Deboer v. Deboer

#26222-rev & rem-SLZ
2012 S.D. 74IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
BRADLEY C. DEBOER, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
TARA D. DEBOER, Defendant and Appellant.
****
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
ROBERTS COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
****
THE HONORABLE JON S. FLEMMER
Judge
****
CHAD C. NELSON
Milbank, South Dakota Attorney for plaintiff
and appellee.
THOMAS L. SANNES
DAVID A. GEYER of
Delaney, Nielsen & Sannes, PC
Webster, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant
and appellant.
****
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
ON AUGUST 27, 2012
OPINION FILED 10/24/12
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ZINTER, Justice
[¶1.] Bradley DeBoer sued Tara DeBoer for divorce. Tara counterclaimed
for custody and support of a child she had from a prior relationship. The circuit
court granted Tara custody of the child, but denied Tara’s request for child support.
Tara appeals. She argues that a duty of support arose under Texas presumption of
paternity statutes. We agree that a duty of support arose under the Texas statutes,
and we reverse.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] Tara DeBoer, formerly Tara Koliba, resided in San Antonio, Texas. On
July 13, 2003, she gave birth to a son, Taiton Koliba. Tara only knew Taiton’s
biological father by his first name, and Tara did not identify a father on Taiton’s
Texas birth certificate.
[¶3.] Tara met Bradley DeBoer in December 2004. They married shortly
thereafter. Tara and Taiton moved to rural Corona, South Dakota, to live with
Bradley and his son (Caleb DeBoer). Caleb was Bradley’s son from a prior
marriage.
[¶4.] In January 2006, Bradley executed a will. In his will, Bradley
indicated that he had two children: “Caleb DeBoer” and “Taiton DeBoer.” Two
weeks later, Bradley and Tara decided to change Taiton’s last name from “Koliba”
to “DeBoer.” Because they thought it was too expensive, they did not utilize an
attorney to assist them. Instead, they decided to execute a Texas “Application for
New Birth Certificate Based on Parentage.”
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[¶5.] The application required applicants to attach evidence of parentage.
Three options were available: a certified copy of a court decree, an acknowledgment
of paternity, and a “certified copy of the BIOLOGICAL parents’ marriage license.”
Bradley and Tara chose the “BIOLOGICAL parents’ marriage license” as their
evidence of parentage.
[¶6.] Bradley and Tara signed the application and had it notarized. Printed
language immediately below Bradley’s signature indicated that the person signing
the application was the “FATHER or Legal Guardian swearing to this affidavit.” A
warning on the application, directly above Bradley’s signature, stated: “[t]he
[p]enalty for knowingly making a false statement in this form can be 2-10 years in
prison and a fine of up to $10,000.” Although Bradley knew he was not Taiton’s
biological father, he testified that by executing the application, he thought he was
going to become Taiton’s father.
[¶7.] The parties submitted the application to the Texas Department of
State Health Services—Vital Statistics Unit. In March 2006, the Department
issued an amended birth certificate naming Bradley as the father of “Taiton
DeBoer.” The parties later obtained a new social security card with Taiton’s new
name. During the marriage, Bradley also identified Taiton as his child on tax
returns and health insurance documents. Bradley further held Taiton out as his
child, rather than his stepchild, in some church and school activities.
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[¶8.] Bradley filed for divorce in 2010. Tara counterclaimed for custody of
Taiton and child support. Bradley and Tara stipulated to all matters other than
child support.
[¶9.] At trial, the parties primarily focused on whether the birth certificate,
by itself, created a presumption of paternity. However, they also referenced Texas
statutes creating a presumption of paternity. The circuit court ruled that Bradley
“ha[d] no custody or visitation rights nor any support obligation for [Tara’s] child,
Taiton.” The court concluded that no presumption of paternity arose under the
birth certificate because it was fraudulently obtained and was null and void. The
circuit court further concluded that even if there were a presumption of paternity
under Texas law, the presumption was rebutted. The court finally concluded that
no presumption arose under South Dakota law and that “adoption by estoppel” was
not recognized in South Dakota.
[¶10.] On appeal, Tara argues that the circuit court: (1) erred in concluding
Bradley was not Taiton’s presumed father under Texas Family Code Annotated
Sections 160.204 and 160.607; (2) erred in concluding Bradley was not Taiton’s
presumed father under SDCL 25-8-52 and 25-8-59; and (3) erred in concluding
Bradley did not adopt Taiton by estoppel. Because the first issue is dispositive, we
do not discuss issues (2) and (3). 1
1. Tara does not pursue her trial argument that the birth certificate established
a presumption of paternity.
