Cooke v. United States

267 U.S. 517 (1925)

COOKE
v.
UNITED STATES.

No. 311.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued March 20, 1925. Decided April 13, 1925. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT.

Mr. Edwin C. Brandenburg, with whom Messrs J.A. Templeton, G.A. Stultz, W.E. Spell, and E. Howard McCaleb were on the brief, for petitioner.

Mr. Merrill E. Otis, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom Solicitor General Beck was on the brief, for the United States.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the Court.

The first objection to the sentence of the court, made on behalf of the petitioner, is that the letter written to the judge is not a contempt of the court. Section 21 of the Judicial Code contains the following:

"Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be designated in the manner prescribed in the section last preceding, or chosen in the manner prescribed in section twenty-three, to hear such matter. Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of the term of the court, or good cause shall be shown for the failure to file it within such time. No party shall be entitled in any case to file more than one such affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are made in good faith."

It is said that all that the petitioner intended to do by this letter was to advise the court of the desire of his client to have another judge try the four cases yet to be heard, and of his own desire to avoid the necessity of filing an affidavit of bias under the above section in those cases by inducing the regular judge voluntarily to withdraw. Had the letter contained no more than this, we agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that it would not have been improper.

But we also agree with that court that the letter as written did more than this. The letter was written the morning after the verdict in the heat of the petitioner's evident indignation at the judge's conduct of the case and the verdict. At least two weeks would elapse before it was necessary to file an affidavit of bias in the other cases.^[1] The letter was written and delivered pending further necessary proceedings in the very case which aroused the writer's anger. While it was doubtless intended to notify the judge that he would not be allowed to sit in the other cases, its tenor shows that it was also written to gratify the writer's desire to characterize in severe language, personally derogatory to the judge, his conduct of the pending case. Though the writer addressed the judge throughout as "Your Honor", this did not conceal but emphasized the personal reflection intended. The expression of disappointed hope that the judge was big enough and broad enough to overcome his personal prejudice against petitioner's client and that the client would have the privilege of rebutting the whispered slanders to which the judge had lent his ear, and the declaration that his confidence in the judge had been rudely shattered, were personally condemnatory and were calculated to stir the judge's resentment and anger. Considering the circumstances and the fact that the case was still before the judge, but without intending to foreclose the right of the petitioner to be heard with witnesses and argument on this issue when given an opportunity, we agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that the letter was contemptuous.

But while we reach this conclusion, we are far from approving the course of the judge in the procedure, or absence of it, adopted by him in sentencing the petitioner. He treated the case as if the objectionable words had been uttered against him in open court.

To preserve order in the court room for the proper conduct of business, the court must act instantly to suppress disturbance or violence or physical obstruction or disrespect to the court when occurring in open court. There is no need of evidence or assistance of counsel before punishment, because the court has seen the offense. Such summary vindication of the court's dignity and authority is necessary. It has always been so in the courts of the common law and the punishment imposed is due process of law. Such a case had great consideration in the decision of this Court in Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289. It was there held that a court of the United States upon the commission of a contempt in open court might upon its own knowledge of the facts without further proof, without issue or trial, and without hearing an explanation of the motives of the offender, immediately proceed to determine whether the facts justified punishment and to inflict such punishment as was fitting under the law.

The important distinction between the Terry Case and the one at bar is that this contempt was not in open court. This is fully brought out in Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267. The contempt there was an effort to deter a witness, in attendance upon a court of the United States in obedience to a subpoena, while he was in a waiting room for witnesses near the court room, from testifying, and the offering him money in the hallway of the courthouse as an inducement. This was held to be "misbehavior in the presence of the Court" under § 725 R.S. (now § 268 of the Judicial Code). The Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Harlan, said (Page 277):

"We are of opinion that, within the meaning of the statute, the court, at least when in session, is present in every part of the place set apart for its own use, and for the use of its officers, jurors and witnesses; and misbehavior anywhere in such place is misbehavior in the presence of the court. It is true that the mode of proceeding for contempt is not the same in every case of such misbehavior. Where the contempt is committed directly under the eye or within the view of the court, it may proceed ``upon its own knowledge of the facts and punish the offender, without further proof, and without issue or trial in any form,' Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 309; whereas, in cases of misbehavior of which the judge can not have such personal knowledge, and is informed thereof only by confession of the party, or by testimony under oath of others, the proper practice is, by rule or other process, to require the offender to appear and show cause why he should not be punished. 4 Bl. Com. 286."

This difference between the scope of the words of the statute "in the presence of the court," on the one hand, and the meaning of the narrower phrase "under the eye or within the view of the court," or "in open court" or "in the face of the court," or "in facie curiae," on the other, is thus clearly indicated and is further elaborated in the opinion.

We think the distinction finds its reason not any more in the ability of the judge to see and hear what happens in the open court than in the danger that, unless such an open threat to the orderly procedure of the court and such a flagrant defiance of the person and presence of the judge before the public in the "very hallowed place of justice," as Blackstone has it, is not instantly suppressed and punished, demoralization of the court's authority will follow. Punishment without issue or trial was so contrary to the usual and ordinarily indispensable hearing before judgment, constituting due process, that the assumption that the court saw everything that went on in open court was required to justify the exception; but the need for immediate penal vindication of the dignity of the court created it.

