State v. Slota

#27125-a-SLZ
2015 S.D. 15IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
FREDERICK BLAIR SLOTA, Defendant and Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
BROWN COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
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THE HONORABLE TONY L. PORTRA
Judge
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MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
KIRSTEN E. JASPER
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
ELLERY GREY of
Grey Law, Prof. LLC
Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant
and appellant.
****
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
ON FEBRUARY 17, 2015
OPINION FILED 03/18/15
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ZINTER, Justice
[¶1.] Fredrick Slota was tried on charges of first-degree rape and sexual
contact involving a child. The trial judge, on his own initiative, and without a pre-
closure hearing, closed the courtroom during the victim’s testimony. Slota was
convicted, and after trial the State moved to supplement the record with the
reasons for the closure. The circuit court held a hearing and entered findings of fact
and conclusions of law supporting closure. Slota appeals, arguing that his Sixth
Amendment right to a public trial was violated; that the only appropriate remedy is
a new trial; and, that if a new trial is not the only appropriate remedy, the State
failed to present sufficient justification for the closure. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] Slota was tried on charges of first-degree rape and sexual contact with
a child under the age of sixteen. The victim, A.L., was seven years old at the time of
the incident and eight years old at the time of trial.
[¶3.] Before the trial started, the judge informed a newspaper reporter that
he intended to close the courtroom during A.L.’s testimony. No motion was made by
the State or Slota requesting the closure. Before A.L. testified, the judge
announced: “The record should reflect that the courtroom has been cleared at this
time.” The judge did not hold a hearing, hear argument, or enter findings regarding
the closure. The only people left in the courtroom after closure were the jury, one of
A.L.’s adoptive parents, an expert witness, Slota, his counsel, and court staff. The
closure was approximately ten to fifteen minutes in length. The public was allowed
to be present for the rest of the trial. This included the presentation of a thirty-
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eight minute forensic interview of A.L., which was a more detailed account of the
events than A.L.’s trial testimony. The jury found Slota guilty of both charges.
[¶4.] After trial, the State moved to supplement the record with facts and
reasons for the closure, and Slota moved for a new trial based on the closure. The
court acknowledged that “a mistake was made and a further record should have
been made regarding [the courtroom closure] issue.” The court granted the State’s
motion to supplement the record and denied Slota’s motion for a new trial.
[¶5.] Following a post-trial hearing, the court addressed the “Waller factors.”
See Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2216, 81 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1984).
The court first described the interest that would be prejudiced if the proceeding was
not closed. The court found that A.L. was seven at the time of the crime, eight at
the time of her testimony, and the crime involved first-degree rape. The court also
found that A.L. was developmentally delayed, she was on an Individualized
Education Plan (IEP), she had hearing loss, she had been subjected to prior physical
abuse, she had been removed from her home on numerous occasions until her
biological parents’ rights were terminated, and she lacked maturity. The court
further found that A.L.’s adoptive family expressed their desire that A.L. not be
exposed to any more trauma through testimony at a public hearing.
[¶6.] The court then found that the closure was no broader than necessary
to protect the foregoing interests. The court noted that the trial was closed only for
A.L.’s testimony, which was ten to fifteen minutes in length and comprised only
thirty-five of 491 pages of trial transcript. Further, the public and the media were
allowed to hear A.L.’s forensic interview, which was thirty-eight minutes in length
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and contained more detail about the events than her testimony at trial. The judge
noted that he approached the press sua sponte because he wanted the media to have
an opportunity to be heard if they wanted to watch A.L.’s testimony. The reporter
did not subsequently request courtroom access.
[¶7.] The court finally made findings regarding alternatives to closure. The
court noted that the only option that would not adversely affect Slota’s
constitutional rights was having A.L.’s testimony shown on closed circuit television
in another room. This option, however, was not possible because the necessary
technology was unavailable in that courthouse. The court ultimately indicated that
its decision was not made on any individual factor. The closure was based on all the
facts and circumstances.
[¶8.] Slota now appeals, 1 arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to a
public trial was violated; and that because the circuit court failed to address the
Waller factors before the closure, the only remedy is a new trial. In the alternative,
Slota argues that the State did not present sufficient justification for the closure.
