpone the day fixed in an obligation for payment, or provide that a bond for the payment of money shall be discharged by the payment of any thing else than money? This no one will contend can be done, because such an act would clearly impair the obligation of the contract; and no compensation, which the state could give, would make the act valid.
The question is asked whether the provision implied in the constitution of Massachusetts, that private property may be taken by making compensation, is hot impliedly incorporated in every con
Can the contract be impaired within the meaning' of the federal constitution, when the action of the state is upon the property? The contract is not touched, but the thing covered by the contract is taken' under the power to appropriate private property for public use. If taking the property impair the obligation of the contract, within the meaning of the constitution, .it cannot be taken on any terms. The provisión of the federal constitution, which requires compensation to be made when private property shall be taken for public use, acts only upon the officers of the federal government. This case must be.governed by the constitution of Massachusetts.
Can a state, in any form, exercise a power over contracts which is expressly prohibited by the constitution of the Union? The parties making a contract may embrace any conditions they please, if the conditions do not contravene the law, or its established policy. But it is not in the power of a state to impose upon contracts which have, been made, or which may afterwards be made, any condition, which is prohibited by the federal conkitution. No state.shall impair the obligation of contracts. Now, if the act of a' state, in appropriating private property to public use come \yithin the meaning of this provision, is not the act inhibited, and, consequently, void? This point would seem to be too plain for controversy. And is it not equally clear, that no provisions contained jn the constitution of a state, or in its legislative acts, which subject the obligation of a contract to an unconstitutional control of the .state, can be obligatory upon the citizens of the state? If the state has attempted to exercise a power which the federal constitution prohibits, no matter under what form the power may be assumed, or what specious pretexts may be urged in favour of its exercise, the act is unconstitutional and void.
That a state may take private property for public use, is controverted by no one. It is a principle, which, from the foundation of our government, has been sanctioned by the practice of the statesj respectively; and has never been considered as coming- in conflict with the federal constitution.
This power of the state is admitted in the argument; but it is contended that the obligation, of the Contract has been impaired, as the property of the complainants has been taken without compensation. Suppose' the constitution of Massachusetts provided that no land
Can the construction of the federal constitution depend upon a reference to a state constitution, and by which, the act complained of is ascertained to be legal or illegal? By this doctriné, the act, if done in conformity to the state constitution, would be free from objections under the federal constitution; but if this conformity, do not exist, then the act would not be free from such objection. This, iii effect, would incorporate the state constitution in, and make it a part of the federal constitution. No such rule of construction exists.
Suppose the legislature of Massachusetts had taken the farpi of the complainants for the use of a poor house, or any asylum forlünatics, without making adequate compensation; or, if, in ascertaining the damages, the law of the state had not been strictly pursued: could this Court interpose its jurisdiction through the supreme court of thé state, and arrest the power of appropriation? In any form, in which the question could be made, would it not arise under the constitution bf the state, and be limited between citizens of the same state to the local jurisdiction? Does not the state constitution, which declares that private property shall not be taken for public purposes, without compensation, afford a safe guarantee to the citizens of the state against the illegal exercise of this power; a power essential to the well-being of every sovereign state, and which is always exercised under its own rules?
Had aji adequate compensation been made to the complainants,
In all cases where private property is taken by a state for public use, the'action is on the property; and the power,- if it exist in the state, must be above the contract! It does not act on the contract, but takes from under it vested rights. And this power, when exercised by a state, does not, in the sense of the federal constitution, impair the obligation of the contract. Vested rights are disturbed, and compensation must be made; but this is a subject which belongs to the local jurisdiction. Does this view conflict with the established doctrine of this Court? A reference to the points adjudged will show that.it does not.