When the contempt is not in open court, however, there is no such right or reason in dispensing with the necessity of charges and the opportunity of the accused to present his defense by witnesses and argument. The exact form of the procedure in the prosecution of such contempts is not important. The Court in Randall v. Brigham, 7 Wall. 523, 540, in speaking of what was necessary in proceedings against an attorney at law for malpractice said:

"All that is requisite to their validity is that, when not taken for matters occurring in open court, in the presence of the judges, notice should be given to the attorney of the charges made and opportunity afforded him for explanation and defence. The manner in which the proceeding shall be conducted, so that it be without oppression or unfairness, is a matter of judicial regulation."

The Court in Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267, applied this rule to proceedings for contempt.

Due process of law, therefore, in the prosecution of contempt, except of that committed in open court, requires that the accused should be advised of the charges and have a reasonable opportunity to meet them by way of defense or explanation. We think this includes the assistance of counsel, if requested, and the right to call witnesses to give testimony, relevant either to the issue of complete exculpation or in extenuation of the offense and in mitigation of the penalty to be imposed. See Hollingsworth v. Duane, 12 Fed. Cases 359, 360; In re Stewart, 118 La. 827; Ex parte Clark, 208 Mo. 121.

The proceeding in this case was not conducted in accordance with the foregoing principles. We have set out at great length in the statement which precedes this opinion the substance of what took place before, at and after the sentence. The first step by the court was an order of attachment and the arrest of the petitioner. It is not shown that the writ of attachment contained a copy of the order of the court, and we are not advised that the petitioner had an exact idea of the purport of the charges until the order was read. In such a case, and after so long a delay, it would seem to have been proper practice, as laid down by Blackstone, 4 Commentaries, 286, to issue a rule to show cause. The rule should have contained enough to inform the defendant of the nature of the contempt charged. See Hollingsworth v. Duane, 12 Fed. Cases 367, 369. Without any ground shown for supposing that a rule would not have brought in the alleged contemnors, it was harsh under the circumstances to order the arrest.

After the court elicited from the petitioner the admission that he had written the letter, the court refused him time to secure and consult counsel, prepare his defense and call witnesses and this although the court itself had taken time to call in counsel as a friend of the court. The presence of the United States District Attorney also was secured by the court on the ground that it was a criminal case.

The court proceeded on the theory that the admission that the petitioner had written the letter foreclosed evidence or argument. In cases like this, where the intention with which acts of contempt have been committed must necessarily and properly have an important bearing on the degree of guilt and the penalty which should be imposed, the court can not exclude evidence in mitigation. It is a proper part of the defense. There was a suggestion in one of the remarks of the petitioner to the court that, while he had dictated the letter he had not read it carefully, and that he had trusted to the advice of his partner in sending it; but he was not given a chance to call witnesses or to make a full statement on this point. He was interrupted by the court or the counsel of the court in every attempted explanation. On the other hand, when the court came to pronounce sentence, it commented on the conduct of both the petitioner and his client in making scandalous charges in the pleadings against officials of the court and charges of a corrupt conspiracy against the trustee and referee in bankruptcy, and in employing a detective to shadow jurymen while in charge of the marshal, and afterwards to detect bribery of them, in proof of which the court referred to a sworn statement of the detective in its hands, which had not been submitted to the petitioner or his client. When Walker questioned this, the court directed the marshal to prevent further interruption. It was quite clear that the court considered the facts thus announced as in aggravation of the contempt. Yet no opportunity had been given to the contemnors even to hear these new charges of the court, much less to meet or explain them, before the sentence. We think the procedure pursued was unfair and oppressive to the petitioner.

Another feature of this case seems to call for remark. The power of contempt which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly administration of justice and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the court is most important and indispensable. But its exercise is a delicate one and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. This rule of caution is more mandatory where the contempt charged has in it the element of personal criticism or attack upon the judge. The judge must banish the slightest personal impulse to reprisal, but he should not bend backward and injure the authority of the court by too great leniency. The substitution of another judge would avoid either tendency but it is not always possible. Of course where acts of contempt are palpably aggravated by a personal attack upon the judge in order to drive the judge out of the case for ulterior reasons, the scheme should not be permitted to succeed. But attempts of this kind are rare. All of such cases, however, present difficult questions for the judge. All we can say upon the whole matter is that where conditions do not make it impracticable, or where the delay may not injure public or private right, a judge called upon to act in a case of contempt by personal attack upon him, may, without flinching from his duty, properly ask that one of his fellow judges take his place. Cornish v. The United States, 299 Fed. 283, 285; Toledo Company v. The United States, 237 Fed. 986, 988.

The case before us is one in which the issue between the judge and the parties had come to involve marked personal feeling that did not make for an impartial and calm judicial consideration and conclusion, as the statement of the proceedings abundantly shows. We think, therefore, that when this case again reaches the District Court to which it must be remanded, the judge who imposed the sentence herein should invite the senior circuit judge of the circuit to assign another judge to sit in the second hearing of the charge against the petitioner.

Judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.

Reversed.

NOTES

[1] The next term of the court at Forth Worth would have been the second Monday in March (Judicial Code, § 108) so that the affidavit required by § 21 for disqualification need not have been filed before March 2nd. The letter was written February 15th.