Wilkins v. United States

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2022 1
Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
WILKINS ET AL. v. UNITED STATES
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 21–1164. Argued November 30, 2022—Decided March 28, 2023
Petitioners Larry Steven Wilkins and Jane Stanton own properties in
rural Montana that border a road for which the United States has held
an easement since 1962. The Government claims that the easement
includes public access, which petitioners dispute. In 2018, petitioners
sued the Government under the Quiet Title Act, which allows chal-
lenges to the United States’ rights in real property. The Government
moved to dismiss on the ground that petitioners’ claim is barred by the
Act’s 12-year time bar. 28 U. S. C. §2409a(g). Petitioners countered
that §2409a(g)’s time limit is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing
rule. The District Court agreed with the Government and dismissed
the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit held
that §2409a(g) had already been interpreted as jurisdictional in Block
v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S.
273, and affirmed.
Held: Section 2409a(g) is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule. Pp.
3–12.
(a) Jurisdiction is a word of many meanings. This Court has empha-
sized the distinction between “the classes of cases a court may enter-
tain (subject-matter jurisdiction)” and “nonjurisdictional claim-pro-
cessing rules, which seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation
by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain
specified times.” Fort Bend County v. Davis, 587 U. S. ___, ___. Non-
jurisdictional claim-processing rules generally include a range of
“threshold requirements that claimants must complete, or exhaust, be-
fore filing a lawsuit.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154,
166. Jurisdictional bars—which may be raised by any party at any
time during the proceedings and which are required to be raised by a
court sua sponte—run the risk of disrupting the “orderly progress of
2 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES
Syllabus
litigation” that procedural rules often “seek to promote.” Henderson v.
Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435.
Given the risk of disruption and waste that accompanies the juris-
dictional label, a procedural requirement will be construed as jurisdic-
tional only if Congress “clearly states” that it is. Boechler v. Commis-
sioner, 596 U. S. ___, ___. To determine whether the statutory text
“plainly show[s] that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdic-
tional consequences,” courts apply “traditional tools of statutory con-
struction.” United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 410.
Section 2409a(g) lacks a jurisdictional clear statement, and nothing
about §2409a(g)’s text or context gives reason to depart from this
Court’s observation that “most time bars are nonjurisdictional.” Ibid.
Section 2409a(g) states that an action “shall be barred unless it is com-
menced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued.” This
“text speaks only to a claim’s timeliness,” and its “mundane statute-of-
limitations language say[s] only what every time bar, by definition,
must: that after a certain time a claim is barred.” Ibid. Further, “[t]his
Court has often explained that Congress’s separation of a filing dead-
line from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the time bar is not juris-
dictional.” Id., at 411. Here, the Quiet Title Act’s jurisdictional grant
is in §1346(f), well afield of §2409a(g). And “[n]othing [in §1346(f)]
conditions the jurisdictional grant on the limitations perio[d in
§2409a(g)] or otherwise links those separate provisions.” Id., at 412.
Pp. 3–5.
(b) None of the three decisions of this Court on which the Govern-
ment relies—Block, 461 U. S. 273, United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S.
834, and United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38—definitively inter-
preted §2409a(g) as jurisdictional. This Court has made clear that it
will not undo a “definitive earlier interpretation” of a statutory provi-
sion as jurisdictional without due regard for the principles of stare de-
cisis. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130, 138.
Yet the mere fact that this Court previously described something as
jurisdictional is not dispositive, as “[c]ourts, including this Court, have
more than occasionally misused the term ‘jurisdictional’ to refer to
nonjurisdictional prescriptions.” Fort Bend, 587 U. S., at ___–___, n. 4.
To separate “definitive” interpretations of jurisdiction from those in
which the term “jurisdictional” has been used imprecisely, the Court
asks if a prior decision addressed whether a provision is “ ‘technically
jurisdictional,’ ” i.e., whether it truly operates as a limit on a court’s
subject-matter jurisdiction, and whether anything in the decision
“turn[ed] on that characterization.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S.
500, 512 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523
U. S. 83, 91). A decision that simply states that “the court is dismiss-
Cite as: ____ U. S. ____ (20__) 3
Syllabus
ing ‘for lack of jurisdiction’ when some threshold fact has not been es-
tablished” is understood as a “drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g]” and re-
ceives “no precedential effect.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 511.
Block is a textbook “drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g].” Arbaugh, 546
U. S., at 511. The Government points to a statement in that opinion’s
conclusion that if the Quiet Title Act’s time limit applied, “the courts
below had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits,” Block, 461 U. S.,
at 292. Yet there is no discussion in Block about whether the provision
is “ ‘technically jurisdictional’ ”—just a mere statement that a “thresh-
old fact” must “b[e] established” for there to be “jurisdiction.” Arbaugh,
546 U. S., at 512. While Block did describe the Act’s time limit as “a
condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity,” 461 U. S., at 287,
Block never addressed whether the Act’s time limit was truly a limit
on subject-matter jurisdiction, nor did anything in the case turn on
this question. Contrary to the Government’s contentions, even in that
era, time limits in suits against the Government were not necessarily
subject-matter jurisdictional under this Court’s caselaw.
