United States Ex Rel. Tucker v. Seaman

58 U.S. 225 (1854) 17 How. 225

THE UNITED STATES, ex relatione BEVERLY TUCKER, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
A.G. SEAMAN, SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC PRINTING.

Supreme Court of United States.

It was argued by Mr. Chilton and Mr. Johnson, for the plaintiff in error, and by Mr. Cushing, (attorney-general,) for the defendant.

Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendant in error, at the times hereinafter mentioned, was, and still is, superintendent of public printing of the two houses of congress; and the relator printer to the senate, and O.A.P. Nicholson printer to the house of representatives.

By the act of August 26, 1852, it is made the duty of the superintendent to receive, from the secretary of the senate and the clerk of the house of representatives, all matter ordered by congress to be printed, and to deliver it to the public printer or printers. And the 12th section provides, that when any document shall be ordered to be printed by both houses of congress, the entire printing of such document shall be done by the printer of that house which first ordered the printing.

On the 31st of January, 1854, the commissioner of patents communicated to the senate that portion of his annual report for 1853 which relates to arts and manufactures, which that body, on the same day, ordered to be printed; and, on the following day, it was communicated to the house of representatives, who passed a similar order. This communication was delivered by the superintendent to the relator.

On the 20th of March, 1854, the commissioner communicated to both houses the agricultural portion of his report, which each house, on the same day, ordered to be printed; the order of the house of representatives being, it is admitted, first made.

The relator claimed, that the report of the commissioner of patents was but one document, within the meaning of the act of congress above referred to, and that, by virtue of the order of the senate of the 31st of January, 1854, he was entitled to the printing of the agricultural portion of the report, although the printing of this part was first ordered by the house of representatives. The superintendent, however, refused to deliver it; and the relator thereupon applied to the circuit court for the District of Columbia for a mandamus, to compel the delivery. That court was of opinion that it had not jurisdiction of the case, and refused the mandamus; and this writ of error is brought by the relator.

The power of the circuit court of this district to issue writs of mandamus to an officer of the government in Washington, has frequently been the subject of discussion in this court. It was before the court in Kendall v. Stokes, 12 Pet. 524; in Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Ib. 497; in Brashear v. Mason, 6 How. 92; and again, in Goodrich v. Guthrie, at the present term. The rule to be gathered from all of these cases is too well settled to need further discussion. It cannot issue in a case where discretion and judgment are to be exercised by the officer; and it can be granted only where the act required to be done is merely ministerial, and the relator without any other adequate remedy.

Now, it is evident that this case is not one in which the superintendent had nothing to do but obey the order of a superior authority. He had inquiries to make, before he could execute the authority he possessed. He must examine evidence; that is to say, he must ascertain in which house the order to print was first passed. He may, it is true, generally obtain this from the journals of the two houses, but yet he must examine them, and compare the dates of the orders; and, in this particular case, it may even have been necessary to take oral testimony, before he could determine the fact of priority, as the order was passed in each house on the same day. And, after he had made up his mind upon this fact, it was still necessary to examine into the usages and practice of congress, in marking a communication in their proceedings as a document; and to make up his mind whether separate communications upon the same subject, or on different subjects from the same office, when made at different times, were, according to the usages and practice of congress, described as one document, or different documents, in printing and publishing their proceedings. He was obliged, therefore, to examine evidence, and form his judgment before he acted; and, whenever that is to be done, it is not a case for a mandamus.

Nor is there any reason of public policy or individual right, which requires that this remedy should be extended beyond its legitimate bounds, in order to embrace cases of this description; for it would embarrass the operations of the legislative and executive departments of the government, if the court of this district was authorized to interfere, by this summary process, in controversies between officers, in their respective employments, whenever differences of opinion as to their respective rights may arise. If these differences cannot be adjusted by the authorities under which they are acting, an ordinary action at law would be an adequate remedy for any injury sustained.

It seems to be supposed that the case of Kendall v. Stokes justified this application; but it is altogether unlike it. The award of the solicitor of the treasury, in that case, was an official act; he was the officer appointed by act of congress to settle that account, and determine the amount of credit to which Stokes was entitled, if to any; and all that the postmaster-general was required to do was, to enter it in the books of the department, when reported to him by the solicitor of the treasury. He was merely to record it. His duty, under that act of congress, was like that of a clerk of a court, who is required to record its proceedings; or, of an officer appointed by law to record deeds, which a party has a right by law to place on record; or of the register of the treasury of the United States, to record accounts transmitted to him by the proper accounting officers, to be recorded. The duty, in such cases, is merely ministerial; as much so as that of a sheriff or marshal to execute the process of a court.

This was the point decided in Kendall v. Stokes, and the subsequent cases have all been decided upon the same principles. They are in no degree in conflict with it; on the contrary, they have followed it.

But the case before us, for the reasons above stated, is unlike that of Kendall v. Stokes, and the circuit court were right in refusing the mandamus. The judgment must, therefore, be affirmed.

Order.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the circuit court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the county of Washington, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said circuit court in this cause be and the same is hereby affirmed with costs.