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Decision
[¶11.] The question we address is whether two Texas statutes created an
unrebutted presumption of paternity. 2 The material facts are not in dispute and
“the question requires us to consider legal concepts in the mix of fact and law . . . to
exercise judgment about the values that animate legal principles[.]” See Manuel v.
Toner Plus, Inc., 2012 S.D. 47, ¶ 8, 815 N.W.2d 668, 670. This is a question of law
that we review de novo. See id.[¶12.] Texas Family Code Annotated Section 160.204 creates a presumption
of paternity under certain circumstances when parties marry after the birth of a
child. That statute provides:
(a) A man is presumed to be the father of a child if . . . (4) he
married the mother of the child after the birth of the child in
apparent compliance with law, regardless of whether the
marriage is or could be declared invalid, he voluntarily asserted
his paternity of the child, and: (A) the assertion is in a record
filed with the bureau of vital statistics; [or] (B) he is voluntarily
named as the child’s father on the child’s birth certificate . . . .
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.204 (West 2003).
[¶13.] There is no dispute that Bradley married Tara after the birth of
Taiton. Therefore, the first requirement of the statute was satisfied.
[¶14.] The second requirement is that Bradley must have voluntarily
asserted paternity. The circuit court acknowledged that Bradley swore under oath
that he was Taiton’s biological parent on the application for an amended birth
2. In referencing the applicable law, both parties rely on Texas statutes. We
decide this case under the arguments presented. We express no opinion
regarding the appropriate choice of law.
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certificate. But the court concluded the application was not a voluntary assertion of
paternity because “there [was] no dispute that Brad [was] not the biological father
of Taiton.” The court also reasoned that Bradley’s signature on the application did
not equate to a formal “Acknowledgement of Paternity.” The court finally reasoned
that Bradley never “specifically assert[ed] that he [was] the father, other than the
language printed under his signature line.”
[¶15.] The circuit court erred in applying the Texas statute. First, there is no
requirement in Section 160.204(a)(4) that the putative father be the biological
father in order to have asserted paternity. Second, the statute does not require a
formal “Acknowledgement of Paternity.” The statute only requires that the
putative father “voluntarily assert[] his paternity of the child” in an undefined
manner. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.204. Finally, Bradley did specifically
assert that he was Taiton’s father. Bradley testified that he read the entire
application, including the penalty for perjury; and he signed the document and had
it notarized. In that document, Bradley asserted that he was Taiton’s “biological
parent[ ].” He also asserted that he was Taiton’s “FATHER.” By his signature and
acknowledgment, Bradley voluntarily asserted paternity.
[¶16.] The final requirement is that the assertion of paternity be “in a record
filed with the bureau of vital statistics” or that “[the father was] voluntarily named
as the child’s father on the child’s birth certificate.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §
160.204(a)(4)(A)-(B). The circuit court apparently considered these alternatives
together. The court concluded that neither requirement was met because Taiton’s
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amended birth certificate was null and void as Tara and Bradley obtained it by
fraudulently executing the application. 3 However, the Texas presumption statute
did not require a valid birth certificate. The statute only required that an
“assertion” of a paternity be filed with the bureau of vital statistics or that the
putative father be voluntarily named on a birth certificate.
[¶17.] In this case, the last two requirements were satisfied. Bradley’s
application contained an assertion that he was Taiton’s biological father, and the
application was filed with the Texas Department of State Health Services—Vital
Statistics Unit. Alternatively, there is no dispute that Bradley voluntarily allowed
his name to be placed on Taiton’s birth certificate. Because both requirements were
satisfied, a rebuttable presumption of paternity arose.
3. The circuit court indicated that there was no Texas case law determining
whether a fraudulently obtained birth certificate was void. The court relied
on other courts that have voided fraudulently executed paternity
acknowledgments and paternity affidavits. Because this case involves a mere
assertion of paternity rather than a formal paternity acknowledgement,
paternity affidavit, or birth certificate, we find the circuit court’s authorities
inapposite.
The circuit court also erred in relying on Crouse v. Crouse, 1996 S.D. 95, 552
N.W.2d 413, to conclude that Bradley’s false assertion of paternity to obtain
Taiton’s amended birth certificate could not create a presumption of
paternity. In Crouse, this Court stated that, under Iowa law, “a false
acknowledgment of fatherhood on a birth certificate will not establish
paternity . . . .” Id. ¶ 12 (emphasis added). The question in Crouse was
“whether placing the husband’s name on the non-biological child’s birth
certificate afforded the husband parental rights to custody . . .”; it “did not
involve a presumption of paternity.” State ex rel. Wernke v. Cortez, 2010 S.D.