Like Block, Mottaz contains no discussion of whether the Quiet Title
Act’s 12-year time bar was technically jurisdictional. Instead, the
Court decided which of two possible time bars applied and, having de-
termined it was the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year limit, concluded that the
plaintiff had notice over 12 years before she sued. Neither step in the
Court’s analysis “turn[ed] on” whether any time limits were “ ‘techni-
cally jurisdictional.’ ” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512. Once again, general
statements in the opinion about waivers of immunity cannot change
this basic fact.
Finally, in Beggerly, the Court carefully analyzed whether the text
and context of §2409a(g) were consistent with equitable tolling. This
would have been a mere waste of words if the Court had already held
in Block and Mottaz that §2409a(g) was jurisdictional.
These three cases point in one direction: This Court has never defin-
itively interpreted §2409a(g) as jurisdictional. The Government’s ar-
gument about legislative acquiescence is unavailing given the absence
of any definitive judicial interpretation to which Congress could acqui-
esce. Pp. 5–12.
13 F. 4th 791, reversed and remanded.
SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KAGAN,
GORSUCH, KAVANAUGH, BARRETT, and JACKSON, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and ALITO, J., joined.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 1
Opinion of the Court
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that
corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 21–1164
_________________
LARRY STEVEN WILKINS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[March 28, 2023]
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Larry Steven Wilkins and Jane Stanton wanted quiet ti-
tles and a quiet road. Wilkins and Stanton, the petitioners
here, both live alongside Robbins Gulch Road in rural Mon-
tana. The United States has permission, called an ease-
ment, for use of the road, which the Government interprets
to include making the road available for public use. Peti-
tioners allege that the road’s public use has intruded upon
their private lives, with strangers trespassing, stealing,
and even shooting Wilkins’ cat.
Petitioners sued over the scope of the easement under the
Quiet Title Act, which allows challenges to the United
States’ rights in real property. Invoking the Act’s 12-year
time limit, 28 U. S. C. §2409a(g), the Government main-
tains that the suit is jurisdictionally barred. Petitioners
counter, and the Court holds, that §2409a(g) is a nonjuris-
dictional claims-processing rule.
I
Robbins Gulch Road runs through about a mile of private
property. Petitioners acquired their properties along the
2 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
road in 1991 and 2004. Back in 1962, petitioners’ predeces-
sors in interest had granted the United States an easement
for the road. The Government contends that the easement
includes public access, which petitioners dispute. On peti-
tioners’ telling, the easement does not allow access to the
general public and requires the Government to maintain
and patrol the road.
In 2018, petitioners brought suit under the Quiet Title
Act. The Government moved to dismiss the action on the
ground that the Act’s 12-year time limit had expired. Un-
der the Act, “[a]ny civil action . . . , except for an action
brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is commenced
within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued.”
§2409a(g). Accrual occurs “on the date the plaintiff or his
predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the
claim of the United States.” Ibid. The parties disagreed as
to whether the Act’s time limit is jurisdictional, which is
relevant to the procedures for litigating whether §2409a(g)
bars petitioners’ claim.1
The District Court agreed with the Government and dis-
missed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
13 F. 4th 791 (2021). Applying Circuit precedent, the Court
of Appeals held that this Court had already interpreted
§2409a(g) as jurisdictional in Block v. North Dakota ex rel.
Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273 (1983).
This further entrenched a divide among the Courts of Ap-
peals.2 This Court granted certiorari to resolve the split,
——————
1 The parties dispute the precise implications on remand of a ruling
that §2409a(g) is nonjurisdictional. This Court takes no position on that
dispute.
2 Compare Wisconsin Valley Improvement Co. v. United States, 569
F. 3d 331, 333–335 (CA7 2009), with, e.g., Bank One Texas v. United
States, 157 F. 3d 397, 402–403 (CA5 1998); Spirit Lake Tribe v. North
Dakota, 262 F. 3d 732, 737–738 (CA8 2001); Kane County v. United
States, 772 F. 3d 1205, 1214–1215 (CA10 2014); and F.E.B. Corp. v.
United States, 818 F. 3d 681, 685–686 (CA11 2016).
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 3
Opinion of the Court
596 U. S. ___ (2022), and now reverses the Ninth Circuit’s
judgment.
II
A
“Jurisdiction, this Court has observed, is a word of many,
too many, meanings.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S.
500, 510 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). In par-
ticular, this Court has emphasized the distinction between
limits on “the classes of cases a court may entertain
(subject-matter jurisdiction)” and “nonjurisdictional claim-
processing rules, which seek to promote the orderly pro-
gress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain
procedural steps at certain specified times.” Fort Bend
County v. Davis, 587 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at
6–7) (internal quotation marks omitted). The latter cate-
gory generally includes a range of “threshold requirements
that claimants must complete, or exhaust, before filing a
lawsuit.” Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U. S. 154,
166 (2010).
To police this jurisdictional line, this Court will “treat a
procedural requirement as jurisdictional only if Congress
‘clearly states’ that it is.” Boechler v. Commissioner, 596
U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 3) (quoting Arbaugh, 546
U. S., at 515). This principle of construction is not a burden
courts impose on Congress. To the contrary, this principle
seeks to avoid judicial interpretations that undermine Con-
gress’ judgment. Loosely treating procedural requirements
as jurisdictional risks undermining the very reason Con-
gress enacted them.