Decision
[¶9.] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right to a public trial is
also found in S.D. Const. art. VI, § 7. (“In all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to . . . a speedy public trial . . . .”). “In general, courts conduct
1. Slota’s appellate counsel did not represent him at trial.
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public trials ‘for the benefit of the accused; that the public may see he is fairly dealt
with and not unjustly condemned, and that the presence of interested spectators
may keep his triers keenly alive to a sense of their responsibility and to the
importance of their functions.’” State v. Rolfe (Rolfe I), 2013 S.D. 2, ¶ 17, 825
N.W.2d 901, 906 (quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 46, 104 S. Ct. at 2215). “[T]he public
has the right to be present whether or not any party has asserted the right.” Id.(quoting Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 214, 130 S. Ct. 721, 724-25, 175 L. Ed. 2d
675 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[¶10.] The right, however, is not absolute. Id. ¶ 18 (citing Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 606, 102 S. Ct. 2613, 2620, 73
L. Ed. 2d 248 (1982)). “‘The right to an open trial may give way in certain cases to
other rights or interests, such as the defendant’s right to a fair trial or the
government’s interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information. Such
circumstances will be rare, however, and the balance of interests must be struck
with special care.’” Id. (quoting Presley, 558 U.S. at 213, 130 S. Ct. at 724).
[¶11.] The Legislature has determined that a child victim testifying about
sexual abuse may be one case in which the right to a public trial may give way to
other interests. SDCL 23A-24-6 provides:
Any portion of criminal proceedings, with the exception of grand
jury proceedings, at which a minor is required to testify
concerning rape of a child, sexual contact with a child, child
abuse involving sexual abuse, or any other sexual offense
involving a child may be closed to all persons except the parties’
attorneys, the victim or witness assistant, the victim’s parents
or guardian, and officers of the court and authorized
representatives of the news media, unless the court, after proper
hearing, determines that the minor’s testimony should be closed
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to the news media or the victim’s parents or guardian in the best
interest of the minor.
This statute gives the circuit court “discretion to determine who should remain in
the courtroom when a child testifies about a sexual offense.” Rolfe I, 2013 S.D. 2,
¶ 19, 825 N.W.2d at 906. Still, “the party seeking closure of the proceeding must (1)
advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, (2) the closure must be
no broader than necessary to protect that interest, (3) the [circuit] court must
consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and (4) the [circuit] court
must make findings adequate to support the closure.” Id. ¶ 20, 825 N.W.2d at 907
(quoting Waller, 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S. Ct. at 2216) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court should address these requirements “before excluding the public
from any stage of a criminal trial[.]” Presley, 558 U.S. at 213, 130 S. Ct. at 724.
[¶12.] “A violation of the right to a public trial is a ‘structural defect affecting
the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the
trial process itself.’” Rolfe I, 2013 S.D. 2, ¶ 14, 825 N.W.2d at 905 (quoting Arizona
v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991)).
“‘Without these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function
as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment
may be regarded as fundamentally fair.’” Id. (quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 310,
111 S. Ct. at 1265). “We review the trial court’s ‘application of the law de novo, and
the ultimate decision to close a court proceeding for an abuse of discretion.’” Id.
¶ 15 (quoting Rapid City Journal v. Delaney, 2011 S.D. 55, ¶ 9, 804 N.W.2d 388,
392).
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[¶13.] In this case, the circuit court recognized that it had made a mistake by
not having a pre-closure hearing to determine whether the Waller factors justified
closure. 2 The initial question is whether that error requires a new trial.
[¶14.] In Rolfe I the trial judge also closed the courtroom without addressing
the Waller factors. 2013 S.D. 2, ¶ 25, 825 N.W.2d at 909. We determined that a
new trial was not the appropriate remedy. We remanded for the circuit court to
“supplement the record with specific findings and reasons for the closure of the
courtroom[.]” Id. ¶ 26. Further, in Rolfe’s second appeal, after considering the
remand court’s findings justifying closure, we reiterated “that a remand to the trial
court in order to supplement the record was an appropriate remedy.” State v. Rolfe
(Rolfe II), 2014 S.D. 47, ¶ 12, 851 N.W.2d 897, 902.
[¶15.] In this case, the circuit court recognized its error, conducted a closure
hearing, and entered Waller findings before the case was appealed. Despite our
rulings in Rolfe I and Rolfe II, Slota argues that the only proper remedy is a new
trial. Slota contends that a new trial is required based on a “plain reading” of
Waller v. Georgia and Presley v. Georgia. However, we considered those cases in
2. We are troubled by what appears to be the circuit court’s ex parte
arrangement with the media regarding closure. The media have a qualified
right of access to criminal trials. Associated Press v. Bradshaw, 410 N.W.2d
577, 578 (S.D. 1987), superseded by statute SDCL 26-7A-36, as stated in
Rapid City Journal, 2011 S.D. 55, ¶ 18, 804 N.W.2d at 395. We have
previously outlined the procedure that should be followed to ensure that the
parties, the media, and the public have notice of intent to close a court
proceeding. “Once a request for closure has been made, the [circuit] court
must assure that the interests of all parties, including the . . . [m]edia, the
State, and the court, are protected. All parties must be afforded notice and a
hearing before the [circuit] court makes a determination on the closure
issue.” Id. at 579.
