State v. Talla

#28031-a-DG
2017 S.D. 34IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
****
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
JANNO KOLLAY TALLA, Defendant and Appellant.
****
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MINNEHAHA COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
****
THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS E. HOFFMAN
Judge
****
MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
CULLEN P. MCNEECE
Assistant Attorney General
Pierre, South Dakota Attorneys for plaintiff
and appellee.
BEAU J. BLOUIN of
Minnehaha County Public
Defenders Office
Sioux Falls, South Dakota Attorneys for defendant
and appellant.
****
CONSIDERED ON BRIEFS
MAY 30, 2017
OPINION FILED 06/07/17
#28031
GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
[¶1.] Janno Kollay Talla appeals his sentence of life imprisonment for one
count of first-degree manslaughter. Talla argues that in light of other sentences
imposed for manslaughter in Minnehaha County, as well as his alleged lack of
criminal history, the circuit court abused its discretion. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶2.] Talla was born in Barentu, Eritrea, in 1984 and immigrated to the
United States as a refugee sometime around 2012. After living in Charlotte, North
Carolina, for a short time, he moved to Sioux Falls, where he began a relationship
with Ammuna Gayya. The two moved in together, and in late 2013, Gayya became
pregnant with Talla’s child. In August 2014, prior to their child’s birth, Talla
obtained new employment in Worthington, Minnesota, which required him to
relocate. Gayya, who was in her late teens at the time, stayed in Sioux Falls to be
close to her mother. Gayya gave birth to a boy in September 2014.
[¶3.] For a time, Talla and Gayya continued their relationship, and Talla
provided some financial support to Gayya and their son. When Talla would visit
Sioux Falls on his days off, he would stay with Gayya and their son. However,
Gayya eventually became romantically involved with another man, Danga Kotudi,
and ended her relationship with Talla. According to Talla, Gayya denied having a
relationship with Kotudi on several occasions when confronted by Talla. During
this time, Gayya also formally sought child support from Talla. 1
1. Talla actually quit his job to avoid paying child support.
-1-
#28031
[¶4.] On October 29, 2015, while visiting Sioux Falls, Talla saw Gayya with
Kotudi. Talla was jealous because he wished to continue his relationship with
Gayya, so he drove to Kotudi’s apartment to confront them. Talla waited 30 to 40
minutes for them to return. He placed a folding knife with a six-inch blade in his
pocket, intending to kill Kotudi. After Kotudi and Gayya returned, Talla went
inside and confronted them. After speaking with them for several minutes, Talla
informed Kotudi that the two of them were going to fight to the death. Kotudi
refused, and Talla drew his weapon and stabbed Kotudi in his left arm. Kotudi fled
the apartment while his friend, Banana Tsegay, and Gayya attempted to restrain
Talla. Talla stabbed Gayya, puncturing her left lung and heart. Gayya attempted
to flee the apartment, but only made it a few feet before collapsing in the hallway.
Talla did not attempt to render aid; instead, he fled. Gayya died from her wound
about an hour later, but Kotudi survived.
[¶5.] Following the encounter, Talla drove back to Worthington. Local law
enforcement was waiting and arrested him as he exited the interstate highway.
Talla’s pants had Gayya’s blood on them. Law enforcement found the folding knife
in the glove compartment of Talla’s car. The next day, Sioux Falls police searched
Talla’s car and discovered a suitcase, which contained clothes, medications, a white
envelope with $2,600 cash, a 0.25 caliber handgun, and a brown wallet containing
identification cards and documents for one “Malik Mensur.” 2 During a subsequent
2. At the sentencing hearing, Talla’s attorney asserted that Mensur is Talla’s
cousin and that Talla was in possession of Mensur’s documents because
Mensur was incarcerated at the time. In contrast, the State asserted that it
had been unable to establish any connection between Talla and Mensur. The
(continued . . .)
-2-
#28031
interview, Talla admitted that he intended to kill Kotudi and had been planning to
do so for months.
[¶6.] Talla was indicted on 12 counts, including two counts of first-degree
murder (premeditated and felony murder), one count of second-degree murder, one
count of attempted first-degree murder, three counts of first-degree burglary, two
counts of aggravated assault, and three counts of stalking. Eventually, Talla and
the State entered into a plea agreement. Talla agreed to plead guilty to one count of
first-degree manslaughter and one count of attempted first-degree murder. In
exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts and to recommend
concurrent sentences. The agreement did not require the State to recommend a
particular length of imprisonment for either count. At a change-of-plea hearing on
June 17, 2016, Talla pleaded guilty, and the State produced a written factual
statement signed by Talla. Three months later, after the completion of a
presentence investigation, the circuit court sentenced Talla to concurrent terms of
imprisonment: 25 years for attempted first-degree murder and life for first-degree
manslaughter.