Procedural rules often “seek to promote the orderly pro-
gress of litigation” within our adversarial system. Hender-
son v. Shinseki, 562 U. S. 428, 435 (2011). Limits on sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction, in contrast, have a unique
potential to disrupt the orderly course of litigation. “Brand-
ing a rule as going to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction
4 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
alters the normal operation of our adversarial system.” Id.,
at 434. “For purposes of efficiency and fairness, our legal
system is replete with rules” like forfeiture, which require
parties to raise arguments themselves and to do so at cer-
tain times. Ibid. Jurisdictional bars, however, “may be
raised at any time” and courts have a duty to consider them
sua sponte. Ibid. When such eleventh-hour jurisdictional
objections prevail post-trial or on appeal, “many months of
work on the part of the attorneys and the court may be
wasted.” Id., at 435. Similarly, doctrines like waiver and
estoppel ensure efficiency and fairness by precluding par-
ties from raising arguments they had previously disavowed.
Because these doctrines do not apply to jurisdictional objec-
tions, parties can disclaim such an objection, only to resur-
rect it when things go poorly for them on the merits. Ibid.Given this risk of disruption and waste that accompanies
the jurisdictional label, courts will not lightly apply it to
procedures Congress enacted to keep things running
smoothly and efficiently. Courts will also not assume that
in creating a mundane claims-processing rule, Congress
made it “unique in our adversarial system” by allowing par-
ties to raise it at any time and requiring courts to consider
it sua sponte. Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center,
568 U. S. 145, 153 (2013). Instead, “traditional tools of stat-
utory construction must plainly show that Congress imbued
a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences.” United
States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 410 (2015).
Under this clear statement rule, the analysis of §2409a(g)
is straightforward.3 “[I]n applying th[e] clear statement
——————
3 The dissent maintains that this Court’s settled clear statement rule
does not apply here because §2409a(g) is a condition on a waiver of sov-
ereign immunity and “as such, this Court should interpret it as a juris-
dictional bar to suit.” Post, at 2 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Over three dec-
ades ago, this Court in “Irwin . . . foreclose[d] th[e] argument” that “time
limits” are jurisdictional simply because they “function as conditions on
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 5
Opinion of the Court
rule, we have made plain that most time bars are nonjuris-
dictional.” Ibid. Nothing about §2409a(g)’s text or context
gives reason to depart from this beaten path. Section
2409a(g) states that an action “shall be barred unless it is
commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it
accrued.” This “text speaks only to a claim’s timeliness,”
and its “mundane statute-of-limitations language say[s]
only what every time bar, by definition, must: that after a
certain time a claim is barred.” Id., at 410. Further, “[t]his
Court has often explained that Congress’s separation of a
filing deadline from a jurisdictional grant indicates that the
time bar is not jurisdictional.” Id., at 411. The Quiet Title
Act’s jurisdictional grant is in 28 U. S. C. §1346(f ),4 well
afield of §2409a(g). And “[n]othing conditions the jurisdic-
tional grant on the limitations perio[d], or otherwise links
those separate provisions.” Wong, 575 U. S., at 412. Sec-
tion 2409a(g) therefore lacks a jurisdictional clear state-
ment.
B
The Government does not focus on the text of §2409a(g),
but instead points to a trilogy of decisions by this Court that
purportedly establish that the provision is jurisdictional.
——————
the Government’s waiver of sovereign immunity.” Wong, 575 U. S., at
417–418 (citing Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89(1990)). Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, Irwin extends to the “many
statutes that create claims for relief against the United States or its
agencies [and] apply only to Government defendants.” Scarborough v.
Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 422 (2004); cf. also Boechler v. Commissioner, 596
U. S. ___, ___ (2022) (slip op., at 3) (applying clear statement rule to pe-
titions for review of agency action). Notably, even the dissent in Wong
did not engage in such an attempt to turn back the clock, instead arguing
that the provision in that case was jurisdictional based on its specific text
and history. See 575 U. S., at 423–428 (opinion of ALITO, J.).
4 Section 1346(f ) provides that “[t]he district courts shall have exclu-
sive original jurisdiction of civil actions under section 2409a to quiet title
to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest is claimed
by the United States.”
6 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
None of these three decisions definitively interpreted
§2409a(g) as jurisdictional.
This Court has made clear that it will not undo a “defini-
tive earlier interpretation” of a statutory provision as juris-
dictional without due regard for principles of stare decisis.
John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U. S. 130,
138 (2008). At the same time, however, “[c]ourts, including
this Court, have more than occasionally misused the term
‘jurisdictional’ to refer to nonjurisdictional prescriptions.”
Fort Bend, 587 U. S., at ___–___, n. 4 (slip op., at 5–6, n. 4)
(some internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
The mere fact that this Court previously described some-
thing “without elaboration” as jurisdictional therefore does
not end the inquiry. Henderson, 562 U. S., at 437. To sep-
arate the wheat from the chaff, this Court has asked if the
prior decision addressed whether a provision is “ ‘techni-
cally jurisdictional’ ”—whether it truly operates as a limit
on a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction—and whether any-
thing in the decision “turn[ed] on that characterization.”
Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for
Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83, 91 (1998)); see also Zipes
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 395 (1982)
(looking to whether “the legal character of the requirement
was . . . at issue”). If a decision simply states that “the court
is dismissing ‘for lack of jurisdiction’ when some threshold
fact has not been established,” it is understood as a “drive-
by jurisdictional rulin[g]” that receives “no precedential ef-
fect.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 511 (some internal quotation
marks omitted).
The Government begins with Block, 461 U. S. 273. The
case presented “two separate issues” about the Quiet Title
Act, neither of which was whether the 12-year limit was ju-
risdictional. Id., at 276. First, the Court held that the Act
was “the exclusive procedure” for challenging “the title of
the United States to real property.” Id., at 276–277, 286.
Second, the Court held that the 12-year limit applied to
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 7
Opinion of the Court
States. Id., at 277. It was only in the opinion’s conclusion
that, in remanding, the Court remarked that if the time
limit applied, “the courts below had no jurisdiction to in-
quire into the merits.” Id., at 292. The opinion contains no
discussion of whether the provision was “ ‘technically juris-
dictional’ ” or what in the case would have “turn[ed] on that
characterization.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512 (quoting Steel
Co., 523 U. S., at 91). There is nothing more than an “un-
refined dispositio[n]” stating that a “threshold fact” must
“b[e] established” for there to be “jurisdiction.” 546 U. S.,
at 511 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is a text-
book “drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g]” that Arbaugh held
“should be accorded no precedential effect” as to whether a
limit is jurisdictional. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
In an effort to endow a fleeting statement with lasting
significance, the Government and the dissent invoke histor-
ical context. Block described the Act’s time limit as “a con-
dition on the waiver of sovereign immunity.” 461 U. S., at
287. Block never stated, however, that the Act’s time limit
was therefore truly a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction.
Yet according to the Government and the dissent, this went
without saying because the case law at the time was “un-
mistakably” clear that conditions on waivers of immunity
were subject-matter jurisdictional. Post, at 9.
This reading is undermined by the very history on which
it draws. In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498
U. S. 89 (1990), the Court surveyed the case law about
whether “time limits in suits against the Government” are
subject to “equitable tolling, waiver, and estoppel.” Id., at
94. If associating time limits with waivers of sovereign im-
munity clearly made those limits jurisdictional, equitable
exceptions would be just as clearly foreclosed. Instead, Ir-
win described the Court’s approach to this question as “ad
hoc” and “unpredictab[le],” “leaving open” whether equita-
ble exceptions were available in any given case. Id., at 94–
8 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
95. Accordingly, even if “a statute of limitations [was] a
condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity and thus
must be strictly construed,” this still “d[id] not answer the
question whether equitable tolling can be applied to this
statute of limitations.” Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S.
467, 479 (1986). The Court instead analyzed the specific
statutory scheme at issue, with varying results. Ibid. (cit-
ing Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484 (1967)).
Block itself reflected the ambivalent nature of time limits
for suits against the Government. Block recognized that
“we should not construe such a time-bar provision unduly
restrictively,” 461 U. S., at 287, which the Court quoted just
a few years later in support of the proposition that some
such limits are subject to equitable tolling, Bowen, 476
U. S., at 479; see also Irwin, 498 U. S., at 94. Similarly,
while Block cautioned that exceptions to such time limits
will not “be lightly implied,” it did not hold they were cate-
gorically precluded. 461 U. S., at 287. Block thus acknowl-
edged nothing more than a general proposition, echoed by
Irwin, that “a condition to the waiver of sovereign immunity
. . . must be strictly construed.” Irwin, 498 U. S., at 94. In
Irwin, as elsewhere, this did not mean that time limits ac-
companying such waivers are necessarily jurisdictional.
Next, the Government offers United States v. Mottaz, 476
U. S. 834 (1986). Once again, the question presented was
not whether the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year time limit was
technically jurisdictional. The Court instead had to decide
which of two possible statutory time bars applied. Id., at
841. This analysis proceeded in two steps. First, the Court
asked which of several federal statutes—“the Quiet Title
Act; the Allotment Acts; [or] the Tucker Act”—was the
“source of . . . jurisdiction” based on the nature of the plain-
tiff ’s claim and the relief sought. Ibid. (citations omitted).
The Court explained that the Quiet Title Act applied be-
cause it was “ ‘the exclusive means by which adverse claim-
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 9
Opinion of the Court
ants could challenge the United States’ title to real prop-
erty,’ ” and the plaintiff ’s claim fell “within the Act’s scope.”
Id., at 841–842 (quoting Block, 461 U. S., at 286). Second,
the Court “then determine[d] whether [the] suit was
brought within the relevant limitations period.” Mottaz,
476 U. S., at 841. The Court concluded that the plaintiff
had notice over 12 years before she sued, and “[h]er claim
[was] therefore barred.” Id., at 843–844. Neither step in
the Court’s analysis “turn[ed] on” whether any time limits
were “ ‘technically jurisdictional.’ ” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at
512 (quoting Steel Co., 523 U. S., at 91).
