State v. Hatchett

#26664-a-DG
2014 S.D. 13
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER HATCHETT, Defendant and Appellant.
****
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
PENNINGTON COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
****
THE HONORABLE JANINE KERN
Judge
****
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
JOHN M. STROHMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
JEREMIAH J. DAVIS
Pennington County Public
Defender’s Office
Rapid City, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant
and appellant.
****
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
ON JANUARY 14, 2014
OPINION FILED 03/12/14
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GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
[¶1.] Defendant Christopher Hatchett was convicted of first-degree burglary
in violation of SDCL 22-32-1 and obstructing a law enforcement officer in violation
of SDCL 22-11-6, after fleeing from a police officer into an occupied apartment and
forcing the door closed against the officer. Hatchett appeals, alleging that
obstructing law enforcement is not a sufficient predicate offense to support the
charge of first-degree burglary. Hatchett also claims the trial court erred by
allowing the State to exercise a peremptory strike motivated by race and that the
trial court abused its discretion by not allowing Hatchett to admit into evidence at
trial a letter written by Hatchett to the victims of the burglary. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] On April 3, 2012, at approximately 3:45 a.m., Rapid City police officer
Fred Baxter responded to a call directing him to an incident at 402 Denver Street,
apartment 103. The call stated that there was a male wearing a brown jacket and
blue shirt kicking the apartment door and trying to light the door on fire. When
Officer Baxter arrived at the apartment building, he saw Defendant Christopher
Hatchett standing on the other side of an interior staircase doorway. Hatchett
matched the description of the suspect. The two made eye contact through a
window in the door and Hatchett immediately ran toward apartment 104. 1 Officer
Baxter followed after Hatchett, but was unable to apprehend him before he
disappeared inside apartment 104.
1. Testimony indicates that apartment 104 was across the hall from apartment
103, where the emergency call originated. Later inspection revealed scorch
marks on the door of apartment 103.
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[¶3.] Brittnie and Brandon Schrier lived in apartment 104. As Brittnie
opened her door to leave for work that morning, Hatchett—a complete stranger to
Brittnie—was standing outside the door. Hatchett pushed his way inside the
apartment. Brittnie screamed and ran to the other side of the room. The screaming
awakened Brandon, who came to Brittnie’s aid. As Brittnie yelled at Hatchett to
get out, the Schriers observed Hatchett push against the door and bolt the deadlock.
Brittnie then called 911 to report the intrusion. After bolting the lock, Hatchett
entered a nearby closet and attempted to conceal himself with clothes, blankets,
and other items.
[¶4.] From outside of apartment 104, Officer Baxter heard Brittnie
screaming. Officer Baxter tried to follow Hatchett into the apartment, but could not
force the door open against Hatchett’s resistance. Once the deadbolt locked, Officer
Baxter stepped back and kicked in the door. Inside the apartment, Officer Baxter
saw Brittnie pointing to the entryway closet, where Officer Baxter found Hatchett
lying on the floor. Officer Baxter placed Hatchett under arrest and escorted him out
of the apartment. At the time of the arrest, Officer Baxter noted a strong odor of
alcohol on Hatchett, but observed that Hatchett could talk clearly and could walk on
his own. 2 Hatchett was charged with first-degree burglary in violation of SDCL 22-
32-1 and obstructing a law enforcement officer in violation of SDCL 22-11-6.
[¶5.] A jury trial commenced February 8th, 2013. During jury selection,
each side exercised its ten peremptory strikes. The State used one peremptory
2. Officer Baxter testified that Hatchett seemed intoxicated, but not to a level
which required placement in detox.
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strike to remove J.D.S., the only Native American member of the jury pool. During
voir dire J.D.S. was asked, “Why do you think we have a law to prevent obstructing
law enforcement?” He answered, “I don’t know . . . I didn’t really pay attention to
the laws. The common intention ones, but just not—I never had to deal with that.”
In his jury questionnaire, J.D.S. also indicated that an immediate family member
had been convicted of a crime other than a traffic offense. Hatchett raised a Batson
challenge to the strike. The State explained that its strike was based on the jury
questionnaire answer and because J.D.S. “stated that he doesn’t pay attention to
the laws or doesn’t follow the laws except for the big ones[.]” The trial court
accepted this race-neutral explanation, and J.D.S. was struck from the jury.