[¶7.] Talla appeals, raising one issue: Whether the circuit court abused its
discretion in sentencing him to imprisonment for life for first-degree manslaughter.
Standard of Review
[¶8.] “We generally review a circuit court’s decision regarding sentencing for
abuse of discretion.” State v. Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 11, 877 N.W.2d 75, 79 (quoting
________________________
(. . . continued)
State theorized that Talla intended to use the documents to establish a false
identity.
-3-
#28031
State v. Chipps, 2016 S.D. 8, ¶ 31, 874 N.W.2d 475, 486). “An abuse of discretion ‘is
a fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices.’”
Id. ¶ 23, 877 N.W.2d at 83 (quoting MacKaben v. MacKaben, 2015 S.D. 86, ¶ 9,
871 N.W.2d 617, 622).
Analysis and Decision
[¶9.] Talla argues the circuit court abused its discretion by sentencing him
to imprisonment for life. Although Talla does not allege that his sentence is cruel
and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment, he nevertheless contends that it
is “grossly disproportionate to other sentences imposed in Minnehaha County on
manslaughter in the first degree convictions in the ten years leading up to
sentencing in this case.” Talla also contends that “[b]y imposing a life sentence, the
court denied [him] the possibility of parole at any time in the future, and
consequently failed to strike an appropriate balance between retribution,
rehabilitation, and deterrence.”
[¶10.] We first address Talla’s proportionality argument. “[S]imilarly
situated defendants should [generally] receive similar sentences. This principle
naturally follows from the notion that ‘when statutory ranges are established, the
legislative intent is that “the more serious commissions of the crime deserve
sentences at the harsher end of the spectrum.”’” Id. ¶ 24, 877 N.W.2d at 83 (citation
omitted) (quoting State v. Bruce, 2011 S.D. 14, ¶ 32, 796 N.W.2d 397, 407).
However, each “sentencing court has broad discretion in determining the sentence
to be imposed.” State v. Anderson, 1996 S.D. 46, ¶ 30, 546 N.W.2d 395, 402. “[A]
sentence within the statutory maximum generally will not be disturbed on appeal.”
-4-
#28031
Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 23, 877 N.W.2d at 83 (quoting Bruce, 2011 S.D. 14, ¶ 28,
796 N.W.2d at 406). Thus, when a judge imposes the maximum sentence permitted
by statute (as in the present case), it is sufficient that the judge could reasonably
conclude the offense in question is among “the more serious commissions of the
crime[.]” Id. ¶ 24, 877 N.W.2d at 83 (quoting Bruce, 2011 S.D. 14, ¶ 32, 796 N.W.2d
at 407).
[¶11.] We think the sentencing court’s implied conclusion that Talla’s crime is
among the more serious occurrences of first-degree manslaughter is reasonable,
especially considering it occurred in the process of attempting to commit first-degree
murder. Talla intended to kill Kotudi. He sat outside Kotudi’s apartment for 30 to
40 minutes, waiting for him and Gayya to return. Talla armed himself and entered
the apartment. He sat, talking to Kotudi and Gayya in relative calm, for several
minutes. He then challenged Kotudi to mortal combat, and when Kotudi refused,
Talla attempted to kill him anyway. When Gayya intervened, Talla stabbed her—
the 19-year-old mother of his infant son—in the heart. Even if doing so was
reflexive and not intentional, Talla did not attempt to render aid to Gayya; instead,
he fled. And even after learning that Gayya died as a result of her injuries, Talla
did not express significant remorse.
[¶12.] Even so, comparing his sentence to the one imposed in Rice, Talla
concludes he should have been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of years. In
Rice, the mastermind of a burglary plot that culminated in a homicide was
sentenced to imprisonment for 80 years (with 20 years suspended) on conviction of
one count of first-degree manslaughter. Id. ¶ 9, 877 N.W.2d at 79. Talla contends
-5-
#28031
that unlike Rice, Talla had no criminal history, had not previously exhibited violent
behavior, had maintained legal employment while in the United States, and did not
attempt to cover up his crime. The sentencing court noted these factors at
sentencing. We also note that the presentence investigation report indicates there
is only a moderate risk that Talla will reoffend. Even so, this case does not involve
the type of unplanned-though-foreseeable violence that occurred in Rice. As noted
above, Talla admittedly entered the apartment with the premeditated intent to kill
Kotudi. In the course of his attempt, Talla instead killed Gayya, who as the circuit
court noted, “was entirely innocent of any wrongdoing and was not complicit in any
kind of illegal activity that spawned her resulting death.” Thus, it would not be
unreasonable for a sentencing court to conclude Talla’s crime was more serious than
the homicide that occurred in Rice despite Talla’s asserted mitigating factors. 3
Thus, Rice does not support the conclusion that the sentencing court abused its
discretion by sentencing Talla to imprisonment for life in this case.