General statements in the opinion about waivers of im-
munity cannot change this basic fact. At the outset of its
analysis, the Court observed that “the terms of [the United
States’] waiver of sovereign immunity define the extent of
the court’s jurisdiction” and that “ ‘a statute of limitations
. . . constitutes a condition on the waiver.’ ” Mottaz, 476
U. S., at 841 (quoting Block, 461 U. S., at 287). Neither of
these statements, however, played a role in determining
which statute applied or whether the plaintiff brought her
claim within 12 years after it accrued. There is also no in-
dication in the opinion that the parties raised tolling or
other equitable exceptions. As such, “ ‘the legal character’ ”
of the time limit was never “ ‘at issue.’ ” Reed Elsevier, 559
U. S., at 169, n. 8 (quoting Zipes, 455 U. S., at 395).
The Government also points to Mottaz’s procedural back-
ground section. Buried in a paragraph recounting a tangled
procedural history, the Court remarked that the Govern-
ment raised the Quiet Title Act, “apparently for the first
time,” in a petition for rehearing. 476 U. S., at 840. This
supposedly reveals that the Court sua sponte and sub silen-
tio raised, considered, and rejected an argument that the
Government had forfeited the Quiet Title Act’s time limit,
doing so all because the time limit was jurisdictional. Yet
a background section is an unlikely place for such a ruling.
This is particularly true where, as the word “apparently”
10 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
indicates, the Court did not pause over its passing remark.
Nor did the Court mention this again. Further, even if the
Court had secretly considered forfeiture, there were nonju-
risdictional reasons the Court could have concluded forfei-
ture did not apply.5 Speculating about what this Court
might have thought about arguments it never addressed
needlessly introduces confusion. This Court looks for defin-
itive interpretations, not holdings in hiding.
Finally, there is United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38(1998). The Court in Beggerly addressed whether §2409a(g)
could be equitably tolled. Id., at 48–49. Subject-matter ju-
risdiction, as noted, is never subject to equitable tolling. If
Block and Mottaz had definitely interpreted §2409a(g) as
subject-matter jurisdictional, the Court could have just
cited those cases and ended the matter without further dis-
cussion.6 Instead, the Court parsed the provision’s text and
context, concluding that “by providing that the statute of
limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff ‘knew or
should have known of the claim of the United States,’ ” the
law “has already effectively allowed for equitable tolling.”
Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 48. Also relevant were “the unusu-
ally generous” time limit and the importance of clarity
when it comes to land rights. Id., at 48–49. This careful
——————
5 For example, the Court might have concluded forfeiture did not apply
because of the confusing way the case had been pleaded, see Brief for
United States in United States v. Mottaz, O. T. 1985, No. 85–546, p. 22,
n. 11, or that any forfeiture argument had itself been forfeited. Or the
Court might have, on reflection, agreed with the Government that it had
sufficiently raised the Quiet Title Act prior to rehearing. Ibid. The dis-
sent, post, at 8, n. 3, mistakes these observations as a suggestion that
Mottaz actually took one of those approaches. Far from it. This Court is
merely declining to read tea leaves to divine lost meanings about what
the Mottaz Court might have thought about a forfeiture argument it
never raised and over which “the parties did not cross swords.” Arbaugh
v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 512 (2006).
6 The Court was not unaware of Block, quoting it for a different point
in the very same section. Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 48.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 11
Opinion of the Court
analysis of whether the text and context were consistent
with equitable tolling would have been wasted words if the
Court had already held that §2409a(g) was jurisdictional.
Precisely because the Court’s inquiry was so focused on the
particular nature of equitable tolling, Beggerly also did not
address whether other exceptions such as “fraudulent con-
cealment or equitable estoppel might apply,” as Justice Ste-
vens noted in his concurrence. Id., at 49. If anything,
Beggerly’s discussion of nonjurisdictional reasons why toll-
ing specifically was unavailable indicates the Court under-
stood §2409a(g) not to be jurisdictional. Thus, Beggerly un-
dermines any notion that Block and Mottaz had put the
jurisdictional question to rest.
All three cases therefore point in one direction: This
Court has never definitively interpreted §2409a(g) as juris-
dictional.7 For similar reasons, the Government’s argu-
ment about legislative acquiescence is unavailing. Con-
gress amended the Act in 1986 to provide special rules for
States in the wake of Block. See 100 Stat. 3351–3352.
Then, as now, “none of our decisions establishe[d]” that the
time limit was jurisdictional, so there was no definitive ju-
dicial interpretation to which Congress could acquiesce. Al-
exander v. Sandoval, 532 U. S. 275, 291 (2001). The mere
existence of a decision employing the term jurisdiction
without elaboration does not show Congress adopted that
view. Nor can the Government’s handful of lower court
opinions stand in for a ruling of this Court, especially where
some of these decisions contain only fleeting references to
jurisdiction.8 See Boechler, 596 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op.,
at 7–8).
——————
7 The dissent invokes a fourth case, United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S.
596 (1990), which offers no more support. Dalm involved a separate pro-
vision of a separate statute, see id., at 601–602, and cannot render
§2490a(g) jurisdictional when Quiet Title Act cases like Block, Mottaz,
and Beggerly failed to do so.
8 See Fulcher v. United States, 696 F. 2d 1073, 1078 (CA4 1982).
12 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES
Opinion of the Court
All told, neither this Court’s precedents nor Congress’ ac-
tions established that §2409a(g) is jurisdictional. While the
Government warns that revisiting precedent results in un-
certainty, no revisiting is necessary here. Far more uncer-
tainty would follow from the Government’s method of divin-
ing definitive interpretations from stray remarks.