[¶6.] While in jail awaiting trial, Hatchett wrote a letter to the Schriers. In
the letter, Hatchett apologized for breaking into the apartment. He also mentioned
his past criminal history and offered the Schriers tattoo work in exchange for the
Schriers’ refusal to testify against Hatchett. 3 Prior to trial, Hatchett filed a motion
in limine to prevent the letter from being introduced into evidence. The State in
response argued that the letter should be admissible, because it was highly relevant
to the issue of guilt. After arguments by both sides, the trial court found that
portions of the letter discussing Hatchett’s prior convictions and imprisonment were
too prejudicial. The trial court granted Hatchett’s motion in part, approving only a
3. Hatchett was separately convicted of witness tampering based on these
actions.
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redacted and typed version of the letter in which references to prior crimes and
imprisonment were removed.
[¶7.] At trial, the State did not offer the redacted letter into evidence.
Hatchett sought to call Brittnie Schrier to the stand as a witness and offer the letter
through her. However, the State objected to the evidence as hearsay. The trial
court found that the letter did not fit any hearsay exception when offered by
Hatchett and sustained the State’s objection.
[¶8.] At the close of the State’s case, Hatchett moved for a judgment of
acquittal, contending as a matter of law that obstructing law enforcement was an
inappropriate predicate crime upon which to base the first-degree burglary charge.
The motion was denied. Because the trial court denied admission of the letter as
offered by Hatchett, the defense rested without calling any witnesses. The jury
found Hatchett guilty on both charges. Hatchett was sentenced to seven years in
the penitentiary for the first-degree burglary conviction, and 90 days in the county
jail for obstructing law enforcement, concurrent with the burglary sentence.
[¶9.] Hatchett appeals his conviction, raising three issues:
1. Whether obstructing a police officer is a sufficient predicate
offense to support a charge of first-degree burglary.
2. Whether the State engaged in purposeful discrimination by
striking the only Native American member of the jury pool.
3. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow Hatchett to
admit his own written statement into evidence.
Analysis
[¶10.] 1. Whether obstructing a police officer is a sufficient predicate
offense to support a charge of first-degree burglary.
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[¶11.] Hatchett first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal. He asserts that obstructing a police officer is not a
sufficient predicate offense to support a charge of first-degree burglary under SDCL
22-32-1. We review issues of statutory interpretation and application as questions
of law under the de novo standard of review. State v. Miranda, 2009 S.D. 105, ¶ 14,
776 N.W.2d 77, 81 (citation omitted). When engaging in statutory interpretation,
“[w]e give words their plain meaning and effect, and read statutes as a whole, as
well as enactments relating to the same subject.” AEG Processing Ctr. No. 58, Inc.
v. S.D. Dep’t of Revenue & Regulation, 2013 S.D. 75, ¶ 17, 838 N.W.2d 843, 849
(citation omitted). “When the language in a statute is clear, certain and
unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and this Court’s only function is
to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed.” Id. (citation omitted).
[¶12.] SDCL 22-32-1 provides:
Any person who enters or remains in an occupied structure, with
intent to commit any crime, unless the premises are, at the time,
open to the public or the person is licensed or privileged to enter
or remain, is guilty of first degree burglary if:
(1) The offender inflicts, or attempts or threatens to
inflict, physical harm on another;
(2) The offender is armed with a dangerous weapon; or
(3) The offense is committed in the nighttime.
First degree burglary is a Class 2 felony.
[¶13.] The language of SDCL 22-32-1 is clear and unambiguous that the
intent to commit any crime is sufficient. In this case, Hatchett was found by the
jury to have entered or remained in the apartment with the intent to obstruct a
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police officer, a crime under SDCL 22-11-6. 4 The facts presented to the jury support
this finding. Hatchett ran when he saw Officer Baxter, disappeared into apartment
104 to avoid apprehension, and used physical force and the door of the apartment to
prevent Officer Baxter from apprehending him.
[¶14.] Hatchett argues that obstructing a police officer is a passive or reactive
offense, and it would therefore lead to an absurd or unreasonable result to allow it
to serve as a predicate offense for first-degree burglary. Hatchett asks this Court to
hold that a purely reactive offense cannot serve as a sufficient predicate offense to
charge first-degree burglary. However, when this Court interprets legislation, it
“cannot add language that simply is not there.” Rowley v. S.D. Bd. of Pardons &
Paroles, 2013 S.D. 6, ¶ 12, 826 N.W.2d 360, 365 (citation omitted). A plain reading
reveals the Legislature unambiguously intended to include all crimes as predicate
offenses for first-degree burglary. The Legislature did not carve out any exception
4. SDCL 22-11-6 provides:
Except as provided in §§ 22-11-4 and 22-11-5, any person who,
by using or threatening to use violence, force, or physical
interference or obstacle, intentionally obstructs, impairs, or
hinders the enforcement of the criminal laws or the preservation
of the peace by a law enforcement officer or jailer acting under
color of authority, or intentionally obstructs, impairs, or hinders
the prevention, control, or abatement of fire by a firefighter
acting under color of authority, or intentionally obstructs
emergency management personnel acting under color of
authority, is guilty of obstructing a law enforcement officer,
firefighter, or emergency medical technician. Obstructing a law
enforcement officer, jailer, firefighter, or emergency medical
technician is a Class 1 misdemeanor.