47, ¶ 5, 783 N.W.2d 852, 854. We have previously concluded that Crouse does
not apply to cases involving presumptions of paternity and resulting
obligations for child support. See Cortez, 2010 S.D. 47, ¶¶ 5-6, 783 N.W.2d at
854.
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[¶18.] Bradley claims that any presumption was rebutted under Texas
Family Code Annotated Section 160.607(b). That statute provided,
A proceeding seeking to disprove the father-child relationship
between a child and the child’s presumed father may be
maintained at any time if the court determines that: (1) the
presumed father and the mother of the child did not live
together or engage in sexual intercourse with each other during
the probable time of conception; and (2) the presumed father
never represented to others that the child was his own.
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.607(b) (West 2003) (amended 2011).
[¶19.] The circuit court ruled that Bradley overcame the “presumption [of
paternity] through the testimony of the parties that he [was] not the biological
father of Taiton and the lack of evidence indicating Brad[ley] represented to others
that Taiton was his own child.” Bradley, however, executed a will stating that
“Taiton DeBoer” was his child. Bradley also made representations inferring
paternity on health insurance documents and income tax returns. Bradley further
held Taiton out as his child, rather than his stepchild, in school and church
activities. Bradley and Tara also obtained a new social security card that identified
Taiton as “Taiton DeBoer” even though they had not pursued a change of name or
adoption proceeding. This record does not support the circuit court’s determination
that Bradley “never represented to others that the child was his own.” See Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 160.607(b). The circuit court clearly erred in finding Bradley
never represented that Taiton was his child. Therefore, the presumption of
paternity was not rebutted.
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[¶20.] Although Bradley is not Taiton’s biological father, Bradley became
Taiton’s “parent” for purposes of child support. A “parent” is “an individual who has
established a parent-child relationship under Section 160.201.” Tex. Fam. Code
Ann. § 160.102(11) (West 2003). An unrebutted presumption of paternity
establishes a parent-child relationship. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.201(b) (West
2003) (providing circumstances that establish a parent-child relationship). That
parent-child relationship imposes a duty on the parent to support the child. See
Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 151.001(a)(3) (West 2003) (providing that a parent has the
duty to support his or her child); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 160.203 (West 2003)
(“Unless parental rights are terminated, a parent-child relationship . . . applies for
all purposes, except as otherwise provided by another law of this state.”); Mata v.
Moreno, 601 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (stating that “a court [may] order
an individual to pay child support only if it determines that a parent-child
relationship exists”).
[¶21.] “Paternity presumptions are driven not by biological paternity, but by
the state’s interest in the welfare of the child and the integrity of the family.” In re
T.R., 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 215, 219 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005). Under Texas law, a parent may
be required to support a non-biological child if a parent-child relationship is
established. See In re Rodriguez, 248 S.W.3d 444, 452, 454 (Tex. App. 2008)
(concluding that the Texas Legislature specifically limited paternity challenges “to
protect the family unit” and thus, DNA evidence allegedly disproving a father-child
relationship is not always admissible); In re J.I.Z., 170 S.W.3d 881, 883-84 (Tex.
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App. 2005) (stating that modification of a child support decree is not permissible
merely because post-decree DNA evidence indicates the obligor—who was
previously determined to be the legal father—is not the biological father).
[¶22.] This Court has also recognized that a presumption of paternity may
require a parent to support a non-biological child. State ex rel. Wernke v. Cortez,
2010 S.D. 47, ¶¶ 2, 6, 783 N.W.2d 852, 853-54. In Cortez, Jorge Cortez knew he was
not the child’s biological father. Id. ¶ 2. Yet, Cortez signed a paternity affidavit and
acknowledged he was the natural father of the child. Id. Because a presumption of
paternity arose, Cortez was legally obligated to support the child. Id. ¶ 6.
[¶23.] Here, Bradley was not Taiton’s biological father. But Bradley
voluntarily asserted paternity in a manner that created a rebuttable presumption of
paternity under Texas law. Because the presumption was not rebutted, Bradley is
legally obligated to support Taiton.
[¶24.] Reversed and remanded for further proceedings on Tara’s claim for
child support.
[¶25.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, SEVERSON, and
WILBUR, Justices, concur.
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