Marye v. Parsons

' Mr. J ustice Matthews

delivered the opinion of the court. .

The appellee, who was complainant below, a citizen of New York, filed his bill in equity, in the Circuit Court uf the United States for the Eastern District of Virginia, against Morton Marye, described as Auditor of the Commonwealth of Virginia; Samuel C. Greenhow, Treasurer of the City of Richmond ; A, L. Hill, Treasurer of the City of Norfolk, and V. G. Dunnington, Treasurer of the City of Lynchburg; R. B. Munford, Commissioner of Revenue for the City of Richmond, Charles ’WV Price, for the' City of Lynchburg, and Charles D. Langley, for the City of Norfolk, all citizens of- Virginia.

The complainant avers in his bill that he is-the owner of overdue coupons to the amount of $28,010, cut from bonds of the State of Virginia issued under the act of March 30,1871, which coupons are receivable, by the terms of that act, in payment, at and after maturity, for all taxes, debts and demands. due the State. A list of these coupons, described by the numbers and amounts of the bonds, is exhibited with the bill. He claims that these coupons constitute a contract with the State, by which-it agreed to. pay the amount of each to -the holder at maturity, and, second, in case, of default, that the .holder should have the right to assign or transfer the same to any tax-payer or other debtor of-the State, with, the quality of being received’for taxes and other demands'due the State, and 'with the guarantee that the State would receive them specifically in payment '¡pro tanto for any such taxes and demands, and that they should be accepted by any of her tax collectors from any of her tax-payers or debtors, in discharge and payment oí such taxes or dues. ,-

' The defendants to the bill, it is -alleged, are officers of the .State, charged, severally with the collection of certain taxes and license fees and. other dufes to the State; and it is charged that, in pursuance of certain statutes-passed since the act of March 30,1871, and the issue of the'bonds and coupons under it, they are forbidden to receive-these-and similar coupons in payment of taxes and other dues to' the States, which statutes, it' is averred, impair the obligation- of the contract between the 'State and the holder of its coupons, and are accordingly in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and are hull and ■void.; but that, nevertheless, the defendants, as officers of the State," as is publiply known, habitually refuse to accept coupons' when tendered • by- tax-payers, in .payment of taxes and other dues' to the. State, with" the collection of which they are severally chargéd, and the General Assembly of Virginia has also passed statutes repealing all laws which provided any remedy for the enforcement" of the .right to have them- so received.

V The bill then proceeds as follows :

“And your petitioner furthermore-shows that, confiding in his right to a specific performance of said contract, and in his title to equitable relief, should the same be denied, he ‘ hath made arrangements with sundry tax-payers of Virginia to use his above coupons in payment pf their taxes and license taxes, now- due, by which .arrangement,’if the said ■ coupons- can -be used' without delay or difficulty, he will- receive nearly 'par •therefor, and thus be able to have-his coupons- collected. But, unless they are so accepted in payment when‘tendered, the said tax-payers will not use them at all, because they are compelled to pay their taxes forthwith under heavy penalties, and to obtain their licenses immediately, or cease from business, so that, if the collectors of these taxes continue to refuse to accept these coupons, and so render necessary an appeal to the courts, and a separate action by each tax-payer upon each tender, such refusal will be tantamount to an utter destruction of the rights of your petitioner, because delays will thus occur which the tax-payers cannot submit to for the above-named reasons and others, and thus your petitioner will be deprived of the benefit of the arrangements he has made, as well as of all opportunity of .having -his coupons so used at any time save in small amounts and at rare intervals.”

The prayer for relief is as follows :

“In tender' consideration whereof, and inasmuch as your petitioner is without adequate relief save in a court of equity, wherein such matters are properly cognizable, and inasmuch as he will suffer great and irreparable loss and damage, exceeding $500 -in amount, unless relief is afforded him immediately, and the above-named officers are required to perform specifically the contract aforesaid, and receive his said coupons in payment of all or any of the dues and taxes above-named immediately upon their being tendered therefor by, any tax-payer or applicant for a license, and to avoid a multiplicity of .suits and prevent an obstruction of justice, he prays- that Morton Marye, Auditor of Virginia, Samuel C. Greenhow, A. L. Hill, and V. G. Dunnington, Treasurers of the Cities of Richmond, Norfolk, and Lynchburg, respectively, and R. B.. Munford, Charges. D. Langley and Charles W. Price, Commissioners of the Revenue for said cities, respectively, be made parties defendant hereto, with apt words to charge them, and may b,e required on oath to- answer fully the allegations hereof.