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in SDCL 22-32-1 for what Hatchett labels “reactive crimes” and we therefore will
not read that exception into the statute. 5
[¶15.] Hatchett cites to two opinions where this Court upheld burglary
convictions on appeal, noting that in both cases the underlying crimes were
volitional in nature, rather than reactive. See State v. Jucht, 2012 S.D. 66, 821
N.W.2d 629 (malicious intimidation or harassment); State v. Burdick, 2006 S.D. 23,
712 N.W.2d 5 (theft). However, these cases do not give any indication that
obstructing law enforcement is or should be excluded from the broad term “any
crime” under SDCL 22-32-1. Nor does Hatchett cite to any other case law which
would lead us to believe that it was absurd or unreasonable for the Legislature to
intend on punishing the entry with intent to commit the crime of obstructing a law
enforcement officer. As is evident from the facts of this case, breaking into
another’s home with the intent to obstruct a law enforcement officer “creates
elements of alarm and danger to persons who may be present in a place where they
should be entitled to freedom from intrusion.” See State v. Wentz, 68 P.3d 282, 289
n.1 (Wash. 2003) (Madsen, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Hatchett gives us no
reason to conclude that the Legislature did not intend to protect against this harm.
[¶16.] The cases cited by Hatchett from other jurisdictions are similarly
unpersuasive. Hatchett first cites State v. Raines, 706 N.E.2d 414 (Ohio Ct. App.
1997), in which an Ohio appellate court reversed a conviction for burglary based on
5. Hatchett gives no standard under which to evaluate whether a crime is
“reactive or passive” or “volitional.” Forcefully pushing a door closed against
a police officer and then bolting the lock seems to take some degree of
volition.
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the predicate offense of resisting arrest. However, the burglary conviction in Raines
was not reversed because of the reactive nature of the crime of resisting arrest, but
instead on the fact that the defendant was not under arrest, nor was there probable
cause to arrest the defendant. Id. at 432. Under Ohio law, the elements of the
predicate offense of resisting arrest were therefore not satisfied. See id. In this
case, Hatchett does not allege that the elements of the underlying offense were not
met.
[¶17.] Hatchett also cites State v. Devitt, 218 P.3d 647 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009),
which reversed a conviction based on similar facts as the case at bar. However, the
court in Devitt relied on Washington’s definition of residential burglary that
required the predicate crime to be “a crime against a person or property,” and the
court found that Devitt had instead committed a crime against the government by
obstructing an officer. See id. at 648-49. The scope of predicate crimes in
Washington’s burglary statute is clearly narrower than in South Dakota’s statute,
and thus leads to a different result. See id. at 648; SDCL 22-32-1.
[¶18.] Under the plain language of SDCL 22-32-1, obstructing law
enforcement fits within the scope of “any crime” and is thus an appropriate
predicate offense to support the charge of first-degree burglary. We therefore
conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Hatchett’s motion for judgment
of acquittal.
[¶19.] 2. Whether the State engaged in purposeful discrimination by
striking the only Native American member of the jury pool.
[¶20.] Hatchett next alleges that the trial court erred in allowing the State to
use a peremptory strike against potential juror J.D.S. He asserts the State
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exercised the strike based on J.D.S.’s race, violating Hatchett’s equal protection
rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69
(1986).
[¶21.] We engage in a three-part test to determine whether a peremptory
strike was improperly based on purposeful racial discrimination:
First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case by
showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an
inference of discriminatory purpose. Second, once the defendant
has made out a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State
to explain adequately the racial exclusion by offering
permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. Third, if a
race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then
decide whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful
racial discrimination.
