United States v. Michigan

190 U.S. 379 (1903)

UNITED STATES
v.
MICHIGAN.

No. 11.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued April 20, 21, 1903. Decided June 1, 1903. ORIGINAL. IN EQUITY.

Mr. Horace M. Oren, attorney general of the State of Michigan, for defendant.

Mr. Marsden C. Burch for the United States.

MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, after making the foregoing statement of facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

By its bill the United States invokes the original jurisdiction of this court for the purpose of determining a controversy existing between it and the State of Michigan. This court has jurisdiction of such a controversy, although it is not literally between two States, the United States being a party on the one side and a State on the other. This was decided in United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 642.

In the consideration of this case, the controlling thought must of course be to arrive at the meaning of the parties, as expressed in the various statutes set forth in the bill. While that meaning is to be sought from the language used, yet its construction need not be of a narrow or technical nature, but in view of the character of the subject, the language should have its ordinary and usual meaning.

Whether, under these circumstances, technical words were used to express the thought that the State was to be a trustee, is not important if, upon a reading of the statutes and a survey of the condition of the country when the acts were passed, it is apparent that the intent was that the State should occupy the position of trustee in the construction and operation of the canal. Winona &c. R.R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625.

The general purpose of these statutes was to build a ship canal, by means of the funds procured from the sale or other disposition of the public lands of the United States, to be used by all those whose business or pleasure should call them to pass through it in order to reach their destination.

As is well known, the Saint Marys River connects the waters of the lakes, Huron and Superior. The navigation of the river is interrupted by Saint Marys Falls, and it early became necessary, in order to provide conveniences for a rapidly increasing commerce, that there should be built a ship canal around these falls, so that large vessels coming from or going to Lake Superior should be thereby enabled to pursue their voyage to the east or to the west without interruption by those falls. The State of Michigan did not feel at that time (1850-1852) able to undertake such work herself, although it was a matter of much importance to many of her citizens. Finally the United States passed the act of 1852, set out in full in the foregoing statement. The State subsequently accepted the same with all the conditions contained therein. We think it sufficiently appears from a perusal of these two acts that it was assumed that the grant of the right of way through the lands of the United States and the grant of the 750,000 acres of its public lands in the State of Michigan would pay the cost of construction of the canal, and the tolls to be collected by the State would repay it for all advances made by it in the repairs which would naturally and from time to time be required in such a work. There was no reason why the United States should provide that the State of Michigan should actually receive a profit over and above the payment to it of all its expenses for the construction of the canal and for keeping it in repair. If, through the action of the United States, a public work of national importance were constructed within the boundaries of that State, and the State itself reimbursed for every item expended by it in the construction and in the keeping of such work in repair, it would certainly seem as if the State could properly ask no more. It was clearly not the intention that the State should realize a beneficial interest from the transaction between the United States and the State over and beyond that which would arise from the existence of this canal. The cost of its construction and the keeping of it in repair were not to be borne by the State, even to the extent of a single dollar. That the parties supposed the cost would be borne by the United States is proved by an examination of the statutes, and if it be a fact, it goes far to show that the State was in this matter acting in effect and substance as an agent, or, in other words, as a trustee for the United States, and that the transaction was not to be a source of profit to the State, by reason of getting more from the United States than it would cost to build the canal.

The expectation that the means provided by the United States for the construction of the work would be adequate for that purpose, was not a visionary one, and it is proved by the fact, alleged in the bill and admitted by the demurrer, that such means were in truth adequate, and the canal was wholly constructed from the appropriation of the lands granted by the United States, and managed, repaired and maintained from the tolls exacted by the State from vessels passing through the canal.

An examination of the act of Congress of 1852, set forth in the foregoing statement of facts, will show, as we think, the trust character of the transaction between the United States and the State. There is granted to the State, by section one, the right of locating a canal through the public lands of the United States four hundred feet in width, but this right of way is by the terms of the act to be used by the State or under its authority for the construction or convenience of such canal and the appurtenances thereto, and the use thereof is thereby vested in the State forever, but "for the purposes aforesaid and no other." The canal must be at least one hundred feet wide, with a depth of water of twelve feet, and with locks at least two hundred and fifty feet long and sixty feet wide. The act does not grant an absolute estate in fee simple in the land covered by this right of way. It was in effect a grant upon condition for a special purpose; that is, in trust for use for the purposes of a canal, and for no other. The State had no power to alien it and none to put it to any other use or purpose. Such a grant creates a trust at least by implication. We have just held in Northern Pacific Company v. Townsend, ante p. 267, in reference to a grant of a right of way for the railroad, that it was "in effect a grant of a limited fee, made on an implied condition of reverter in the event that the company ceased to use or retain the land for the purpose for which it was granted."