[¶13.] Next, Talla contends that the sentencing court failed to strike a
balance between retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence. Talla essentially
contends the sentencing court’s view that rehabilitation was problematic was
erroneous. Whether a defendant “is capable of rehabilitation [is] a fact question to
be decided by the [sentencing] court.” State v. Pulfrey, 1996 S.D. 54, ¶ 20,
548 N.W.2d 34, 39. On the question of rehabilitation, the court said:
[I]n circumstances like this, where the individual’s character
creates a propensity to commit domestic abuse to the level of
3. Nor is it necessarily unreasonable for a different sentencing court to conclude
the homicide that occurred in Rice was more serious.
-6-
#28031
murder, the issue of rehabilitation is problematic. At the age of
31, being a middle adult, when one’s mental processes are such
that he concludes that he must kill his rival and put his former
love interest at risk of a similar fatal result, the supposition that
the individual could return to the community and engage in
healthy relationships with other partners and that those
partners would not be at risk of a similar fate is purely
speculative in the [c]ourt’s view.
The court considered Talla’s mitigating factors prior to reaching this conclusion.
Considering the evidence available to the sentencing court, we are not “satisfied
that [the court’s findings] are contrary to a clear preponderance of the evidence.”
Gartner v. Temple, 2014 S.D. 74, ¶ 8, 855 N.W.2d 846, 850 (quoting In re Estate of
Olson, 2008 S.D. 97, ¶ 9, 757 N.W.2d 219, 222).
[¶14.] Moreover, “[r]ehabilitation ‘is not a bright-line rule that must be
considered in every case.’” Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 26 n.6, 877 N.W.2d at 84 n.6
(quoting State v. Milk, 2000 S.D. 28, ¶ 18, 607 N.W.2d 14, 20); see also Atiyeh v.
Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1314, 101 S. Ct. 829, 830, 66 L. Ed. 2d 785 (1981) (“[T]here is
nothing in the Constitution that says that ‘rehabilitation’ is the sole permissible
goal of incarceration . . . .”). Retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation are each legitimate penological goals. See Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 999, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2704, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Rice, 2016 S.D. 18, ¶ 26 n.6,
877 N.W.2d at 84 n.6. None of these goals is “preeminent over any of the others.”
Anderson, 1996 S.D. 46, ¶ 31, 546 N.W.2d at 402 (quoting State v. Ramos, 1996 S.D.
37, ¶ 14, 545 N.W.2d 817, 821); see also Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999, 111 S. Ct.
at 2704. “[T]he sentencing court determines, on a case-by-case basis, which theory
is accorded priority.” Anderson, 1996 S.D. 46, ¶ 31, 546 N.W.2d at 403.
-7-
#28031
[¶15.] As noted above, the sentencing court had serious concerns about
Talla’s ability to “return to the community and engage in healthy relationships with
other partners[.]” Notably, the court found that Talla was not significantly
remorseful. The court was also convinced that the age disparity between Talla and
Gayya, Talla’s response to Gayya’s formal request for child support (i.e., quitting his
job to avoid garnishment), and ultimately, Talla’s fatal attempt to control Gayya’s
relationships were evidence of domestic abuse. The court also noted that Talla has
two other children by two other mothers, one of whom was—like Gayya—much
younger than Talla. Thus, the court was concerned that Talla’s other partners (and
prospective partners) would be at risk of a fate similar to Gayya’s. So even if we
were convinced that the court clearly erred in determining Talla’s prospects for
rehabilitation were purely speculative, the court’s concerns also support the
sentence imposed under theories of deterrence and incapacitation.
Conclusion
[¶16.] A sentencing court could reasonably conclude that Talla’s offense is
among the most serious commissions of first-degree manslaughter. Our opinion in
Rice, even when considered in the context of Talla’s mitigating factors, does not
suggest otherwise. The court’s finding that rehabilitation was speculative is not
clearly erroneous. Therefore, we are not convinced the court abused its discretion
by sentencing Talla to imprisonment for life for killing Gayya.
[¶17.] We affirm.
[¶18.] ZINTER, SEVERSON, WILBUR, and KERN, Justices, concur.
-8-