State v. Guthmiller, 2014 S.D. 7, ¶ 12, __ N.W.2d __ (quoting State v. Scott, 2013
S.D. 31, ¶ 16, 829 N.W.2d 458, 465-66). “The finding of intentional discrimination is
a factual determination. Accordingly, we review an appeal alleging a Batson
violation for the State’s use of peremptory challenges for clear error.” State v. Ryan,
2008 S.D. 94, ¶ 6, 757 N.W.2d 155, 158 (citations omitted).
[¶22.] The trial court found in the first step of the analysis that Hatchett
established a prima facie case of discrimination because Hatchett is a Native
American and J.D.S. was the only Native American in the jury pool. The burden
then shifted to the State to offer a permissible race-neutral explanation for striking
the juror. Scott, 2013 S.D. 31, ¶ 16, 829 N.W.2d at 465 (citations omitted). Here,
the State explained that it moved to strike J.D.S. because his juror questionnaire
indicated that J.D.S. had family members or friends that have faced prior criminal
convictions other than a traffic offense. The State also explained that during
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questioning J.D.S. indicated that “he doesn’t pay attention to the law or doesn’t
follow the laws except for the big ones[.]”
[¶23.] Presented with a prima facie case by Hatchett and a race-neutral
explanation by the State, the trial court was then required to “assess the veracity of
the State’s race-neutral reasons and determine whether [Hatchett] met his burden
of proving purposeful discrimination.” Id. ¶ 21 (citation omitted). Under the third
part of the Batson analysis, the “court’s findings are afforded great deference, as the
analysis depends highly on credibility.” Id. ¶ 18 (citing United States v. Maxwell,
473 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2007)). Under this step, the trial court determined that
the State struck J.D.S. based on race-neutral reasons. Specifically, the court noted
that J.D.S.’s jury questionnaire answer indicating family members being convicted
of crimes and his answer about not paying attention to the laws were both
acceptable race-neutral explanations.
[¶24.] Hatchett argues that these reasons were clearly pretextual excuses to
remove the only Native American member of the venire, and the trial court’s finding
to the contrary was clearly erroneous. He asserts that the exclusion of J.D.S. was
the product of a “surgical effort to pose a technical legal question to the only Native
American member of the venire.” Hatchett argues J.D.S. was singled out in this
technical legal questioning. However, the record reflects otherwise. At least one
other juror was asked about why there would be a law preventing the obstruction of
a law enforcement officer. Other jurors were asked about the meaning of burglary
and intent. Thus, J.D.S. does not appear to have been singled out in what Hatchett
describes as technical legal questioning.
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[¶25.] Hatchett also contends that J.D.S.’s answers reflected at most a
disinterest or lack of knowledge of the law and that the State’s concerns over his
answers are nothing more than a sham to hide discriminatory intent. However,
J.D.S.’s answer went beyond lack of technical legal knowledge. He stated, “I didn’t
really pay attention to the laws. The common intention ones, but just not—I never
had to deal with that.” From a cold record, it appears that “not paying attention to
the laws” could mean, as Hatchett contends, that J.D.S. simply acknowledged that
he was not law trained. However, it could also show some degree of lack of respect
for, or disregard of the law. The State claimed concern with the latter explanation,
and the trial court accepted this explanation for the peremptory strike. This Court
gives deference to the trial court’s determination that the explanation was credible.
See State v. Roach, 2012 S.D. 91, ¶ 34, 825 N.W.2d 258, 267-68.
[¶26.] Hatchett also argues that there was no showing by the State that any
non-Indians were removed from the venire because of family members or friends
being convicted of crimes. However, under the final step of the Batson analysis,
“the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and
never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338,
126 S. Ct. 969, 974, 163 L. Ed. 2d 824 (2006) (citation omitted). See also Ryan, 2008
S.D. 94, ¶ 14, 757 N.W.2d at 159. Hatchett did not make this argument below when
opposing the State’s use of its peremptory strike, nor does he direct this Court to
any place in the record where such a discrepancy exists. Hatchett therefore fails to
prove purposeful discrimination based on this alleged discrepancy.
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[¶27.] Giving deference to the trial court’s determinations of credibility, we
conclude that Hatchett has not carried his burden of proving that the State’s use of
its peremptory strike against J.D.S. was racially motivated. Accordingly, we
conclude that Hatchett’s equal protection rights were not violated.
[¶28.] 3. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow Hatchett to
admit his own written statement into evidence.
[¶29.] Last, Hatchett argues that the trial court erred in denying the
admission of Hatchett’s letter to the Schriers into evidence. “The trial court’s
evidentiary rulings are presumed correct and will not be overturned absent a clear
abuse of discretion.” State v. Yuel, 2013 S.D. 84, ¶ 8, 840 N.W.2d 680, 683 (citation
omitted). To overturn an evidentiary ruling, any error demonstrated must be
shown to be prejudicial error. Id. (citation omitted).