The case of Satterlee v. Mathewson, 2 Peters, 380, presented the, following facts. Satterlee was the tenant of Mathewson, who claimed at the time of the lease under, a Connecticut title, in Luzerne county, Pennsylvania. Afterwards, Satterlee purchased a Pennsylvania title for the same land. An ejectment was brought by Mathewson for the land, and the court of common pleas decided that as Satterlee was the tenant of the plaintiff, he could hot set up a title against his landlord. On a writ of error, this judgment was reversed by the supreme court, on the ground that the relation of landlord and tenant could not exist under a Connecticut title. Shortly afterwards, the legislature of Pennsylvania passed a law, that, under such a title the relation of the landlord and tenant should exist, and the supreme court of the state having decided that this act was valid, the question was brought before this Court by writ of error. In their opinion, the Court say, “We come now to the main question in the cause. Is the act, which is objected to, repugnant to any provision of the constitution of the United States? It is alleged to be particularly so, because it impairs the obligation of the contract between, the state of Pennsylvania and the plaintiff, who claims under her grant, &c.’.’ The grant vested a fee simple in the grantee, with all the rights,
The objection most pressed upon the Court was, that the effect of this act was to divest rights which were vested by law in Satterlee. “ There is certainly no part of the constitution of the United States,” the Court say, “which applies to a state law of this description; nor are we aware of any decision of this, or 'any circuit court which has condemned such a law upon this ground, provided its effect be not to impair the obligation of the contract.” And the Court add, that in the case of Fletcher v. Peck, it is no where intimated, that á state statute, which divests a vested right, is repugnant to the constitution of the United States. There is a strong analogy between this case and the one under consideration.
The effect of the. act of Pennsylvania was, to defeat the title of Satterlee, founded upon the grant of the state. It made a title valid, which, in that very case, had bee» declared void by the Court, and which gave the right to Mathewson, in that suit, agamst the prior grant of the state. And this Court admit that a vested right was divested by the act; but they say if is not repugnant to the federal constitution. The act did not purport to affect the grant which was left with its covenants untouched; but it created a paramount right, which took the land against the grant.
In the case'under consideration, the Warren Bridge charter does not purport to repeal or in any way affect the complainants’ charter. But, like the Pennsylvania act, in its effects it divested the vested rights of the complainants. Satterlee was not the immediate grantee of the state; but that could not affect the principle involved ,in the case. He- claimed under the grant of the state, and the fact that there was an intermediate grantee between him and the state, could not weaken his right.
In the case of Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, the legislature of Georgia attempted to annul its own grant. The law, under which the first grant was issued, was attempted to be repealed; and all grants under it were declared to be null and void by the second act. Here the state acted directly upon the contract; and the case comes within the rule, that to impair the obligation of the contract, the state, law must act upon the contract.
The act of the legislature, complained of in the case of Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Cond. Rep. 409, had a direct bearing upon the con
In the case of Terret and others v. Taylor and others, 9 Cranch, 52, the uncontroverted doctrine is asserted, that a legislature cannot repeal a statute creating a private corporation, and thereby destroy vested rights.
The case of Green et al. v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, has also been cited to sustain the jurisdiction of the Court in this case. The Court decided in that case, that the compact, which guarantied to claimants of land lying in Kentucky under titles derived from Virginia, their rights as they existed under the laws of Virginia, prohibited the state of Kentucky from changing those rights. In other words, that Kentucky could not alter the compact. And when this Court were called on to give effect to the act of Kentucky, which they considered repugnant to the compact, they' held the provisions of the compact paramount to the act..
After a careful examination of the questions adjudged by this Court, they seem not to have decided in any case that the contract is impaired, within the meaning of the federal constitution, where the action of the state has not been on the contract. That though vested rights have been divested under an act of a state legislature, they do not consider .that as impairing the grant of the state, under which the property is held. And this it appears is the true distinction; and the one, which has been kept in view in the whole current of adjudications by this Court, under the above clause of the constitution.
Had this Court established the doctrine that where an act of a state legislature affected vested rights held by a grant from the state, the act is repugnant to the constitution of the United States, the same principle must have applied to all vested rights. For, as has been shown, the constitution of a state gives the same guarantee of their vested rights to all its citizens, as to those who claim directly under grant from the state. And who can define the limit of a jurisdiction founded on this principle ? It would necessarily extend over the legislative action of the states; and control, to "a fearful extent, the exercise of their powers.
In ascertaining the damages, the claimant has a right to demand a jury, and that the damages shall be assessed in strict conformity to the principles of the law. To revise these cases would carve out for this Court a new jurisdiction, not contemplated by the constitution, and which cannot be safely exercised.
These are considerations which grow out of our admirable system of government, that should lead the judicial tribunals' both of the federal and state governments to mutual forbearance, in the exercise of doubtful powers. The boundaries of their respective jurisdictions can never perhaps, be so clearly defined on certain questions, as to free them from doubt. This remark'is peculiarly applicable to the federal tribunals, whose powers are delegated, and consequently limited. The strength of our political system consists in its harmony; and this can only be preserved by a strict observance of the respective powers of the state and federal government. Believing that this Court has no jurisdiction in this case; although I am clear that the merits are on the side of the complainants; I am in favour of dismissing'the bill for want of jurisdiction.