The second section granted to the State, "for the purpose of aiding said State in constructing and completing said canal, 750,000 acres of public lands," belonging to the United States and lying within the State, which were to be subject to the disposal of the legislature of the State for such purpose and no other, and the canal was to be and remain a public highway for the use of the Government of the United States, free from toll or other charge upon the vessels of said Government engaged in public service, or upon vessels employed by said Government in the transportation of any property or troops of the United States. It was also provided that if the canal should not be commenced within three years and completed within ten years, the State was bound to pay to the United States the amount it received upon the sale of any part of said lands by the State at not less than $1.25 per acre, although the title to the purchasers from the State should remain valid. The State was bound to cause to be kept accurate accounts of sales and net proceeds of the lands granted and of all expenditures in the construction, repair and operating of the canal and of the earnings thereof, and was to render a statement of the same annually to the Secretary of the Interior, and whenever the State should be fully reimbursed for all advances made for the construction, repairs and operation of the canal, with legal interest on all advances until the reimbursement of the same, or upon payment by the United States of any balance of such advances from the receipts from the lands and canal with such interest, the State was then only to be allowed to tax for the use of the canal such tolls as should be sufficient to pay all necessary expenses for the care, charge and repairs of the same, and before the State could dispose of any of the lands, the route of the canal was to be established and a plat thereof filed in the office of the War Department, and a duplicate thereof in the office of the Commissioner of the General Land Office. The sixth paragraph of the bill calls special attention to these facts.

In this Federal statute we find the purpose of the United States in granting the land. It was not for the benefit of the State of Michigan, and the State did not thereby receive any beneficial interest in such lands. As soon as it was repaid its outlay for the cost of the construction and for the maintenance and repairs of the canal, the tolls were to be reduced to such a sum as should be sufficient only to pay the necessary expenses for the care, charge and repair of the same. Evidently it was not supposed that the State was to profit from this grant further than such profit as might arise indirectly from the completion and operation of the canal.

Defendant refers to certain grants of land made to Illinois, Indiana and Ohio, and perhaps to some of the other States, where such grants were made to aid in the construction of canals in those States, and where possible profits from the construction of such canals were within the contemplation of the various grants. But in the acts referred to there are no restrictions upon the tolls which the States may charge for the use of their respective canals, the only limitation imposed being that the Government should have their free use for the passing of its vessels, while in this act the tolls which the State may charge are to be only such, after the payment for its construction, etc., as should be sufficient to pay the necessary expenses for the care, charge and repairs thereof.

The State of Michigan, through an act of its legislature, duly accepted the terms of the act of Congress, and agreed to carry out all the conditions therein made obligatory upon that State. An attentive reading of that statute shows its purpose to conform to all of the provisions of the Federal statute. It provides (section 7) for keeping accurate books of account of sales and net proceeds of the lands and for making returns to the Secretary of the Interior containing such accounts; provides (section 5) for designating the lands granted as "Saint Mary Canal Lands;" and also (section 3) provides that in letting contracts for construction of the canal, the responsibility of the proposed contractor and his ability to carry into effect the object of the act of Congress are to be considered. Reading both statutes, it seems to us the effect was to create a trust, and that the State was made the trustee to carry out the purposes of the act of Congress in the construction and maintenance of the canal. If there were funds arising from the sale of the lands over and above the cost of construction and other expenses of the canal, it could not within reason (after a perusal of these two statutes, with the provisions for accounting for sales and net proceeds of lands, and the other provisions of the statutes already mentioned) be supposed the parties understood that Michigan was to have for its own treasury the balance arising beyond such cost, maintenance, etc., of the canal. If a surplus arose in the course of the operation of the canal the tolls were to be at once reduced, and it seems to us that that surplus would upon a fair and reasonable construction of the acts belong to the original owner of the lands, by means of which the State, as in substance the agent of the United States, was enabled to construct the canal and secure the tolls arising from its operation, to be expended upon its maintenance and for necessary repairs. This would certainly be so after the formal transfer of the canal and after the surplus was conclusively ascertained, and was subject to no further claims for repairs of the canal on the part of the State. The tolls were in fact the proceeds of the trust fund (the lands) which belonged to the United States, and should be transferred with the rest of the trust property.

