State Ex Rel. Jackley v. City of Colman

#25588-a-JKM
2010 S.D. 81IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA
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STATE OF SOUTH DAKOTA, ex rel,
MARTY J. JACKLEY and
ASSOCIATED SCHOOL BOARDS
OF SOUTH DAKOTA, INC., Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
CITY OF COLMAN, Defendant and Appellant.
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APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
MOODY COUNTY, SOUTH DAKOTA
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HONORABLE TIM D. TUCKER
Judge
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MARTY J. JACKLEY
Attorney General
JEFFREY P. HALLEM
Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for appellee
Pierre, South Dakota State of South Dakota.
WILLIAM H. ENGBERG
Pierre, South Dakota
RICHARD P. TIESZEN
NAOMI R. CROMWELL of
Tieszen Law Office Attorneys for appellee
Pierre, South Dakota Associated School Boards.
PAUL M. LEWIS
WILLIAM J. ELLINGSON Attorneys for defendant
Flandreau, South Dakota and appellant.
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ARGUED ON AUGUST 25, 2010
OPINION FILED 10/27/10
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MEIERHENRY, Justice
[¶1.] The question in this case is whether a city can enforce its speed limit
ordinance, instead of state law, on a state trunk highway and thereby direct the fine
to city coffers rather than local school districts. This question was brought to the
South Dakota Attorney General’s attention after the City of Colman, South Dakota,
ticketed speeders on State Highway 34 with a city ordinance violation rather than a
state law violation. The Attorney General notified Colman that the city did not
have authority to enforce the city’s speed limit ordinance on the state highway.
Colman rejected the Attorney General’s opinion and filed an action for declaratory
judgment in circuit court. The circuit court agreed with the Attorney General.
Colman appeals. We affirm and hold that Colman does not have authority to
enforce its city ordinance rather than state law.
[¶2.] Highway 34 is part of the state trunk highway system and passes
through Colman’s city limits. The speed limit on Highway 34 is set by state law and
violations are classified as misdemeanors. See SDCL 32-25-7. Colman’s city council
enacted city ordinance 10.0201, which duplicated the state speed limit and penalty
classification. See SDCL 32-25-7. When enforcing the speed limit, Colman’s law
enforcement officers ticketed speeders with a city ordinance violation rather than a
state law violation. 1
1. The Legislature has given city law enforcement the power to arrest those who
violate state speed limits when the violation occurs on the portion of the state
highway passing through a city’s jurisdiction. See South Dakota v. Hirsch,
309 N.W.2d 832, 835 (S.D. 1981); SDCL 9-29-19.
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[¶3.] The main difference between enforcing the city ordinance rather than
state law lies in the distribution of the fine proceeds. South Dakota law directs that
65 percent of fines collected from city violations go to the city treasury and 35
percent to the State. SDCL 16-2-34. In contrast, 100 percent of the fines collected
from state law violations go to school districts in the county where the fine is
assessed. S.D. Const. art. VIII, § 3. 2
[¶4.] Colman claims it has statutory authority to enforce its own ordinance
rather than state law. Colman gleans its authority from the following four statutes:
SDCL 9-31-1; SDCL 9-31-3; SDCL 9-29-1; and, SDCL 32-14-5. The first statute,
SDCL 9-31-1, gives a city the power to regulate the use of certain vehicles. It
provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided, every [city] may regulate the use of
motor vehicles, bicycles, house cars, house trailers, trailer coaches, traction engines,
tractors, and road rollers.” Id. The second statute, SDCL 9-31-3, grants a city the
power to regulate the speed of vehicles. It provides that “[e]very [city] shall have
power to regulate the speed of animals, vehicles, motor vehicles, cars, and
locomotives.” Id. The third statute, SDCL 9-29-1, gives a city the power to enforce
its ordinances within, and one mile surrounding, the city limits.3 Id. Finally,
2. The Associated School Boards of South Dakota, Inc. joined the State as a
party plaintiff because Colman’s enforcement of its ordinance, rather than
state law, reduced the amount of money that school districts in the area
received.
3. SDCL 9-29-1 provides:
Every [city] shall have power to exercise jurisdiction for all
authorized purposes over all territory within the corporate
limits and over any public ground or park belonging to the [city],
(continued . . .)
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SDCL 32-14-5 provides cities with limited regulatory authority for “traffic on
highways under their jurisdiction.” Id. 4 Colman claims these statutes, collectively,
demonstrate that the Legislature “intended to empower [cities] with the authority
to regulate traffic over all territory within their corporate limits.”
[¶5.] In analyzing Colman’s claim, we continue to apply our longstanding
rule that cities have only those powers expressly granted to them by the
Legislature. Elkjer v. City of Rapid City, 2005 S.D. 45, ¶ 9, 695 N.W.2d 235, 239.
“A grant of authority includes those incidental or implied powers that are necessary
to enable a municipality to perform the function authorized.” Id. (citations
omitted). Because cities have “no inherent powers, and none of the attributes of
sovereignty,” the scope of their implied powers falls under “a reasonably strict
standard.” Id. “Whatever latitude these implied powers might include will depend
upon the circumstances of each case.” Id._______________________
(. . . continued)
whether within or without the corporate limits, and in and over
all places, except within the corporate limits of another [city],
within one mile of the corporate limits or of any public ground or
park belonging to the [city] outside the corporate limits, for the
purpose of promoting the health, safety, morals, and general
welfare of the community, and of enforcing its ordinances and
resolutions relating thereto.