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Rolfe I and Rolfe II. Indeed, Rolfe I cites Presley for authority. See Rolfe I, 2013
S.D. 2, ¶¶ 17-18, 825 N.W.2d at 906.
[¶16.] Slota alternatively suggests that this case presents an opportunity to
reconsider Rolfe I and Rolfe II. Slota argues that in Presley “the Supreme Court did
not order the case remanded for further inquiry into the merits of the courtroom
closure. Had the Supreme Court believed that the structural error of improper
closure could be remedied by a rehearing on the merits, the Supreme Court would
have announced such.” Brief for Appellant at 10. However, Presley did not involve
the remedy for an improper closure. Presley involved a trial court’s failure to
consider alternatives to accommodate public attendance. “Nothing in the record
show[ed] that the trial court could not have accommodated the public at Presley’s
trial.” Presley, 558 U.S. at 215, 130 S. Ct. at 725. Thus, Presley does not provide
guidance on remedies for closure violations. Waller, however, specifically indicates
that a new trial is not required. In analyzing the question of “what relief should be
ordered to remedy [a] constitutional [closure] violation,” the Waller Court held that
“[it did] not think [the closure violation] require[d] a new trial[.]” Waller, 467 U.S.
at 49-50, 104 S. Ct. at 2217. Instead, “the remedy should be appropriate to the
violation.” Id. at 50, 104 S. Ct. at 2217.
[¶17.] In Rolfe I, we adopted this view, concluding that “the remedy should be
appropriate to the violation and it [did] not require a new trial[.]” 3 2013 S.D. 2,
3. Slota takes issue with Rolfe I’s citation to Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S.
94, 111, 96 S. Ct. 1338, 1348, 47 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1976). Goldberg was cited for
the proposition that “Rolfe’s rights can be fully protected by a remand to the
trial court ‘with direction to hold an inquiry consistent with this opinion.’”
(continued . . .)
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¶ 26, 825 N.W.2d at 909. In Rolfe II, we reaffirmed Rolfe I, concluding “that a
remand to the trial court in order to supplement the record was an appropriate
remedy.” 2014 S.D. 47, ¶ 12, 851 N.W.2d at 902. Slota, however, relies on other
courts for his argument that a new trial is the proper remedy for a violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. But Slota’s cited authorities were
presented to this Court in Rolfe II. Thus, Slota provides no new authority
supporting his request for reconsideration of Rolfe I and Rolfe II.
[¶18.] Moreover, Slota acknowledges that other cases recognize a closure
error may be cured by a post-hoc articulation on remand. See United States v.
Canady, 126 F.3d 352, 364 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the remedy was not a new
trial, but a remand for public announcement of the verdict); State v. Rollins, 729
S.E.2d 73, 79 (N.C. App. 2012) (“Given the limited closure in the present case and
the fact that the trial court did not utilize the Waller four-part test, we hold that the
proper remedy is to remand this case for a hearing on the propriety of the closure.”);
State v. Cote, 725 A.2d 652, 660 (N.H. 1999) (remanding for a hearing to apply the
Waller factors to the existing record to determine if the public was improperly
excluded); Kendrick v. State, 661 N.E.2d 1242, 1244-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)
(remanding for findings to determine whether defendant’s right to a public trial was
violated); State v. McRae, 494 N.W.2d 252, 260 (Minn. 1992) (“Waller, however,
________________________
(. . . continued)
Rolfe I, 2013 S.D. 2, ¶ 26, 825 N.W.2d at 909. The Supreme Court, however,
also cited Goldberg for the same proposition. See Waller, 467 U.S. at 50, 104
S. Ct. at 2217 (“Rather, the remedy should be appropriate to the violation. If,
after a new suppression hearing, essentially the same evidence is suppressed,
a new trial presumably would be a windfall for the defendant, and not in the
public interest.” (citing Goldberg, 425 U.S. at 111, 96 S. Ct. at 1348)).