Where Congress grants land to a State to be used as provided in this statute, we think a trust or power to dispose of the lands for the purpose of carrying out the improvement is granted, and in this case no beneficial interest passes to the State by the language used, considering the whole statute. Rice v. Railroad Company, 1 Black, 358, 378.

If any particular part of the statute in this case were ambiguous or its meaning doubtful, of course the intention must be deduced from the whole statute and every part of it. Hence the importance of those provisions which in effect, if carried out, prevent the State from making any direct profit by the construction of the canal or from the tolls received from vessels passing through it. And where words are ambiguous, legislative grants must be interpreted most strongly against the grantee and for the Government, and are not to be extended by implication in favor of the grantee beyond the natural and obvious meaning of the words employed. Any ambiguity must operate against the grantee and in favor of the public. Rice v. Railroad Company, supra, p. 380. This rule of construction obtains in grants from the United States to States or corporations in aid of the construction of public works. 1 Black, 381.

Then, too, there is the almost contemporaneous construction placed upon the Federal statute by the legislature of Michigan in the act No. 175, approved February 14, 1859, in the preamble of which it is said that "whereas such canal, having been built and accepted by the authorities of this State, is found to need repairs in order to its preservation and usefulness, and the due performance of the trust created by said act of Congress and the assent of this State thereto," etc. Again, the treasurer of the State, who by virtue of his office was one of the members of the board of control of the Saint Marys Falls Ship Canal, in the course of his annual report for the year 1883, made to the governor and transmitted to the legislature of the State, used the following language:

"Since my last report, the remainder of the personal property belonging to the Saint Marys Falls Ship Canal has been sold, making a final balance in that fund of $68,927.12. All business pertaining to the management of the canal on the part of the State has ceased and the moneys in the fund remain in the state treasury under act No. 17, laws of 1881, the State acting simply as trustee."

We do not, of course, assume that the state treasurer could bind the State of Michigan by any admission he might make in a report to the legislature of that State, but it shows simply the understanding of that official, who was so closely connected with the construction and operation of the canal, in relation to the surplus funds in the treasury of the State arising out of the operation of the canal. That the state legislature in 1859 regarded the State as a trustee, is evident from the above language in the portion of the preamble quoted.

Finally, by the joint resolution of the legislature, being No. 20 of the Public Acts of 1897, it was stated as follows:

"Whereas, there has remained to the credit of the Saint Mary's Ship Canal fund a credit balance which was on hand at the time of the transfer of the said canal from the State to the United States, and no claim has been made for any part of such moneys, either by any persons who paid the same into said fund or by the General Government,

"And whereas, there now remains on hand, under the control of the board of control of the Saint Mary's Ship Canal, an invoice of tools and machinery, and no demand by any person or persons or by the United States having been made for a transfer of said tools and machinery; therefore

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the State of Michigan, That the auditor general be and he is hereby directed to transfer such balance as shown upon the books of his office to and the same shall hereafter become a part of the general fund of the State.

"And be it further resolved, That the board of control of the Saint Mary's Ship Canal be and they are hereby authorized to dispose of, at the best possible advantage, the tools and machinery aforesaid and now under their control, and deposit the money received from the sale of said property in the general fund of this State."

From these statutes and resolutions we think it quite clearly appears that the State and its public officers thought that a trust had been created, and that the State had received the lands in trust for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Federal statute. A surplus arising from the sales of lands and from the tolls, over and above all cost of construction, repairs, etc., after the formal transfer of the canal itself, belongs to the United States, and it is the proper party to recover the same.