“ And that the said defendants, their assistants, clerks,- and agents, be required and compelled to specifically perform the - said coupon contract according to its legal tenor and effect, and to accept your orator’s said coupons, or any of them, from any tax-payer presenting them or any of them in payment of1 . Ms uáxes," license taxes, or other dues, and to-receipt therefor, or .certify thie payment and deposit thereof, in cases of applications for license, in precisely the same form, and'with precisely ,.the game force and effect ás they would do if said tender, pay- • ment, or deposit were made in money. 1 And that your honors , will- decree said coupons to be genuine, legal coupons, legally ' receivable for all taxes, debts, and demands due the State of .Virginia, .and especially for all license taxes or assessments by whatever name the same may Be called. ' And to the end'that ■your orator may have full relief in the premises he also prays . that. a preliminary restraining order and injunction may be issued without delay, enjQining- and restraining the said de- , fendants, their assistants, clerks, and agents, and each and ¿very one of them, from refusing'to accept any of the coupons named in, the Exhibit A herewith, in full payment fro tanto of the taxes,, license taxes, or other dues, due by any tax-payer to the, State who may tender the same in payment thereof,-and ^enjoining and restraining ,the*p from/refusing to execute and .deliver'forthwith to such tax-payer his tax-bill, duly receipted,' , or to an applicant for a license a certificate that the amount-of coupons tendered by such applicant has been deposited with him in payment of the, tax or deposit required .or assessed for said license, and from refusing,-immediately upon-the presentation of such certificate, to grant and issue the license applied for to .such applicant, all in-the same manner, and to have pre- : cisely the same forcé and effect as if- said payments were made 'in coin or currency.”

There is also a prayer for general relief.

There, was a final decree on bill, answer, replication and proofs, granting the injunction as prayed for, and the defendants Appealed. ■

This bill is without precedent, and should have .been dismissed. It is a clear case,-as stated,-of damnum absque injuria. So far as the contract with the complainant was, that the State should pay to him his coupons at maturity, there is, no doubt, á breach; but he asks no relief as to that, for there is no remedy by 'suit tó .compel the State to pay its debts. So far as the contract was to receive the coupons of the complainant in payment of .taxes and other dues to the State, there is no breach, for he does not allege that any of them have been tendered by any tax-payer or debtor to the State in payment of taxes or other dues; nor that there has been a refusal on the part of any tax collector, or other officer of the State charged with the collection and receipt of taxes and dues tp the State, to receive them in payment therefor. Personally the complainant has no right to offer them for such purpose, for he owes no taxes or other debt to thg. State. There is nothi '’’"shewn in the bill by which'he is prevented from transferring them vto others who would have the legal right to use them in that way, except that, being discredited for such uses by the previous -refusals of the officers of the State to receive. other, but similar, coupons, the complaiiiant can find no one willing to purchase them from him at a reasonable price for such purposes. This damage is not actionable, because it is not a direct and legal consequence of a breach of the contract, and is not distinguishable from the damage any creditor might suffer from the known inability or unwillingness of his debtors to perform their obligations. Such discredit might, and often does, result in the, bankruptcy and financial ruin of the creditor, but no action lies to recover damages for the consequential loss, which the law does not connect with the default, as cause and effect. To enable- the complainant to avail himself of the benefit of his contract with the State, to receive his coupons in payment of taxes, he must first assign them to some one who has taxes to pay, as he has not; but when he does so, by the assignment, he has lost his interest in the contract and his right to demand its performance, all right to which he has transferred with the coupons. It is only when in the hands 'of tax-payers or other debtors that the coupons are receivable in payment óf taxes and debts due to the State.

The bill as framed, therefore, calls for a declaration of an abstract character, that the contract set out requiring coupons to be received in payment of taxes and debts due to the State is valid; that the statutes of the General Assembly of Virginia impairing its obligations .áre contrary ihe Constitution of the United States, and therefore vótay'aira that it is the legal duty of the collecting officers of the State to receive them when, offered in payment of such, taxes and debts.

■But no court sits to determine questions of law in thesi. There must be a litigation upon actual transactions between real parties, growing out of a controversy affecting legal or equitable rights as to person or property. All questions of law arising in such cases are judicially determinable. The present' is not a case of that description. .

The decree of the Circuit Coxort is accordingly reversed, and the cause is rema/nded, with directions to dismiss the hill.