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made it clear that the remedy should be appropriate to the violation. If a remand
for a hearing on whether there was a specific basis for closure might remedy the
violation of closing the trial without an adequate showing of the need for closure,
then the initial remedy is a remand, not a retrial.”).
[¶19.] Considering all relevant authority, Slota fails to provide a reason for
overruling Rolfe I and Rolfe II. 4 And because this Court may remand to address the
Waller factors, in the appropriate case, a circuit court may supplement the record
before an appeal. However, closures should be preceded by motion and notice of
opportunity to be heard sufficiently in advance of the hearing to permit intervention
by interested members of the public. See United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189,
200 (2d Cir. 2005). And a closure motion, whether made by a party or a court sua
sponte, should be filed in the public files maintained in the clerk’s office. See id.(citing In re The Herald Co., 734 F.2d 93, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1984). See also In re
S. Carolina Press Ass’n, 946 F.2d 1037, 1039-40 (4th Cir. 1991).
4. Only three of Slota’s cases declined to remand. See State v. Cox, 304 P.3d
327, 335 (Kan. 2013) (“We . . . do not find persuasive the reasoning . . . that
failure to make findings to support closure can be remedied by remand.”);
Carter v. State, 738 A.2d 871, 880 (Md. 1999) (“When we have determined
that the denial of a public trial has occurred, we have held that a new trial,
rather than remand to supplement the record, is the proper remedy.”); Renkel
v. State, 807 P.2d 1087, 1094 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (“The state has cited no
post-Globe authority to support its contention that remand is a viable
remedy. The only remedy available to this court is reversal.”). We decline to
follow these cases.
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[¶20.] Slota also argues that the circuit court’s post-hoc findings did not
justify closure of the courtroom. 5 Slota contends that the reasons proffered by
circuit court were general concerns that are applicable in most cases involving
children who were sexually abused.
[¶21.] On a case-by-case basis, a circuit court may decide “whether closure of
a courtroom is necessary to protect a child victim of sexual abuse. A [circuit] court
should weigh factors such as the ‘victim’s age, psychological maturity and
understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the interests
of parents and relatives.’” Rolfe I, 2013 S.D. 2, ¶ 19, 825 N.W.2d at 906 (quoting
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 608, 102 S. Ct. at 2621). “The interest and
specific findings should be articulated so that a reviewing court can make a
determination about whether closure was proper.” Id. ¶ 20, 825 N.W.2d at 907
(citing Press–Enter. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., Riverside Cnty., 464 U.S. 501, 510, 104
S. Ct. 819, 824, 78 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1984)). “‘Such circumstances [where the right to
an open trial gives way to other rights or interests] will be rare, however, and the
balance of interests must be struck with special care.’” Id. ¶ 18, 825 N.W.2d at 906
(quoting Presley, 558 U.S. at 213, 130 S. Ct. at 724).
[¶22.] In this case, the circuit court entered numerous findings addressing
the Globe Newspaper Co. factors for child victims of sexual abuse. The court
5. A distinction has been drawn between total and partial courtroom closures.
Although a “substantial reason” is needed to justify a partial closure, Waller
requires an “overriding interest” to justify a complete closure. Rolfe I, 2013
S.D. 2, ¶ 22, 825 N.W.2d at 907. In this case, the circuit court “considered”
its closure partial. Nevertheless, it found that “an overriding interest” was
advanced by the State. Therefore, we need not determine whether the
closure in this case was complete or partial.
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specifically addressed the victim’s age and maturity, nature of the crime, desires of
the victim, and interests of the parents. The circuit court also addressed each
Waller factor in its oral and written findings. See supra ¶ 5 (overriding interest);
¶ 6 (breadth of the closure); ¶ 7 (reasonable alternatives). Slota, however, argues
that the circuit court was persuaded by “the ordinary hardships of a child
testifying,” and that those considerations do not “justify an automatic, general
exclusion of the public in every case involving a young victim.”
[¶23.] The circuit court considered factors beyond the “ordinary hardships”
children face when testifying about sexual abuse. The circuit court found that A.L.
was developmentally delayed, was on an IEP, and had hearing problems. Moreover,
A.L. had been repeatedly subjected to abuse and forcible removal from her parents’
custody until her parents’ parental rights were terminated. And A.L.’s adoptive
father testified that it would be traumatic for A.L. to testify. The circuit court
articulated factors beyond those normally associated with child testimony on
sensitive issues. The court’s findings demonstrated an overriding interest in closing
the trial during A.L. testimony.