The counsel for defendant, however, urged that other action by the United States shows that no such trust existed. He referred to the joint resolution of the State adopted in 1869, wherein the necessity for the immediate enlargement of the Saint Marys Falls Canal, a work of urgent necessity and national importance, was advocated, and it was therein said that the State of Michigan had no funds properly applicable to such purpose, and it was, therefore, resolved that the board of control of the canal should be authorized and directed to transfer the canal, with all its appurtenances and all the right and title of the State of Michigan in and to the same, to the United States, provided the State should be first guaranteed and secured to the satisfaction of the board against loss, by reason of its liability, on certain bonds which had been issued by it under authority of an act to provided for the repairs upon the canal, "and to perform the trust respecting the same," approved February 14, 1859. Even in this act of 1859, the legislature, as has already been stated, acknowledges the trust and passes an act for the purpose of performing its obligations respecting the same. But it is said that this resolution (of 1869) providing for the transfer of the canal was not noticed or accepted by the United States until 1880, when Congress, by an act approved June 14, 1880, authorized the Secretary of War to accept on behalf of the United States from the State of Michigan the canal, provided "such transfer should be made so as to leave the United States free from any and all debts, claims and liability of any character whatever. Said canal after such transfer to be free for public use."

This offer under the act of 1880 was accepted by the State by act No. 17, Public Acts of Michigan of 1881, supra, and the board of control was authorized and directed: First. "To transfer the said canal and the public works thereon, with all its appurtenances and all the right and title of the State of Michigan in and to the same, to the United States," in accordance with the provisions of the act of Congress approved June 14, 1880; and, second, "At any time when they may deem it proper, to transfer all material belonging to said canal, and to pay over to the United States all moneys remaining in the canal fund, excepting so much as may be necessary to put the said canal in repair for its acceptance in accordance with the act above recited: Provided, Such transfer of material and payment of moneys shall be in consideration of the construction, by the United States, of a suitable dry dock, to be operated in connection with the Saint Mary's Falls Ship Canal for the use of disabled vessels."

It is argued from this legislation that Congress thereby recognized and acknowledged the ownership of the canal by the State free from any trust connected therewith, and that the provision by the State for transferring all material belonging to the canal and for paying over to the United States all moneys remaining in the canal fund, etc., were upon the condition just quoted, and it is stated that there was no proof that such dry dock had been constructed, and hence there was no liability on the part of the State to pay the moneys or deliver the tools. But if the original transaction amounted to a trust, as we think it did, the attempt of the State to impose a condition upon its payment of the moneys and the transfer of the tools did not take away its liability as trustee nor make it necessary that the United States should build the dry dock before it should be entitled to the money and the tools. The United States might have been satisfied to permit the State to retain its nominal title and to remain in possession, and to operate the canal under its original obligations, and when in 1880 it authorized the Secretary of War to accept the canal from the State without any liability on its part for debts or claims in regard to the canal, it did not thereby in any manner admit the non-existence of any trust theretofore created. Assuming that the land grant and the tolls had been sufficient to construct the canal and operate and repair it, there was no reason why the United States should assume or agree to pay any debts or claims which might exist in regard to the canal. The consideration for the transfer of the material and the payment of the moneys amounted at most to a provision in the nature somewhat of a condition subsequent, and the right to such transfer and payment did not rest upon the prior building of the dry dock by the United States. There was nothing in this legislation, in our opinion, which changed the character in which the State had acted as trustee up to the time of such transfer of the canal, and the liability of the State was not altered by reason of the act of 1880 or that of 1881.

We are of opinion that the bill shows a cause of action against the State of Michigan as trustee, and its liability to pay over the surplus moneys, (if any,) which upon an accounting it may appear have arisen from the sale of the granted lands, over and above all cost of the construction of the canal and the necessary work appertaining thereto, and the supervision thereof, together with the surplus money arising from the tolls collected, which latter sum by the demurrer is admitted to amount to $68,927.12. This sum the United States in substance (especially in the fourth paragraph of the bill) admits is all that is due from the State on account of such tolls. It is not entitled to go back of that amount and call for an accounting as to the tolls prior to the transfer of the canal to the United States. The latter is also entitled to recover the value of the tools, etc., mentioned in the bill, as of the time of the transfer of the canal.

We think there is no ground of defence arising from any alleged laches on the part of the United States in bringing this suit. Assuming the existence of what would be laches in a private person, the defence that might arise therefrom is not available ordinarily against the Government. United States v. Beebe, 180 U.S. 343, 353.

There must be judgment overruling the demurrer, but as the defendant may desire to set up facts which it might claim would be a defence to the complainant's bill, we grant leave to the defendant to answer up to the first day of the next term of this court. In case it refuses to plead further, the judgment will be in favor of the United States for an accounting and for the payment of the sum found due thereon.

Demurrer overruled and leave to answer given, etc.