Blair v. Cuming County

111 U.S. 363 (1884)

BLAIR
v.
CUMING COUNTY.

Supreme Court of United States.

Argued April 8th, 1884. Decided April 21st, 1884. IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEBRASKA.

Mr. Walter C. Larned for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Uriah Bruner and Mr. R.F. Stevenson for defendant in error.

Mr. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the facts in the foregoing language, and continued:

It is urged against the right of the plaintiff to recover, that in the bonds and coupons the West Point Precinct promises to pay, and so the obligations are not those of the defendant and it cannot be sued on them. This question was decided by this court in Davenport v. County of Dodge, 105 U.S. 237, in regard to precinct bonds issued under the same statute, and it was held that a suit against the county on coupons cut from special bonds issued by the county commissioners for the precinct was a proper suit.

It is also contended that the statute (sec. 7) required that precinct bonds should be issued as special county bonds for the precinct, by the county commissioners, and did not authorize the chairman of the board and its clerk to issue the bonds; that the county commissioners could not delegate their authority to sign and issue the bonds to any one else, or to one of their number; and that precinct bonds signed by one of the county commissioners, as chairman, and attested by the clerk of the board, and coupons signed by some one as clerk, have no validity. We see no force in these objections. The bonds bear the seal of the county and purport to be issued by the board of county commissioners, on behalf of the precinct. The bond states that the board, in testimony of the statements in the bond, has caused the bond to be signed on behalf of the precinct, by the chairman of the board, and to be attested by the clerk of the board (who appears, by the petition, to have been the clerk of the county), and that such clerk has affixed thereto the seal of the county. This was a sufficient compliance with the statute. The commissioners, by statute, constituted "a board." That was their official designation, when meeting to perform any duties with which they were charged. Gen. Stat. of 1873, chap. 13, secs. 7, 14, pp. 233, 234. The attestation of the bonds by the signatures of the chairman and the clerk of the board, and the county seal, was proper. It was not necessary that all the commissioners should sign the bonds. What was done was not an issuing of the bonds by the chairman and clerk. The coupons, in the form in which they were issued, annexed to the bond, were adopted as coupons, by the statement in the body of the bond, and the question as to any one of them, when detached, is only one of genuineness and identity. The bonds are special bonds for the precinct, and contain a sufficient statement showing their special nature, that is, that they are special bonds for the precinct.

It is also objected that the bonds state that they are issued under the act of 1869, to aid the company in improving the water-power of the river for the purpose of propelling public grist-mills "and other works of internal improvement of a public nature" in the precinct; and that the latter part of the statement is indefinite, and the other works to be aided or improved, or propelled, should be described or identified, so that it may be seen they were works of internal improvement, within the statute, and also because the proposition voted on must, in order to be a lawful one, have stated what the specific "other works" were. It is a sufficient answer to this objection to say, that the petition states, and the demurrer admits, that the only work of internal improvement of a public nature for which the bonds were issued to the company, was the improvement of the water-power of the Elkhorn River for the purpose of propelling public grist-mills in the precinct; that the improving of such water-power for that purpose rendered it available and useful for propelling other works of internal improvement of a public nature, which were or thereafter might be constructed and located on that river in that precinct; that the improvement of the water-power of that river, to aid which the bonds were issued and negotiated, consisted in constructing a canal for water-power purposes in the precinct; and that the bonds and their attached coupons were issued and negotiated under and by virtue of a majority vote of the qualified voters of the precinct, and in pursuance of the act. Thus, there is a distinct statement as well as an admission, that no work of internal improvement was covered by the vote or the issue of the bonds, other than the one of improving such water-power for the purpose of propelling public grist-mills in the precinct. The statement in the bonds in regard to propelling other works of internal improvement of a public nature in the precinct, is explained by the allegation in the petition that the improving of the water-power for the purpose stated rendered it available to propel other works of internal improvement of a public nature, then existing, or which might be constructed on the river within the bounds of the precinct. But this was an incidental result, and aside from the only work in aid of which, or purpose for which, the bonds were issued, as existing, or as notified to, or known by, the plaintiff, at the time of the sale and delivery of the bonds to him.

It is also objected that improving the water-power of the river, by constructing a canal for water-power purposes, is merely digging a mill race, and that the doing so, for the purpose of propelling a public grist-mill in the precinct, is not constructing a work of internal improvement, within the statute. We are not referred to any decision of the highest court of Nebraska, made before the plaintiff became, on January 1st, 1876, the bona fide owner of these coupons, or even since, holding in accordance with the contention of the defendant.

In Osborne v. County of Adams, 106 U.S. 181, this court decided, in November, 1882, that, under the same statute that is in question here, bonds issued to aid in the construction of a steam grist-mill were not issued to aid in the construction of a work of internal improvement. There was a suggestion in the opinion in that case, that the statute did not cover the construction of any kind of grist-mill as a work of internal improvement. During the same term a petition for rehearing was filed, and the attention of the court was called to the case of Traver v. Merrick County, 14 Neb. 327, in which the Supreme Court of Nebraska had held, at its January Term, 1883, that county bonds issued by county commissioners, under the act of 1869, as a loan to an individual to aid in building a public grist-mill and water-power in the county, were valid. But this court adhered to its view that the act did not cover the construction of a steam grist-mill, and denied the rehearing. Osborne v. Adams County, 109 U.S. 1.