* * *
Section 2409a(g) is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing
rule. The Court of Appeals’ contrary judgment is reversed,
and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 1
THOMAS, J., dissenting
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
_________________
No. 21–1164
_________________
LARRY STEVEN WILKINS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[March 28, 2023]
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE and
JUSTICE ALITO join, dissenting.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars suits against the
United States. But, in the Quiet Title Act of 1972, Congress
waived this immunity and consented to suits against the
United States in order to determine the status of disputed
property. 28 U. S. C. §2409a. Congress conditioned this
consent on, among other things, a 12-year statute of limita-
tions: “Any civil action under this section, except for an ac-
tion brought by a State, shall be barred unless it is com-
menced within twelve years of the date upon which it
accrued.” §2409a(g). This Court has long construed such
conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity as jurisdic-
tional. And, it has acknowledged the jurisdictional nature
of the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations in several prec-
edents.
In holding that §2409a(g) is not jurisdictional, the major-
ity commits two critical errors. First, it applies the same
interpretive approach to a condition on a waiver of sover-
eign immunity that it would apply to any run-of-the-mill
procedural rule. Second, by reading the Court’s prior Quiet
Title Act precedents in this way, the Court disregards their
express recognition of the jurisdictional character of the
Act’s time bar. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
2 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES
THOMAS, J., dissenting
I
This Court’s skepticism of the jurisdictional character of
procedural bars does not extend to conditions on a waiver
of sovereign immunity. In the context of a waiver of sover-
eign immunity, the Court presumes that procedural limita-
tions are jurisdictional. The Act’s time bar is one such pro-
vision, and, as such, this Court should interpret it as a
jurisdictional bar to suit.
As a sovereign, the United States “is immune from suit
save as it consents to be sued, . . . and the terms of its con-
sent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction
to entertain the suit.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S.
584, 586 (1941); see also Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S.
156, 160 (1981); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U. S. 206,
212 (1983) (describing this principle as “axiomatic”). Con-
sequently, “[s]overeign immunity is by nature jurisdic-
tional.” Henderson v. United States, 517 U. S. 654, 675
(1996) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). This principle is
longstanding, and the majority does not dispute it. See
ante, at 7–8.
“A necessary corollary of this rule,” however, “is that
when Congress attaches conditions to legislation waiving
the sovereign immunity of the United States, those condi-
tions must be strictly observed, and exceptions thereto are
not to be lightly implied.” Block v. North Dakota ex rel.
Board of Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273, 287 (1983);
see also United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U. S. 30,
34 (1992) (stating that a waiver of sovereign immunity
“must be construed strictly in favor of the sovereign” and
“not enlarge[d] . . . beyond what the language requires” (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, “in many cases
this Court has read procedural rules embodied in statutes
waiving immunity strictly, with an eye to effectuating a re-
strictive legislative purpose when Congress relinquishes
sovereign immunity.” Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484, 501
(1967). In United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596 (1990), the
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 3
THOMAS, J., dissenting
Court reaffirmed this “settled principl[e]” in the specific
context of “[a] statute of limitations requiring that a suit
against the Government be brought within a certain time
period.” Id., at 608. Such a requirement, the Court ex-
plained, “is one of ” the “terms of [the United States’] con-
sent to be sued” and, therefore, “define[s] th[e] court’s juris-
diction to entertain the suit.” Ibid. (emphasis added;
internal quotation marks omitted).
Those straightforward principles resolve this case. The
Quiet Title Act partially waives the immunity of the United
States by granting federal district courts “exclusive original
jurisdiction of civil actions under section 2409a to quiet title
to an estate or interest in real property in which an interest
is claimed by the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §1346(f ). This
provision’s cross-reference to §2409a incorporates several
conditions on this waiver. For example, the Act specifies
that the United States “shall not be disturbed in possession
or control” of contested land “pending a final judgment or
decree, the conclusion of any appeal therefrom, and sixty
days,” and “if the final determination [is] adverse,” the
United States shall have the right to purchase the land for
just compensation. §2409a(b). Similarly, the Act provides
that any “civil action against the United States under this
section shall be tried by the court without a jury” and bars
suits based on adverse possession. §§2409a(f ), (n). It also
incorporates the time bar at issue here: “Any civil action
under this section, except for an action brought by a State,
shall be barred unless it is commenced within twelve years
of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be
deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or his pre-
decessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim
of the United States.” §2409a(g).
These provisions carefully delineate the scope of the Act’s
limited waiver of sovereign immunity, establishing condi-
tions on which the United States has consented to be sued.
The United States has not, for example, consented to a jury
4 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES
THOMAS, J., dissenting
trial or to be sued on an adverse possession theory. Simi-
larly, and just as critically, it has not consented to be sued
(except by a State) once the 12-year statute of limitations
has passed.
The majority acknowledges that these restrictions must
be strictly construed. See ante, at 8. Yet, it concludes that
the time bar should not be considered jurisdictional. In an-
other context, the majority’s conclusion is arguably plausi-
ble. But, in this context, it is simply incorrect. As a condi-
tion on the United States’ limited waiver of sovereign
immunity in the Quiet Title Act, the Act’s statute of limita-
tions is jurisdictional. Moreover, in light of this Court’s
longstanding case law, the jurisdictional character of the
time bar would have been well understood by the 1972 Con-
gress. See ante, at 3 (suggesting that the Court should
“avoid judicial interpretations that undermine Congress’
judgment” when interpreting arguably jurisdictional provi-
sions).