4. SDCL 32-14-5 provides:
Local authorities may provide by ordinance for the regulation of
traffic on highways under their jurisdiction by means of traffic
officers or traffic control devices on any portion of the highway
where traffic is heavy or continuous or local authorities may
prohibit other than one-way traffic upon certain highways and
may regulate the use of the highway by processions or
assemblages.
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[¶6.] We acknowledge that the four statutes Colman relies on give a city the
power to regulate certain traffic within its jurisdiction. But we must view the city’s
limited jurisdiction in the context of the broader jurisdictional scheme of the state
highway system. The Legislature categorizes state highways as: (1) municipal
streets and alleys; (2) state trunk highways; (3) county highways; and, (4) secondary
highways. See SDCL 31-1-4.
[¶7.] The Legislature also “clarif[ies] the duties and powers of the various
governmental state agencies charged with the administration of the highways in
South Dakota.” SDCL 31-1-5. 5 The Legislature charges the Department of
Transportation with the “control[ ] and supervis[ion]”of “highways designated by
statute” as the “state trunk system.” SDCL 31-1-5(1). County commissioners
5. SDCL 31-1-5 provides:
For the purpose of clarifying the duties and powers of the
various governmental state agencies charged with the
administration of the highways in South Dakota, the following
definitions of highway systems shall be applicable:
(1) “State trunk system,” the highways designated by statute
to be controlled and supervised by the Department of
Transportation;
(2) “County highway system,” the highways designated by
the board of county commissioners in organized counties under
the supervision of these bodies that have been approved by the
Department of Transportation;
(3) “Township highways,” the secondary highways in
organized townships that are administered by a board of
township supervisors;
(4) “County secondary highways,” the rural local highways in
organized counties, excluding the approved county highway
system, that are under the supervision of a board of county
commissioners.
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oversee county and secondary highways, and township supervisors administer
township highways. Id.[¶8.] Additionally, the Legislature specifically gives the State
Transportation Commission, a commission in the South Dakota Department of
Transportation, the authority to regulate speed limits on the state trunk highway
system. SDCL 1-44-4; SDCL 32-25-7. State law outlines how speed limits on state
trunk highways are set and what penalties exist for violations:
The Transportation Commission may establish, by rules
promulgated pursuant to chapter 1-26, a maximum speed limit
of less than that established by §§ 32-25-1.1 and 32-25-4 upon
any highway or portion of highway on the state trunk highway
system and any portion of highway under the jurisdiction of a
state or federal agency if requested by the agency. The speed
limit established by the commission is the maximum speed that
any person may drive or operate any vehicle or class of vehicle
upon that portion of highway. The Department of
Transportation shall conspicuously post signs at the beginning
and end of a portion of highway to show the maximum speed
limit established by the commission on that portion of highway.
A violation of any maximum speed limit established by the
commission pursuant to this section is a Class 2 misdemeanor.
SDCL 32-25-7.
[¶9.] The Legislature’s overall scheme and apportionment of authority over
the various highways signals legislative intent to preempt the field. This scheme
confines a city’s authority to the “streets and alleys within the limits of municipal
corporations.” SDCL 31-1-4. Other highways are under the supervision and control
of other governmental agencies. See SDCL 31-1-5. Notably, the Legislature gives
the control and supervision of a state trunk highway, such as Highway 34, to the
State Department of Transportation and the specific power to set speed limits to the
State Transportation Commission. SDCL 31-1-5(1). This delegation of control and
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supervision of state trunk highways to state agencies demonstrates the
Legislature’s intent in this field.
[¶10.] We have said that one way to determine if a state law preempts a local
ordinance is to look at whether the state law “occup[ies] a particular field to the
exclusion of all local regulation.” In re Yankton County Com’n, 2003 S.D. 109, ¶ 15,
670 N.W.2d 34, 39. We find preemption if “the scheme of [state] regulation is
sufficiently comprehensive to make [a] reasonable [ ] inference that [the
Legislature] ‘left no room’ for supplementary [city] regulation.” Id. ¶ 16, 670
N.W.2d at 39.
[¶11.] Here, the regulatory scheme gives control of state trunk highways to a
state agency. The speed limits are set by a state agency and violations are state
offenses. Moreover, the Legislature has not expressly authorized cities to regulate
speed limits on state trunk highways. See SDCL 32-14-3. A reasonable inference
drawn from the statutes is that the Legislature intended to “occupy the field” of
regulating state trunk highways and did not intend to leave “room for
supplementary [city] regulation[.]” See Yankton County Com’n, 2003 S.D. 109, ¶ 21,
670 N.W.2d at 41. Consequently, we hold that Colman did not have authority to
enforce a city speed limit ordinance on state Highway 34.
[¶12.] Affirmed.
[¶13.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP, ZINTER, and
SEVERSON, Justices, concur.
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