DocketNumber: 18-1386
Citation Numbers: 140 S. Ct. 6, 205 L. Ed. 2d 262
Judges: Clarence Thomas
Filed Date: 10/21/2019
Status: Relating-to orders
Modified Date: 7/25/2023
Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2019) 1 THOMAS, J., concurring SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES DAN M. LIPSCHULTZ, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS COMMISSIONER OF THE MINNESOTA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, ET AL. v. CHARTER ADVANCED SERVICES (MN), LLC, ET AL. ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT No. 18–1386. Decided October 21, 2019 The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. THE CHIEF JUSTICE took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition. JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, concurring in the denial of certiorari. Charter Advanced Services provides Voice over Internet Protocol services, which allow users to place voice calls over an Internet connection. After the Minnesota Public Utili- ties Commission attempted to regulate Charter’s provision of these services, Charter brought suit in federal court, ar- guing that the state regulation was pre-empted. The Dis- trict Court granted summary judgment to Charter. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Federal Com- munications Commission’s “policy of nonregulation” of these services pre-empted state law. Charter Advanced Servs. (MN), LLC v. Lange,903 F.3d 715
, 718 (2018) (in- ternal quotation marks omitted). I agree with the Court’s determination that this case does not satisfy our criteria for certiorari. I write to explain why, in an appropriate case, we should consider whether a fed- eral agency’s policy can pre-empt state law. The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all 2 LIPSCHULTZ v. CHARTER ADVANCED SERVICES THOMAS, J., concurring Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Au- thority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” Art. VI, cl. 2. The Clause contains a non obstante provision, a common device used by 18th-century legislatures to signal the im- plied repeal of conflicting statutes. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,564 U.S. 604
, 621 (2011); see also Nelson, Preemption,86 Va. L
. Rev. 225, 237–242, 245–246 (2000). At the time of the founding, this Clause would have been understood to pre-empt state law only if the law logically contradicted the “Constitution,” the “Laws of the United States,” or “Treaties.” Seeid., at 260.
It is doubtful whether a federal policy—let alone a policy of nonregulation—is “Law” for purposes of the Supremacy Clause. Under our precedent, such a policy likely is not fi- nal agency action because it does not mark “the consumma- tion of the agency’s decisionmaking process” or determine Charter’s “rights or obligations.” Bennett v. Spear,520 U.S. 154
, 177–178 (1997) (internal quotation marks omit- ted); see also Merck Sharp & Dohme Corp. v. Albrecht, 587 U. S. ____, ____ (2019) (THOMAS, J., concurring). Even if it were final agency action, the Supremacy Clause “requires that pre-emptive effect be given only to those federal stand- ards and policies that are set forth in, or necessarily follow from, the statutory text that was produced through the con- stitutionally required bicameral and presentment proce- dures.” Wyeth v. Levine,555 U.S. 555
, 586 (2009) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment); see also Department of Trans- portation v. Association of American Railroads,575 U.S. 43
, 86 (2015) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (“The Government may create generally applicable rules of pri- vate conduct only through the proper exercise of legislative Cite as: 589 U. S. ____ (2019) 3 THOMAS, J., concurring power”). Giving pre-emptive effect to a federal agency policy of nonregulation thus expands the power of both the Execu- tive and the Judiciary. It authorizes the Executive to make “Law” by declining to act, and it authorizes the courts to conduct “a freewheeling judicial inquiry” into the facts of federal nonregulation, rather than the constitutionally proper “inquiry into whether the ordinary meanings of state and federal law conflict,”Wyeth, supra, at 588
(THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Because this petition does not clearly chal- lenge the underlying basis of the pre-emption theory, how- ever, I concur in the denial of certiorari.