In Union Pacific Railroad v. Commissioners, 4 Neb. 450, it was held, in 1876, that a public wagon bridge, over the Platte River, as an extension of a public highway, was a work of internal improvement, under the act of 1869, being a work from the construction of which benefits were to be derived by the public. But the court said that no authority existed to aid a merely private enterprise. See, also, United States v. Dodge County, 110 U.S. 156.

In The State v. Thorne, 9 Neb. 458, 460, in 1880, it was suggested that works of internal improvement, under the act, might include railroads, turnpikes, canals, and numerous other enterprises, not objects of private concern purely

In Dawson County v. McNamar, 10 Neb. 276, in 1880, it was held that the building of a county court house was not a work of internal improvement, under the act, and it was said that "works of internal improvement" meant "only those works within the State in which the whole body of the people are supposed to be more or less interested, and by which they may be benefited."

In Traver v. Merrick County, before cited, the court considered the act of 1869 and the question whether a water grist-mill was a work of internal improvement, within the meaning of that act. It cited the provisions of an act "relating to mills and mill dams," which passed and took effect February 26th, 1873, Gen. Stat. of 1873, chap. 44, p. 472, and especially sections 1, 2 and 24 to 29 of that act, as authorizing a person who, in good faith, had expended a considerable sum of money towards the erection of a grist-mill on a stream, to obtain an injunction against the making by another person of a dam across the same stream on his own land, the effect of which would be to destroy the water-power of the former; and it stated that, under the cases of Nosser v. Seeley, 10 Neb. 460, and Seeley v. Bridges, 13 Id. 547, that was the settled law of the State. The act of 1873 provides that all mills for grinding grain, and which shall grind for toll, shall be deemed public mills; that the owner or occupier of every public mill shall grind the grain brought to his mill as well as the nature and condition of his mill will permit, and in due time as the same shall be brought; and that he shall post in the mill his rates of toll, and the county commissioners of the county shall establish and regulate the amount of toll to be charged. The court held, in Traver v. Merrick County, that the legislature had authority to provide that streams capable of being applied to mill purposes should be so utilized for the benefit of the public; that the right to erect a mill and dam, on paying damages for the injury caused, was granted for the better use of the water-power, on considerations of public policy and the general good, with a view to keeping up mills for use; and that, under the act of 1873, water grist-mills were mills for the use of the public. It also held that, under the act of 1869, works of internal improvement were not restricted to railroads and works of like character, such as canals, turnpikes and bridges; that, if an internal improvement was for public use, subject to the control and regulation of the legislature, it was within the act; and that, as the mill in that case was one to be propelled by water, and was for the use of all who might desire to patronize it, at such rates of toll as might be prescribed by the county commissioners of the county, it was a work of internal improvement, within the act.

We concur in these views, and regard them as a sound exposition of the legislation of Nebraska. In Traver v. Merrick County the thing aided was the building a public grist-mill and water-power. As we understand the present case, the thing aided is the improving the water-power of a river, by constructing a canal for water-power purposes to propel public grist-mills. This is within the act of 1869. A water grist-mill cannot be run so as to be a public grist-mill, unless it is furnished with water-power, and, if an existing river needs to be improved to furnish such power, the improvement of it is a public work of internal improvement.

In Township of Burlington v. Beasley, 94 U.S. 310, this court held that a steam custom grist-mill, not on a water-course or operated by water-power, was a "work of internal improvement," within an act of Kansas authorizing municipal bonds in aid of "the construction of railroads or water-power, ... or for other works of internal improvement." The decision was based, in part, on the ground, that there was another act which declared that "all water, steam or other mills, whose owners or occupiers grind or offer to grind grain for toll or pay, are hereby declared public mills," and provided for the order in which customers should be served, and prescribed the duties of the miller, and that the rates of toll should be posted; and, as it would also be competent for the legislature to regulate the toll, it was held that aid to the mill was aid of a public work of internal improvement.

Enterprises of a class within which that in the present case falls are so far of a public nature that private property may be appropriated to carry them into effect. Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 12 Pick. 467; Commonwealth v. Essex Company, 13 Gray, 239, 249; Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454, 464; Scudder v. Trenton Delaware Falls Co., 1 Saxton Ch. 694; Beekman v. Saratoga & Schenectady Railroad Co., 3 Paige, 45. And when the legislature has given to grist-mills and the water-power connected with them such a public character as in the present case, the improvement of the water-power must be regarded as a public work of internal improvement, which may be aided in its construction by the issue of bonds, under the act in question.

These conclusions require that

The judgment of the Circuit Court should be reversed, and the case be remanded to that court, with direction to overrule the demurrer to the petition, and to take such further proceedings in the cause as may be required by law and as shall not be inconsistent with this opinion.