With no answer to the Court’s longstanding view that
conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity are jurisdic-
tional, the majority seeks refuge in Irwin v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990). Ante, at 7–8. Irwin
considered whether equitable tolling should apply to the
time to file an employment-discrimination lawsuit against
the Government under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. There, the Court reasoned that “[t]ime requirements
in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily sub-
ject to ‘equitable tolling,’ ” and that “[o]nce Congress has
made . . . a waiver [of sovereign immunity], . . . making the
rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Gov-
ernment, in the same way that it is applicable to private
suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congres-
sional waiver.” Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95. It thus concluded
that “[s]uch a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment
of legislative intent as well as a practically useful principle
of interpretation.” Ibid.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 5
THOMAS, J., dissenting
The majority suggests that Irwin stands for the proposi-
tion that a condition on a waiver of sovereign immunity
must be strictly construed, but then goes on to argue that it
is not necessarily jurisdictional. Ante, at 8. However, our
decision in United States v. Williams, 514 U. S. 527 (1995),
decided five years after Irwin, demonstrates that statutes
of limitations in suits brought against the United States are
no less jurisdictional now than they were before Irwin. In
Williams, the Court cited Dalm’s holding that failure to file
a claim against the Government for a federal tax refund
within the statute-of-limitations period operates as a juris-
dictional bar to suit, and the Court reaffirmed that a stat-
ute of limitations “narrow[s] the waiver of sovereign im-
munity.” 514 U. S., at 534, n. 7 (citing 494 U. S., at 602).1
Irwin, thus, does not disrupt this Court’s long held under-
standing that conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity
are presumptively jurisdictional.
II
Regardless of whether conditions on waivers of sovereign
immunity remain jurisdictional post-Irwin, we have said
that, where the Court has offered a “definitive earlier inter-
pretation” of a statutory time bar as jurisdictional, we will
continue to treat it as jurisdictional unless and until Con-
gress directs otherwise. John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v.
United States, 552 U. S. 130, 137–138 (2008); see also
United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U. S. 402, 416 (2015)
——————
1 I have previously noted that Irwin “does perhaps narrow the scope of
the sovereign immunity canon.” Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401,
426 (2004) (dissenting opinion). But, it “does so only in limited circum-
stances,” such as “where the Government is made subject to suit to the
same extent and in the same manner as private parties are.” Ibid. (em-
phasis added). This is not one of those circumstances. The Quiet Title
Act’s framework exclusively governs actions to quiet title against the
United States. And, it includes a number of conditions favorable to the
Federal Government that would not apply in traditional quiet title ac-
tions among private litigants.
6 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES
THOMAS, J., dissenting
(reaffirming John R. Sand’s rule). And, we have empha-
sized that Irwin “does not imply revisiting past precedents.”
John R. Sand, 552 U. S., at 137.
The John R. Sand standard is amply met here. This
Court concluded in Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of
Univ. and School Lands, 461 U. S. 273 (1983), and again in
United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834 (1986), that compli-
ance with the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year time bar is a juris-
dictional prerequisite.
Block considered whether the Act’s statute of limitations
applied to state litigants.2 There, the Government had ar-
gued that the plaintiffs’ failure to sue within the 12-year
deadline established by the statute meant that the “district
court lacked jurisdiction” to consider the plaintiffs’ claims.
Brief for the Petitioners in Block v. North Dakota ex rel.
Board of Univ. and School Lands, O. T. 1982, No. 81–2337,
p. 5. In assessing this argument, the Court made clear that
it understood the Act’s statute of limitations to arise in the
context of a waiver of sovereign immunity, discussing at
some length the tradeoffs proposed as Congress deliberated
over the scope of the Act. See 461 U. S., at 280–285. The
Court also prominently invoked Sherwood and Lehman,
cases discussing the jurisdictional nature of
sovereign-immunity waivers, to explain why the limitations
provision must be “strictly observed.” Block, 461 U. S., at
287. After concluding that States were not exempt from the
time bar, the Court stated that, “[i]f North Dakota’s suit is
barred by [the statute of limitations], the courts below had
——————
2 At the time of the Court’s decision, the Act’s statute of limitations
read as follows: “Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless
it is commenced within twelve years of the date upon which it accrued.
Such action shall be deemed to have accrued on the date the plaintiff or
his predecessor in interest knew or should have known of the claim of
the United States.” 28 U. S. C. §2409a(f ) (1982 ed.). Congress subse-
quently amended the provision to add its current language excepting ac-
tions brought by States.
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 7
THOMAS, J., dissenting
no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits,” and it remanded
for the lower courts to determine whether the suit was so
barred. Id., at 292–293. This statement that the time bar
went to “jurisdiction” was an integral part of the Court’s in-
structions on remand. Moreover, on remand, the Eighth
Circuit understood the Court to have used the term “juris-
diction” to refer to a court’s authority to hear the case. See
North Dakota ex rel. Board of Univ. and School Lands v.
Block, 789 F. 2d 1308, 1310 (CA8 1986) (noting that neither
the Eighth Circuit nor the District Court had “ ‘jurisdiction
to inquire into the merits’ ” because the Act’s “statute of lim-
itations is jurisdictional”).
