Kellogg v. Hoven School District No. 53-2

HENDERSON, Justice

(dissenting).

As the trial court did not give proper deference to the school board’s decision, I would reverse the trial court. Therefore, I respectfully dissent to this opinion.

An appeal from a school board’s decision is not a trial de novo in the true sense of the word. Moran, at 595, 598. The judiciary is forbidden from invading the school board’s decision, unless it is made contrary to law, as the school board is a creature of the State Legislature. Notwithstanding, that is exactly what the trial court did in this case.

Certain basic obligations of citizenship are demanded of all of us. Direct participation by the public in the operation of the school system comes through the service of school patrons on school boards. We should not discourage their participation; rather, we should encourage it. Basically, solving problems in the school districts and between them, though it appears cumbersome, is best served by people who serve on local boards and understand local problems. Therefore, we should, generally, give deference to their judgment.

Under SDCL 13-8-39, it is the school board which has general charge and management of the schools of the district, not the courts. Therefore, per stare decisis in this Court, the courts are bound by the spirit of the law, to give deference to the decisions of a school board. See, Huffman v. Bd. of Ed. of Mobridge Ind. Sch. Dist., Etc., 265 N.W.2d 262, 265-66 (S.D.1978).^*

Here, the trial court was required to ascertain, under a limited de novo hearing, if there was substantial evidence to support the school board’s decision. Busker v. Bd. of Ed. of Elk Point, 295 N.W.2d 1 (S.D.1980). In my opinion, the Hoven School District did have substantial evidence to base its decision.

In one of the conclusions of the trial court, it was expressed that the school district’s decision was “unsupported by the evidence.” Therein — alone—the trial court should be reversed for using an improper standard of review on the evidence. It substituted its judgment for the school board. In essence, the trial court decided that the school district’s decision was “improper,” not that it was “illegal.”

Here, school board was vested with statutory authority to act and complied with procedural requirements imposed by Law. SDCL 13-46-1.

This is not a teacher discipline case; it involves a boundary decision by a school district. There is substantial evidence to support that decision. Substantial evidence means such relevant and competent evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Busker at 1, 3, n. 1, (citations omitted). It was not an “illegal” decision, which is the issue at hand. Trial court went beyond its power. Essentially, it second guessed the school district, rather than to determine whether its decision was “legal." Strain, Dale, Moran. By no means do I suggest that the school boards of this state have unlimited or unrestrained authority to act on these boundary modification decisions.

Kellogg and Gettysburg School District allot a considerable amount of time in their brief regarding the differences in size of the Gettysburg and Hoven school districts. This thesis is faulty for the difference in size of the two school districts is entirely irrelevant. The Hoven board, in granting or denying a petition, has the responsibility of providing a good education for the students within their district. Geographic size is not a proper method, in itself, of analysis. It is not the Hoven School District’s job, nor the job of the courts of this state, to equalize these two districts. This is strictly a legislative function which is not to be accomplished through SDCL 13-6-85.

Furthermore, it appears the Hoven school board did consider the welfare of the Kellogg children, who were the only children residing in the area to be transferred. The board did not believe the Kellogg children would be adversely affected by turning down the boundary change petition. This is noted by Hoven School District’s Exhibit No. 1. Since 1983, there have been eleven previous minor boundary changes transferring land from the Hoven district to the Gettysburg district. It is understandable why the Hoven district is concerned about the Kellogg petition, which involves only the Kellogg children. Using its discretionary powers, under the statutory law, under settled law of the state, see, Jager v. Ramona Bd. of Educ., 444 N.W.2d 21, 25-26 (S.D.1989), the board agreed the land, to be transferred, was excessive; the board knew, and this was part of the rationale of its decision, that the previous eleven petitions constituted a loss of $2.8 million of assessed evaluation. If the Kellogg petition were granted, the board noted that the allowed assessed evaluation would represent one-third of the total of the previous eleven petitions. It is obvious that if the Hoven board approved eleven other petitions that it was not opposed to change. But this time it was. This writer notes that the board offered to approve a petition of a one-third lesser amount of the real estate, duly petitioned; however, Kellogg refused to reduce the amount of real estate. Kellogg wants all or nothing at all. He wanted to dictate the discretionary power of the Hoven board. Gettysburg School District backed him up. Land was included which was not owned by Kellogg; and far more land was included than was necessary to connect the Gettysburg District to Kellogg’s residence where his children live. There can be no doubt that the statutory scheme and settled law of this state is that a school board has some discretion to either grant or deny a minor boundary petition. Were it not so, SDCL 13-6-85 would not require that the petition be approved by the school board. Because the Hoven board was paying tuition and mileage for the Kellogg children to attend the Gettysburg school, it also knew there had been no problems assigning these children to the Gettysburg school. Put another way, the educational welfare of the Kellogg children was taken into account. Surely this Board had the additional responsibility of considering the welfare of the other school children in its district.

Judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the case remanded for a determination limited to the legality of the Board’s action. In my opinion, the composed majority opinion has struck a severe blow to the integrity of the decisions of school boards in this state. A trial in the circuit court is a limited de novo proceeding. Majority decision opens up the proceeding in the circuit court to a wide-open de novo hearing. Our scope of review should respect the doctrine of separation of powers. Deference to the school board’s decision is mandated by the Legislature in SDCL 13-8-39. Thus, the circuit court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law must be restricted to the legality of the school board’s decision. Strain, supra; see also, Dale, supra at 116 (Henderson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Trial court was clearly erroneous in its findings and created conclusions of law, which were mistakes of law, in determining there was not substantial evidence upon which the Board made its decision and that board acted arbitrarily and capriciously or abused its discretion.

* Had the transfer been approved, the real estate tax income to the Hoven School District would be reduced by approximately $7,500; yet, it is now costing the Hoven School District about $10,800 in tuition and transportation to educate the Kellogg children.