[¶30.] On appeal, Hatchett asserts that the State should have been judicially
estopped from arguing against the admission of the redacted version of Hatchett’s
letter to the Schriers, because the State had previously fought to allow the letter
into evidence. Hatchett argues that by not allowing Hatchett to introduce the letter
into evidence, he was denied the due process of law, because the actions of the State
amounted to unfair surprise. Hatchett’s arguments fail to convince this Court that
the trial court abused its discretion and committed prejudicial error.
[¶31.] First, although the court found the evidence was relevant, Hatchett
offers no hearsay rule exception under which he should be allowed to offer the letter
into evidence. Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.” SDCL 19-16-1(3) (Rule 801(c)). The term “statement”
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includes both oral and written assertions. SDCL 19-16-1(1) (Rule 801(a)). Hearsay
is generally not admissible. SDCL 19-16-4 (Rule 802).
[¶32.] Hatchett’s letter to the Schriers, if offered by the State, would have
been admissible as an admission of a party opponent. See SDCL 19-16-3 (Rule
801(d)(2)). However, the same letter offered by Hatchett did not fit into that
exception. Instead, it fell squarely within the definition of inadmissible hearsay
because it was being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 6 The trial
court explained this distinction, and correctly sustained the State’s objection to the
evidence as offered by Hatchett.
[¶33.] Second, judicial estoppel does not apply to this controversy. Judicial
estoppel is applied only when four elements are present:
(1) A party’s inter-proceeding inconsistency must be about a
matter of fact, not law.
(2) The position the party took in the prior proceeding must have
been a significant factor there.
(3) The two positions must be absolutely irreconcilable.
(4) The prior position must not have been taken as a result of
mistake, inadvertence or fraud upon the party taking the
position.
State v. St. Cloud, 465 N.W.2d 177, 180 (S.D. 1991). In this case, Hatchett fails to
satisfy the first element, because he has not demonstrated any inconsistency by the
State regarding a matter of fact. The only inconsistency alleged is in the State’s
trial strategy. The State initially wanted the entire letter admitted into evidence,
6. See United States v. White Horse, 177 F. Supp. 2d 973, 977 (D.S.D. 2001)
(stating that prior statements consistent with not guilty plea are hearsay);
United States v. Chard, 115 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir. 1997) (defendant’s
attempt to introduce out-of-court exculpatory statements excluded as
hearsay); United States v. Waters, 194 F.3d 926, 931 (8th Cir. 1999) (same).
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but it ultimately lost that battle. Hatchett cites no authority that would prevent
the State from adjusting its trial strategy after the unfavorable evidentiary ruling
required significant redaction. 7
[¶34.] Hatchett cites State v. Blem, 2000 S.D. 69, 610 N.W.2d 803, to support
his proposition that the State should be estopped from arguing for exclusion of the
letter after fighting to have the letter deemed admissible. However, Hatchett’s
reliance on Blem is misplaced. In Blem, the court granted a motion in limine
preventing the defense from offering any testimony or evidence of defendant’s
mental illness. Id. ¶ 61. The defense complied with the ruling, but the State then
questioned the defendant about his mental illness during cross-examination. Id. ¶
62. The Court concluded that “the State’s violation of its motion in limine and its
conduct during closing argument constitute[d] prejudicial error resulting in an
unfair trial.” Id. ¶ 69. The Court’s decision in Blem was not based on a theory of
estoppel, as advanced by Hatchett, but it was instead based on the State’s direct
violation of its own motion in limine prohibiting discussion of a certain issue at
trial. Id. No such violation occurred in this case. Because the letter constituted
hearsay not within any exception and judicial estoppel does not apply, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by preventing Hatchett from introducing this
hearsay evidence to the jury.
7. Hatchett argues generally that the State cannot “have it both ways”—
fighting for inclusion then fighting for exclusion of the letter. Under this
theory, however, we see no reason why Hatchett should instead be able to
“have it both ways.” It was Hatchett who first moved to exclude the letter
from evidence.
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Conclusion
[¶35.] Under the clear and unambiguous language of SDCL 22-32-1, the
intent to commit “any crime” includes the intent to commit the crime of obstructing
a police officer. The trial court therefore did not err in denying Hatchett’s motion
for judgment of acquittal. Furthermore, we conclude there was no clear error in the
trial court’s determination that the State struck juror J.D.S. for race-neutral
reasons. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Hatchett’s
letter to the Schriers as hearsay evidence. For these reasons, we affirm.
[¶36.] KONENKAMP, ZINTER, SEVERSON, and WILBUR, Justices, concur.
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