[¶24.] Slota, however, also argues that this case is not as compelling as Rolfe
II. There, we found sufficient justification for closure because:
the trial court found that A.F.[, the victim,] was quite young—
only nine years old when the abuse began and thirteen at the
time of trial—and that A.F. showed psychological immaturity
and lack of understanding of some of the sexual terminology
used in the courtroom. The trial court also noted the prolonged
and disturbing nature of the abuse alleged. The trial court
observed that A.F. had difficulty relating her victimization to
others, even to A.F.’s counselor. A.F. feared Rolfe and his
manipulation of her family, and also felt betrayed and confused.
At the time of trial, A.F. was suffering from stress-related illness
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including vomiting, weight loss, and trouble concentrating.
Additionally, the trial court found that A.F. sought to protect
others from the horrific details of her abuse, and that A.F. was
concerned she would not be able to answer questions as
completely in an open courtroom. The trial court also found that
the family wished the courtroom to be closed during A.F.’s
testimony.
Rolfe II, 2014 S.D. 47, ¶ 18, 851 N.W.2d at 904. Although the circuit court in this
case did not make the identical findings as in Rolfe II, the court made sufficient
findings regarding the “‘victim’s age, psychological maturity and understanding, the
nature of the crime, the desires of the victim, and the interests of the parents and
relatives.’” See id., 851 N.W.2d at 903 (citing Rolfe I, 2013 S.D. 2, ¶ 25, 825 N.W.2d
at 909 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 608, 102 S. Ct. at 2621)).
[¶25.] Slota also argues that A.L.’s circumstances were not sufficient to
justify closure under McIntosh v. United States, 933 A.2d 370 (D.C. 2007). In
McIntosh, the child victim initially testified in an open courtroom. The child was
timid; had to be reminded to speak louder and not to worry about the other people;
had anger problems; and had limited mental capacity and other psychological
problems. Id. at 373, 377. The court generally noted that the victim was in a
vulnerable position. Id. at 379. The court closed the courtroom because the victim
“seem[ed] to be uncomfortable with the excess people[.]” Id. at 375. McIntosh
reversed and remanded for a new trial because “the court’s general reference to the
child’s vulnerability [was] not sufficient to meet the fourth Waller requirement, nor
[did] it show that the trial court adequately considered other important interests
before ordering the courtroom closed.” Id. at 379-80. In this case, the circuit court
did more than just find that A.L. “was ‘in a more vulnerable position’ and was ‘a
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child talking about a sexual attack.’” See id. at 379. The circuit court made specific
findings as to A.L.’s “age, psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of
the crime, the desires of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives.” See
id. at 377 (indicating these are the factors that trial court should have considered in
determining whether closure is necessary). 6 Furthermore, it was the lack of
findings by the trial court, not the facts of the case that precipitated the reversal in
McIntosh. McIntosh found an overriding interest in protecting that victim “from the
emotional trauma that was likely to occur unless the court closed the courtroom
while she testified.” Id. That same interest is present in the case we consider
today.
[¶26.] The circuit court made adequate findings addressing the Waller and
Globe Newspaper factors. Those findings demonstrated an overriding interest that
6. Slota cites several additional cases for the proposition that prevention of
trauma or embarrassment is not enough to justify closure. Those cases are
distinguishable either because those courts failed to evaluate the specific
factors or there was nothing in the record to support the findings. See State
v. Hightower, 376 N.W.2d 648, 650 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985) (rejecting closure
because there was only a “mere reference to the ‘sensitive nature of the
testimony’”); State v. Klem, 438 N.W.2d 798, 802 (N.D. 1989) (rejecting public
closure because there were no findings that supported closure); People v.
Holveck, 524 N.E.2d 1073, 1083 (Ill. App. 1988) (holding that the lower court
did not carefully balance interests and the individualized evaluation of
factors); Cote, 725 A.2d at 660 (N.H. 1999) (remanding to supplement the
record and rejecting public closure when the court’s rationale focused on
victim’s fear of defendant); Davis v. Reynolds, 890 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir.
1989) (rejecting closure when the State was merely “trying to save [the
witness] some problem and embarrassment”). In the case at bar, the circuit
court articulated more than just a general reference to the sensitivity and the
embarrassing nature of the testimony. There is a record that includes the
necessary, individualized evaluation and the findings supporting closure.
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was no broader than necessary, considering the alternatives, for courtroom closure
during A.L.’s testimony. We affirm.
[¶27.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SEVERSON, WILBUR, and KERN,
Justices, concur.
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