In Mottaz, three years after Block, the Court again con-
sidered the jurisdictional nature of the Act’s time bar. In
the lower courts, the Government initially defended against
a “somewhat opaque” set of claims by relying on the general
6-year statute of limitations for actions against the United
States, 28 U. S. C. §2401(a). Mottaz, 476 U. S., at 839. The
District Court held that the suit was time barred under
§2401(a), but the Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded.
Id., at 838–839. The Government then argued, for the first
time, in its petition for rehearing in the Court of Appeals
that the suit arose under the Quiet Title Act and was thus
subject to the Act’s 12-year statute of limitations. Id., at
840–841. This Court granted certiorari “to consider
whether [the] respondent’s claim was barred under either
[the 6-year bar] or [the 12-year bar].” Id., at 841.
In addressing these, the Court cited Sherwood for the
proposition that, “[w]hen the United States consents to be
sued, the terms of its waiver of sovereign immunity define
the extent of the court’s jurisdiction.” 476 U. S., at 841. It
then quoted Block for the proposition that “ ‘[w]hen waiver
legislation contains a statute of limitations, the limitations
provision constitutes a condition on the waiver of sovereign
immunity,’ ” treating Block as precedential on this point.
476 U. S., at 841. The Court also characterized the statute
8 WILKINS v. UNITED STATES
THOMAS, J., dissenting
of limitations as a “central condition of the consent given by
the Act.” Id., at 843 (citing Block, 461 U. S., at 283–285).
As in Block, this reasoning was a critical and substantial
part of the Court’s opinion. The Court ultimately concluded
that the plaintiff ’s claim was untimely and thus barred un-
der the Act. 476 U. S., at 844. The Court further concluded
that no other statute “conferred jurisdiction” on the lower
courts to adjudicate her claim. Id., at 841; see also id., 844–
851. In deciding the case, the Court noticeably did not en-
gage in a forfeiture analysis, underscoring that it under-
stood the Government’s late-raised statute-of-limitations
argument to be jurisdictional and, thus, capable of being
raised at any point in the proceedings. See Arbaugh v. Y &
H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006) (explaining that jurisdic-
tional arguments cannot be forfeited).3
United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38 (1998), on which
the majority relies, see ante, at 10–11, is not to the contrary.
In that case, the Court considered whether the Quiet Title
Act’s time bar may be equitably tolled. After noting that
the Court of Appeals had considered the statute of limita-
tions jurisdictional, see Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 42, the Court
turned to the language of the Act. The Court emphasized
that the 12-year statute of limitations began to accrue when
the litigants knew or should have known of the claim of the
United States, and it observed that the provision’s text “has
——————
3 The majority suggests that United States v. Mottaz, 476 U. S. 834,
may have (sub silentio) concluded that forfeiture did not apply in that
case. See ante, at 10, and n. 5. But, presumably, such a conclusion would
have merited mention in the Court’s opinion. To be sure, the majority
notes that the Government had raised the statute of limitations “ ‘appar-
ently for the first time’ ” in a petition for rehearing. Ante, at 9 (quoting
Mottaz, 476 U. S., at 840 (emphasis added)). However, the use of the
word “apparently” does not indicate that the Court “did not pause over
its passing remark,” as the majority contends. See ante, at 9–10. To the
contrary, it suggests that the Court did not need to conduct a forfeiture
analysis, because the provision was jurisdictional in any event (and thus
not subject to forfeiture).
Cite as: 598 U. S. ____ (2023) 9
THOMAS, J., dissenting
already effectively allowed for equitable tolling.” Id., at 48
(citing Irwin, 498 U. S., at 96). “Given this fact, and the
unusually generous nature of the [Act]’s limitations time
period,” the Court concluded that “extension of the statu-
tory period by additional equitable tolling would be unwar-
ranted.” 524 U. S., at 48–49. Thus, while Beggerly might
be read to view the Act’s time bar as potentially susceptible
to tolling (and thus, by inference, nonjurisdictional), the
Court did not hold that the bar actually could be tolled. Ra-
ther, the Court held the opposite. Beggerly is therefore, at
best, ambiguous with respect to the jurisdictional nature of
the time bar. As such, it does not overcome the Court’s clear
prior view set out in both Block and Mottaz.
For the majority, the Court’s statements in Block and
Mottaz are not “definitiv[e]” enough to satisfy John R.
Sand. Ante, at 11. But, the import of the Court’s references
to “jurisdiction” in Block and Mottaz would have been clear
at the time. A court in the 1980s discussing a provision of
a statute as a waiver of sovereign immunity, citing Sher-
wood (and, later, Block), invoked a well-known set of ideas
that readers at the time unmistakably associated with the
concept of jurisdiction. In fact, the Court in Dalm cited
Block and Mottaz—and no other cases—for the proposition
that conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity “define
th[e] court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.” 494 U. S., at
608 (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court’s precedents must be understood in that context.
* * *
The Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations functions as a
condition on a waiver of sovereign immunity, and is there-
fore jurisdictional. This Court has repeatedly characterized
the Act’s time bar as jurisdictional, and that interpretation
remains authoritative under John R. Sand. Accordingly, I
respectfully dissent.